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ABSTRACT 
  
On October 22, 1914 a temporary institution named the Commission for Relief in 
Belgium (CRB) was created by a group of diplomats, industrialists, businessmen, and volunteers 
under the direction of American engineer-financier Herbert C. Hoover with the goal of providing 
emergency food relief in Belgium.  Within twelve months the scope of the CRB expanded from 
providing relief to the communes surrounding Brussels to an effort geared towards making 
Belgium self-sufficient by the harvest of 1915 before becoming the permanent, on-going, official 
charitable organization supporting Belgium.  In the course of development the Commission 
evolved into a worldwide charitable organization network with diplomatic and political powers 
reserved primarily for sovereign states.  Described as “A Piratical State Organization for 
Benevolence” the CRB combined seemingly disparate elements of private charity and 
philanthropy with principles of American big business and engineering into an organization with 
a single purpose of Belgian relief.  
In 1914 and 1915 the CRB set up an infrastructure of relief under the Provisioning and 
Benevolence Departments that systematically accumulated, coordinated, and distributed charity 
in the form of money and material from around the world through volunteer organizations, 
cooperation with large freight companies and food producers in the United States, and shipping 
interests in Europe to deliver products to the Belgian communes.  Working in conjunction with 
the Comité National the Commission scientifically determined the actual needs of the civil 
population and set up a network of warehouses, soup kitchens and canteens to deliver pre-
specified rations on a daily basis.  Active at every step of the provisioning process the delegates, 
representatives, and volunteers of the CRB stood constantly vigil to make sure that its promises 
were maintained  Whether it was coordinating the collection of wheat and cornmeal in America, 
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writing appeals and pamphlets explaining the plight of Belgium, manning the Commission’s 
warehouses and private fleet of shipping vessels, or serving as delegates inside the communes 
the thousands of volunteers that made up the CRB fought with resolve and tenacity to make sure 
that Belgium survived World War I.   
This project focuses on the formative period of the CRB during its first year and a half of 
operations spanning from October 1914 to December 1915 in Belgium and Northern France.  
Over its first fifteen months of existence the Commission set into action its program of 
theoretical imports, established the basic parameters for diplomacy with belligerents, launched a 
vigorous press world-wide press campaign, and forged the system of charity that coordinated 
vast sums of money and supplies at an overhead expense rate of less than one-half of one 
percent—a figure unprecedented in the realm of charitable and philanthropic organizations.  
Tracing the experience of the CRB from multiple points of view the text examines the history of 
the Commission from the farms of North America to the dangerous waters of the English 
Channel, the negotiating table in London and Berlin, the occupied city of Brussels, the several 
thousand communes distributing rations and all places in between.   
Under the constant threat of starvation, governmental prohibition, public scrutiny, 
harassment by the German military and financial failure the Commission pressed to feed 
Belgium in the most efficient manner possible under the guidance Hoover and his cadre of 
volunteers.  While the CRB faced new challenges calling for it to adapt to conditions in Belgium 
and Northern France between 1916 and its retirement in 1919 the Commission’s program of 
relief was fundamentally in place by the end of December 1915.  For the remainder of its 
existence the structure and strategies employed by the CRB remained virtually static.   
1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In August 1914 the major powers of Europe found themselves in a war that many 
believed would be quick and decisive.  Under ultimatum the neutral country of Belgium was 
compelled to yield to advancing German forces on the march towards France.  Despite a gallant 
effort native fortification supported by British reserves failed to stall the invasion and within 
weeks the nation was under the control of Germany.  Suddenly a country of peasant farmers and 
laborers dependent upon imports for 80 percent of its necessities was cut off from the rest of the 
world.  Fears of famine and starvation created a domino effect of concern that trickled down 
from the American Ministry in Brussels to the British Foreign Office where it was eventually 
brought to the attention of American engineer and financier Herbert Hoover.   
Relief operations aimed at assisting beleaguered Belgians began with the purchase of a 
small cache of foods in London under the commission of the American Minister Brand Whitlock 
for the feeding of Brussels and the surrounding communes exclusively.  All the while reports 
from across Belgium foretold of imminent tragedy if greater action was not taken.  It was not 
long before newspaper readers in both Britain and the United States learned that food supplies 
were nearly exhausted throughout Belgium.  Recognizing the seriousness of the situation in less 
than six weeks a series of contacts between diplomats, engineers, and businessmen in London 
and Brussels led to the creation of the Commission for Relief in Belgium on October 20, 1914.  
Under the chairmanship of Herbert Hoover the commission was immediately authorized to 
purchase relief goods for Brussels under the belief that the organization was a short-term 
association aimed at providing localized relief that would stave off starvation until the next 
harvest.   
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Once the CRB began operations in November 1914 it became apparent that its work 
would be more than temporary and limited in scope.  Over the next fifteen months the 
commission in cooperation with the Comité National and Comité Français expanded into a 
virtual government with rights and liberties usually reserved for sovereign nations to provide 
ravitaillement to an estimated 8,000,000 people in Belgium and Northern France.  Through the 
work of delegates, representatives, and volunteers the commission hammered out guarantees 
protecting imports and domestic crops from the belligerent powers while working tirelessly to 
raise funds across the globe for a distribution system that stretched from the Great Plains in 
North America and the Pampas in Argentina across the Atlantic to the front lines of the war and 
the Belgian communes.  By late summer 1915 any thoughts entertained by the commission of 
retiring were cast aside.  As the first calendar year of relief concluded in October of that year the 
CRB had installed a system of coordination and distribution for relief that set a precedent for 
both the remainder of conflict and for post-war ravitaillement efforts under agencies including 
the American Relief Association.   
While the commission struggled with new problems pertaining to the operation of a state 
within a state on a day-to-day and month-to-month basis, by January 1916 the CRB had 
established what was described as a “piratical state organization for benevolence” that was well-
equipped to deal with the demands of feeding a population that was weeks away from starving 
through a private relief organization that always existed mere days away from financial failure.  
Constant pressure from the Britain and Germany combined with the logistical difficulties of 
feeding an increasingly-destitute population to harden the commission’s resolve and dedication 
to the cause.  Under the direct management of Herbert Hoover a cadre of American delegates 
and representatives met both the challenge of creating and implementing a program aimed at 
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wholly feeding a neutral nation under a state of war.  This project details the developmental 
phase of relief efforts in Belgium during the first half of direct American involvement (October 
1914 to December 1915) and the experiences of the CRB within this unique milieu.   
The Historiography of the CRB and Herbert Hoover 
 Several different features of the research and the writing in this project mark its 
exceptionality.  The narrative component of the text was derived in part from the enormous 
volume of CRB documents generated between 1914 and 1919 through office memorandum, 
financial accounting statements, official diplomatic communications, personal letters, and 
personal memoirs written by delegates and volunteers who participated in the process of relief.  
As a private charitable organization funded by massive multi-national fund raising campaigns 
and national governments (the British, Belgian, and French initially with the US contributing 
after its entrance in the war in 1917) the commission under the directorship of Hoover made it a 
point that the processes, conduct, business affairs, and financial standing of the CRB were a 
matter of public record.  As demonstrated in the Public Relations of the Commission for the 
Relief of Belgium, Volumes I and II, the CRB kept strict and accurate record of its activities 
through internal memos, telegrams, financial statistics, relief statistics, and other forms of 
documentation.  Records in the Herbert Hoover Presidential Library Archives in West Branch, 
Iowa detailing the weekly meetings of the CRB New York office confirm the importance of data 
to the members of the commission by including a weekly ledger of spending and expenses.   
While these sources yield copious amounts of data relating to the day-to-day affairs of the 
CRB what they do not possess is a common interwoven narrative.  Although the Public Relations 
of the Commission for the Relief of Belgium, Volumes I and II allows researchers to trace for 
example the lines of communication between the German general-government and Chairman 
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Hoover regarding specific events and circumstances within Belgium what these documents lack 
in general is a narrative that provides linkages between internal memos, statistics, and telegrams 
with the greater story of the Commission for Relief in Belgium over a four year period.  With the 
exception of  The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium: 1914-1917 written by T.B. 
Kittredge in 1917 there is not a narrative in existence dealing exclusively with the commission’s 
work between October 1914 and December 1916.  While Kittredge’s work is of value as a 
primary source it is at the same time subject to external criticisms of objectivity—Kittredge 
himself was a CRB delegate and by his relation to the work can be questioned about his 
impartiality on the subject, not to mention the fact that the text lacked the access to many of the 
commission’s documents published twelve years later in Public Relations of the Commission for 
the Relief of Belgium, Volumes I and II.  The History of the CRB remains an important source of 
information regarding the work of the commission, but in essence Kittredge’s text is the history 
of the CRB between 1914 and 1917 from his perspective.  In general the task of creating a 
narrative covering the work of the CRB between October 1914 and January 1916 was 
comparable to putting together a puzzle containing literally thousands of pieces without an initial 
picture to use as a guide in arranging the pieces together.   
The other unique and challenging part of this project has been the effort to combine a 
wide variety of personal accounts written by participants in Belgium during the war into a 
narrative component that blends the experience of ravitaillement with the documentary evidence 
of the relief program that validates the accuracy of individual’s experiences.  Several participants 
including Edward Eyre Hunt, George Barr Baker, Robert Withington, Vernon Kellogg, T.B. 
Kittredge, and Brand Whitlock in particular provided tremendous insight through personal 
journals that described the CRB in action.  These individuals are of critical importance because 
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they create the vital link between the executive paper trail of the commission and its actual 
performance inside the Belgian communes.  The writings of Whitlock in particular were of 
tremendous value thanks to his prominent role at the center of relief as the American Minister in 
Brussels.  Originally assigned to Belgium before the war began, Whitlock was one of the first 
Americans involved in food relief and was one of the last Americans to depart after the United 
States entered the war in April 1917.  His position was unlike any other in that he dealt with the 
Belgians, the Germans, the British, the Americans, Hoover, the Comité National, the Comité 
Français, and everyone else down to the local communes.   
In creating the narrative of the CRB an emphasis was placed on the first hand accounts 
that were written at the time or just after the work of the CRB concluded in Belgium.  Most of 
these personal narratives were originally published in the late 1910s or early 1920s immediately 
after the war.   Secondary sources were used only for ancillary pieces of evidence and were for 
the most part not a major component of the greater narrative.  For that reason the memoirs of 
Herbert Hoover published decades later played only a minor role in the research.  Documents in 
the form of telegrams and internal memorandum were a far more accurate source of Hoover’s 
perspective in his own words during the war.  The latter chapters in the text detailing the 
experience of providing relief in Belgium utilizes the personal experiences of CRB members to 
trace the actions of the commission and the impressions of the participants at the time as they fit 
into the broader story of Belgian relief. 
A third source of critical material in this project was newspaper articles, advertisements, 
and circulars published in America and Britain during the war.  These pieces of evidence were 
important not only for their reports covering events in Belgium, but were also valuable because 
they possess opinions and perceptions regarding the conduct and results of relief from Allied and 
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neutral viewpoints.  As a charitable organization the CRB under Chairman Hoover placed a high 
value on public relations and the garnering of public support.  For this reason, newspaper articles 
and advertisements are the actual embodiments of commission’s press campaign in action.  
Additionally, the newspaper articles provide a third layer of analysis regarding the progress of 
relief from the perspective of the journalist.  While these articles were not always objective they 
represent opinions and views that are separate from those of the commission and the delegates 
themselves.  For that reason they do provide a sense of objectivity because they reveal an 
outsider’s perspective on the work of the CRB at the time of relief efforts were being conducted.  
Disbursed throughout the text the accounts of the commission published in British newspapers 
and the New York Times are an extremely important part of the greater narrative.  The press 
clippings of the CRB collection at the Herbert Hoover Presidential Library Archives were used 
extensively in gathering this information.  Assembled in one collection this history of the 
commission in the British press was tremendously insightful.  Indeed an entire book could be 
written from this archive alone.  The challenge regarding this data was deciding what materials 
were essential to the narrative given the constraints regarding length in this project. 
Beyond the story of the Commission for Relief in Belgium detailed in the following 
chapters the rise of Herbert Hoover into both the American and European consciousness is a 
secondary, yet important feature of the research.  While an enormous body of scholarship 
presently exists on his Presidential administration there are gaps in the treatment of Hoover’s 
early years of public service that included the coordination and management of Belgian relief 
during World War I.  In 1914, Hoover entered public service with a firmly established belief in 
the principles of individualism, voluntarism, and cooperation. It was through the Commission for 
Relief in Belgium, the American Relief Administration, and the US Food Administration that 
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these concepts were put into action and proven effective.  Beyond elevating his personal status as 
the man who saved the lives of 20 million, the experience of feeding Europe solidified the 
principles that Hoover would apply to his work as the Secretary of Commerce and later the 
Presidency.  More than a foray into politics and the public spotlight, Hoover’s work during 
World War I established standards by which he would later govern the nation as an engineer-
financier-manager.   
Beyond Hoover’s personal memoirs, George Nash and David Burner are among the few 
who have dealt with what historians consider Hoover’s “missing years,” those detailing his pre-
1920s professional career and WWI relief work.  In Herbert Hoover: A Public Life, Burner 
addresses Hoover through the ways in which his life and thought bore influence upon twentieth-
century orderings of civilization, and the newer collectivities within business, the economy, and 
public opinion that now supplement or replace the older groupings by neighborhood, shop or 
local government.  Combined with the scholarship of Joan Hoff-Wilson, the two portray Hoover 
as progressive reformer adapting to new situations.  As an aggregate this scholarship has done 
much to inform historians about the pre-presidential Herbert Hoover.  This project is also in part 
aimed at revealing additional aspects of Hoover’s pre-Presidential career through his 
chairmanship of the CRB.1 
What Nash and Burner have in common is their descriptions of Hoover’s mining and 
business career before 1914.  In what is considered the definitive biography on the subject 
entitled The Life of Hoover, Volumes I and II Nash sheds light on his successful engineering 
career in addition to giving an in-depth analysis of World War I relief work.  Written as more 
than an interpretive narrative of Hoover’s life, the impressive primary source material collected 
by Nash translates into a detailed explanation of his administrational and organizational acumen 
                                                          
1 Burner, David.  Herbert Hoover: A Public Life.  (New York: Alfred Knopf Publishing, 1979),p. xi. 
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both before and during the war.  While Burner dedicates two chapters to European relief efforts 
(combining the Commission for Relief in Belgium and the American Relief Administration) and 
Nash dedicates volume two and part of volume three of his collection to the subject of WWI 
relief coordinated by Hoover there is still considerable room for scholarship within the discipline 
dedicated exclusively to the programs, participants, and benefactors of Hoover-administered 
ravitaillement in Belgium during World War I.  The story of World War I relief through 
predominantly American efforts remains an area of Hoover’s history that is largely untouched in 
current scholarship, especially from an international perspective.   
Originally this project began as an article giving a brief description of European relief 
and the accomplishments of the CRB and the ARA under the executive leadership of Hoover.  In 
the process of expanding the narrative and refocusing the subject matter to emphasize the CRB 
between October 1914 and the beginning of January 1916 the research for this piece expanded to 
include not just the chairman but the history of the commission as a unified whole.  Reflecting 
the extensive research discovered on the day-to-day management of the CRB the first half of the 
text features both the organizational structure of the commission and an analysis of Hoover’s 
leadership as both the executive director of Belgian relief and tough negotiator secured 
guarantees with belligerent governments while securing sovereign powers the initiative.  While 
the second half of the text shifts the focus in part away from Hoover directly to the work of the 
commission inside of Belgium it does not diminish the importance of Hoover’s role in directing 
the program of relief that fed 8 million people in Northern France and Belgium.  Hoover’s 
chairmanship of the CRB marked not only his official entrance into the “political arena,” but it 
was also the first demonstration of Hoover’s financial, organizational, and leadership skills to 
people outside the mining and engineering industries.  In America many would first be 
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introduced to these talents in 1917 when Hoover became the Director of the US Food 
Administration and later in his role as Secretary of Commerce and President of the United States.   
General Features of the Text 
The treatment of the Commission for Relief in Belgium in the text employs an approach 
that is chronological in its coverage of 1914 and both contextual and chronological in its 
coverage of 1915.  After providing a brief history of philanthropy in chapter one details the first 
days of German invasion and introduces the food emergencies that immediately followed 
Belgian occupation in chapter two.  Utilizing both first-hand and newspaper accounts of events 
this section traces the first attempts made to assist Belgians up to the creation of the CRB in 
October 1914.  In the following two chapters (three and four) the narrative details the genesis of 
the commission under the leadership of Hoover and overviews its first actions in the final two 
months of the year primarily through the use of personal accounts, newspaper articles, and 
internal documents of the CRB.   
  Chapters five through seven in essence details organizational structure of the CRB and 
how it functioned.  Using largely the internal documents of the commission, this section of the 
text was the most challenging part of putting the puzzle together.   By today’s standards it would 
be like writing a business history of a corporation from a collection of e-mail messages written 
between members of the board and a collection of middle managers in the field.  In these 
chapters the functions, processes, and the system of the commission are discussed at length.  
Covering the functional departments of provisioning and benevolence and including issues of 
funding, shipping, and belligerent negotiations this part of the narrative details the entire process 
of relief from the donation of money to the purchasing of wheat in Kansas or corn in Iowa to its 
shipment of these supplies to the East Coast for its journey across the Atlantic into Rotterdam 
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and Brussels on down to the communes governed by assurances brokered by the CRB between 
belligerents.  Within this section specific attention is paid to the coordination of both money and 
food into Belgium.   
The following two chapters (eight and nine) discuss the unique challenges the 
commission faced as a neutral power with quasi-governmental powers.  Caught between the 
belligerents the CRB engaged in an on-going struggle to expand relief efforts and make the 
system of ravitaillement more efficient while trying to keep relief efforts alive. As direct 
participants in this process the contributions of both Brand Whitlock and Herbert Hoover are 
emphasized specifically.  Whitlock’s work with both the CRB and the Comité National by 
contrast to Hoover’s as executive director of relief is significant because of the Minister’s unique 
position as both a diplomat and participant in the actual distribution of relief.  The contributions 
he made to ravitaillement efforts in Belgium are symbolic of the hard work and determination of 
a multitude of delegates that saved millions from starvation.   
The final three chapters of the text (ten, eleven, and twelve) of the text transition from a 
definition of the CRB program into a detailed description of ravitaillement in action.  Picking up 
the story of relief in late 1914 from chapter four and combining with the explanation of the 
system given in chapters five through seven, the three section of the narrative details the 
experience of the commission at the communal level in 1915.  In these chapters the contributions 
of the Comité National and Comité Français are discussed as the final components of the 
interlocking system of relief that coordinated the distribution of rations within the communes.   
Additionally, this portion of the narrative also focuses on the experience of the American 
delegates and volunteers working within this system by detailing their interactions with both 
local authorities and the German general-government.  As a post-script the concluding chapter of 
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the project includes the final statistics of the CRB program between 1914 and 1919 and discusses 
the immediate impact of the commission’s benevolence in the 1910s and 1920s. 
The overall focus of this project is on what by today’s standards is considered the 
planning and implementation phases of relief work in Belgium that took place in 1914 and 1915.  
By the end of December 1915 the commission’s strategies of benevolence and provisioning 
alongside its theoretical program of rations were in place.  Structurally the commission by this 
point had its fundamental organization in place that would be followed by American delegates 
and volunteers until their withdrawal in April of 1917.  Afterward, the Dutch and Spanish 
ministers that assumed control of the CRB employed the same strategies and structures that were 
previously implemented by American representatives.   
Under this system created during the first fifteen months of operation the executive 
framework governing the commission in its relationship with the German general-government 
and other nation-states was in place, the Comité National and Comité Français were 
collaboratively distributing goods across Belgium and Northern France, and the provisioning and 
benevolence departments of the CRB were mobilizing charity outside Belgium while delegates 
within the Belgian provinces had clearly delineated responsibilities and duties guiding their 
actions.  Outside of the occupied territories the CRB was supported by hundreds of local 
committees across the globe working with the CRB press agency that bolstered its program 
through print media outlets and advertisements coordinated out of the New York and London 
offices.  Diplomatically, its close relations with both the British Foreign office and officials in 
Berlin allowed the commission to negotiate guarantees for shipping and distribution amiable to 
belligerent demands of war that permitted the commission’s fleet of neutral vessels under its own 
markings to traverse the English Channel.  As 1916 began the power and prestige earned by the 
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CRB granted it the dual role of guarantor and negotiator for import and domestic foodstuffs that 
would continue until its termination in the summer of 1919.  While the CRB faced new 
challenges calling for it to adapt to conditions in Belgium and Northern France between 1916 
and 1919, the structure that the commission followed was fundamentally in place by December 
1915.   
 
13 
 
CHAPTER ONE: A Brief History of Philanthropy 
In broad terms philanthropy refers to private giving for public purposes.  Beyond this 
definition the concept of philanthropy has been interpreted in numerous ways.  Over the past 
three centuries the words philanthropy, charity, benevolence, and giving have commonly 
expressed the human character of engaging in good or worthy actions and deeds.  In the 
seventeenth century, philanthropy meant a benevolent disposition and humane mind.  During the 
following two centuries the term became associated with active participation in humanitarian 
reforms aimed at improving society.  In the eighteenth century, the ideological foundation of 
modern charity was formed behind the emergence of a new view of man and society that fostered 
a scientific spirit of inquiry and investigation into various questions regarding the plight of man.2   
Individual motivations also played a key role in the developing nature of philanthropy 
and giving.  In the nineteenth century many people gave not only to help others but also did so as 
a response to their own need for forgiveness, reward, love, and recognition.  At the time, 
philanthropy in America was most commonly associated with the “love of (fellow) man” 
expressed in an altruistic and humanitarian manner.  Beyond its borders Americans philanthropy 
abroad was in part attributable to the great debt that American society and culture felt it owed to 
the Old World.  In practice what Americans did through non-governmental efforts to help these 
people was closely related to efforts made at home to assist the disadvantaged members of 
society.  As the concept of philanthropy came to include contributions of money to a variety of 
                                                          
2 Curti, Merle.  American Philanthropy Abroad.  (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1963), p. viii. 
Kiger, Joseph C. Philanthropic Foundations in the Twentieth Century.  (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2000), p. 
7.  Bremner, Robert H. Giving: Charity and Philanthropy in History.  (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 
1994), p. xii.  Watson, Frank D.  The Charity Organization Movement in the United States: A Study in American 
Philanthropy.  (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1922), p. 13. 
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causes intended to benefit all classes the accepted nomenclature of giving was naturally extended 
to philanthropy both domestically and internationally.3   
Personal motivations underlying people’s desires to support philanthropic ventures have 
varied.  At the root of some individual’s decision to contribute was a sense of obligation to help 
the needy while others felt a sense of personal responsibility for related ethnic groups in other 
parts of the world.  Religion was also a major factor in the support offered to various agencies 
operating domestically and abroad.  In the twentieth century new motivational factors became 
involved in the drive to support philanthropy stemming from a sense of guilt based on the 
relative abundance found at home in contrast to the misery and suffering in other areas.4 
Overseas philanthropy from the time of the American Revolution through the late 
nineteenth century was extended in a broadly generalized manner without a series of overriding 
principles or an organizational strategy.  During this period philanthropic giving for virtually 
every foreign disaster was met in a characteristically American ad hoc manner with little formal 
or institutional connection between what was done on different occasions.  Following the 
Spanish-American War in 1898 the nature of overseas philanthropy changed in terms of the 
magnitude of giving and by the larger role the government played in its provision.  Changes in 
motivations and desires behind philanthropic giving were altered as well.  Some people gave out 
of habit or in response to social pressures.  In some instances the motives behind giving were 
related to class and occupational considerations.  National pride also contributed to the sense of 
American giving abroad.  Once the government began playing a larger role in philanthropy 
                                                          
3 Bremner, Giving: Charity and Philanthropy in History, p. 107.  Curti, American Philanthropy Abroad, p. viii.  Loc 
cit, 5.  Loc cit, ix.  By the end of the nineteenth century the structure and functions of voluntary agencies engaged in 
foreign relief and rehabilitation closely resembled those of their domestic American counterparts.  Bremner, Giving: 
Charity and Philanthropy in History, p. xii. 
4 Curti, American Philanthropy Abroad, p. x. 
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individuals began experiencing a different sense of feelings regarding giving to others especially 
in regards to the potential feelings of guilt related to national interests or foreign policy.5 
American philanthropy abroad began with the extension of assistance to Canada in1816 
after a fire destroyed a large section of St. John’s, Newfoundland.  Despite a series of ongoing 
disputes between New Englanders and Britons for fishing rights off the coast of Newfoundland a 
group of local merchants in Boston chartered the Good Hope to send supplies that arrived three 
days later.  Several years later the first example of popular American support for a distress group 
on a national scale occurred with the extension of aid to the Greek independence movement 
during the 1820s.  As “Greek Fever” spread in 1823 and 1824 a group of conservative-minded 
Americans insisted that it was too dangerous for popular emotions to sway the nature of support.  
In their view it was crucial for philanthropy to be handled by knowledgeable and competent 
individuals.  By 1828 growing concerns about the organization of philanthropy were warranted.  
Since relief began some four years earlier the task of providing benevolent support had become 
increasingly complicated due to the presence of pirates that threatened ongoing shipments of 
relief and by the separate issues of making sure that those who were in need received aid 
alongside the problem of making sure a small supply of goods met a vast array of needs.  The 
challenges Americans faced in supporting Greece had a marked impact on future philanthropic 
efforts abroad.  Overall, American benevolence extended to Greece had a transitive effect by 
bringing domestic relief into an international orbit while pointing out the need for better means 
of organization and coordinating national efforts.6   
American benevolence in Greece also marked a change in the nature of overseas 
philanthropy by serving as the first major episode in a series of separate, scattered, and limited 
                                                          
5 Curti, American Philanthropy Abroad, p. 621.  Loc cit, p. 623.  Loc cit, p. 624. 
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disasters that conjoined relief efforts with larger, national issues.  The penultimate event in the 
first half of the nineteenth century that fostered widespread and intense American giving on a 
scale not yet seen was the Great Famine in Ireland.  In scope the Irish potato famine in the 1840s 
generated the most impressive response to overseas suffering by Americans to date through the 
creation of the first national campaign to assist people in another nation without respect to 
political and nationalistic inclinations.  While a nationwide benevolent movement was organized 
in 1845 and 1846 to assist beleaguered Irish its creation was not without its problems however.  
At home it was widely known that the failure of potato crops in Ireland was the immediate cause 
of famine in Ireland.  Beyond that people’s opinions on how to handle the situation varied 
greatly.  In early 1847 supporters of relief unsuccessfully pressed Congress to appropriate funds 
for areas where food shortages were posing the greatest threat.  Although both houses balked at 
offering official government support to assuage suffering in Ireland the Congress did offer 
indirect assistance by lending American war vessels to private interests in New York and Boston 
for transmitting provisions secured through relief committees.7   
The refusal of the government to offer funding for Ireland had a significant impact on the 
organization of philanthropy.  Once Congress denied appropriations for relief the burden of 
raising funds, buying provisions, and transporting supplies fell entirely upon voluntary efforts.  
Attempts to generate contributions varied from emotional appeals to indebtedness, fear, and 
guilt.  One of the strongest motivations compelling individuals to support relief efforts for 
Ireland was the Christian duty of charity linked with the concept of humanitarianism.  In 
appealing to the humanitarian aspect of individual’s character many of the drives for support 
used concrete illustrations to sway people in ways that abstractions could not.  Across the 
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Atlantic, the Central Relief Committee of the Society of Friends in Dublin emerged as the 
official private almoner for almost all voluntary aid apart from that dispensed by the Catholic 
Church and by varying government agencies.  In organizing and coordinating relief from various 
multi-national groups the Central Relief Committee worked in cooperation with the British 
government to efficiently and cheerfully distribution voluntary relief offerings.  Under its 
management supplies flowed from various locations to those whom the committee authorized to 
receive provisions.8 
The American experience in providing relief for Ireland firmly established the role of 
voluntary agencies in the coordination of national philanthropic efforts.  By being denied 
governmental funding and official support the menagerie of private organizations engaged in 
Irish relief began to recognize the need to improve their means of managing and coordinating 
their efforts.  During the first half of the nineteenth century American philanthropy abroad was 
primarily handled by groups of businessmen trading with the region, government representatives, 
and church groups in a relatively proscribed manner with no systematic or sustained 
organizational structure in place.  Slowly through philanthropic activity abroad Americans were 
learning that offering assistance to those in foreign lands required greater effort, organization, 
and leadership than did fund raising drives for worthy causes at home.  They also learned that the 
problems of supervising the disbursement of relief abroad created an entirely new set of 
problems not easily solved.9 
Both domestic and overseas philanthropy in America went through a series of transitions 
in the second half of the nineteenth century.  After the Civil War there was an increasing 
                                                          
8 Curti, American Philanthropy Abroad, p. 50.  Loc cit, p. 50 and 51.  Loc cit, p. 52.  The use of concrete 
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December 1847 commented that the Central Relief Committee in Dublin did its work with “great sagacity and 
prudence.”  Loc cit, p. 61-62. 
9 Curti, American Philanthropy Abroad, p. 21. 
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emphasis on materialism in American society marked by an adoption of pseudo-Darwinian 
interpretations of the laws of nature.  One consequence of this ideological shift was the reluctant 
acceptance that the accumulation of a fortune was acceptable so long as it was given away in a 
manner that did not compromise the moral order of the community or society at large.  It was 
this concept of generosity and the social acceptability of being wealthy that an expanding group 
of the affluent in America came to view as philanthropy.  The changing concept of giving that 
developed during this era forced the traditional goals and institutions of charity in America to 
shift in order to satisfy the ambitions of an emerging philanthropic class whose values reflected a 
desire to provide philanthropic funding instead of mere charity.  Within society this transition 
was not without its critics.  Many of the new American philanthropists were recently minted 
captains of industry who were not well assimilated into the existing institutions and patterns of 
elite charitable activity.  Compounding the difficulty was the fact that some of these individuals 
were making money faster than they could give it away.10 
As they became a part of the greater tradition of American benevolence in the late 
nineteenth century these wealthy philanthropists struggled to fit their concepts of giving into 
broader cultural contexts.  While these individuals recognized that they were indeed members of 
a ruling class in America they fancied themselves as an embattled segment of the population 
because of their wealth.  For this reason many industrial philanthropists and later foundation 
philanthropists tended to avoid political entanglements if they could.  It was only when 
regulation began to influence philanthropic activity that these men became more actively 
involved in the world of politics.  Issues of republicanism and fundamental freedoms also 
influenced the behavior of the new benevolent class.  Modern philanthropists (including Andrew 
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19 
 
Carnegie and John D. Rockefeller) staunchly believed that the state intervention in their private 
activities would deprive them of the power and responsibility of deciding how their wealth 
should be used.11 
The modern system of philanthropy still in place today began taking shape between the 
1880s and WWI as multimillionaires and the affluent began to seek practical, socially useful 
ways of disposing surplus wealth.  Both Carnegie and Rockefeller in particular distinguished 
between philanthropy and charity.  Rockefeller declared that “the best philanthropy is not what is 
usually called charity.”  Carnegie added that the worst thing a millionaire could do with his 
money was give it away to the irreclaimably poor.  While donors held a personalized view of the 
appropriate use of wealth in their philanthropic pursuits they held a shared commitment to 
benevolence in wealth distribution.  In general these individuals accepted the obligation of 
community responsibility that came along with their contributions.12   
Other changes in the accepted modes of giving and the philosophy of philanthropy were 
occurring alongside the emergence of new sources of funding.  As the nineteenth century came 
to a close the old, enlightened view of a natural order interpreted as harmony between the 
individual, community, and God was becoming less tenable.  Increasingly it was accepted that 
the indomitable will of moral discipline and hard work could create private wealth that could 
benefit all.  Possessing higher intellect the successful businessman was believed by modern 
philanthropists to be the appropriate trustee of wealth.  Individuals including Carnegie believed 
that their job was to unleash the reasoning power of ordinary men and women through the 
appropriate use of wealth.  In order to meet the needs of delegating responsibility, infusing 
                                                          
11 Karl, Barry D. and Katz, Stanley N. “Foundations and the Ruling Class Elites.” Daedalus, Vol. 116, No. 1, 
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expert knowledge, and adapting to the changing technological environment in America the 
traditional methods of management and control of philanthropy would have to change.13 
Within this emerging structure a number of notable philanthropists rose to prominence.  
The first noteworthy post-Civil War philanthropist in this group was George Peabody.  Before 
his death in 1869, Peabody gave over $10,000,000 to various efforts.  One of the issues that drew 
his attention was the necessity of inexpensive and decent living quarters for working class 
individuals.  In 1862 he donated $755,000 towards the project.  Peabody was also concerned 
with the problem of poverty in London and gave more generously to the cause than any other 
American philanthropist in the nineteenth century.  At home, he created the Peabody Education 
Fund in 1867 with assets of over $2 million aimed at offering direct assistance to the South.  
After his passing the Times in London declared that there was nothing narrow about Peabody’s 
giving and that his benevolence represented the discovery of a new motive for using wealth—the 
pleasure of giving it away.14 
Andrew Carnegie began his philanthropic pursuits shortly after Peabody’s passing.  In 
distributing wealth he believed that should be given away in such a manner as to encourage self 
help and provide opportunities through which the poor who were ambitious could better 
themselves.  Carnegie also contended that philanthropies both at home and abroad should enrich 
the culture of appreciation for the arts, music, and scientific research as a means to further 
individual and social progress.  His “Gospel of Wealth” began with the insistence that a man of 
great wealth had an obligation to act as a steward for his less fortunate brethren.  As steward the 
wealthy were then supposed to regard their money—except that necessary to make a modest 
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living—as trust funds to be administered in a manner that would produce the most beneficial 
results for the community.  In following this rationale the donor was required to avoid 
“indiscriminant charity” and in turn provide part of the means by which those who desired to 
improve may do so.  As a philanthropist he preached that the extremely wealthy could do one of 
three things with their money: leave it to heirs, leave it for philanthropic and charitable purposes 
upon death, or use it for the same ends during their own lifetimes.  In motivation Carnegie 
himself wanted to avoid the degradations of dying a wealthy man.15 
The philanthropies of Andrew Carnegie encompassed a broad spectrum of projects and 
purposes including the advancement of learning, social welfare, world peace, and the related 
promotion of intercultural meaning.  One of his first philanthropic activities was the construction 
of a library in his hometown of Dumfermline, Scotland in 1881.  Several years later, Carnegie 
donated $481,012 to build a library in Allegheny, PENN where his family settled in 1848.  As 
the scope of his giving expanded Carnegie came to the realization that disposing of money 
philanthropically was a complicated business because the giving of money as mere charity was 
akin to throwing it away.  In order to handle the benevolent funds properly he would have to 
distribute his wealth and knowledge to the community before death.  This commitment required 
Carnegie to systematize and organize his philanthropic endeavors in a manner that in his opinion 
required greater wisdom, experience, and organization that the public could provide itself.16 
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Behind his philanthropic giving, Carnegie worried that he would be personally tainted by 
the money that he worked so hard to earn.  At the same time his worldly ambitions compelled his 
business practices and he relished on the entrepreneurial quest he promised to renounce in the 
“Gospel of Wealth.”  While Carnegie was aware that he had used his talents to amass a large 
fortune he never fully believed that it was more than an instrument (contingent on his ability to 
organize) that made life more convenient and comfortable for humanity.  Always in search of 
new ideas he wrote to friends asking them how they thought $10 million could be best spent, 
adding with his characteristic ebullience “P.S. Prize for the best!”  In public Carnegie’s boastful 
character, humor, and vanity gave his work a certain “Peter Pan quality.”17   
To Carnegie philanthropy was serious business.  It marked penance for idolatry and 
progress towards a world of reason, beauty, prosperity, and peace.  In his gifts Carnegie 
attempted to organize them so that as many people as possible could pursue an autonomously 
defined search for culture and perfection.  With this in mind Carnegie refused to stock the grant 
libraries he funded with books and did not provide money for maintenance.  His hope was that 
these limitations would foster what he called “proprietorship” among the recipients of his 
grants.18 
John D. Rockefeller was also convinced that his industrial activities served a purpose that 
ultimately benefitted mankind.  He believed that God had given him great wealth and that 
through the Protestant ethic of austerity and thrift was the means for providing Christian charity.  
In character, thrift dominated Rockefeller’s personal life while generosity guided his 
philanthropic benevolence.  A man of deep religious convictions, Rockefeller as a young adult 
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claimed that his great ambition to make money was rooted in a desire to pay off the mortgage of 
the church he attended in Cleveland, Ohio.  He believed that all accumulated objects—including 
money—were a part of God’s gift to man that required stewardship because in society it was 
natural for the more dedicated to become wealthy while the careless and undisciplined remained 
poor.  In handling his wealth Rockefeller experienced no internal tensions between the 
accumulation and distribution of wealth because he considered his talents for making money and 
giving it away a gift from God.19 
Both Rockefeller and Carnegie followed specific principles regarding philanthropic 
activities.  Rockefeller in particular supported self-help through programs that strengthened the 
individual and believed that social problems should be solved at the source rather than 
supplemented by kindhearted humanitarian charity.  The immensity of his fortune created a 
unique set of challenges shared by other wealthy magnates like Carnegie.  By the end of the 
nineteenth century that the vast size of his fortune made Rockefeller’s philanthropic endeavors a 
complicated business.  In an attempt to combine his vision of philanthropy with the reality of 
giving Rockefeller hired Baptist Minister Frederick Gates to coordinate his benevolence.  Under 
Gates’ management Rockefeller’s principles were turned into a system of scientific philanthropy 
aimed at resolving human problems through the development of research foundations.20 
The coordination of Rockefeller benevolence by Frederick Gates was part of a larger 
movement in America to bring better organization to charity.  In the post-Civil War era the 
demands of benevolence in the new industrial and urban milieus of America ultimately led to an 
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examination of the prevailing methods of relief.  The recognition that conventional methods of 
charity prevalent in the mid nineteenth century were incredibly wasteful and inefficient led to the 
launching of a charity organization society movement in the 1870s.  Charity organization 
societies were created as devises to aid individuals who were willing to work collaboratively 
towards discovering on an need-by-need basis what was the best way out of a specific difficulty 
in a manner that assisted both those in need and the community at large.  The origins of the 
charity organization movement were rooted in a series of problems dating back to the 1840s that 
stymied the effectiveness of charitable organizations.  Pre-Civil War charities were plagued by a 
series of problems that at their base were attributable to a lack of coordination, vision, and 
planning.  During this period charities rarely kept their activities in step with the original 
premises under which the society was founded.  Compounding their difficulties was the issue 
that there were no adequate safeguards against deception, fraud, and the duplication of services 
within a given community.  While these charitable organizations were committed to meeting 
obvious distress they were admittedly unable to meet situations that required large financial 
contributions and continuous, ongoing management.21 
Several causes contributed to the rise of the charity organization movement in the early 
1870s.  One of the leading factors was the influence of the panic of 1873 and the following 
financial depression in America.  From these financial burdens a citizen motive emerged that 
engendered a desire to more effectively discharge the social obligations incident to republican 
citizenship.  The charity organization movement in America marked the introduction of a new 
method of utilizing existing charitable forces and resources within the community.  By the 
conclusion of WWI the movement had so profoundly impacted the social thought of the era that 
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many of its methods were directly employed by diverse groups ranging from child welfare 
services, hospital social service departments, and juvenile courts to the American Red Cross.  
Underlying its application of its emphasis on organization to a multitude of situations was the 
new commitment of organized charity to take some of the guesswork out of giving by using 
almoners to make charitable decisions based on the gathering and usage of important data.22 
In the late nineteenth century charities of all kinds were in need of internal reform and 
external facelifts.  By the 1880s traditional charities were just as unpopular in the benevolence 
community as millionaire philanthropists.  To combat poor reputations many relief agencies in 
American cities banded together in federations patterned after the London Charity Organization 
in order to eliminate duplications of effort and to reduce competition among its constituents.  
These organized charities attempted to bring a sense of discipline to the charitable impulses of 
ordinary donors by replacing casual giving with systematic and scientific methods of 
distinguishing between the deserving and undeserving through registration, investigation, and 
counseling.  By the 1890s the dominant motivation of the charity organization movement was to 
see out and strike effectively at the particular causes of dependence and intolerable living 
conditions prevalent society that existed beyond the control of the individuals involved.23 
While industrial philanthropists and charity organization societies combated the problems 
of society within the United States there were also problems that arose overseas that called for 
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American philanthropic support.  In October 1891, Minister Charles Emory Smith reported to the 
State Department that crop failures put some 13,700,000 people in Russia on the verge of 
starvation.  Given the situation it was estimated that even a donation of two million pounds of 
bread costing upwards of $25 million could not prevent widespread death.  Two months later 
American William C. Edgar spearheaded an effort to provide food relief for Russia.  In a popular 
appeal for support he pointed out among other things that Americans had far more wheat, corn, 
and flour than they could possibly consume.  As editor of the Northwest Miller, Edgar proposed 
that every reader give a few sacks of low-grade flour to Russia so that peasants would not be 
forced to eat bread made of bark flavored with ground peas.24 
Edgar’s appeal to the general public was matched in organization by a plan to efficiently 
coordinate the shipping and distribution of food relief to Russia.  To further promote the 
practicality of the scheme the Northwest Miller appealed to American railroads for free passage 
of the flour collected to New York City and asked that the Russian government provide freight 
for shipment of the relief.  Recognizing the criticism that the program was bound to face, Edgar 
took every possible precaution to assure that relief collected for Russia would not be handled 
inefficiently or dubiously.  To assure the proper handling of relief an official of the American 
Red Cross along with a member of the staff of the Northwest Miller were appointed to personally 
accompany the relief shipment and check on the distribution of the provisions by the Russian 
Red Cross and the czarist government.25 
The response to Edgar’s appeal for support and his organizational strategies for handling 
relief was tremendous.  The Pillsbury-Washburn flour mills in Minneapolis responded 
immediately with an offering of 800 sacks of flour.  Eight other mills quickly follow suit with 
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donations varying from 100 to 600 sacks.  On February 12, 1892 the Northwest Miller 
announced that the foreign freight agents of the New York Central and Atlantic Transport Lines 
had offered the use of the steamer Missouri.  Edgar commented that “we have demonstrated that 
nowhere else but in America could such an undertaking be successfully carried out in eight short 
weeks.”  In total a cargo estimated at 5,600,000 pounds representing 800 subscriptions from 
twenty-five states and territories made the journey to Russia aboard the Missouri.  The New York 
World estimated the value of the millers’ contribution at $100,000.  Combined with an additional 
$67,000 incurred in transportation, insurance, and other costs associated with shipping the total 
value of Russian relief was $167,000.26   
While William Edgar and the Northwest Miller were completing their drive for relief 
supplies the former governor of the Wyoming territory John Hoyt took the lead in organizing the 
Russian Famine Committee of the United States.  Designed to awaken greater public interest in 
the plight of Russia and to facilitate cooperation between local movements the committee 
publicized the slogan “Grain from the West, money for the cost of transportation to the East.”  
The committee was also part of an unsuccessful effort to secure a joint congressional 
authorization for the transport of voluntary food contributions by the US Navy.  By early spring 
1892 it was clear that the program to support Russia would have to be carried out by voluntary 
efforts exclusively.  Supporters doubled their efforts to maintain the support of potential donors 
and to fight the perception that famine relief would only relieve an unjust Russian regime from 
shouldering responsibility for its problems and enacting reforms.  In total when the program 
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concluded in 1893 it not only combated widespread famine in Russia but also sparked a growing 
interest among Americans in the needs of other peoples.27 
As the nineteenth century closed the system of American philanthropy overseas expanded 
to include a wider range of projects as the United States became a world power.   In this program 
disaster relief and aid to foreign missions were only part of an ever-increasing program of 
American benevolence.  As the century concluded many Americans also donated money for the 
creation of schools, hospitals, art galleries, orphan asylums, and projects aimed at mitigating 
poverty abroad.  The trend towards overseas giving for welfare and education also gained 
momentum in large part due to the important segment of the American philanthropic community 
that possessed great amounts of wealth and possessed a personal tie to a specific foreign 
country.28  
Meanwhile at home the role of systemization and expertise played an increasingly 
important role in the development of American philanthropy.  As the US moved from a 
preindustrial and industrial state to a post industrial state the concept of knowledge joined land, 
labor, and capital as a critical national resource.  In this environment the management of an 
enterprise required specialized, expert knowledge in order to guide and justify its goals, choices, 
and policies governing action.  Philanthropy in America itself passed through the same stages as 
other sciences had done previously.  In the 1890s, benevolence attempted to mirror the field of 
medicine by using traditional experience, accurate records, comparison of treatment, accepted 
principles, systematic diagnosis, hygiene, and prevention to improve the process.  It was during 
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this period of development that individuals employed by charities began considering themselves 
professionals.29 
As the twentieth century began the awareness of a small group of Americans that the 
older system of charitable support and local reform was failing marked the transition of 
benevolence from private, localized charity to foundations.  Just as managers of the evolving 
corporate structure in the United States strove to rationalize and streamline systems of 
production so too did the new breed of foundation executives that began coordinating charity in 
the first decade of the 1900s.  These individuals pressed for the rationalization of social services 
and a more efficient and manageable system of national benevolence.  The progressive era 
emphasis on efficiency, elimination of waste, alleviation of mass misery, and the establishment 
of a more humane, decent, and just society was internalized by the mangers of philanthropic 
foundations in certain cases more coherently and completely than their corporate counterparts.30    
Perceptions regarding the future of benevolence underwent sweeping changes as 
philanthropists reevaluated the nature of benevolence in American society.  In general members 
of the new philanthropic class sought to transform the ways that wealth could be used to solve 
major problems.  Medicine provided philanthropy with their first ideal model of how to bring 
scientific understanding to their work primarily because its metaphors for describing illness and 
disease were easily transferrable to societal blight.  In the early twentieth century the emerging 
concept of modern philanthropy rested on a recognition of progress and choice that made the 
eradication of poverty possible through systematic, scientific human endeavors.31   
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At the same time industrial philanthropists faced increased scrutiny as reformers searched 
for new ways to appropriate wealth through taxes and other seemingly preferable means of 
allowing the public to control the benefits of private fortunes.  When the first American 
philanthropic foundations were created they sought to stabilize the rapidly evolving corporate 
order and legitimize their actions before the American general public.  Through the support of 
educational institutions these foundations endeavored to create a worldwide network of elites 
whose approach to governance and change would be efficient, professional, moderate, 
incremental, and nonthreatening to the class interests of those who established the trusts.  
Through the funding of American colleges and universities the trusts sought to gain a larger 
influence in the creation of social and governmental policy by training the professionals and 
managers that would then run the institutions of the liberal capitalist state.32 
The development of foundations and a continued commitment to private philanthropy in 
America was due in large part to the tradition of federalism in the United States that fueled a 
general unwillingness among Americans to surrender to the government the authority to set 
national standards of social well being.  Federal financial support in America was traditionally 
deemed to be supplementary rather than a controlling force in state and local policies.  In the 
philanthropic community private organizations supported by groups of well-to-do citizens and 
religious groups worked jointly with agencies managed by local communities that bore the major 
responsibility for dealing with those needing assistance.  The result was a conflict between a 
growing consciousness among the elite of modern industrial reformers desiring national 
programs of social welfare and the general political culture in America that would not accept a 
government control over such reforms.  It was out of this clash that the modern foundation 
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emerged—creating a system of national philanthropy privately devoted to increasing the welfare 
of society.33 
Philanthropic foundations were a uniquely American development.  Privately funded 
trusts in the early twentieth century found a way of doing privately what governments in other 
advanced industrial societies were beginning to do in Europe publicly.  Programs such as 
Carnegie Libraries served as a model for collaboration between private funds and public 
interests.  Applied to overseas benevolence, Herbert Hoover’s belief that governments being 
aided abroad should be prepared to match contributions made from private, external sources was 
part of the emerging American philanthropic tradition that assured benefactors that the 
community being helped was willing to take action in its own support.  Traditional concerns 
about the way that funds were collected and used also played a large role in the creation of trust.  
Tax considerations were another motivating factor in the creation of foundations.  Taxation was 
an issue that the multitude of classes in America had been arguing over for decades.  Long 
accustomed to forming local watchdog agencies to superintend the spending of tax funds, the 
attitudes of the trusts towards social spending reflected the belief that local support for measures 
was far more effective than federal support because it could be controlled more effectively by the 
immediate citizenry.34 
The traditional structure of charities also contributed to the creation of American 
philanthropic foundations.  Pre-existing charitable institutions in the nineteenth century were 
narrowly focused on particular problems and were committed to cautious and well-tried courses 
of action.  Generally these organizations were directed by quasi or semi-professionals and elites 
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who were not likely to change their goals or patterns of behavior radically in any given situation.  
Although a good deal of effort went into the rationalization of their efforts during the charity 
organization movement the traditional means of benevolence were still firmly entrenched as the 
twentieth century began.  Breaking the cycle of American philanthropy required the creation of 
new institutional forms—the endowed trust in particular.35 
The creators of philanthropic foundations in America brought the business principles 
guiding their financial interests into the world of benevolence.  Committed to rationality, 
organization, and efficiency these individuals saw no reason why their charitable actions should 
not be guided by the same principles as their business concerns.  In their view the task of giving 
away money almost necessitated the rationalization of charity.  They believed that a more 
thoroughly scientific approach was the best means to attack the root causes of social dysfunction.  
The philanthropic foundation was also advantageous for donors.  Their support was drawn in 
part from individual’s desire to support perpetual trusts unbound by specific purposes.  Given 
many donors admiration for the scientific and technological advances of the era they were 
prepared to accept widespread change in the philanthropic community offered by foundations 
that traditional forms of charity could not hope to achieve.36 
The status of politics and reform in America also played a prominent role in the 
emergence of philanthropic foundations.  Trusts appeared alongside the attempts of progressives 
to evolve a liberal consensus and chart a more equitable political and economic path for the 
United States.  Within the movement the more far-sighted progressives recognized that a societal 
consensus could only be achieved if the extremes of poverty and wealth were somewhat 
mitigated through benevolence.  At the same time there was a general agreement among 
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reformers that the most flagitious abuses associated with the system of industrial capitalism 
needed to be checked as well.  For others the fear of socialism led to the support of foundations.  
Since the late 1870s, increasing labor unrest coupled with a growing awareness of urban poverty 
and its consequences led many who were critical of conditions in the factories and cities to 
predict some sort of socialist upheaval in America.37 
Once in place foundations were an opportunity for the corporate form of charity to play a 
major role in clearing the way for the modern capitalist state by influencing social policy and 
government action.  Part of the rationale behind the creation of trusts was the desire to give 
industrial society an educated class that would continue to produce researchers, teachers, and 
managers in the spheres of culture and technology.  Through their benevolent activity the 
creators of foundations and their successors showed a demonstrated commitment in one way or 
another to the American system of government.  At the same time, trust directors believed that 
the political parties in America were not equipped to solve social problems efficiently or 
economically.  In their view a system of welfare capitalism held little promise for a bright future.  
They believed that continued investment in industrial expansion would produce the profits to 
support labor and wages.  Populists countered that foundations represented the investment of ill-
gotten gains in a manner that threatened to subvert the democratic process by giving 
philanthropists a determining role in the conduct of American public life.38   
Forged in the economic battles of the Progressive Era the foundation was a new form of 
philanthropy representing the perceived benefits of corporate management applied to 
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benevolence.  By definition philanthropic foundations are non-governmental, non-profit 
organizations with funds of their own provided for by donors managed by an independent group 
of trustees or directors with a program designed to maintain or aid socially useful activities.  In 
organization the philanthropic foundation represents the fusion of traditional charitable 
organizations and ancient methods of perpetuating wealth with novel social, legal, and 
intellectual ideas.  Their attempts to coordinate charity organizations so that they could better 
serve the needs of the poor were in keeping with the liberal reform tendencies of the Progressive 
Era.  The need to coordinate and professionalize the field of social work so that its pervading 
ideology would be one of limited reform within a framework of corporate capitalism led the 
trustees of organizations such as the Russell Sage Foundation (created in 1907) to begin 
subsidizing projects with a goal of insuring that social change was carried out in a way that 
would not threaten the evolving economic order in America or the privileged position of those of 
the elite philanthropic class.39 
Inside this emerging system the rise of bureaucracy and bureaucratic thinking in America 
played an important role in the development of trust philanthropy.  According to historian Robert 
Wiebe the goal at the heart of progressivism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century 
was the desire to fulfill the destiny of reform ideals through bureaucratic means.  In the new 
urban-industrial environment of America the system of bureaucratic thinking was in Wiebe’s 
view particularly suited to the fluidity and impersonality of the city and factory floor.  Once 
applied to social issues the influence of bureaucratic thinking was immediate as individuals 
increasingly came to view society as a vast tissue of reciprocal activity instead of an infinite 
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number of one-on-one relationships.  In the realm of reform bureaucratic thought signaled a 
transition from simple moral precepts to an emphasis on complex procedural principles 
administered by experts.  With an embedded sense of scientific analysis first applied to urban 
political reform, city beautification movements, and case work the arrival of foundation 
philanthropy presaged the transition from makeshift, short-term philanthropy towards a 
continuous application of funds for less determinate objectives.40 
The work of foundations performed deeds that were unachievable for private, small scale 
philanthropic organizations in the early twentieth century.  In America the rise of 
industrialization, technological change, and the establishment of a national economy operating in 
an increasingly international market left few alternatives for coping with major welfare issues 
under the previously existing practices of benevolence.  At the same time the federal government 
was not in a position to bring wide sweeping change.  Situated in both the public and private 
spheres the foundations were strategically positioned to play a pivotal role in determining what 
knowledge, ideas, and what views would received support and become a part of society’s general 
discourse.  In the early days of existence many of philanthropic foundations pursued a number of 
different benevolent options before settling on a structure supporting general purposes through 
funding for universities, research universities, reform trusts, and social work institutions.41   
While foundation philanthropies were private organizations they were at the same time 
engaged in a process of influencing the formulation of policies that affected the public in ways.  
Private philanthropy was forced to accept the fluctuations of public opinion which swung in 
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favor and against their actions as a result.  Operating in tumultuous environment of public 
opinion in the progressive era the attempt on the part of foundations to conduct their activities on 
a national scale while trying to win political recognition for doing so raised the issue of whether 
or not the traditional relationship between philanthropy and the government was transferrable 
from the local level to the federal government.42   
Several key factors contributed to the increasing influence that foundations wielded in 
determining foreign and domestic policy.  First, their possession of significant amounts of capital 
which could be allocated for the direct purposes of trust directors made them powerful.  
Secondly, their ability to allocate this capital to certain individuals and groups strategically 
located in the cultural sphere provided an important source of legitimization for their 
philanthropic goals.  Third, their direct connection with the decision making components of the 
capitalist state made them influential.  Fourth, their shared view that the development of 
domestic and foreign policy could be best advanced through the aegis of worldwide capitalism 
was well supported within the government and among the American people.43   
Efforts by Rockefeller and Carnegie to create an open connection with the federal 
government were in the end vehemently rejected however.  From their creation the foundation 
philanthropies and the federal government had the same sort of uneasy relationship as reformers 
did with politicians.  What brought the two divergent groups together from time to time was the 
use of outside sources of advice combined with foundation funding to make the public believe 
that something was being done to cope with national issues.  While trusts were forced to interact 
with the government they still functioned as an independent agent with the goal that neither 
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politics nor profits would shape the direction of intellectual and cultural growth in America.  
Regardless of the situation foundation philanthropists in the end trusted their own judgment.44 
Within the foundation structure of philanthropy the wealth of Andrew Carnegie for 
example was distributed in four major areas including libraries, peace projects, education and 
research, pensions, and personal benefits.  In 1901, he sold his steel interests to J.P. Morgan for 
$480 million and retired from business with an excess profit of $225 million.  The Carnegie 
Institution of Washington was created a year later to perform philanthropic work with an initial 
endowment of $10 million.  Carnegie’s philanthropic interests varied over the next few years 
before the creation of Carnegie Corporation of New York in 1911.  One of the benefactions that 
gave him the deepest sense of satisfaction was the Hero Fund Commission set up in 1904 with an 
endowment of $5 million earmarked for individuals injured while performing heroic deeds and 
for widows and dependents of those lost in the act of heroism.  Ultimately, Carnegie was most 
famous for his library gifts of $60 million for the construction of facilities under the stipulation 
that recipients provided funds for the purchase of books and maintenance of the building.45   
In 1911, the Carnegie Corporation became the largest foundation created to date with an 
initial endowment of $125 million.  Chartered to “promote the advancement and diffusion of 
knowledge and understanding among the people of the United States” the corporation became 
heavily involved in the politics of knowledge.  With a goal of advancing and diffusing 
knowledge and understanding the corporation’s self-imposed mandate to define, develop, and 
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distribute knowledge was in a sense a franchise to govern in an important indirect manner.  
Carnegie personally directed the foundation until his death in 1919.  During this eight year 
period the character of the corporation reflected his unshakable belief in late nineteenth century 
British liberalism and from his broad approach to benevolence entire consistent with his 
conceptions of distributive rather than regulatory policy making.  Through Carnegie’s influence 
the corporation’s commitment to liberalism was manifest in a clearly defined series of values that 
were sustained through time.  The first value reflected a belief in the individual’s need for 
freedom to strive, improve, and advance in education.  The second value recognized that liberty 
without equality would result in an unstable and oppressive society in which liberty itself would 
be insecure.  The third value projected a conviction that individualism, liberty, and equal 
opportunity could be best preserved and advanced in a society where voluntary action and a 
consensus about the direction of the nation would preclude a monopoly of power under the 
auspices of governmental agencies.46 
Popular enlightenment as the key to social progress was a major contributing factor to 
Carnegie’s benevolent motivations.  He also maintained that giving must broaden opportunities 
for those on the lower rungs of society.  As a result, Carnegie paralleled many of his gifts in 
America with similar ones in Canada, Australia, Great Britain, and Ireland.  His donations of 
funds for libraries across the British Empire accounted for approximately thirty-seven percent of 
the $56,162,623 given in total for this purpose.  In support of education Carnegie also established 
the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching with an endowment of $15,000,000 
earmarked for retirement provisions in 1911.  The previous year he established the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace with $10 million in assets devoted to the juridical approach 
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to the problem of peace and war.  In the 1910s, his major interests continued to be popular 
education and welfare.  In October 1913, the Carnegie United Kingdom Trust was created with 
the broad design of improving the well being of Great Britain and Ireland through such means 
embraced in the meaning of the word “charitable” with an endowment of $10 million.47 
In the last decade of his life Carnegie spent enormous amounts of time and energy 
towards giving away his fortune.  By 1911, his donations of $180 million still left nearly half of 
his wealth untouched however.  Increasingly, Carnegie worried that he would fall short of his 
pledge to divest his money before death.  With that in mind he decided to transfer most of the 
remaining money to the foundation.  In doing so Carnegie hoped to be able to continue to 
personally supervise his fortune during his lifetime and make sure that it would continue to be 
put to good use after his passing.48   
During this same period the foundational philanthropy of John D. Rockefeller began in 
1901 with the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research in 1901 and the General Education 
Board in 1902.  Similar to Carnegie, he advocated the establishment of trusts as a way of 
managing the business of benevolence properly and effectively.  According to Allen Nevins, 
Rockefeller wanted to give to well established causes and institutions in a way that would 
stimulate other gifts and enlist numerous supporters.  In general he sought to support the 
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soundest forms of benevolence.  Rockefeller also sought to forge a direct relationship with the 
government through the creation of the Rockefeller Foundation in 1913.49   
In the twentieth century the new industrial elite took part in the national development of a 
more effective collaboration between the federal government and industry.  Rockefeller himself 
advocated national charters for business corporations to enable them to deal more directly with 
Washington on those aspects of regulation and rationalization that they were finding useful.50  
Even progressives who decreed the evils of trusts were attracted to the same conception of 
efficient management and productivity that the men who built them were seeking.  Under similar 
business-based pretenses the Rockefeller Foundation was initially intended to be a government 
corporation headed by a board.  Under this structure the US Congress was to be given the power 
to impose limitations on the objects of the corporation if it was determined so in the public’s 
interest.  Congress ultimately rejected the proposal however.  In 1915 the Walsh Commission 
labeled the emerging philanthropic foundations in America as thinly disguised capitalist 
manipulations of the social order.  Senator Frank B. Walsh himself contended that the hearings 
led him to challenge the wisdom of giving public sanction to foundations because it appeared 
that large philanthropic trusts were a menace to the welfare of society.51 
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Americans continued to give money to foreign projects alongside the growing 
proliferation of philanthropic trusts at home.  In general the patterns of giving for welfare and 
culture overseas did not changed markedly in the first decade of the twentieth century.  While 
trends remained relatively stable there was a general anticipation that change would happen as 
the well-to-do in America became increasingly involved in benevolence alongside the 
reorganization of numerous charities and the rise of the foundations.  Opportunities for the 
expansion of giving abroad were not simply limited to needs within the new territories acquired 
by the United States.  Natural disasters for example were a continued source of American 
benevolence.  The steady stream of overseas charity from America in the early twentieth century 
is partly attributable to better forms of international communication, general domestic prosperity, 
and the growing interest of the State Department in American relief activities dealing with 
overseas catastrophes.52   
While the number of overseas charity opportunities increased the general patterns of 
benevolence stayed the same.  In general the communities having a special proximity, 
connection, or obligation to a beleaguered nation played a more active role in relief projects than 
other interests.  Early twentieth century disasters in Martinique (1902), Finland (1903), China 
(1901), Chile (1906), Sicily and Calabria (1908), Jamaica (1907), Mexico (1909), Costa Rica 
(1910), Haiti (1915), Guatemala (1915), and San Salvador (1917) provided Americans with 
opportunities to provide assistance to those in need.  To meet the challenges created by these 
disasters the established agencies of fund raising and relief activities swung into action.  
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Philanthropic foundations in this period also became involved in overseas charity.  Concerned 
with the living conditions among the civilian populations of both allied and central powers 
during WWI, the Rockefeller Foundation in October 1914 appointed a War Relief Commission 
under the leadership of Dr. Wicklyffe Rose.  During the conflict the WRC played a significant 
role in relief activities by allocating a total of $22 million.  In the early stages of WWI, WRC-
sponsored relief included the chartering of food ships and the providing of funds for relief to 
occupied Belgium.  By early 1915 this relationship had ended.53 
In the venue of overseas relief the American Red Cross played an increasingly vital role 
from the late nineteenth century forward.  After the Spanish-American War (1898) the Red Cross 
steadily moved to the front as a major agency of foreign benevolence despite the fact that its 
activities were limited to fund raising.  Nonetheless, both before and after its reorganization in 
1905 the Red Cross was free to respond to request for help in natural disasters insofar as its 
resources permitted.  At the same time it was less free to act in the face of overseas civil 
disturbances however. When national interests involving foreign policy and security became 
involved the Red Cross tended to serve as an arm of the federal government.54   
Originally organized in 1881 the Red Cross was granted a special charter by Congress in 
1905 allowing it to pursue a system of national and international relief in times of peace by 
mitigating suffering caused by pestilence, famine, floods, and other national calamities.  Under 
these premises the Red Cross contributed $1,640,186 to natural disaster relief abroad between 
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1898 and WWI.  Some of this effort was made possible by its 1905 reorganization that brought 
closer and more effective relations between national, state, and local auxiliaries.55   
On the eve of WWI American philanthropy was poorly prepared for large scale funding 
and relief programs abroad.  In 1914, the Red Cross for example had only 150 chapters and 
20,000 members despite the progress that had been made over the previous decade.  When war 
began it immediately appealed to its constituent chapters to raise funds for relief.  To meet the 
demand the Red Cross divided the country into thirteen districts with some 15,000 local 
branches.  The problem was that where social work was not previously organized the Home 
Service of the Red Cross had to break entirely new ground.56   
Into the void left by American philanthropy stepped the Commission for Relief in 
Belgium.  Author Merle Curti in American Philanthropy Abroad commented that Belgium 
would have starved without the brilliant help of Hoover and his associates.  He added that the 
most extensive, ingenious, and statesmanlike program during the period of American neutrality 
in WWI was in Belgium.  During WWI the CRB overshadowed all other American philanthropic 
enterprises involved in the conflict, including the Clearing House and the Rockefeller 
Foundation.57 
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CHAPTER TWO: “Immediate Action is Imperative” 
The Invasion of Belgium 
 Belgium’s direct involvement in World War One began with an ultimatum from 
Germany on August 2, 1914.  On Monday evening, August 3, 1914, the Belgian government 
issued a dignified response to the ultimatum, stating that it refused to break prior engagements 
and would resist German aggression.  In Brussels, the Belgian government received a note from 
Herr von Below at six o’clock in the morning on August 4, that Germany could take what it 
wanted by “force of arms.”  After receiving this information, Belgium notified both France and 
England that they would come to its defense if they were invaded.  Facing the prospects of 
invasion, the nation stood steadfastly determined to “repel by all the means in its power every 
attack upon its rights.”58   
 German forces proceeded headlong into Belgium during the first week of August.  On 
Aug 6, 1914 troops crossed the frontier near Dolhain and by late afternoon had reached the forts 
surrounding Liége.  Two days later, the Belgian government received a telegram begging King 
Albert to spare the nation from the further horrors of war.  In the telegram, Germany again gave 
solemn assurance that it was not its intention to appropriate Belgian territory to itself and that an 
intervention of that nature was fare from its thoughts.  The concluding portion of the message \ 
declared that the Germans remained ready to evacuate Belgium as soon as the state of war will 
allow it to do so.59 
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 The Belgian government was not swayed by Germany’s second appeal for acquiescence.  
In a reply issued on Aug 12, the Belgians reiterated its original reply issued on August 3 stating 
that its neutrality was violated and that war was forced upon them.  People across the nation 
responded to the invasion and outbreak of war in different ways.  Removed from the immediate 
frontlines of the conflict, Brussels thrilled with the emotions of patriotic fervor and excitement.  
By Wednesday, Aug 19, the mood was sobered.  German troops were advancing on city with 
only the Garde Civique to defend it.  Four days later the city had fallen.60   
Seeking refuge elsewhere, the Belgian government retired to Antwerp—the Germans 
next major objective.  Initially, the main thrust of the German attack missed Antwerp in its 
sweep southward to Paris.  In the attack the city was spared the wrath of the Germans until the 
deadlock on the Marne and the Aisne led to the so-called “race to the sea.”  Strategic control of 
the Belgian coastline (with Antwerp as the key position) prompted the Kaiser to issue orders for 
its capture on September 9.  Delays in bring huge siege guns to bombard the city’s defenses 
allowed Belgian resistance to gain confidence until its ultimate failure in the first week of 
October, 1914.61 
Order within the city devolved quickly once Antwerp began to fall.  By October 7, there 
was almost no order and no direction inside the city while the Belgian military headquarters was 
in a state of disarray as well.  A British major reported that it was practically impossible to hold 
the Belgian trenches.  Whole companies of Belgian infantry and cavalry proceeded westward as 
night began to fall on October 7.  Troops were being drawn off from the forts surrounding the 
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city; the officers called it “making a change of base.”  Over the next few days German forces 
methodically pounded the city of Antwerp.  Finally, at noon on October 9 the shelling stopped 
and German troops entered the city.  Over a span of approximately thirty-six hours, one hundred 
and eighty-one houses were destroyed by incendiaries, thirty-one houses were partially burned, 
nine houses totally destroyed, and five hundred and fifty-six badly damaged.62 
Throughout the country stories of atrocities and violence followed the path of German 
advance.  As German forces seized the city of Louvain on August 15, occupying soldiers 
claimed that they were being fired upon by local citizenry from the upper windows of houses in 
the Rue de la Station.   In response the Germans began firing on the homes of civilians during the 
evening of August 25.  For the remainder of the night soldiers beat in doors, turned people into 
the streets, shot them down, and set fire to the houses.  In total, for two days the Germans looted, 
murdered, sacked, pillaged, and burned the city.  At nine o’clock on August 27, an order was 
issued for all inhabitants to leave Louvain at once before bombardment was to begin.  Soldiers 
again entered and cleared homes, refusing to allow inhabitants to take anything with them.63 
The events at Louvain gained notoriety as far away as the United States as word of 
German deeds spread.  The New York Times reported on September 12 that in actuality the 
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burning of Louvain constituted only one of the charges of atrocity against the Germans.  In its 
aftermath the Germans launched an investigation, finding that incident was the fault of Belgian 
francs-tireurs.  In a sworn deposition, Dr. Georg Berghausen declared it “undeniable that on the 
night from the twenty-fifth to the twenty-sixth of August, inhabitants of Louvain shot on 
numerous occasions on the German soldiers, and this without pretext, without a shot having been 
first fired by an officer or soldier.”  No Belgians or neutrals were allowed to follow the progress 
of the hearings.64 
By October 1914, evidence began piling up regarding German atrocities in Belgium.  
Using 1,200 depositions as evidence, Viscount Bryce issued a report on behalf of the British 
Government finding that in many parts of Belgium a series of “deliberate and systematically 
organized massacres” accompanied “many isolated murders and other outrages.”  The report also 
concluded that the looting, burning, and wanton destruction of property were ordered and 
countenanced by the officers of the German army and that in the conduct of war innocent 
civilians were murdered in large numbers.  The British believed that generally the burning and 
destruction were of no military necessity—it was part of a system of general terrorization.65   
While German attempt to destroy the Allied forces and to occupy the English Channel 
ports of continental Europe during the first few weeks of the war failed, they succeeded in 
occupying practically all of Belgium and a large portion of Northern France.  In Brussels, the 
Germans were to have passed through in three days.  By mid-September German troops had been 
there for more three weeks, exhibiting tremendous influence over the local government and 
making themselves quite at home in those surroundings.  Residents attempted to maintain a 
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modicum of their normal pre-war daily lives as occupation became a permanent feature of city 
life.  In Antwerp the situation was seemingly worse however.  By the second week of October 
was reported that much of the city’s population was fleeing.   Reports of Newspaper 
correspondents still residing in the city described Antwerp as a spectacle of pity and terror.66   
Devastation and mass exodus were common sights across Belgium.  Across the country 
the German actions evolved from mandates and prohibitions into outright requisitioning and 
theft.  In Antwerp, General von Beseler reported to Kaiser Wilhelm that an enormous “war 
booty” seized from the city including 500 cannons and large quantities of ammunition along with 
4,000,000 kilograms of wheat and the large quantities of flour, coal, and flax wool valued at an 
estimated 10,000,000 marks.  Edward Eyre Hunt succinctly summarized what he observed as 
commonplace amongst the soldiers.  As they occupied town after town, province after province, 
they quartered soldiers upon Belgians whom hastily consumed what little food was available.  
He added that in many cases the native goods were confiscated while in other cases payment was 
promised at a convenient time in the future.67   
By the end of October 1914, German requisitions of non war materiel directly impacted 
the health and safety of Belgians.  In a joint statement the cities of Namur and Liége proclaimed 
that they had “rudely suffered” at the hands of the Germans.  The press release also made 
mention of a problem that was beginning to demand an increasing share of attention after stories 
of atrocities in the first days of occupation fell from the front pages of Western newspapers: 
famine.  “The German armies since the beginning of the invasion have lived on our soil by 
requisitioning victuals of all nature,” explained Deputies Joseph Botogne and A. Jourense, “At 
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the moment of writing we have hardly grain enough for a few days.”  This same situation would 
come to dominate the nature of relief and bring into sharp focus the threat of starvation that 
Belgium and Northern France constantly faced over the following four years.68 
Requisitions and confiscations of food supplies by the Germans were not the only 
problems facing Belgium.  In addition to requisitions the actions of belligerents placed the 
Belgians in a dangerous situation regarding food supplies.  On one side, the Germans were 
preoccupied with securing sufficient foodstuffs for their own people and armies.  On the other, 
the Allies steadfastly maintained their naval blockade of the Central Powers that prohibited the 
passage of food supplies into Belgium that might make its way into the mouths of the enemy.  
All the while frantic cries for help from Belgian communes echoed out to anyone who would 
listen.69   
Initial German Guarantees Regarding Belgium 
The Germans issued guarantees regarding Belgium almost immediately after occupation 
began.  These guarantees played an ever-increasing role in the relations between the German 
military, the Belgian government and its people, and relief programs that were beginning to take 
shape.  Serving as the first Governor-General in Belgium, General von der Goltz was from the 
beginning inclined to adopt a policy of conciliation towards the Belgians.  On September 2, he 
declared that no Belgian would ever be required to do anything “repugnant to his patriotic 
instincts.”  Localized promises were also made by other German generals across Belgium; many 
of which went unfulfilled.  Before taking Liége, General von Emmich for example gave formal 
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guarantee to the city that it would not suffer the horrors of war by promising to pay for food 
taken from the people.  He further proclaimed that “our soldiers will show themselves to be the 
best friends of the people from whom we entertain with the highest esteem, (and) the greatest 
sympathy.”70 
Guarantees regarding food accompanied policies of conduct.  On October 1, the Belgian 
Minister in London and the American Consul General at Antwerp were informed that German 
military authorities had given assurances in writing that any food supplies purchased by relief 
organizations would be reserved for the feeding of the civil population, free from requisitioning.  
News accompanying this message reported that food supplies in Brussels as practically 
exhausted.  The cable concluded, “Immediate action is imperative.”  Diplomatic representatives 
in Belgium discussed the food conditions and who was responsible for its remedy.  These 
individuals reminded the Germans that under the provisions of the Hague Convention they were 
required to feed the Belgians.  Looking at the situation realistically, Ambassador Whitlock 
commented that the Hague Conventions were all they could offer the civil population—and the 
people could not eat them.71  
The necessity for action became increasingly clear as conditions worsened.  By mid-
October, the issue of food supplies was applicable to not only Brussels but to the entire 
population in Belgium.  Baron von der Lancken stood poised to offer guarantees on behalf of the 
German government that relief supplies of food would go directly to the Belgian populace.  
Armed with the prospects of relieving hungry Belgians, the Comité Central de Secours et d’ 
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Alimentation took action.  On October 16, Baron von der Goltz gave official assurances to the 
Comité Central in the form of promises that provision were exclusively for the civil population, 
that the foodstuffs would hereafter be exempt from requisitioning by the military, and that these 
stocks were the property of the Committee.  Eleven days later, word of German promises and of 
American action appeared in Western newspapers.72 
The issue of German complicity in the importation of relief was contentious.  A second 
series of assurances regarding relief were released via the German Foreign Office in November 
1914, explaining that the Imperial Government consented willingly to the importation of 
foodstuffs but reserved the right to revoke this consent should it become necessary.  Included in 
this statement was the order that relief supplies were to be sent to Belgium through Dutch ports 
exclusively.  Chafing at the conditions of hunger, Whitlock complained that the Germans had 
done nothing to get food to the Belgians.  “The best that can be said,” Whitlock continued, “is 
that they have put no obstacle in the way of Americans buying food and shipping it here.”  A 
month later, the new Governor-General in Belgium, General von Bissing, reiterated his 
assurances that food would not be requisitioned.73   
The Nation of Belgium and the Immediacy of the Problem  
The highly industrialized nature of the Belgian economy and its heavy dependence on the 
importation of foodstuffs made the country particularly vulnerable once the war began.  With an 
area of 11,373 miles and a population of nearly 8, 000,000 its population density was 
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approximately 700 people per square mile before the outbreak of war.  In normal times, Belgium 
imported nearly 80 percent of its breadstuffs.  Looked at from a different perspective, Belgium 
produced only about one-sixth of the food its people consumed annually.  Its agricultural 
production afforded sustenance to the population for only four months out of the year and it 
never had enough reserves on hand to keep the population alive for more than two months.  As a 
nation of bread-eaters, the cereal industries of Belgium normally produced only one-fourth of its 
annual consumption as it was.  “Bread,” reported the New York Times, “is not only the staff of 
life; it is the legs (of Belgium).”  Any peaceable interruption of overseas and overland commerce 
would bring famine conditions to the Belgians.  Invasion made the prospect of starvation all the 
more likely.74 
The timing of war and the invasion of Belgium contributed substantially to its suddenly 
emerging problem of food supplies.  The harvest was being gathered just as war broke out in the 
countryside.  Ripened crops were left standing in the fields where they were either trampled by 
marching soldiers or were left to rot as people fled.  In addition, a substantial supply of grain was 
left un-harvested in the fields of Belgium during the confusion and panic of the first days of 
war.75 
The economy of Belgian also contributed to its difficulties once war began.  Among 
industrialized nations, Belgium was unique in possessing a permanent mass of floating laborers.  
The head of household often migrated from place to place during the summer months while 
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women and children tended to a tiny agricultural holding.  In total, 1,204,810 people worked as 
agricultural laborers in Belgium before the outbreak of war.  Invasion brought a sudden shock to 
the entire working Belgian population.  August 7, 1914 found practically every man, woman, and 
child in every village, town, and city suddenly idle, without work, and without food.  American 
James Harder reported that the first requisitions squeezed Belgium dry.  “Its industrial riches 
were very great,” Harder commented, “but for that reason (it) did not produce much; (Belgium) 
was a factory hand, buying (its) bread instead of baking it.  All the Belgian industries stopped at 
once.”76 
While the shock of war affected the economies of all combatants its impact on Belgium 
was acute.  The sudden disruption of world trade in August 1914 staggered every industrialized 
nation in the world.  In each case there came a gradual readjustment to new conditions after a 
painful period of unemployment and financial distress with one exception—Belgium.  As 
potentially the most industrialized nation in the world in 1914 (with the possible exception of 
Britain) it was the European nation most dependent on access to raw materials and markets for 
survival.  An April 1917 report released by the CRB explained the domino effect that caused 
destitution in Belgium.  As an aggregate the destruction of property, the loss of breadwinners, 
and the paralysis of industry and the consequent unemployment not only contributed to the crisis 
of food amongst Belgians it also created a situation where many of them could not afford to pay 
for foodstuffs if they were imported.  The hardest hit by the economic dislodging of Belgium 
were the middle classes—those in trades, official positions, or small businesses.77 
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The disruption of trade swept away the superstructure of Belgian civil society making the 
situation critical almost overnight.  In 1917, CRB representative Francis Cogswell Wickes 
recalled how, without warning, and in what seemed to be a day, Belgium was reduced to a 
“primitive and almost medieval state” by a the Germans.  Despite the growing difficulties the 
communes maintained some semblance of order and control across Belgium however.  
Communal authorities alone continued assert a degree of independence and exercised a limited 
number of their functions.  In retrospect, Wickes believed they provided a rallying point for the 
gradual awakening of the population.  Although the commune structure survived, the threat 
remained pervasively real.  Hope for the moment was gone; there was nothing that the people 
could turn to and nothing to protect them.78 
Existing stocks of food disappeared as fast as industry in Belgium.  Within the first weeks 
of war they had been depleted either by destruction or requisition.  Driven by the fear of 
shortage, hoarding and speculation by segments of the population that preyed on the misfortunes 
of others led to further difficulties.  Compounding the issue and fueling these rumors was the 
Allied blockade of Germany that cut off food imports and exports of industrial goods.  
Transatlantic traffic remained virtually suspended in the weeks following the outbreak of war.  
By September 1914, the Allied blockade was working.  It seemed however that the first suffer 
would not be Germany, but Belgium instead.79 
Specific parts of Belgium suffered more than others in the fall of 1914.  Those living near 
the front faced the worst situations.  Villages in these districts were overrun by thousands of 
passing troops going to and from the trenches.  Absolute martial law without mitigation 
prevailed in these regions.  German soldiers took what they wanted, remaking villages according 
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to their whims.  Luxembourg suffered disproportionately to other locations.  Its 230,000 
residents lived in scattered communities in the Ardennes region.  Entire villages were practically 
erased from existence in the southern and western parts of the province following invasion.  
Communal authorities assumed the problem of sheltering, feeding, and clothing practically the 
entire of the remaining population.  Such a task was beyond the means of what could be done 
locally.80 
The First Organization of Charity 
The communes remained a small glimmer of hope in relieving desperate Belgians despite 
the staunch challenges before them.  The whole machinery of the Belgian central government 
was broken down and swept away by the invader.  Provincial administrations were likewise 
superseded or outright controlled by German provincial governors making any initiative on their 
behalf virtually impossible.  Only the communal administrations survived mostly intact.  They 
alone possessed the liberty of action to deal with the crisis brought about by food shortages and 
destitution.81 
Assistance from the communes could not come soon enough.  In Brussels the situation 
was growing more desperate by the hour.  On August 22, the Burgomaster of the city announced 
that there was no food, no forage for horses, and no money left in the banks.  By the end of the 
month it was practically impossible to purchase more than a pound of flour or sugar.  Already in 
short supply, canned goods were bought by anxious people who besieged shops hoping to get 
hold of a private cache before they were gone.  Even at the American Legation there was only 
grey bread to be found.  It was later reported that if not for the initial supply of food secured by a 
small contingent of Americans, Brussels would have been out of food by the end of September.  
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Nevertheless, on October 1 Hugh Gibson reported to the Belgian Minister in London that there 
was practically no flour nor salt in Brussels.  Foreshadowing a grave future on the prospects of 
the present, Gibson worried that “anything approaching a famine will lead to grave disorders the 
consequences of which cannot now be foreseen.”82 
The food situation in Belgium grew increasingly grim in October 1914.  Delegates from 
the Hainaut informed the Belgian minister at The Hague on October 4 that only a few days of 
provisions remained.  The Hainaut was struggling to assist the nearly 900,000 destitute in the 
region, offering only a half-ration to most citizens.  Refugees who fled the communes fared little 
better in their Dutch surroundings.  The bread supply had been exhausted for days before Edward 
Eyre Hunt arrived in Hulst.  Nearby, a village swelled from one thousand locals to a new 
population including some 23,000 Belgians.  Revictualing through Belgian efforts alone proved 
problematic.  Hunger fed the threat of other problems ancillary to the strife.  By mid-October it 
was feared that desperation would lead to revolt by a stubborn and starving population.  
Inevitably such revolts would be met by the savage repression of German bayonets and machine 
guns.83 
Diplomats still stationed in Belgium began spreading word about the situation in hopes of 
securing assistance—before it was too late.  On October 16, Ambassador Whitlock sent 
telegrams to both Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan and President Woodrow Wilson.  
Whitlock cut straight to the point in his cable to Bryan: “Within two weeks there will be no more 
food in Belgium.”  He also explained to the secretary of state that relief needed to be extended to 
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the entire country as winter approached.  Whitlock’s words to the President were similar: “In two 
weeks the civil population of Belgium, already in misery, will face starvation.”  In his opinion 
local efforts centered in Brussels and Antwerp needed to be extended to the greater population of 
Belgium under the patronage of the Marquis de Villalobar and himself.84   
The proposition made by Whitlock appeared to be the only solution for the time being.  
On October 24, the Belgian Committee (the Comité Central) reported that Brussels possessed 
sufficient food supplies for approximately ten days.  Foodstuffs in Charleroi and Liége by 
contrast were practically exhausted.  Meanwhile the British press watched the unfolding events 
closely.  Two days later on October 26, the Burgomaster and Alderman of Charleroi warned that 
their people were now on the point of starvation.  Starvation en mass could not be staved off 
forever despite the limited successes of local relief efforts in the communes.  Belgian Emile 
Francqui reported that there were only a few thousand sacks of wheat left in the entire country; 
after that there was nothing.  His recommendation was that only relief spearheaded by an 
external organization could save Belgium.  Ernest Solvay agreed.  In a meeting of the Comité 
Central on October 29 he admitted that Belgium was on the verge of famine.85 
A massive relief effort would be needed most urgently to avert a famine.    In early 
November, King Albert of Belgium’s cry for help reverberated in both Britain and the United 
States.  According to King Albert, “Despite all that can be done, the suffering in the coming 
winter will be terrible, but the burden we must bear will be lightened if my people can be spared 
the pangs of hunger with its frightful consequences of disease and violence.”  “It is not money, 
but food that is needed,” the King continued, “and if means can be formed to call the attention of 
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our people at home to the plight of the poor Belgians, I am sure they will send succor and relief 
for the winter that is drawing near.”  Assistance could not come soon enough; by November 1 an 
estimated 1,200,000 Belgians were destitute.  For its part the Belgian government advanced one 
million pounds as working capital and for transportation.86 
The New York Times monitored events in Belgium closely in the weeks following King 
Albert’s appeal.  Sobering facts regarding Belgian relief necessity filled the pages of the New 
York Times alongside cries for help which in many cases bringing to life the sheer magnitude of 
the problem.  Belgian Consul General Pierre Mali in an article appearing in late November 
reported that the nation’s consumption of flour in normal times was between 40,000 and 4,500 
220-pound bags of flour a day.  Explained differently, Belgium needed 4,000 tons or one 
shipload of flour every day.  At that point the various relief organizations could only ship one 
shipload of flour per week—one-seventh of the daily requirement.87 
News regarding the plight of Belgium only worsened in December 1914.  The Newcastle 
Daily Journal reported on December 12 that they were on the eve of seeing the population of 
Belgium plunged into one of the “blackest famine.”   Less than two weeks later the holiday of 
Christmas brought little cheer, especially among the laboring classes.  By this point the slender 
resources of the unemployed were exhausted, forcing them to become totally dependent on 
charitable aid for their support.  Without assistance the unemployed faced the alternatives of 
starving or accepting work from the Germans.  In many areas desperation drove the unemployed 
and destitute to the brink.  Several cases of persons breaking into the houses of rich Belgians 
who fled to England were reported.  In the face of lawlessness and the prospects of rioting, W.W. 
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Stratton (an Oxford Rhodes Scholar volunteering in Brussels) reported that the incidents had no 
serious consequences largely owing to the good temper of the German commanders.  Stratton 
offered a caveat in that the situation could change quickly.  He commented that, “if this sort of 
thing continues—and it may be more or less expected as long as there is hunger—there is no 
knowing what may be the result.  It might be terrible.”88 
Reports of potential rioting and civil unrest were not a product of the holidays 
exclusively.  Captain C.F. Lucey reported nearly two months earlier that there was great danger 
of revolution, especially near Liége.  It appeared the boiling point had been reached according to 
Lucey: “The people are so hungry and so desperate that the sight of every German incites them, 
and in their desperate frame of mind, seeing their children and families without food or clothes, 
they are liable to attack the German soldiers at any moment, which would mean another terrible 
and useless sacrifice of the Belgian people.”  The chill of winter exacerbated tensions, especially 
in regards to clothing.  Edward Eyre Hunt observed that for three months children in Willehroeck 
were absent from school literally because they had no clothes to go in.  In every household the 
brightest was chosen to wear what clothes were available.  It was common place to see little boys 
in their sisters’ dresses and little girls in boy’s clothes.89   
Unbeknownst to the general public a cadre of Belgian organizations began providing 
relief as soon as the war began.  As early as August 5, Ambassador Whitlock commented that the 
government of Belgium was making requisitions of food stuffs and preparing measures for 
aiding the families of soldiers.  Within five days of the commencement of fighting a royal decree 
was issued providing action to meet the crisis.  On August 14, the specifics of this law were set 
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by the provincial governors (the Burgomasters) fixing maximum prices for the chief articles of 
food and requisitioning stocks of those items in order to provision the population.90   
In the interim the communes stepped up almost immediately to meet the needs of 
Belgians.  Early volunteer efforts in Louvain were among the most remarkable for the results 
they obtained in the face of German occupation.  On August 26, a group of leading citizens came 
together and organized a Comité de Notables (Committee of Notables).  The Comité was better 
equipped to solve their localized problems precisely because a considerable stock of wheat and 
flour prepared in the mills near the city were turned over directly to the committee for the needs 
of the population.91   
Meanwhile, the vacuum of power at the national level created by the departure of the 
King, Cabinet, and Parliament left only the Belgian Permanent Deputation—an executive 
committee of the provincial councils—between the invaders and the people.  German military 
decree quickly assumed the presidency of the nine Permanent Deputations and in the process 
resurrected the structure of the Belgian civil government under their control however.  Although 
their powers were diminished, the communal authorities were not left without recourse and the 
ability to act on behalf of the Belgian populace.  Possessing a limited supply of foodstuffs 
Belgians appealed to Brussels, sending purchasing agents with dog-carts to buy what little flour 
and potato they could in the open market.  As the capital of Belgium this gravitation towards 
Brussels was not unusual.  What was unique, and what gave Brussels an advantage over other 
communes, was a volunteer relief organization that served the city.  Named le Comité Central de 
Secours et d’ Alimentation pour l’ Agglomeration bruxelloise ( the Central Relief Committee), 
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the organization was formed on September 5 under the patronage of the American Minster Brand 
Whitlock and the Spanish Minister Marquis de Villalobar with Earnest Solvay as its president.92   
The Comité Central immediately took action once it was formed.  Working in 
conjunction with Spanish and American Ministers a number of prominent citizens in Brussels 
realized that the supply of food within the city would soon become exhausted and organized the 
city’s sixteen communes.  With little food to be found throughout Belgium, the committee 
resolved to make an effort to import supplies.  After a series of short negotiations the approval of 
the project was secured with the German Military Governor along with a promise that imported 
food would be immune from requisitions.  In conjunction with the creation of the Comité a 
system of food distribution via soup kitchens was also created by Burgomaster (Mayor) Max of 
Brussels.93   
Acting in a similar manner, the city of Antwerp created two commissions of its own; one 
for ravitaillement and the other for assistance.  These two committees survived the initial 
German onslaught to become the nucleus of the provincial group later reorganized to work in 
concert with the Comité National.  Existing as a group representing all classes and all interests, 
the Antwerp Relief Committee faced challenges that were difficult to overcome—the issue of 
control especially.  During a brief period of readjustment and conflict with organizers the role of 
American volunteers was to for independence from the political influence of the Germans and 
for administrative unity from the Belgians.94   
Internal conflict combined with the exigencies of occupation to create a perplexing 
situation for the Antwerp Relief Committee and its American representatives to deal with.  At the 
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heart of conflict was the belief among officials in Antwerp that relief was a municipal matter.  
With a spirit of patriotism they shared with neighboring communes what food and money they 
municipally controlled and saw no reason why they should not take credit for the generosity or 
why they should surrender their position at the center of supplies when food began to arrive from 
America.  Despite these reservations it became clear that unity of action was needed in order 
prevent starvation.95   
By the latter part of September the Comité Central in Brussels and the volunteer 
committees of Liége, Charleroi, and Namur realized that famine was but a few weeks off.  In the 
following weeks the challenges the communes faced became increasingly complicated as they 
continued to function as individual units under a loose confederation of relief organizations.  
With normal supplies of foodstuffs greatly influenced by requisition and destruction the 
volunteer committees had to find ways of providing food for not only the destitute but for entire 
populations.  When the situation became critical many Belgians combined initiative, energy, and 
patriotic devotion to avert famine.  In this process they came to the realization that unless 
assistance could come from the outside world their efforts, sacrifice, and devotion would be all 
for naught.96   
The embedding of relief efforts within the commune system of Belgium was a critical 
component of ravitaillement that contributed greatly to its success throughout the war.  Shortly 
after communal-based relief efforts began that “it was a fortunate circumstance that the 
organization was formed somewhat on the model of the Belgian government, the system of 
which is based on the commune, the cell of the whole organization.”  The cornerstones of 
Belgium were its 2,633 communes which acted freely in governing local affairs.  Whitlock noted 
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that “there is not a square inch of soil in Belgium that does not belong to a commune, not a 
citizen that does not form a part of a little city of community, and this whether it is in the country 
or in the town, though, of course, in a country so densely populated every commune has a village 
as a nucleus.”  Edward Eyre Hunt added that while the Belgian state did not come into existence 
until the 1830s, the commune had been “in existence from time immemorial.  It had survived 
under an almost endless trampling of foreign armies.  The commune, not the nation, was the 
Belgian fatherland.”97   
Despite their noted resiliency the communes faced new problems that put them to the test 
like never before.  Four problems that emerged proved to be particularly problematic, they 
included: (1) the reestablishment of order and credit abroad; (2) the right to transport foodstuffs 
through the British blockade into territory occupied by the Germans; (3) the right to Belgian 
transportation facilities for such imports and (4) the securing of guarantees that the Germans 
would leave relief imports alone.  Recognizing these concerns, a preliminary meeting was held 
on September 1 to set the machinery of the Comité National de Secours et d’ Alimentation in 
motion.  At the meeting it was agreed that a strong private body, possessing the neutral character 
necessary to engender confidence in local officials, German authorities, and neutral powers with 
sufficient public prestige and credit to carry on large operations was needed.98 
The Comité Central/National began working on the specifics of its system after 
organizing officially on September 5 under the presidency of Ernest Solvay.  A central 
component of this planning involved the arrangement for a central warehouse and the 
appointment of a special subcommittee under the direction of Daniel Heinemann and other 
Americans to take charge of securing food.  At the time, the Comité planned to provide 
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temporary relief to the destitute of Greater Brussels and its neighbors in Louvain only.  
Meanwhile, numerous committees appeared in the various centers of Belgium, each engaged in 
relief work but acting independently and in competition with each other with the intent of 
solving local cases regardless of national emergencies.  It was not until late October or early 
November 1914 that the possibility of general famine across the country and a means to remedy 
it became a primary directive for the Comité Central/National.99 
Domestic Belgian relief organizations presaged the work of ravitaillement that eventually 
fell under the management of Americans.  CRB officials admitted after their work began that 
even before the war a well organized system of charitable relief existed throughout Belgium.  
Edward Eyre Hunt observed that in every village there was a Bureau de Bienfaisance that in 
many cases this organization was accompanied by a Society of Saint Vincent de Paul and a 
Comité de Secours.  Larger cities possessed branches of the Red Cross with committees of 
charity, reduced price restaurants, committees for the children of soldiers, support for nursing 
mothers, and a variety of other relief organizations handled primarily under the auspices of the 
Roman Catholic Church.100 
Preexisting relief structures in Belgium were forced to adapt once the war commenced.  
Immediately the system was taxed in a way it had never been before.  The relief of Belgium was 
not a matter of pouring a stream of supplies for a large number of people suddenly destitute, as is 
the case when a region is devastated by an earthquake; it was a problem of provisioning a highly 
industrialized, densely populated population suddenly cut off from the external markets 
generated its revenues and provided 80 percent of the cereals it consumed.  Belgians quickly 
responded in earnest to assist fellow Belgians.  Six organizations emerged dealing with relief in 
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occupied Belgium; ten looked after the wounded and convalescent Belgian soldiers, both in 
Britain and at the front; and nineteen dealt with clothing, food, rest, and recreation for Belgian 
soldiers at the front or on leave in England.101 
American participation in relief began immediately after Belgium was pulled into the 
fray.  In early August a committee of Americans residing in Brussels was formed under the 
patronage of Brand Whitlock to aid Americans caught in Europe and to assist the Legation and 
Consulate in organizing the American colony within the city.  Committee membership included 
several prominent Americans in the business and financial life of Brussels—Daniel Heineman, 
his associate William Hulse, and mining engineer Millard K. Shaler.  These men would serve as 
the connecting link between Belgian structure and American strategy that defined relief work 
during the war.102 
The challenges before Whitlock in particular were tremendous as the events of August 
and September 1914 unfolded.  Edward Eyre Hunt commented that Whitlock was the sole 
representative of the only great neutral power left in the world in Brussels and by his position 
was at the very center of the cyclone.  Waves of refugees, many of them destitute, all of them in 
a state of abject panic and demoralization flooded into Brussels as the Germans advanced.  
Without decisive and quick action these refugees would either starve by the roadside or be driven 
by desperation into plundering.  Diplomacy, Whitlock’s primary job in Belgium before the 
outbreak of war, was equally problematic.  Relations between the Belgians and the Germans 
were tenuous at best after the outbreak of war.  Reporting for the British press, Arno Bosch 
warned that slightest misunderstanding might upset everything.  “The relations between the 
Germans and Belgians are strained and dangerous,” Bosch continued, “In Brussels I felt as if I 
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were on the half-formed crust of a volcano.  A single hasty action by an American might bring 
disaster.”103 
During the week of August 1-8, 1914 the American committee met for the first time in 
Brussels.  At this conference the four men (Whitlock, Heineman, Shaler, and Hulse) discussed 
the means to relief fellow-Americans overwhelmed by the war.  The results of their planning 
were the raising of funds and the renting of a house where Americans might seek shelter.  They 
also made preliminary arrangements to assist Americans wishing to return to the states a safe 
way to Britain and then across the Atlantic.  This effort also would soon be taken over by 
Herbert Hoover.104 
American organizations in Brussels quickly became ad hoc institutions that Belgians 
turned to for assistance.  Staffed by Secretary Hugh Gibson and clerk Alexander Cruger, the 
American Legation became the foundation head for all sorts of help and advice for both Brussels 
and greater Belgium.  Edward Eyre Hunt believed that after August 20, the American Legation 
became the one stable point around which the demoralized population could rally.  The Legation 
formed and supplied bread lines, opened soup kitchens, and created depots to distribute clothing.  
Beyond that, it served as a haven of refuge.  Hunt recalled that American delegates in Brussels 
feared to think and could never speak out.  The only place in Belgium where they could speak 
their mind and listen to opinion without the fear of spies and perform their diplomatic duties was 
at the American Legation.  Visitors, including journalists, intermittently stopped by the 
American offices but invariably hurried across the border at the first opportunity.  Legation 
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representatives laughed at them but understood.  Belgium was, in the view of Hunt, “like a 
military prison and an asylum for the insane rolled into one.”105 
Within Belgium the Comité Central was also working towards providing relief locally.  
In mid-September they asked American mining engineer Millard Shaler to proceed to Holland 
and England to purchase some 2,500 tons of four, rice, beans, and peas to meet the immediate 
needs of Brussels soup kitchens.  The trip was treacherous for Shaler.  In Liége he was arrested 
and held for a day by the Germans before being allowed to enter Holland.  Finding no food 
available from the Dutch he went on to England, arriving in London on September 27.  Shaler 
found food in London, but encountered economic difficulties in securing the transaction.  These 
difficulties made the organization of the Committee for Relief in Belgium necessary before any 
food could be sent back to Belgium.106 
In carrying out his mission, Shaler made a connection that would change the character of 
Belgian relief permanently.  Around the time he reached London, Shaler had contacted Edgar 
Rickard, an acquaintance and professional associate of his, explaining the situation of peril 
facing Belgium and the purpose of his trip.  Promising to help if he could, Rickard took Shaler to 
an acquaintance of his.  Rickard believed if any man could save Belgium it was this individual—
one Herbert Clark Hoover.107 
Food relief became the primary component of American involvement by the beginning of 
October 1914.  Herbert Hoover commented upon his first study of the situation that although 
much relief work was already being done for the Belgian refugees but the circumstances for 
those remaining in the country were dire.  Because of their neutral position, Hoover’s 
recommendation was that Americans might be able to render a great service by concentrating 
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their relief efforts on a scheme to provide food for Belgians in Belgium.  Secretary Hugh Gibson 
of the American Legation ventured to London on October 1 in an attempt to garner support.  He 
brought with him stories of the increasing dangers of famine and Belgium along with letters from 
Brand Whitlock addressed to Ambassador Walter Hines Page urging American intervention.108   
Action quickly resulted from discussions and meetings in Britain.  Food began making its 
way to Belgium via Holland within weeks.  By the end of October the S.S. Coblenz crossed the 
channel with a cargo of flour, beans, and peas.  The voyage marked the beginning of a 
monumental effort.  It was the first of 2,313 cargoes destined for Belgium which in total carried 
more than 5,000,000 tons of relief supplies during the next five years.109 
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CHAPTER THREE: Creating the “Improvised Machine” 
Refugee Assistance in Britain 
As events began unfolding in the fall of 1914 the British were particularly in tune to the 
problems at hand in Belgium and proved ready and willing to assist.  In the first days of war 
British-based relief efforts began with the appearance on August 5, 6, and 9 of the Committee on 
the Prevention and Relief of Distress, the National Relief Fund, and the War Emergency 
Workers’ National Committee respectively.  Rising food prices and unemployment seemingly 
justified the creation of British relief committees.  On August 5, the Committee for the 
Prevention of Relief and Distress met for the first time; setting its purpose at advising on 
measures necessary to deal with distress arising in the consequence of war, and to initiate, 
advise, and coordinate action taken with a view to prevent and relieve distress.  The following 
day the Committee issued an advertisement “inviting” local authorities to establish committees 
for the prevention of relief and distress.  The committees were to be set up on “thoroughly 
representative lines” and should be comprised of local authorities, distress committees, and 
philanthropic bodies.  August 6 also marked the beginning of the National Relief Fund.  The 
quick emergence of charitable organizations revealed that private charity did not enter the war 
unprepared.  This was clearly demonstrated by the ability of the National Relief Fund to raise 
large sums of money during its first week of existence.110 
Both British and Belgian relief organizations were in need of organization.  Belgian relief 
in particular was at first a big, ramshackle business with only the limits of public generosity 
being its primary factor determining the level of growth.  An initial problem was that there were 
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too many organizations pursuing the same ends.  This issue would later be addressed by the CRB 
in its many statements that it was the official charity for the relief of Belgium.  The root cause of 
charity duplication was determined as the ambitions and strong wills of individuals whom 
desired to captain independent agencies.  Belgian charity loomed very large within the scheme of 
things in British society.  By February 1916 the editor of the Daily Chronicle (Robert Donald) 
listed 69 Belgian relief charities in operation.111   
Private philanthropy towards Belgium generally followed a similar structure as that 
offered by British relief commissions.  In the fall of 1914 when many of these groups were being 
formed the British government announced that private charity would be the best mode for 
handling war relief.  This view that the state should be seen and heard as little as possible in the 
treatment of most social problems was common throughout British society.  In many cases both 
before and during experts claimed that volunteer helpers, not bureaucrats, were best suited in 
dealing with suffering.  While philanthropists were generally conservative against the extension 
of state welfare in the case of Belgian relief they were at the same time prepared to countenance 
state intervention (or funding) where private efforts proved inadequate.112 
War relief efforts were rooted in the British philanthropic philosophies of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century.  At the center of British charitable forces was the Charity 
Organization Society (COS); an organization founded in 1869 to bring order from the chaos of 
London’s numerous but uncoordinated charities.  Initially the COS based its social program on 
the belief that poverty was the result of defects in character, not the social structure and the 
economic organization of Britain.  In the changed social and political climate of early twentieth 
century England the arguments for equal treatment of citizens in need gained primacy over the 
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COS’s discriminating moralism.  Despite its shrinking authority, the COS was still an active and 
powerful force in 1914.  One of its crucial contributions to early wartime relief organization was 
its dedication to scientific charity, espousing the believing that assistance must be based on the 
rigorous investigation of problems before taking action.113 
Extensive experience informed British charities that the methods by which help was 
administered were crucial.  Beyond the organizational implications of methods, the issue of 
moral consequence of aid for giver and receiver were also of critical importance.  Because it 
produced new social problems, exacerbated old ones and diminished others, war wrought 
changes in the philanthropic community of Britain.  Above all else the mushrooming growth of 
new charitable organizations brought into focus the problems that were traditionally endemic to 
philanthropy: overlapping effort, extravagance, and fraud.  Overlapping and waste went hand 
and hand in charity.  The slippery slope it created led from inefficiency and insensibility into 
fraudulent activity.114   
British relief organizations would not have to wait long for a steady stream of Belgians to 
appear in England.  Once in Britain their presence personalized the war for many British.  Brits 
were shocked by German reprisals against Belgian citizens and enraged by the destruction of 
Louvain over a period of six days in late September and early October 1914.  Naturally there was 
a sense of eagerness to receive confirmation of enemy barbarity from the lips of their victims.  
Reporters avidly questioned refugees at railway stations or transit camps for dramatic stories of 
murder, rapine, and pillage.  Through extensive print coverage the population of Belgium was 
transplanted almost overnight from a nation despised or ignored by the British public before the 
war into a brave, heroic ally.  Propagandist in both the public and private sectors painted a 
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picture of a stubborn, tenacious, conservative, thrifty, hardworking, and domestic Belgian nation.  
The coming of war forced the British government to prepare for the unthinkable—the invasion of 
England.  Belgian refugees in the early days of World War I first brought Britain face to face 
with what invasion meant to the population.115 
Importing refugees from Belgium to Britain was seen as a patriotic and humane duty.  
“We in England must throw out the life-lines, we must invite and select and transport, not merely 
receive, the exiles, “Sir Gilbert Parker exclaimed, “It is our clear duty to do so.”  At the same 
time, bringing refugees to England appeared to be the least of several possible evils.  The 
promise of the British government to allow food to be shipped to Belgium meant placing a strain 
on the shipping capacity of the Allies.  Feeding refugees in England prevented complex 
entanglements with the Germans and Americans.  Beyond any overt political implications the 
contingents of Belgian refugees were concrete reminders of the righteousness of the Allied 
cause.  From the beginning of the war Britain’s one immutable and avowed promise was the 
complete restoration of Belgium to its pre-war boundaries.  “Guests of the nation” in the early 
months of the war were symbols of British commitment and compassion for both propagandists 
and the thousands of hardworking men and women in local committees alike.116   
Refugee relief began to normalize as 1914 ended and 1915 began.  November witnessed 
a drastic decline in the number of new committees formed to deal with refugees.  By the time the 
great wave of slowed to a trickle in 1915 some two thousand local committees in Britain were 
formed.  The great majority of these groups began as spontaneous creations of local citizens.  
                                                          
115 Cahalan, Belgian Refugee Relief in England during the Great War, p. 112.  Loc cit, p. 112-113.  Loc cit, p. 186.  
Loc cit, p. 187.  Loc cit, p. 117. 
116 Daily Telegraph, Dec 9, 1914.  Cahalan, Belgian Refugee Relief in England during the Great War, p. 125.  Loc 
cit, p. 125-126.  Loc cit, p. 126.  Loc cit, p. 6.  Loc cit, p. 217. 
 
73 
 
Most frequently an individual or a group of friends and neighbors began by offering to take in 
refugees and then enlisted the entire community to help.117 
Once committees were in place the aid provided to Belgian refugees fell into several 
different categories.  At an elementary level it entailed the giving of gifts in kind, such as 
clothing or food.  But as a semi-permanent refugee community emerged in Britain the needs of 
assistance became increasingly complex.  Organizations expanded giving to include cheap or 
free health care, education, and grant in aid wages along with the intangible services of advice 
and guidance.  Apart from the War Refugees Committee, the National Food Fund, Belgian 
Refugee Food Fund, Women’s Emergency Corps, Catholic Women’s League, Belgian Lawyers’ 
Aid Society, Belgian Journalists’ Emergency Fund, Belgian Doctors and Pharmacists Relief 
Fund, Belgian Orphans Fund, Anglo-Belgian Lace Depot, Exiled Gentlewomen’s Outfitting 
Association, Belgian Cooks Society and the Belgian Repatriation Fund dealt exclusively with 
refugees in England.118 
The War Refugees Committee (WRC) in particular stood as one of the most important 
organizations offering assistance to Belgians in Britain during the war.  Founded on August 23, 
1914 the committee was guided by the notion that philanthropy was the domain of the wealthy 
and that “influence” counted more than “representation.”  In practice the WRC saw its task 
solely in terms of providing hospitality.  Initially relief workers shared the dual assumption that 
the war would be short and that the job of finding basic accommodation left them little time to 
worry about other refinements such as providing work for the expatriated.119   
                                                          
117 Steadily this number dwindled down to about fifteen hundred.  Cahalan, Belgian Refugee Relief in England 
during the Great War, p. 171.  Loc cit, p. 171. 
118 Cahalan, Belgian Refugee Relief in England during the Great War, p. 329.  Loc cit, p. 329-330.  Loc cit, p. 453. 
119 Cahalan, Belgian Refugee Relief in England during the Great War, p. 48.  Loc cit, p. 206. 
 
74 
 
In a manner of speaking the refugee relief movement in Britain had no guiding principles 
or ideology.  The movements’ central organization (the WRC) began as an ad hoc response to an 
immediate problem.  Other minor organizations constructed well-articulated philosophies at 
inception, but these ideals were swiftly cast aside by the consuming and mundane work of the 
here and now.  The pragmatic, non-fundamental based nature of relief was hardened by the fact 
that most people involved in the work were motivated not by an overwhelming compassion for 
the plight of Belgium—though pity played a part—but by a simple desire to be involved with the 
war effort.  The WRC in particular began as a collection of elite philanthropists and ended as a 
body of social workers.  It was by sheer coincidence this group in particular and not some other 
form of philanthropic or patriotic endeavor claimed Belgian refugees first.120 
Government involvement in refugee and other forms of relief was juxtaposed against a 
private philanthropic structure especially in regards to funding.  Financial responsibility was the 
first thorny question to be addressed by the two seemingly separate spheres.  The WRC quickly 
realized that without governmental assistance their efforts would have limited effects.  Problems 
relating to transportation and housing in particular required the approval and assistance of the 
British government.  For this reason the WRC existed as a private charity dependent on 
governmental funds.  Conversely, the government accepted that refugee relief was a national 
responsibility yet chose to rely primarily on voluntary efforts.  While both the government and 
the WRC were aware of the ambiguities surrounding their division of labor it was never possible 
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for one to completely take over the task of refugee relief from the other.  Throughout the war the 
balance of power between the two was tenuous and at times confrontational.121   
Despite its struggles, the WRC could only claim success in part from its relationship with 
the British government.  Its generosity was based around an arrangement of mutual reluctance in 
which the government surrendered funds while the committee handed over much of its 
independence.  In regards to funding, the WRC accumulated most of its wartime monies in the 
early days of the war.  After the first few months refugees increasingly became a public 
responsibility as totals of private benevolence reached a plateau and eventually declined.  The 
happily chaotic independence of the war’s early months were a luxury ill-afforded as the war 
dragged on and as private resources dwindled or went to other causes.  By June 1916 the WRC 
possessed a cache of £97,000.  During the last eighteen months of the committees’ existence 
(April 1917 to December 1918) an additional £4,420 in private funds trickled in.  In contrast, by 
the time the last Belgian arrived back home the British government had spent approximately £3.5 
million on refugee relief.122 
Refugees created a peculiar set of problems once they arrived in Britain.  Both private 
organizations and the British government struggled to figure exactly what they were dealing 
with.  In 1914, relief officials for example had a difficult time ascertaining just how many 
Belgians were in England.  While military authorities were concerned with refugees on the 
grounds of national security, local police concerns regarding refugees were much wider.  
Refugees ran the risk of being generally undesirable or worse yet, were potential perpetrators of 
espionage or more serious crimes.  Beyond crime one of the most challenging aspects of refugee 
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relief was securing adequate housing—both in terms of quantity and quality.  Refugees were 
herded into depots usually reserved for the dregs of society whose accommodations were at best 
Spartan and at worst dilapidated and dirty.  Overcrowding was also a serious problem in areas of 
war production boom where refugees joined the scramble for accommodation.123  
Meanwhile, Americans in Belgium and Britain assumed the task of rescuing thousands of 
fellow countrymen in Europe.  Difficulties in completing the mission was compounded as 
frontiers in Europe closed and travel became more restricted.  As was the case with other 
assistance programs, relief of stranded Americans lacked organization.  In the first few days of 
war Americans crowed the American Legation in Brussels.  Quickly the number of Americans 
that flocked to the Legation proved beyond what inadequate resources could be provided for 
their assistance.  It was at that point Whitlock contacted Daniel Heineman who was himself in 
Brussels.124 
Across the English Channel Americans in London faced similar, yet not as dramatic, 
circumstances as those stranded in Belgium.  London was full of Americans who were perfectly 
solvent at home but effectively broke in Britain.  They all were in need of lodging, food, railway 
and steamer tickets, and pocket money to get them through.  Above all they were in need of a 
new tourist agency that could not only arrange for their subsistence and traveling needs, but also 
serve as one that would be able to provide cash for their arrangements on the basis of personal 
checks drawn from American banks.  It was under these circumstances that Herbert Hoover and 
Edgar Rickard organized a committee of acquaintances in London that secured funds from their 
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own credit and arranged the safe passage home for 160,000 fellow countrymen without personal 
profit or gain.125   
Hoover and Rickard worked in concert with Ambassador Walter Hines Page in London 
to remedy the situation.  Hoover’s participation relieved a great deal of personal weight from the 
Ambassador who initially assuming the burden and responsibility of coordinating several 
different efforts himself.  Working quickly in August 1914, Hoover used his experience in 
managing large engineering projects to reduce the mass of confused Americans into an orderly 
group.  With ten other Americans he guaranteed an American Bank in London against 
transaction losses and announced that all sorts of American paper would be exchangeable for 
hard currency.  Hoover also arranged transportation with steamship companies to send the stream 
of tourists homeward.  At the height of exodus from Europe, 5,000 Americans passed each day 
through Hoover’s makeshift organization.  In accepting checks and paper totaling more than 
$1,500,000 the effort lost between $150 and $400.126   
Organizing Efforts Leading to the Creation of the CRB 
The experience of repatriating Americans showcased the organizing and coordinating 
talents that Hoover would soon apply to the CRB.  “This was the first time that those friends who 
were not also his business associates saw Hoover at work,” Will Irwin commented in 1928.  
“Compared to his big engineering enterprises, I know now, it was almost child’s play,” Irwin 
continued in the article appearing in the New York Times, “We marveled nevertheless at the 
smooth run of his improvised machine.”  Hoover’s efficient methods of coordinating funding and 
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transportation for the safe passage home of Americans in Europe was noticed and appreciated in 
both Britain and Belgium.  His services would soon be called upon for a task much larger.127 
Events leading to the creation of the CRB began taking shape in August of 1914.  
Movements of various types from different nations were started to bring aid to the embattled 
country as soon as the outside world became aware of what was happening in Belgium.  In the 
early days of the war many emergency problems were met through funds supplied by the Belgian 
government and out of the Belgian Relief Fund.  It would not be until October 1914, however, 
that a recognized channel existed to relieve the growing distress in Belgium.  Amidst a scene of 
considerable uncoordinated charitable activity the CRB sprouted roots and began taking form.128   
Relief efforts in Belgium were at the locus of uncoordinated was charities during the 
month of August.  September by contrast brought the first attempts to bring order from chaos 
through the creation of the Comité Central in Brussels on the 5th.  Initiated to provide 
unemployment relief to the city and its neighbors, the weight of intense demands flowing in from 
the rest of the country pressed the Comité Central into the becoming part of the larger Comité 
National.  In the face of these increasing demands, Emile Francqui wrote to the Belgian Minister 
in London asking him to send out an appeal for global charitable offerings on September 9.  
Within Belgium the Comité Central worked to provide food relief inside the occupied state as 
diplomatic channels worked outside the country to raise charitable funds for the program.  In 
Brussels a uniform daily ration of 200 grams (seven ounces) of bread and a half liter (one pint) of 
soup was distributed.  Of the fifteen centimes total price for the provision the individual was 
expected to pay five centimes of the cost.  In making up the difference the Comité National 
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contributed five centimes while the rest was taken care of by the communal charity office or by 
the communal administration.129 
The problem for the Comité Central and the Comité National was that the work grew 
faster than it could be organized and dealt with.  Organizers believed that the Comité National 
was perfectly suited to distribute food through the communes to its own people as long as it 
could secure an ample supply of foodstuffs.  The securing of food became the factor that all 
relief hinged on in Belgium regardless of the scope and breadth of operation.  Short term 
planning coupled with the inability of organizers to see into the future contributed to their 
difficulties.  Whitlock remembered that, “In my own boundless ignorance I had no notion of the 
quantity of food required until I read the memorandum prepared by the Comité National.  The 
war would soon be over anyway, and if we could only get through the winter all would go 
well.”130 
Securing foodstuffs became the most immediate need for the domestic programs of 
Belgian relief.  On September 26, representatives of the Comité Central (including Millard K. 
Shaler) reached London.  Shaler immediately went to enlist his American engineering colleagues 
in the project of sending food to Belgium.  Part of Shaler’s mission in London was also to drum 
up awareness of the situation in Brussels through publicity and the press in order to solicit 
support.  One of his contacts, columnist Phillip Patchin of the New York Tribune sent several 
cable dispatches back to the US detailing the both the situation in Belgium and the object of 
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Shaler’s mission.  In one of the dispatches, Shaler was quoted as saying that the food shortages 
threatening famine in Belgium could only be averted by shipments from foreign nations.  He 
added that the American government owed it to Belgium for reasons of pure humanity to insist 
that Germany take favorable action or make shipments through American diplomats whether the 
Germans agree to it or not.131 
While Shaler pressed the issue of Belgian relief in London his engineering contacts also 
began yielding results.  After describing the situation to Edgar Rickard he was taken to Herbert 
Hoover who with John Beaver White, Clarence Graff, and Millard Hunsiker was in the process 
of repatriating 100,000 Americans through the American Relief Committee in London.  
According to Whitlock, those who were involved in Belgian relief and those who were about to 
get involved in the effort failed to realize at the time what a task it would be to feed Belgium.  He 
recalled that if they had known the monstrous task before them it would have been appalling.  At 
the time there were stores of wheat in available in Antwerp.  The mission was simply one of 
securing the supply and getting it past the German army to Brussels.132 
Getting Herbert Hoover Involved 
After the work of the American Relief Committee in London was completed many of its 
members shifted their attention to the task Belgian relief.  On October 4, a meeting attended by 
Hoover at the office of Walter Hines Page initiated the organization that became the CRB.  At 
that moment relief efforts inside Belgium were in a terribly disorganized and demoralized 
condition.  Deprived of ordinary facilities for transportation and communication the Belgians 
could not hope to effect an adequate organization for assistance themselves.  Hoover explained 
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that it was essential that some neutral agency, possessed of liberty of movement and freedom 
from the severe measures imposed on them by the Germans should undertake the initial work of 
bring order out of the chaos.133 
From the beginning, all material obstacles—such as financial difficulties, shipping issues, 
or questions of distribution—were to be overcome by careful organization, by efficient 
application or trained intelligence, and by proven business methods.   In the early twentieth 
century the terms “efficiency” and “economy” were catchphrases of the day.  These factors 
became critical components of CRB strategy and structure.  In this process it was determined that 
Americans were the best-suited to take charge of neutral relief to Belgium.  Captain C.F. Lucey 
believed that only his fellow countrymen could provide the directing influence necessary in the 
provinces.  In his estimation only Americans could secure unity of purpose and efficiency.  
Using mostly voluntary service the CRB began work with the idea of accomplishing as much as 
possible through a maximum expenditure of energy and directed intelligence and a minimum 
expenditure of money.  In the early days, delegates literally threw themselves into the breach and 
did what was to be done without inquiring into what their authority was or whether they were 
expected to attack the problem which they devoted themselves to.134  
The first and most important business of neutral relief after the meeting on October 4 was 
initiating a series of negotiations with German authorities to protect native products from 
requisitioning.  A second crucial task was carving out agreements with the Germans that would 
govern interaction between the military government and relief work.  Success of any relief body 
in Belgium would ultimately hinge on the attitude and the cooperation of the German military 
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towards the process of ravitaillement.  The diplomacy that came to represent the work of neutral 
relief with the governments of Britain, France, Germany, and the United States presented 
enormous obstacles from the beginning.  In the first months of the war the immediate stumbling 
block was the British naval blockade and the general state of enmity that existed between the 
Germans and the Belgians.135   
The process of breaking through the blockade began on October 1 with a letter written to 
the State Department by Walter Hines Page in consultation with Hoover asking for the authority 
to protect relief supplies under the conditions of an export permit.  From that point forward any 
progress made towards the shipping of neutral relief was slow and methodical.  On October 6, 
Page informed Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan that both British and German 
authorities consented to the export of supplies on the condition that they be dispatched by the 
American Embassy in London and consigned by the American Legation at Brussels.  Critical to 
the process of negotiation were the appeals of the Central Relief Committee through the 
American and Spanish Ministers to Governor-General Kolmar von der Goltz for a guarantee of 
safe passage of Belgian relief.136  
Timeliness was also factor that American representatives in London and Brussels had to 
take into account.  In Belgium the clock was running out—famine conditions were quickly 
approaching.  On October 13, Millard Shaler reported to the American press that three weeks ago 
he left Brussels with a $100,000 credit to purchase foodstuffs for Brussels.  Since that time the 
situation had grown worse.  When Shaler departed for London there were 200,000 people 
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already receiving rations.  “I have the authority to ship fifteen hundred tons,” Shaler explained, 
“but there is no way of getting the food there until the diplomatic red tape is cut.”137 
The critical point of contention in mid-October 1914 was how to get the food supplies 
secured through American efforts from England to Belgium.   Ongoing negotiations culminated 
with a series of German guarantees that provided the basis for future agreements regarding CRB 
shipping.  On October 14, Baron von der Lancken promised that food imported by the neutral 
commission would be free from German requisitions.  In discussing the situation with Whitlock, 
von der Lancken explained that while the German government was well disposed to aid in the 
feeding of Belgium there was not enough food in Germany to provide for both their own people 
and the Belgians.  Two days later Marshal von der Goltz gave formal, written guarantee that the 
foodstuffs imported by the American Relief Committee for the Comité Central would remain at 
the sole disposal of this organization and would be free from requisitions.138   
With German guarantees secured the American Legation sent Baron Lambert and Emile 
Francqui of the Comité Central and Hugh Gibson to London to present Belgium’s case before 
the British government.  Before sending their representatives the Comité Central sketched out the 
basic plan of organization for what would become the CRB in an October 17 Associated Press 
dispatch, explaining that “there has been initiated here and referred to in Washington a 
comprehensive organization of an American committee with the purpose of taking over the 
entire task of furnishing food and other supplies to the population of Belgium, so far as 
American relief measures are concerned, under the official supervision of the American 
government.”  The following day when Francqui, Lambert, and Gibson arrived in London they 
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found the ground swept clean for action.  In an almost continuous series of meetings over the 
next four days (October 19-22) the Commission for Relief in Belgium and the Comité National 
de Secours et d’ Alimentation were created.  The outline of dual organization in Belgium relief 
established during the first day of meetings stipulating that the American commission was to 
undertake the work of centralizing gifts and supplies, making purchases, arranging shipping, 
supervising distribution inside Belgium, and enforcing conditions imposed by belligerent 
governments while the Comité National and the communes was to control the actual handling 
and distribution of all imported food.139 
Diplomatic channels were simultaneously working to secure supplies while the 
superstructure of Belgian relief was taking shape.  On October 19, Ambassadors Page and 
Whitlock received authorization from the State Department to extend their personal patronage to 
the work of shipping supplies into Belgium.  The following day the British government promised 
to not interfere with the shipment of foodstuffs from neutral countries carried by neutral vessels 
consigned to the American Minister at Brussels or to the US Consul at Rotterdam.  While the 
agreement opened the door for neutral shipping through the blockade, the limited acquiescence 
of the British would be wholly inadequate for what would become the shipping goals of the CRB 
including some 80,000 tons of provisions per month carried by a fleet forty ocean steamers 
constantly in motion.140 
In the course of their diplomatic work the three representatives of the Comité Central 
appealed personally to Ambassador Walter Hines Page in Britain.  It was through Page that they 
were referred to Herbert Hoover.  Hoover had been a resident of London for ten years before the 
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outbreak of war and had come to be recognized as one of the ablest organizers among the 
American contingent in the city.  At the time he was in control of a large share of the world’s 
supply of base metals, particularly zinc and lead.  Earlier that year Hoover was in Europe 
securing from various governments their participation in the Panama Pacific Exposition.  August 
1, 1914 found Hoover in London.141 
Hoover’s work in assisting stranded Americans in Belgium and Britain pushed his efforts 
into the sphere of relief and benevolence.  He was immediately impressed by the seriousness of 
the situation after having his attention initially to the plight of Belgium by fellow Californian 
Edgar Rickard.  Hoover recommended that perhaps a program of importation requirements for 
food could be met within the constraints of diplomatic relations if the foodstuffs were consigned 
to the American Minister in Belgium and distributed under his guardianship.  Using his own 
contacts, Hoover then took the Millard Shaler who was in London with funds to secure food for 
Brussels to Ambassador Page who promptly agreed to use his standing with the British 
government to assist in negotiations.142 
In September 1914 Hoover participated in a series of conferences that drew him into the 
work of Belgian relief permanently.  For three days he sat with Ambassador Page and the 
Belgian committee, discussing details and imagining the possibilities of relief.  Every evening he 
contemplated his own situation before finally deciding to cast his lot with the relief of Belgium.  
Working directly with Page, he suggested that relief should be undertaken not only for Brussels 
but for the entire occupied territory.  Hoover also lobbied for the creation of an organization 
under American leadership with Belgian participation that would protect the Belgians from 
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interference and to secure the coordination of efforts within the country itself.  Specifically, he 
proposed on September 17 that local assurances given by German authorities should be extended 
to the entire population of Belgium and that direct guarantees should be obtained from the 
German and British governments since the work of the commission could not rest solely on the 
assurances of military officers.  This memorandum was later considered as the working 
“constitution” for CRB and Comité National work.143 
By the end of September, Hoover realized what his decision to head Belgian relief efforts 
meant.  At the same time he found many of his associates from the American Relief 
Committee—men including Millard Hunsiker, Edgar Rickard, and John Beaver White—willing 
to assist him in this new undertaking.  On October 12, Hoover made a formal proposition to 
Ambassador Page establishing that all funds raised in America for the aid of Belgians should be 
concentrated to the feeding of the civil population and that an American committee should be 
concurrently authorized by diplomatic representatives to act as the agency to centralize, disburse, 
and administer all funds related to the project.  After the proposal was immediately accepted, 
Hoover issued an appeal the next morning to the American press and cabled a personal message 
to Whitlock requesting him to reinforce his explanation of the situation to President Wilson.144   
News of the projected American organization for relief in Belgium spread quickly.  A 
critical component of CRB success during the war would prove to be its use of the press.  
Hoover repeatedly used his personal relationships with newspapers and newsmen back in the 
states to plead his case before the American people.  He also considered the public relations 
component of the CRB to be one of its most important departments.  On October 15 the world 
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was introduced to the organization that seven days later would be permanently recognized as the 
CRB through an Associated Press dispatch in which Hoover outlined the problems in Belgium 
and his plans for their solution.  In the interview, Hoover again commented on the necessity of 
centralizing all funds collected outside of Britain under an individual or individuals familiar with 
existing conditions in Belgium.  In a memo to Page five days later, Hoover explained in detail 
the importance of the press writing that in order to maintain an open gateway into Belgium and 
at the same time protect the native food supply from further absorption by the occupying army, it 
would be necessary to create the widest possible feeling (in both belligerent and neutral nations) 
as to the rights of the Belgian population which is dependent normally upon importation of food 
supply that one of the first duties of the American organization will be to create such a public 
opinion as widely as possible.145 
Herbert Hoover immediately gained a stellar reputation for his efforts in relieving 
Belgium.  In October 1914, Hoover was a relative unknown outside of the mining industry and 
the business world.  With his odd pervasiveness, Hoover naturally drew men to him and won 
their loyalty, friendship, and confidence.  A common characteristic among CRB volunteers 
throughout the war would be their loyalty to the chief.  With his characteristic modesty, Hoover 
always depreciated the tendency to attribute the success of the commission to his own efforts.  
He sought to make the CRB an institution by setting it in motion in such a way that it would not 
depend on any one man or group of men.  Whitlock commented within three months of 
beginning CRB efforts that “I admire this man Hoover, who has a genius for organization and for 
getting things done, and beneath it all, with his great intelligence, he has a wonderful human 
heart.”  Whitlock also observed that “One could not talk with him long without seeing that there 
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was great idealism there; it showed in the first words he spoke concerning the Belgians and their 
suffering.  He had them on his heart already.”  Emile Francqui concurred.  “We have the good 
fortune to have at the head of the commission in London a man of action in every sense of the 
term, Mr. Hoover,” he added.  When Hoover was pressed to directly take over the relief of 
Brussels on October 18, the American and Belgian contingent knew that his experience in the 
purchase and transport of materials and his familiarity with the landscape made him well suited 
for the job.146  
Hoover was reluctant at the time to take charge of relief efforts in Belgium.  While 
sympathetic to the problems of the Brussels committee, Hoover pointed out that he knew little 
about food management and that had great professional obligations to important concerns over 
the world, all of which were in difficulty because of the war.  After a long evening of 
contemplation, the next morning Hoover and his wife Lou concluded that duty called him to 
accept.  Upon accepting the task Hoover asked for the stipulation that he pay his own expenses 
and receive no compensation for his work.  At the time Hoover did not recognize the impact of 
the decision.  He was about to enter public service through an organization that for four and a 
half years managed the feeding of ten million people.  At the time Hoover and other relief 
officials believed that the war would last no longer than the next summer (1915).  Their initial 
strategy called for the temporary relief of Belgium until the next harvest.147   
The Purpose of the CRB (October 1914) 
Hoover finalized his plans for Belgian relief in the days before the CRB was officially 
launched on October 22, 1914.  Hoover laid out precisely what he envisioned for Belgium in an 
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October 20 memorandum addressed to Walter Hines Page.  He began with the statement that in 
order to provide for the proper distribution of foodstuffs and relief there must be a consolidation 
of organization in Belgium on national lines with sub-committees in provinces and communes 
under strong central control.  He continued with the statement that in order to provide for the 
purchase and shipment of foodstuffs abroad, for the mobilization of charity throughout the 
world, and for the guardianship of the supplies in Belgium and the supply of American members 
to Belgian committees, an American committee should be set up under the patronage of 
American Ambassadors and Ministers, with a head office in London and branches in New York, 
Rotterdam, and elsewhere as may become necessary. 148   
Hoover also had a clear plan in regards to the financial arrangements of Belgian relief.  In 
his memorandum to Page, Hoover explained that in order to solve the economic situation outside 
of charity and to obtain permits for exchange transactions inside and outside of Belgium from 
belligerent governments the organization should in the first place obtain possession of Belgian 
bank balances abroad and make counter payments to Belgian owners from the sale of foodstuffs 
to avoid the actual transfer of money over the frontier.  Hoover also understood that gaining 
access to the large amounts of working capital necessary to secure foodstuffs from external 
markets would also prove challenging.  As a partnership subject to unlimited liability the original 
banking interest immediately withdrew from the program.  In order to meet these large financial 
obligations he recommended that a loan be secured from England and guaranteed by Belgian 
banks specifically for this purpose.  Within the organization itself, Hoover demanded that from 
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inception a strict and complete system of accounting for all financial transactions, including 
accurate statistical records covering the movement of all commodities, should be kept.149 
Dealing with belligerents was one of the most apparent issues as questions regarding the 
organization of Belgian relief began to be worked out.  Hoover recognized that a fragile balance 
was needed and that an uneasy coexistence might be necessary.  He predicted even before relief 
work commenced that there would be a great deal of antagonism on the part of the Allies 
concerning the introduction of foodstuffs into Belgium because of their position that it was the 
duty of the occupying army to feed the civil population.  In view of this position, the securing of 
German assurances, maintaining strict neutrality and the opening of the naval blockade became 
all the more important to both Hoover and the CRB.  Hoover’s initial belief that penetration of 
the blockade and the Occupation Zones could be accomplished only through the intervention of 
Americans with the authorizations and guarantees from both belligerent  groups and under the 
patronage of powerful neutral governments remained a fundamental part of the CRB throughout 
the entire course of its work in Belgium and Northern France.  As a result of its position the 
commission came to be regarded as a kind of informal state with its own international 
agreements under special privileges and immunities granted by the belligerents including travel 
passports and the recognition of the CRB flag on the open seas.150 
Despite the complexity of the operation, Hoover categorized the work of the CRB into 
three distinct functions.  The first job of the commission was to protect foodstuffs and native 
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produce in Belgium.  The second task was to purchase and transport foodstuffs into Belgium 
through the subventions they receive from the Comité National and other sources.  The third duty 
of the commission was to stimulate the philanthropic efforts that would rescue the Belgian civil 
population from starvation.151 
After over a month of careful analysis and planning the American Commission for Relief 
in Belgium was formally organized at a meeting held in London’s Wall Buildings on October 22, 
1914.  Hoover told those in attendance that Ambassador Page had asked him to set up an 
organization to carry into execution the engagements undertaken by the American Ambassadors 
in London and Brussels with regard to the importation of foodstuffs and general relief for 
Belgium.  This sentence became the de facto charter for the commission.  Initial membership 
included Chairman Hoover, Vice-chairman Daniel Heineman, Treasurer Clarence Graff, and 
Secretaries Millard K. Shaler, Brand Whitlock, and William Hulse.152  
Four pressing orders of business were addressed in the first committee meeting.  First and 
foremost was the question of finding money for the purchase of food supplies.  The second 
concern dealt with the necessity of coming to an agreement with the British government so that 
the blockade of German ports and the invaded territory could be suspended at a place to be 
determined as a port of entry for relief supplies.  The third point regarded the desire to obtain 
guarantees first from the German government and then from the French that imported food for 
Belgium would be reserved for the civil population exclusively.  The fourth issue decreed that in 
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order to make distribution certain and effective it was crucial that the commission have entire 
control over all supplies imported.153 
The first meeting of the American Commission for Relief in Belgium was accompanied 
with a press statement released by Hoover explaining the organizational structure of the 
committee and the nature of the situation in which they were dealing with.  “It is obvious that 
with the scarcity of foodstuffs in Holland it is impossible to get supplies on that side for more 
than emergency service,” Hoover explained, “A stream of supplies must be started from America 
if the Belgians are to be saved from famine.”  “The supplies available at the relief stations in 
Brussels (on) Monday were believed to be sufficient to last until Saturday, and these were 
available only because a certain quantity of wheat was received from Antwerp,” he continued, 
“That source is now exhausted.”  In regards to available food supplies that situation was also 
becoming grim.  Hoover reported that “Because of the restrictions on the exportation of food it is 
extremely difficult to find even emergency provisions (in Britain), and supplies from America 
are even more imperatively needed than was originally expected.”154    
Neutral shipping was already underway by October 22.  Hoover announced that the 
British government agreed to contribute $750,000 a month while food to the value of $250,000 
had already been bought in the name of Ambassador Page and Minister Whitlock and was to be 
distributed in Belgium beginning on October 26.  He was confident that relief could reach the 
Belgian population through the newly established CRB system of shipping via neutral ships 
bearing authorization slips from belligerents.  Hoover confided to Page that “We are the only 
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channel through which such relief can be introduced into Belgium and the Comité Central is the 
only practical organization through which it can be distributed.”155 
The organizational structure of the CRB that retired in the summer of 1919 became quite 
different from the framework originally designed in October 1914.  At inception the commission 
was organized more or less as a temporary American Relief Committee to aid the suffering and 
the destitute in Belgium.  Born out of the exigencies of the military situation, the CRB was 
created as a temporary gap, or rather valve, in the iron-bound ring of the belligerent lines through 
which food could pass to the population living under German rule and by its consequence save 
the lives of millions.  As time passed it transitioned into a permanent neutral organization 
carrying on semi-diplomatic relations with at least seven governments (Germany, Britain, 
France, Belgium, US, Holland, and Spain) while playing the part of a commissary department for 
more than seven million people in Belgium and two million in France and acting as the medium 
of mobilization for the charity of the world.156   
The time frame of relief efforts itself was certainly a manner of conjecture in the fall of 
1914.  Few people believed in late October 1914 that it possible that the war could last more than 
a few months.  When the CRB was organized the idea prevailed that once the winter was over 
the commission’s work would come to an end.  In the interim, the relief that intervened was a 
system of food exports (based on emergency shipments of food) aimed at immediate threats of 
famine.  As time passed the program came to include clothing and other products that preserved 
the health of people in Belgium and Northern France.  Hoover himself expected that his 
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connection with the enterprise would end once negotiations regarding export permits were 
completed.  What he found was that it was only the beginning.157     
While the nature, scope, and breadth of relief work changed over time, the organizational 
structure stayed fairly constant during throughout the war.  From the beginning the CRB 
established its primary office in London with secondary bases of operations working in 
Rotterdam, New York, and Paris.  Housed at 3 London Wall Buildings, the diplomatic direction 
of the entire work of Belgian relief including the solicitation or purchase of supplies and their 
shipment was handled through this office.  Initially Millard Hunsiker served as the director for 
Britain, John Beaver White was the primary purchasing agent and manager of shipping, and 
Edgar Rickard handled publicity.  Seven to ten delegates who exercised general control over the 
work inside the occupied regions were assigned to the Brussels office.  At the local levels there 
were one or more delegates assigned to each of the nine Belgian provinces and in the six zones 
of the German army in Northern France to supervise the distribution and to keep an eye on the 
Germans.  This structure was of critical importance in achieving the CRB goal of unified control 
over the flow of foodstuffs into Belgium.158   
The organizational strategy struggled for clarity well after the structure was in place 
however.  The status of the commission as the sole channel through which supplies could be sent 
into the occupied territories was not generally understood outside of the CRB.  In America the 
impression prevailed that the commission was simply a London committee under Ambassador 
Page’s direction to forward supplies to Belgium.  As a result American committees that formed 
to assist Belgium sent their contributions to the American Embassy in London, the Legation at 
The Hague, or the American Consulate instead of the CRB offices in New York.  Early public 
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statements released by the CRB were aimed at clearing up this confusion by first bringing 
pressure on the US State Department to authorize American sponsorship of the enterprise and 
second to make the purpose of the commission better known across the nation.159 
Hoover and the CRB understood the importance of charity work and philanthropy among 
the populations of not only Britain and America, but the world as a whole.  Charitable 
contributions formed the first link in a chain that began its life as a gift in kind and ended as a 
meal, a piece of clothing, or some other form of direct relief in the communes of Belgium.  Much 
like foodstuffs, the supply of charity rarely remained constant or consistent with the changing 
needs of the commission.  To handle the flows of gifts it was determined that all charity should 
be turned over to the provisioning department with its full value being added to the general 
stream of goods destined for Belgium.  The value of the gift food was determined on the basis of 
the cost of replacement at the time of giving with the benevolence department being credited the 
estimated value against its books.160 
Public relations were also a critical component of maintaining supplies of foodstuffs and 
charity for Belgium.  Hoover himself knew the psychological and fund-raising value of a “strong 
punch cable” dispatched from the “scene of action.”  Under the direction of Will Irwin the press 
department of the CRB New York office instituted a system of daily and weekly news releases to 
papers and press associations and prepared pamphlets and handbooks for the use of committees 
in the field.  Weekly and monthly CRB publications carried articles on Belgian relief while both 
magazines and newspapers in America donated advertising space for appeals for contributions.  
The primary purpose of the CRB press campaign was to bring in contributions to the numerous 
collecting agencies.  A secondary purpose was the mobilization of general support for the whole 
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relief enterprise.  One of the most effective appeals for Belgian relief was the “Famous Authors 
Service” conceived of by Will Irwin.  Over a period of three months these syndicated stories by 
authors including George Bernard Shaw formed a serial appeal appearing in the leading 
newspapers of America.161 
Hoover recalled in a 1917 report on benevolence what he thought the nature of CRB 
work would be in October 1914 and how it changed over the course of the war.  At the outset it 
was hoped that the need for relief would continue for only a few months.  Three special 
conditions surfaced that necessitated the extension of relief beyond all initial expectations.  The 
first was an increase in destitution partly attributable to rising foodstuff and transportation prices.  
The second was attributable to the inability of world charity to keep pace without substantial and 
regular assistance through governmental subventions. The third involved the problem of the 
internal credit necessities supplied by receipts from food sales outrunning available commercial 
funding.162 
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CHAPTER FOUR: “The Largest Commissary Undertaking the World Has Ever Seen” 
The First Actions of the CRB (October-December 1914) 
With its initial charter in place the American Commission for Relief in Belgium leaped 
into action.  Decisive movement, not rhetoric was called for in late October 1914.  Two days 
after its public launching the commission released a statement published in the American press 
expressing that the commission realized that its work would require vast quantities of American 
grain and that work was underway to create an American branch of the commission to handle 
contributions of grain and money.  Meanwhile, Ambassador Page impressed upon the Secretary 
of State the seriousness of the situation and explained how the commission was handling 
American assistance.  Page told Bryan that since food cannot be bought on this side of the world 
the American committees should confer with Hoover through the American Embassy in Britain 
as to what kind of food was needed and how to send it instead of sending cash. “Money sent will 
be of no use,” Page declared, “Food sent except through the Commission may never reach 
Belgium or be confiscated.”163 
Questions of finance and operations were also in the minds of commission members after 
going public.  On October 26 Hoover wrote to Emile Francqui expressing his concerns over the 
money required to purchase food relief.  To purchase the necessary 60,000 tons of wheat, 15,000 
tons of maize, and 3,000 tons of rice and dried peas required the mobilization of between 
£800,000 and £1,000,000.  Organizationally the commission was changing quickly as well.  On 
the same day Hoover wrote to Francqui with his concerns about securing proper financing it was 
decided to drop the word “American” from its name and invite the Spanish diplomatic 
                                                          
163 In a letter to Lindon Bates, Hoover restated the position that was to be repeated over and over again in the British 
and American press—that it was certain that seven million people in Belgium were on the verge of famine. “The 
situation is one of the greatest gravity,” Hoover explained.  Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for 
Relief in Belgium, p. 1:251.  New York Times, Oct 25, 1914, p. 5.  Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the 
Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 1:20. 
 
98 
 
representatives and consuls in London and Belgium to join in the work.  The addition of Spanish 
representatives made Señor Don Merry del Val and the Marquis de Villalobar honorary chairmen 
of the commission.164 
Engendering American participation in Belgian relief at the local level was another task 
that the commission moved to address quickly.  Hoover detailed the situation regarding Belgium 
in a message to American W.J. Chalmers in Chicago on October 27.  “The Belgian National 
Relief Committee in Belgium (is) in desperation securing food supplies for their people (and) 
have appealed to America (to) procure and arrange for transportation and guardianship of 
foodstuffs in Belgium,” Hoover explained.  The chairman also made a personal appeal for 
assistance, “I would be glad to know if you would associate yourself with this effort and 
surround yourself with men of standing in Chicago as a branch of this committee who could 
undertake our work in that center.”165   
Hoover made contact with other Americans in a similar manner across the country during 
the fall of 1914.  An American press release on October 22 explained that because of the 
restrictions on the exportation of food it was extremely difficult to find even emergency 
provisions in Belgium.  This situation made supplies from America even more urgently needed 
than originally expected.  In order to bring new communities into activity, Hoover urged friends 
in America and elsewhere to take the lead in mobilizing support of relief in their communities.  
Telegrams were also sent to state governors asking them to appoint committees or otherwise 
assist in the campaign.  By the end of October, committees were independently organized in 
Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa, Massachusetts, and Nebraska.  In November, California, Kansas, 
Louisiana, New Hampshire, and Oregon, while Alabama, Georgia, and North Carolina followed 
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suit in December 1914.  By mid-January 1917 a total of thirty-six states had contributed through 
local Belgian relief committees.166 
As November began the issue of extending private philanthropy through public channels 
remained critically important.  Throughout the war the purchase of foodstuffs required a large 
supply of liquid/working capital.  During the early days of war however the CRB possessed little 
of the two most important things they required for success: foodstuffs and cash.  In a November 
3 letter to the diplomatic patrons of the CRB, Hoover confided that provisioning the entire nation 
of Belgium appeared to be such a large order that it cannot depend exclusively on private 
funding for its positive resolution.  “(While) every possible devise to secure private philanthropy 
will be used by this commission and no doubt will (succeed),” Hoover predicted, “there still 
remains the fact that such a supply is not dependable and that if the situation is to be handled 
properly and systematically we have got to have a substratum of government subvention.”167   
The press for local participation continued alongside new efforts to foment governmental 
participation.  In the New York Times on November 3, Hoover was quoted as saying “There are 
undoubtedly many committees organized and (are) organizing in different parts of the country 
for Belgian relief.”  In the first week of November the CRB sent out a series of appeals to 
individual states.  The Governor of Iowa received a telegram from Ambassador Page via the US 
State Department explaining in detail the organization and purpose of the Commission for Relief 
in Belgium.  Reaching its destination on November 6, the cable began with the clear designation 
that the CRB was the only agency that has the machinery for distribution of food in Belgium and 
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concluded with the statement that it works with the only committee in Belgium for local 
distribution in every community.168 
Once organized, local committees made appeals to community on behalf of Belgium.  In 
the November 9 edition of the New York Times the Belgian Relief Committee of New York 
asked “the people of the United States to relieve the distress of the unfortunate people of 
Belgium whose homes have been devastated by the war and who are not in desperate need of 
food.”  Relaying word from London, the appeal explained that “in order to meet the absolute 
necessities, food must be imported in very large quantities from America.”  The column was 
careful to explain the nature of relief and its trustworthiness.  The article concluded that “Every 
precaution seems to have been taken to insure the delivery of supplies to needy persons, for 
whom otherwise no provision whatever would be made.”  On November 13 the CRB issued a 
statement of its own that also appeared in the New York Times calling for generous Americans 
who were unable to donate money to contribute food.  “Each American farmer, out of the 
abundance of his crop, and every resident, from his own store, can well afford a few bushels of 
grain,” the appeal read, “What is needed is cereals—wheat, flour, shelled corn, beans, and peas, 
and also bacon and ham, as these are the only articles that will stand the long and difficult 
transport conditions.”169 
While ravitaillement efforts were underway the CRB continued to work on perfecting its 
organizational structure.  Hoover himself paid particular attention to the work of the CRB New 
York office, recognizing its importance as the center and fountainhead of American relief 
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destined for Belgium.  Explaining the desired structure, Hoover told Lindon Bates in New York 
on November 11 that the CRB wished to avoid overlapping existing committees in soliciting 
money but would offer all agencies free transport for any foodstuffs they provide.  In regards to 
methods of shipping, Hoover explained that it was most preferable to have express railway 
companies agree to collect and deliver supplies free to the seaboard.  Hoover concluded by 
telling Bates that the purpose of the CRB New York office was to place the commission’s 
machinery for the transport of foodstuffs in close cooperation with all previously-existing 
Belgian relief organizations in America.  Three and a half weeks later, Bates issued a statement 
on behalf of the CRB to the American press.  “A shipload of food a day is what the Belgians 
must have if they are to be saved from starvation,” Bates began in the piece.  “It will take 
6,000,000 pounds of food a day, and it is to the Untied States that these people must look for 
their chief assistance…” the New York Times quoted him as saying.170 
On November 14, Hoover gave Emile Francqui a status report on relief efforts in 
Belgium.  Hoover spoke of four accomplishments in his message detailing the work of an 
organization that was little more than three weeks old.  In staccato measure he proclaimed that 
the CRB had opened an office in New York and had advised the public that they would transport 
foodstuffs to Belgium for free; had secured the assistance of the two largest shipping companies 
in England and that they agreed to handle CRB shipping at no cost; had also secured the 
voluntary services of one of the largest food firms in the Baltic for free; and had taken steps to 
exercise responsible management in the handing of food.  By mid month the stage was set for 
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relief to begin its arduous trip from American farms, towns, and major cities to the Belgian 
communes.171 
The challenges facing the CRB began to be better understood by the beginning of 
December 1914.  The commission announced on December 2 that “the task of provisioning 
7,000,000 people for months, requiring the dispatch of a shipload of food every other day, is the 
largest commissary undertaking the world has ever seen, and demands the closest cooperation.”  
Beyond food the peculiar challenges involved in dealing with belligerents were also becoming 
clearer.  Commenting on the German position, Hoover explained on December 5 that Germany 
does not harbor the slightest objection to the importation of food stuffs for Belgians.  He added 
that since they were not responsible for the overseas blockade the Germans felt no obligation to 
feed a civil population that in normal times could maintain their own subsistence.   By contrast, 
the Allies contended that a free port for the importation of foodstuffs into Belgium was 
ostensibly an entreport for the Germans.172  
Hoover personally focused on the issue of humanly duty during the holiday season of 
1914.  Subtly he played upon emotions and spoke of responsibility when talking about the 
potential tragedies in Belgium to the press.  This same technique was used repeatedly by Hoover 
and the CRB press department throughout the war.  On December 21, an article in the Glasgow 
Herald contained Hoover’s observations as an American on the situation in Belgium.  In 
particular he focused on the bickering between belligerents that ultimately cost Belgians the 
most.  “Before the question is settled as to who has this moral responsibility for feeding the 
Belgians,” Hoover remarked, “these people will have been starved, violence will have broken out 
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in the country, and there will have been a large loss of life among an innocent people.”  In his 
second observation Hoover chastised the intense national hatreds that again ultimately cost the 
Belgians most of all.173 
Despite its numerous growing pains the CRB had forged a general scheme of operation 
by January 1, 1915.  In regards to merchandise, the commission stored all foodstuffs until they 
were ready to be handed over to the communes and retained full and complete power over the 
distribution of these stocks until they were in the hands of communal authorities.  A December 
1914 report on the CRB explained that in spite of the fact that the merchandise was entrusted to 
the Provincial Committees it was still the property of the commission.  As a result the delegate 
retained responsibility for its safety until final delivery.174   
In regards to the Germans, the CRB reported that the occupational government 
guaranteed that all merchandise introduced into Belgium by the commission and distributed by 
the Comité National would be left alone.  Placards were provided by the Brussels office of the 
CRB to remind the Germans of their promises.  To the commission’s delegates fell the 
responsibility of making sure that these placards were properly displayed at all storehouses, 
mills, or on merchandise in transit and making sure that they were used honestly and without 
misrepresentation.  Preventing requisitions was among the most important jobs performed by 
CRB representatives.  News reports or even false rumors regarding German soldiers taking 
advantage of relief supplies would place the support of Britain and even the America in jeopardy.  
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Delegates had to be vigilant if the commission was to maintain its funding from Allied and 
neutral sources.175 
After several months of operation the role of the delegate was better defined, taking in 
large part the final format it would have for the remainder of the war.  CRB delegates at the 
local/communal level were required to keep what were essentially log books of their duties.  In 
these books the delegate was compelled to keep detailed and exact records of ravitaillement 
under his supervision—including keeping close tabs on all goods received and distributed.  The 
commission also mandated in December 1914 that all delegates should be well versed on the 
entire organization of relief so they could fully understand the principles on which it was based.  
While this made sense in print, delegates on the front lines frequently reported that they learned 
their duties on the job.176 
Financial planning in the early days of relief also proved to be a work in progress.  
Monetarily, the committee conceived itself as a charitable operation funded by private donations 
in kind and cash plus what slender resources that could be gathered from Belgian bank reserves 
abroad.  With less than $500,000 available for immediate use the CRB decided to place an initial 
order for 20,000 tons of food per month at a debt obligation of nearly $2,000,000.  The 
commission believed that in reply to this purchase a generous response by the public would be 
forthcoming.177   
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Financially this program of purchase was extremely risky.  Hoover himself quickly 
recognized that the task of relief was far greater than these precarious incomes would support.  
Pressed by the commission the Allies had made their first advance of £100,000 to the CRB while 
an additional £100,000 was obtained from the Belgian Relief Fund in England by the end of 
October.  Edgar Rickard had also immediately gone to work on planning and carrying out a 
campaign for benevolent funds.  Within two months his efforts generated 100,000 tons of gift 
food in America valued at more than $5,000,000.  During this time the Rockefeller Foundation 
became a major contributor to relief efforts in Belgium.  Beginning on November 1, the 
foundation purchased food, chartered ships, dispatched cargoes, and arranged warehouse space 
for the Belgian Relief Fund of New York.178   
For the first few months of the war the Rockefeller Foundation played a vital role in 
assisting the CRB in creating it system of relief while providing valuable funding.  Rockefeller’s 
motivation for getting involved was reportedly that “millions of innocent human beings who 
have taken no part whatever in the hostilities are in danger of starving to death, and too much 
cannot be done for them.”  In a press release the foundation explained that the most appalling 
and terrible effects of war fall upon the non-combatants.  To protect them the foundation was 
willing to provide millions of dollars in the various countries involved if necessary.  
Commenting on philanthropic work as a whole the November 2 edition of the New York Times 
believed that “there (are) assurances now that actual starvation will be prevented by this splendid 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
without direct exports from states requiring upwards of 20,000 tons of foodstuffs monthly.  Gay and Fisher, Public 
Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 2:247.   
178 Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 1:214.  By November 1914 the 
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cooperation of the Rockefeller Foundation with the other admirable agencies, that there will be 
sufficient relief for large numbers, and that the shipping and distribution of supplies will be 
accomplished in the most (expeditious) and competent manner.”179 
For the remainder of the calendar year the CRB continued to organize the flow of relief 
into Belgium while the structure and system of the commission was still in its formative stage.  
While destitution became the problem first attacked by the CRB, questions regarding relief soon 
expanded to include the issue of finding a way to introduce a minimum ration for the entire 
population.  This would mean an immediate increase the projected totals of food imports for 
Belgium.  With financial arrangements sheepishly in place the commission’s representatives 
began arranging shipments of food.  As soon as the British Government tentatively approved the 
CRB plan to ship food into Belgium, Hoover sent Captain J.F. Lucey and Millard Shaler on 
October 25 to Rotterdam to make final arrangements for the transshipment of two cargoes then 
loading on the Thames.  This first shipment of relief by the commission contained approximately 
2,000 tons of flour, rice, peas, and beans.180   
The modest cargo of two small steamers carrying relief could not reach Belgium fast 
enough.  Mr. Hoover wrote to Mrs. Hoover on October 26 that over one million people were 
presently on the bread line in Belgium.  At the moment there were enough supplies to last the 
population from one to three weeks.  To most of those involved the question remained whether 
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the efforts at securing funding and food were too little, too late.  Ernest Solvay explained in a 
statement dated October 29 that the population of Belgium was at the point of famine.  At the 
same time however he referred to the CRB as a beacon of hope for the future.  Solvay 
proclaimed, “Thanks to their invaluable and devoted efforts and to their diplomatic negotiations, 
I think I can say that we have overcome, at least for the time being, the terrible position in which 
we are placed.”  Nevertheless, the prospects remained grim.  Reporting on the 2,000 tons of food 
en route to Rotterdam, the New York Times printed Ambassador Page’s opinion that the initial 
shipments were “wholly inadequate” even if ships are loading immediately in the United 
States.181 
On November 1 and 2, 1914 the first supplies reached Rotterdam on the Coblentz and the 
Iris respectively.  The cargoes purchased by Millard Shaler consisting of 1,777 tons of flour, 414 
tons of rice, and 210 tons of beans were delivered to Whitlock in Brussels forty-eight hours after 
their arrival in Rotterdam.  On November 4 the first shipments reached Brussels in sealed canal 
barges for immediate distribution.  Whitlock recalled that “those barges brought more than 
food—they brought hope.”  The door was now open for food to flow into Belgium.  The second 
week’s report of the CRB showed that in a fortnight the commission had delivered 2,283 tons of 
cereal foodstuffs to Belgian relief stations.  By November 13 the commission was responsible for 
about 17,000 total tons with 13,000 tons of foodstuffs arriving during the previous half month.  
On November 7, the New York Times reported that 400,000 meals were now being served in 
Belgium daily.182 
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Any jubilation felt over the first CRB deliveries was tempered by troubling reports that 
flowed out of Belgium to western newspapers.  It was clear that the first supplies received in 
November were insufficient to meet the needs of the whole population.  For the time being these 
stocks were divided among the districts with the greatest need: Brussels, Liége, Mons, and 
Charleroi.  A reprinted telegraph to Hoover in the New York Times explained on November 3 
that members of the commission, Whitlock, and other local officials believed that within three 
weeks the last foodstuffs would be exhausted.  The same day a separate article in the New York 
Times quoted Walter Hines Page as saying that “I have never known such a case of need…it will 
require $1,000,000 a month for seven or eight months to prevent starvation.  In fact, many will 
starve now before food can reach them.”183 
Hoover stepped up the pressure for support through a series of appeals while the first 
stocks of food began arriving in Belgium.  “This is not a question of charity or relief to the 
chronic poor,” Hoover began in an article published in American newspapers, “it is a question of 
feeding an entire population.”  The release further explained that the situation affected the 
affluent as well as the poor and that the Belgians were attempting to help themselves but there 
was little that they could do.  The chairman’s primary point was that America had to take the 
lead in providing relief; the British and French were already overstrained and could offer little 
while the Dutch were dealing with a million Belgian refugees themselves.  Hoover’s final 
comment spoke directly to the situation: “There (was never) such a call on American charity, and 
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there never was a famine emergency so great.”  Periodically the efforts of the press campaign 
were blunted by negative perceptions, doubts, and rumors.  In early November, Captain J.F. 
Lucey reported a measured increase in uneasiness among Belgians in Brussels over quotes in the 
American press suggesting that supplies would be seized by the military authorities.  They 
worried that requisitions would stop all imports—much like the British had publicly threatened.  
Lucey attempted to persuade them otherwise.184 
The national press campaign of the CRB was supplemented by an appeal by Chairman 
Hoover to state and local officials.  On November 2, Hoover asked the governor of Kansas if he 
would assist in the creation of a committee for the collection of food or money within the state.  
Specifically, the chairman pressed the governor for a shipment known as the “Kansas Ships” 
consisting of cereals and bacon or ham.  As was the case with all other relief shipments across 
the country, Hoover promised the governor that the CRB would arrange for the reception of their 
contributions and its shipment to Belgium free of charge.185 
On November 3, Hoover issued a letter to the diplomatic patrons of the CRB giving a 
status report over existing operations and plans for the immediate future.  In regards to program 
requirements, the chairman reported that a total supply of 80,000 tons per month was required to 
provide a daily ration of 10 ounces per day, per capita—an amount considerably less than one-
half a soldier’s daily ration.  Placing this requirement into context, the report explained that it 
was substantially less than the over 250,000 tons of cereals imported into Belgium normally but 
well over the 20,000 initially estimated by the commission.  In regards to famine, Hoover 
believed that if the CRB could deliver 40,000 tons for the month of November the commission 
could be kept going while in all likelihood preventing violence associated with desperation and 
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hunger.  The cost of this program was estimated to be somewhere between £800,000 and 
£1,000,000 per month.  Explaining the “economy” of the operation for the money invested, 
Hoover determined that the value of the cereal foodstuffs taken in bulk to Belgium were between 
£10 and £20 per ton with nearly £2 per ton dedicated to transportation costs.  Under these 
calculations nearly £5 of food was secured for every pound of expenditure made.186 
That week Hoover also began a series of negotiations with the British government that 
produced limited results.  Through German assurance regarding requisitioning in place the CRB 
had secured the limited acquiescence of the British Foreign Office to allow food to pass into 
Belgium.  The British had no intention of broadening their rights extended to the commission 
and without question would not open the blockade completely for relief purposes.  In a 
November 5 meeting with Sir Edward Grey, Hoover pressed for additional special privileges and 
suggested that the real solution to the shipping problem was to permit the CRB to charter ships 
flying the British flag.  Making further issue, Hoover also asked that government insurance be 
made available for British ships in the service of the commission.  Grey responded with the 
steadfast British position on relief work—as long as the Germans continued to requisition native 
food in Belgium it was impossible for the government to contribute support.187 
The next series of meeting dealing with ravitaillement were between the Comité National 
and the Germans.  After Hoover’s meeting with Sir Edward Grey the CRB and the Comité 
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National realized that German influences over Belgian food supplies was a stumbling block in 
securing funding and support from other neutral and belligerent powers.  On November 11 a deal 
was reached that allowed the free circulation of all merchandise imported by the commission.  
The German government also promised to take steps in freeing the canals and rivers from 
obstructions and would allow the use of railroads in the areas which could not be served by 
Belgium’s extensive canal network.188   
Minister Whitlock was himself working with the Germans to secure formal assurances.  
On November 14, General von der Goltz informed Whitlock that the Imperial Government was 
prepared to offer the most formal assurances that any supplies imported would be “scrupulously 
respected” by the German military and civil authorities and would be exempt from “seizure and 
requisition.”  In dealing with food imports the German government promised that possession, 
control, and disposition of those supplies would be left entirely in the hands of the Comité 
National or its designated agents.189   
Steady progress towards negotiating a clear program of importations, promises, and 
freedoms in late fall 1914 did not mean that the commission was completely clear to pursue its 
goal of relieving Belgium.  On November 14, Hoover sent a letter to Emile Francqui detailing 
the monetary concerns that still beset the CRB despite the new series of guarantees made by the 
Germans to the Comité National.  In dealing with the issue of gift food, the chairman made a 
proposal for giving all foodstuffs in Belgium a cash value based on the market that would allow 
the CRB’s books to show the large subscriptions made from various societies and organizations.  
For accounting purposes this allowed the commission and its contributing members to give a 
monetary value to charity.  Throughout the war the CRB strove to keep strict financial record of 
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its affairs.  Placing a cash value on all charitable contributions allowed the commission to keep 
close tabs on its financial standing.  Each week during the conflict the CRB produced a financial 
record for its receipts and expenditures.  With only a few days or a few weeks worth of food on 
hand at any time in Belgium it was critical that the commission was in constant understanding of 
its current situation.190    
Hoover in his note to Francqui also mentioned the progress being made by CRB 
propaganda in America.  Current efforts in the United States were clearly a national effort that 
included money from San Francisco and foodstuffs from Kansas.  The chairman was especially 
looking forward to the shipments of corn forthcoming from Iowa and flour from the Mississippi 
Valley that were scheduled to leave Philadelphia at the end of November.  To facilitate the 
shipping of these cargoes and others like it the CRB solicited the advice of the leading shipping 
firms in Britain.    Hoover believed that the responsible management of these firms afforded the 
commission a measure of protection that might not exist if they endeavored on their own to 
arrange such matters.191 
The following day (November 15), the first transatlantic shipment of food reached 
Rotterdam.  Sponsored by the Canadian Province of Nova Scotia, the Tremorvah based out of 
Halifax carried 176 tons of flour, 49 tons of meat and bacon, and 2,338 tons of miscellaneous 
goods.  Six days later the first Rockefeller Foundation ship arrived from New York bearing 
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3,500 tons of goods.  With the coming of both cross channel and transatlantic vessels the supply 
of relief arriving in Belgium increased steadily.  In the month of November a total of 26,431 tons 
of food were discharged at Rotterdam for the CRB.192  
Once relief reached Belgium it had an immediate impact.  Comité National member Jean 
van Branden reported on November 21 that thanks to the 17,000 tons delivered to Belgium since 
the beginning of the month the committee was supplying 600,000 meals daily to 300,000 persons 
in Brussels alone.  While progress was being made in feeding the cities of Antwerp and Belgium, 
food supplies struggled to find their way into the countryside however.  The British paper the 
Morning Advertiser reported that in consequence a large part of the population in famine-
stricken villages flocked to the larger centers where food was available.  The result was the 
overrunning of Brussels to the tune of 25,000 new arrivals per day as conditions worsened.  
There appeared to be no way to stop the migration until the CRB relief system could be 
elaborated to reach the remote villages.193   
For its efforts the CRB was beginning to garner praise despite the ongoing difficulties.  In 
Britain the philanthropic community had taken notice of the plight of Belgium, and despite the 
reticence of the government to become involved, people were taking action.  While America can 
take credit for providing the CRB’s organizational zeal, in reality a vast majority of the funding 
and support for Belgian relief came from the “British Empire.”   The Glasgow Herald 
commented on the aspects of the benevolence that compelled many Brits into joining the 
crusade.  “There is something romantic in the rapid solution by a dozen skilled and energetic 
businessmen, moved by a great impulse of humanity, of a problem that has baffled 
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governments,” the paper began.  It bemoaned, “In a month one of the greatest shipping schemes 
in the world has (begun)… (It is) surely an achievement eloquent of the widespread instinct of 
pity still surviving in the world groaning under the burdens and brutalities of red war.”194 
An important component of swaying popular opinion was convincing people that the 
CRB exercised strict command and control over all imported foodstuffs.  In a November 24 press 
release, Hoover stated that “There does not seem to be the slightest fear that the Germans will 
not do their share in assisting Americans in charge of this food.”  The issue, the chairman 
explained, was handled “some time ago” by Whitlock through the securing of safeguards from 
the Governor-General (von der Goltz).  Hoover explained that the process used by the 
commission to import foodstuffs into Belgium was the “exact consignment arrangement agreed 
(to) with the British Admiralty and the German Government for safeguarding foodstuffs.”  On 
November 27, the British government made its position clear, claiming that as far as the 
Admiralty was concerned any vessel could undertake the voyage to Rotterdam…it just wouldn’t 
be covered by governmental insurance.195 
Within Belgium the commission faced similar challenges regarding justification as those 
it faced inside Britain.  T.B. Kittredge of the CRB recalled that in the early days of the war the 
“slow thinking, hard-headed” Belgian peasant could no more understand the real purpose of 
American intervention than that of the Germans.  Even when distribution began reaching smaller 
villages in November and December 1914, many peasants remained bewildered.  They 
questioned why foreigners from a great and wealthy land far away would come to Belgium with 
food for them.196 
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In the meantime, most of Northern France was struggling as mightily as their Belgian 
counterparts and was in need of assistance as well.  While the crisis in Northern France and 
Belgium began at roughly the same time, the intertwining issues of military control and 
stabilization delayed the beginning of ravitaillement in this region as a component of the CRB’s 
program of relief.  After the fall of Antwerp and Ghent between October 7 and 13, the situation 
in the vast majority of Belgium quickly stabilized under the German general government.  
Stabilization (a necessary prerequisite for organized relief efforts) came considerably later in the 
French regions of occupation however.  These areas remained zones of active military fighting 
for weeks to come and were for a longer time unorganized under the German system of the 
Étappen (Stages) and Operations Zones.  The extension of relief had to wait for conditions in 
these regions to normalize in one form or another.197   
On November 24, the CRB agreed to extend relief to the people of Maubeuge.  In the 
following month a similar offer was made to Givet-Fumay through the Comité National on 
December 31.  Under the patronage of the provincial committee of Namur the 20,000 residents 
of Givet-Fumay received thirty tons of flour in a special train arranged for by the Germans 
during the first week of January 1915.  The number of shipments following this initial arrival 
could not be guaranteed by the commission however.  At the time no additional promises could 
be made to people of Northern France because its provisioning was beyond the current resources 
of the CRB.198   
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In late 1914 the official position of the commission in regards to Northern France was 
that while it was willing to assume the added burden of French relief, it could not do so on its 
own responsibility without the approval and financial support which the French government was 
somewhat slow to offer.  The other stumbling block retarding the flow of provisions to France 
was again the issue of diplomatic relations.  Beyond these factors remained the question of 
whether the region was safe enough for CRB activity.  It was not until February 1915 that the 
commission was able to secure both the recognition required from belligerents to place 
ravitaillement on a relatively stable basis and the funding on which the program would be 
based.199 
Complications remained rife despite the progress made by the CRB into the Belgian 
interior.  Whitlock reported that in late-November that both the CRB and the Comité National 
were experiencing the first of a series of tremendously complicated difficulties that were 
“destined to dog us with an almost maddening persistence during so many months.”  The issues 
that by this point were most pressing (and ongoing for the remainder of the war) concerned the 
raising of $10,000,000 every month, the purchasing of foodstuffs in the distant markets of the 
world, the transporting of it across troubled and dangerous seas, and the distribution of it to 
seven million people in a land where the whole machinery of common life was dislocated in the 
midst of an occupying army at war.  Over time these late-November 1914 realizations became an 
internalized component of CRB strategy.  Commission members at the time worried that there 
was no possibility of resuming normal consumption or to even maintain a minimum level of 
subsistence for that matter.  Indeed the first battle in the struggle for program maintenance was 
over finance and the reality that in late 1914 there was practically none.  The second came with 
the announcement of restrictions by the Allied governments regarding imports.  The third battle 
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involved dealing with foot shortages caused by factors including market inaccessibility, and 
shipping losses from submarine attacks.200 
The issue of direction—meaning the way relief was handled and the multitude of ideas 
already in practice regarding it—was also problematic.  With the CRB/CN organization the 
various provincial committees and American delegates had varying ideas as to how food should 
be distributed.  Inside this process, each province was developing a distribution system different 
in some respect from every other that complicated the larger organizational structure of the CRB 
and Comité National as the coordinating bodies of relief.  Quickly it became apparent that a 
greater unity in the general organization of ravitaillement was needed.  Outside of Belgium the 
men of the CRB were rapidly coming to see that the commission would have to assume great 
responsibilities.  To do so the commission needed to have a well organized office in Brussels 
with the executive power to control relief operations in the communes from that central location.  
By the end of November the CRB was already a functioning system of relief, but there were 
many defects that Hoover wanted to remedy firsthand.201 
Hoover went thoroughly over the problems of administration in his first visit to Brussels 
as the Chairman of the CRB.  On November 29, Hoover arrived with fellow CRB representative 
Millard Shaler and Doctors Rose and Bicknell from the Rockefeller Foundation who made the 
trip to investigate conditions in Belgium.  That afternoon the Rockefeller representatives 
thoroughly cross-examined Whitlock on the situation in Belgium and what was being done by 
the commission to remedy it.  The following day a large contingent including Hoover, Francqui, 
Heineman, Rose, Bicknell, and Shaler met to discuss the problem of finances.  On December 1, 
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Hoover and the Rockefeller contingent made their first visits to the soup kitchens with a group of 
Comité National representatives.202   
The chairman was struck by what he saw on the streets of Brussels.  As Whitlock 
described it the Belgians stood shivering with divine patience in the cold rain holding bowls or 
pitchers along with a ration card issued by the commune.  Hundreds of them received their 
rations and passed by silently.  “It was a sight that I could not long endure,” Whitlock recalled, “I 
knew what was going on in Mr. Hoover’s heart when he turned away and fixed his gaze on 
something far down the street.”  On December 1, Hoover, Bell, Rose, Bicknell, Francqui, 
Shaper, Gibson, de Leval, Watts, and Whitlock watched as long lines of poor women and men 
receive a bit of coffee, chicory, and a loaf of bread.  The group stood in the rain and watched the 
line march by for some time.  Each Belgian said “thank you” after receiving their ration; 
Whitlock had to turn away to hide his tears.203  
As Hoover toured Belgium for the first time a new series of agreements with the 
Germans were in the works.  In a manner speaking the commission and the occupational 
government from Germany had a symbiotic relationship in that what impacted one directly 
impacted the other.  By December 1, the Germans had not only agreed to leave imported 
foodstuffs free from requisition but also suspended all seizures of native cereals and granted the 
CRB liberty of action within Belgium.  The German government also approved a plan of 
exchange by which the money of the Belgian government could be obtained by the commission 
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in London in consideration of the payment of obligations inside Belgium by the Comité 
National.204   
Despite these concessions the Germans were not naturally complicit towards CRB 
requests their proclivities towards limited acquiescence notwithstanding.  The commission used 
the provinces of Limbourg and Luxembourg as prime examples of what the Germans reported 
was happening and what the reality of the situation was.  In those two areas the communes made 
repeated appeals for the right to purchase food in Germany that were flatly and consistently 
refused.  The commission demanded that if the Germans were prepared to feed Belgium they 
needed to immediately announce the creation of an organization to handle the work.  If the 
Germans were to take responsibility for Belgium, the commission wanted them to do it now.  In 
public the CRB countered German reports that no one was starving in Belgium and therefore no 
action was required on their behalf with damming evidence speaking otherwise.  The fact that 
1,500,000 people were dependent on soup kitchens at the moment was proof enough for the 
commission.205 
All the while three diplomatic channels that benefited American relief efforts were 
constantly at work.  This triad included Walter Hines Page in Britain, Brand Whitlock in 
Belgium, and James W. Gerard in Berlin.  While the work of Ambassador Page and Whitlock 
drew more of the attention, the labors of Gerard were not to be discounted.  As the direct link to 
the German government, the work of Gerard was absolutely crucial.  Several times during the 
war the CRB (and Hoover in particular) drew harsh criticism from the German Governor-
General for going over his head and pressing demands to the government directly…Ambassador 
Gerard was always there to remedy any conflicts. 
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On December 4, Ambassador Gerard announced from Berlin another set of German 
agreements relating to the rights of neutral shipping on the seas including a promise that the navy 
would not seize food on ships bound for neutral ports (Rotterdam specifically).  The German 
government also agreed to permit non-neutral ships to carry food into Belgium via Dutch ports.  
In regards to expanding the liberty of action for the commission, the promises included a 
guarantee that food would be utilized for the purposes originally intended.  Hoover was generally 
pleased with the results of diplomatic negotiations during the fall and early winter months.  
Speaking ostensibly to the British (who still held reservations about the project over the question 
of Germans benefitting from American relief); he was quoted in the December 5 edition of the 
New York Times as saying “We are meeting with no obstruction from the military authorities of 
Belgium in the prosecution of our work.  Not one loaf of bread or one spoonful of salt that we 
have introduced has been taken by the military.”  The CRB announced in conjunction with 
Hoover’s message that the recent issuance of general shipping instructions the commission 
opened up the flow of provisions to the “little sister of the world” Belgium.206 
The CRB New York office also issued appeal to the American press on December 5, 
speaking as it had before about the urgency of the situation and the responsibility of Americans 
to help.  “A brave, unfortunate nation of 7,000,000 people is without food, without money for to 
buy food, without means of using money for the purchase of food if (it) had it,” the plea began.  
Calling to Americans as the sole means of hope for the situation, the release declared that “We 
are the only people who can.  We have given generously, but we must (still give) more 
generously if we are to avert the most distressing famine in history.”  Accompanying this appeal 
the New York Times included a statement Hoover himself discussing the situation and its tragic 
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implications.  “It is difficult to state the position of the civil population of Belgium without 
appearing hysterical,” Hoover proclaimed.  “I do not know that history presents any parallel of a 
population of 7,000,000 people surrounded by a ring of steel and utterly unable by any 
conceivable effort of their own to save themselves.”  By the end of the war’s first winter the 
press campaign in America was paying off, bringing in contributions in money, food, and 
clothing valued at nearly $6,000,000.207 
Hoover again met with British government officials after returning to London from 
Brussels in early December.  Meeting this time with Herbert Henry Asquith, Hoover faced 
similar difficulties as before in dealing with the British but stood up to the Prime Minister 
nonetheless.  Under the influence of the military party the British government held steadfastly to 
the view that revictualing Belgium was in itself a non-neutral act and that by its nature was an 
aid to the Germans.  Field Marshall Horatio Herbert Kitchener made the cynical and brutal 
comment on ravitaillement that if the Belgians were to be left to starve it would require more 
German troops to subdue the revolutions that would break out as a result of the hunger.208   
The back and forth between Prime Minister Asquith and Hoover showed the moxie that 
made him so well respected in engineering and mining circles.  To Asquith’s point that the 
chairman had “America’s sympathy only because America feels pity for the suffering Belgians,” 
Hoover countered with a threat to send a telegram back to the states that would destroy the last 
vestige of pity held for Britain in his home country.  The chairman dared, “Do you want me to do 
it?”  Shocked by such behavior, Asquith responded that he was not used to being talked to that 
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way.  “You told me you were no diplomat, but I think you are an excellent one, only your means 
are not diplomatic,” The Prime Minister responded. 209  
This event was not the last time that Hoover would use threats to get what he wanted.  
Several times during the war the chairman threatened to terminate all relief efforts immediately if 
a solution amiable to relief efforts was not found.  Under such demands the commission usually 
received what was desired.  With the constant threat of failure—which meant starvation—
Hoover was forced at times to use such fait accompli tactics.  Five days later the chairman 
announced that in cooperation with the Comité National a program to provide 80,000 tons of 
cereals a month was underway with a goal of 300 grams of bread a day.  The price tag for the 
program was an estimated $6,000,000 per month.  As was the case throughout the war, funding 
and food were needed now, not later.  Gentlemanly diplomacy sometimes had to be brushed 
aside.210   
Despite the progress made in diplomacy, Hoover chafed at the pressure of being placed 
between the belligerents.  When the CRB was first asked to undertake Belgian relief the question 
was why the Germans didn’t do it themselves—under international law it was the duty of an 
occupying army to feed the civil population.  On the other side, the commission was told by the 
British that the importation of food to Belgium was relieving the Germans of their moral and 
legal duties while extending the war by relaxing the demands of the enemy.  The position taken 
by Kitchener and others that having the Germans occupied with hunger riots in Belgium was an 
advantage to the Allies was particularly offensive to Hoover.  The chairman argued that “before 
the question is settled as to who is morally responsible for the feeding of the Belgians these 
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people will have been starved and violence will have broken out in that country.”  In his view 
there would be no advantage won through massive suffering.211   
The week of Christmas 1914 brought little of its normal cheer, but did hold a bleak sense 
of hope with regards to the progress being made in Belgium.  By this point the relief kitchens in 
Belgium were up and running.  In Brussels some 200,000 persons were receiving soup and bread 
daily.  W.W. Stratton, an Oxford Rhodes Scholar working for the CRB in Brussels described the 
precise flow of the food lines and the efficient manner in which the kitchens were operated.  
“Not only is waste reduced to an absolute minimum, “Stratton reported, “but the cooking is in 
the hands of experienced men.”212 
One of the highlights of the season—if not the only one—in Belgium was the arrival of 
the “Christmas Ship” bearing gifts from the children of America.  Planning to deliver the 
presents on Christmas Day, the CRB faced several difficulties including the demand by the 
German government that all packages be pre-opened in Rotterdam and that every scrap of 
writing removed before distribution.  Edward Eyre Hunt recalled that the labor involved in 
meeting the German requirement was not the tough part; it was the removal of the charming, 
naïve little notes, painfully copied in children’s handwriting that was heart wrenching.  After 
months of receiving foodstuffs it was the Christmas Ship that personalized the charity of 
America to the citizens of Belgium.  Hunt recalled that after that point the assistance of America 
was never thought of again in terms other than “burning gratitude.”213 
Burning gratitude was exactly what CRB officials received on Christmas 1914.  It was an 
out flowing of emotions that caught many committee members who were reticent to receive 
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praise painfully off guard.  After a dinner, Dr. Rose of the Rockefeller Foundation pulled 
Whitlock aside and showered him with many expressions of appreciation and kindness, saying 
that the Foundation was prepared to aid in the ravitaillement of Belgium to the fullest extent of 
its resources.  Speaking from the heart, Rose told him with tears welling in his eyes that the 
Rockefeller contingent had been everywhere in Belgium and was struck by the patience, 
forbearance, and charity of the commission.  On January 1, Belgians themselves paid their 
respects to the CRB.  Beginning in the early morning hours a constant stream of men, women, 
and children poured into the American Legation leaving cards or signing their names in a book.  
A total of 1,749 notes were left for the commission while many more signed the book.  Steadily 
the commission was making a difference in Belgium.  Before the end of the year ships from 
twenty American ports had either reached or were sailing for Rotterdam.  Relief work in 
Belgium was proving to be an American enterprise—from Hoover in London and Whitlock in 
Brussels to the farmers of Iowa and the financiers of San Francisco.214 
In late December 1914, Hoover returned to again take up the problems of ravitaillement 
inside Belgium.  The chairman’s talents were always in high demand, whether it was in London, 
Rotterdam, Brussels, or New York.  Everywhere Hoover went he found anxious problems to be 
solved, situations to be disentangled, and seemingly insurmountable obstacles to be overcome 
but almost invariably he found a satisfactory solution within a few days.  One of the newest 
challenges for 1915 would be the extending of assistance to Northern France.  Starvation was 
being staved off—at least at this point.  “India and China are used to famine, but it does not seem 
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in the game that thrifty little Belgium should starve for want of bread,” commented The Times.215  
In many cases the problems for the CRB were just beginning. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: “This Cannot Go On Forever” 
The Organizational Components of the CRB 
Active operations for the Commission for Relief in Belgium began on November 1, 1914 
and ended on August 31, 1919.  From the beginning it was directed and shaped by the practical 
wisdom, business efficiency, and straightforward diplomatic acumen of Chairman Herbert 
Hoover.  Commission representative T.B. Kittredge recalled that Hoover brought to the 
commission a belief in using the best methods and the best men for the job to handle business of 
relief instead of trying to install new methods into Belgium and its preexisting system 
communes.  While its purpose was to provide relief assistance for Belgium and Northern France, 
the CRB was set up on a business basis governed by strict accounting methods.216   
As the only official organization through which all relief was accumulated, shipped, and 
distributed the commission worked independently yet associatively with the Comité National 
that handled ravitaillement at the communal level.  Under the executive system of the CRB were 
the two committees that carried out the actual internal distribution of relief supplies: the 
aforementioned Comité National (comprised mostly of Belgians) in Belgium and the Comité 
Français in Northern France.  While a duality existed between the CRB and the two sub-
committees that created in what contemporary terms is considered a synergistic symbiotic 
relationship, the executive organization of Belgian relief called for decision making strategy in 
which the directors of the commission operated independently from its constituent components.  
Inter-committee membership between delegates did assure that lines of communication between 
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the three distinct organizations were maintained.  As its chief executive, Chairman Hoover was 
well informed as to what was needed in Belgium and Northern France.  In a situation where 
quick decision making was needed to avert the constant threats of famine it was more efficient to 
employ independent decision making structures that would be resistant to bureaucratic 
slowdowns.  Observers recalled that Hoover could be bold precisely because he had the 
executive power to do so.217   
The executive structure of the CRB was developed by its representatives who possessed 
extensive experience in American business.  Most of these individuals combined a finely tuned 
sense of logical organization with a highly developed business sense employed in their personal 
endeavors.  The London Times commented that commission members were not chosen for their 
familiarity with Belgian conditions (that was handled by the Comité National and Français) or 
for their experience with relief work—their task was to mobilize the supply industries of two 
hemispheres with aforethought, thoroughness, and efficiency surpassing the belligerent armies.  
American business had been praised over the preceding decades for its work the realm of 
efficiency.  It was this same zeal that the commission desired.218   
Freedom of action was one of the key factors guiding the commission’s coordination of 
relief.  Directed by Americans and managed by the patronage of American, Spanish, and Dutch 
Ambassadors and Ministers the CRB had full responsibility for all phases of collection, finance, 
and transportation of relief outside the occupied territory.  Through its representatives in the 
Comité National and Comité Français the commission was responsible for the strict fulfillment 
of the guarantees and stipulations of the belligerent governments in respect to relief distribution.  
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As the spokesman for relief efforts the CRB was also charged with the duty of assuring 
belligerents that promises were being kept at the communal level as well.  One of the greatest 
challenges in this regard was not only preventing requisitions but investigating and proving that 
seizures were not taking place.219   
As the executive structure at the apex of relief work in Belgium and Northern France the 
CRB performed seven specific tasks.  The first commission directive was to create a detailed 
organizational structure for the systematic provisioning of the destitute using both imports and 
native foods.  As a corollary, the second directive called for the commission to coordinate, 
centrally control, and stimulate charitable effort throughout the world in support of the destitute.  
The third directive involved the “elaboration” of the necessary organizations (the Comité 
National and Comité Français in particular) for the equitable distribution of imported provisions 
to those who could pay for it.  The fourth directive pressed for the establishment of financial 
machinery (through collaboration with various governments and banking institutions) to provide 
working capital for the commission and to assist in the exchange of local currency for gold so 
that Belgian obligations could be met.  The fifth directive dealt with infrastructure, calling for the 
overseas purchase of provisions and the shipment of these essential foodstuffs through inland 
transportation routes in Belgium.  As a component of infrastructural coordination, the sixth 
directive involved the execution of negotiations with belligerent governments to assure 
protection of foodstuffs on the high seas and non-interference on land.  It also included the 
requirement that all imports be distributed exclusively to the civil population (requisition free).  
The seventh directive called for the maintenance of accurate accounting by the commission 
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including auditing and other checks upon all branches of work not only to provide evidence as to 
the execution of all guarantees but to ensure the integrity of CRB administration.220 
Two entirely distinct and separate problems arose from the carrying out of these seven 
responsibilities.  Once the objectives were set forth it then became a case of how to carry out 
these executive functions.  The first problem (which was also one of the primary purposes of the 
CRB) was the provisioning of Belgium and Northern France with a minimum supplement of 
foods beyond what native produce could supply.  The second and most difficult problem arising 
was how to equitably provide food and charity to people in Belgium.  This issue was exacerbated 
by the fact that even if abundant native food stocks existed in Belgium the industrial stagnation 
and high levels of unemployment in the country meant that the public charity required to support 
the destitute would be beyond what private philanthropy could provide.  In practice, the 
difficulties that the CRB had to meet in working out an efficient system of distribution and in 
purchasing/shipping the food to warehouses in Belgium while constantly satisfying belligerent 
powers that each was living up to their guarantees were so great that the technical efficiency of 
the organization often had to be sacrificed to the necessity of immediate action.221 
From an administrative perspective the CRB carefully contemplated what it was trying to 
accomplish given the challenges it faced.  Upon closer examination the problem was not so 
necessarily one of establishing an efficient organization or finding a system of food distribution 
that could be understood by the communes and managed without a high level of executive 
control and inspection.  Because it was impossible to teach new business methods within the 
traditional communal structure the goal of technical efficiency was at times sublimated to the 
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exigencies of immediate necessity.  In its early days of operation the primary goal of the CRB 
was to get food to the communes as quickly as possible.  For this reason the creation of an 
administrative model with a complete system of checks and control was not instituted 
immediately.  The whole work of Belgian relief was begun as if it were merely a temporary 
expedient—it was only later when abuses and difficulties began to arise because of problems 
within the temporary system that the commission attempted to improve efficiency through 
control.   The guiding principle of the CRB hung on a mantelpiece in the lunchroom of the 
London office.  It read “This cannot go on forever.”222 
While achieving efficiency was not within the immediate reach of the commission it did 
not mean that this was not a strategic goal.  Efforts in late 1914 and early 1915 to improve the 
performance of the CRB garnered widespread praise for its methods.  William C. Edgar of the 
Northwest Miller in Minnesota commented in April of 1915 that he had never before seen an 
operation that could compare to the commission in terms of efficiency, thoroughness, and 
wisdom through the combined efforts of the CRB and the Comité National in guiding what was 
essentially a provisional and emergency organization.  Commission representative Colonel E.M. 
House also commented that he knew of no charity that was more efficiently administered.  House 
was especially impressed by the fact that the commission handled no money, that all financial 
matters were managed by accounting firms, that purchasing was done through special 
arrangements, and that the shipping was handled by specialists.  “The American Commission has 
displayed rare tact and executive ability in handling such a delicate situation,” House explained 
in the New York Times, “It has won the confidence of the countries affected by its efforts and 
maintained an avenue for relief under very trying circumstances.”  The Colonel offered similar 
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praise for Chairman Hoover who through his work was already establishing an international 
reputation.223 
Other individuals directly and indirectly associated with the CRB were impressed by the 
commission’s ability to function effectively.  Considering that it was created as a short term, ad 
hoc organization the results it was producing were remarkable.  A key component of its success 
once being placed on more permanent footing was its ability to maintain executive focus.  
According to Honorary Treasurer A.J. Hemphill the calm displayed by the commission was an 
“amazing tribute to the efficiency of the system whereby the relief organization provides and 
distributes to this whole nation the supplies without which there would be chaos and unthinkable 
suffering.”224   
The success that the commission enjoyed was also notable considering the environment 
in which it existed.  The work of the CRB was done in an atmosphere of absolute rule by a 
foreign foe and a system of military discipline complicated by wild rumors, bitter hate, and 
credulous optimism.  At no point was the situation in Belgium considered safe—meaning safe 
for the civilian population, safe for commission representatives, and safe as far as the 
organization remaining in operation.  If there was one guarantor of safety—or at least a sense of 
hope—it was in the ability of the CRB to perform its duties masterfully.225 
With these factors in mind the commission reiterated its statement of purpose on 
February 22, 1915 in a single sentence: “The Commission for Relief in Belgium has but a single 
purpose—to cooperate with (the entire) charitable world in providing sufficient food to keep the 
people of Belgium alive until the war is over.”  Preserving the commitment to this objective 
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required a highly centralized form of organization according to Edward Eyre Hunt.  Beginning 
with the comparatively simple problem of feeding, the work developed—almost in spite of itself 
in Hunt’s view—into a comprehensive plan of national preservation.  As the work expanded, the 
level of commitment and planning attempted to keep pace with the situation.226 
Behind the single purpose of the commission were a menagerie of duties and demands.  
Not only was the commission entrusted with the protection of relief work and with the protection 
of all funds and foodstuffs appertaining to the project, it was also responsible to the Allied and 
Belgian governments for the observance of all German guarantees given with respect to both 
imported and indigenous foodstuffs as well as to other matters covered by agreements affecting 
the welfare of individuals in the occupied territories.  As sole administrator of all relief activities 
for the occupied territories the commission was also charged with the job of mobilizing finance, 
food supplies, and charity, while protecting and transporting foodstuffs.  Once in possession of 
funds and food, the CRB assumed the duty of retaining possession of foodstuffs until their final 
delivery to regional warehouses.  A critical component of this task was the responsibility of the 
commission to convey to the Allied and Belgian governments the actual needs of the occupied 
territories as to foodstuffs and to determine in cooperation with the Comité National the overall 
needs of the population  and the best methods of distribution and transport for the necessary 
imports.227 
Beyond the organizational aspects of providing ravitaillement to Belgium and Northern 
France the commission dealt with other problems external to the situation in Europe.  Chief 
among these problems was the struggle to establish international standing and prestige.  Another 
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was meeting financial obligations through the mobilization of charity, the creation of exchange 
operations, and the procurement of government subsidies through negotiation.   A third issue was 
the actual collection of relief goods and the coordination of shipment from all corners of the 
globe.  A fourth problem was the actual determination of the needs of the population combined 
with the difficulties of formulating a program based on those needs and securing the approval of 
the belligerents to enact them.  A fifth problem concerned the distribution of commodities within 
the commune system guided by the Comité National and Comité Français once the previous four 
questions were handled effectively.228 
Ongoing problems were compounded by various ad hoc and immediate issues that the 
commission dealt with regularly.  In May 1915 the greatest problem faced by the CRB for 
example was the difficulty encountered in selling foodstuffs for paper money in Belgium.  With 
Belgian currency retaining little to no value outside of the country the challenge for the 
commission was how to turn these sums into gold or a gold value equivalent.  Without a hard 
currency base to provide liquid or working capital the CRB would be virtually unable to perform 
its duties in Belgium.229 
In the process of performing its duties it was not unusual for small problems to grow into 
serious crises threatening the whole of Belgium relief.  Careful attention was paid to even minor 
issues for this very reason.  For CRB delegates the usual problems of insurance, shipping, 
warehousing, the preparation of reports, and making sure accounts were properly paid was just 
part of the responsibilities.  Added to these were lists of duties including the handling of 
misunderstandings and complaints on levied by German authorities over inadequate or 
inaccurate communal reports.  In the resulting fray the commission delegate had to be jack-of-all 
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trades to handle the problems that many times were not of his doing.  Whitlock himself faced 
personal difficulties in conjunction with his official CRB duties, including four personal lawsuits 
against him during the war over shipping disputes.230   
Despite the serious nature of on-going problems the CRB became increasingly successful 
in its duties due in part to its efficient handling of “business” which including everything from 
the practical end of completing transactions to the theoretical end of creating the structures that 
guided practices.  Mable Hyde Kittredge (wife of commission delegate T.B. Kittredge) described 
the CRB as a government with its own flag, merchant marine and police power operating a 
neutral state with business in the market of two continents.  Through these powers the 
commission conducted business across barricaded frontiers and by sheer importance and skill of 
effort had compelled warring nations to cooperate with it.  In explaining the financial procedures 
of the CRB, the London Times reported that the commission bought what it needed in the best 
markets of the world, paid for its purchase, and recovered the money from the communal 
authorities.  The communes under the jurisdiction of the Comité National then distributed most 
of the foodstuffs to tradesmen at a small profit while the rest went to the communal canteens that 
supplied food to the destitute.231 
Careful organization and planning was a critical component of the commission’s ability 
to handle its business operations.  In general, the CRB applied the common sense technique of 
employing businessmen to handle the business end of the operation while assigning volunteer 
experts to deal with problems requiring specialized knowledge.  At the communal level this 
meant blending experience with instruction from the communal council that conformed to the 
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with billing combined with problems of dealing with false reports in the American and British press “well-nigh 
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principles set by the commission to handle relief in the proper manner.  On an international level 
this entailed governments, commercial firms, banks, and transportation companies giving 
invaluable advice and special services to the CRB during the war.232   
Purchasing and shipping were an area of relief work that benefitted greatly from the 
expertise of volunteer business-based assistance.  Outside of Belgium and Northern France the 
CRB set up business offices or secured the representation of agencies in principal purchasing 
centers and ports of the world.  Based out of New York and Rotterdam these offices and 
committees engaged in diversified operations of assembling relief in coordination with the 
requests of the commission’s central offices.  Once in place the CRB secured both concessions in 
railway rates and vast quantities of free shipping passes along with generous grants of warehouse 
space and handling services in both the U.S. and Canada.  Banks also donated exchange services 
and paid the full rate of interest on deposits while the British government facilitated with the 
subscription of shipping insurance.  In Holland the CRB was granted free telegraphic service as 
well as free railway transportation once supplies reached Rotterdam.  The measure of value for 
free services and concessions granted to the commission was not only seen in the lowering of 
administrative costs it also had a tremendous impact on lowering the price at which foodstuffs 
were delivered to consumers in Belgium and Northern France.233   
Another key factor in the successful execution of ravitaillement was the clear delineation 
of duties between the various parts of the CRB that composed the whole organization.  At the 
top, executive decisions were made by an administrative group including Chairman Hoover and 
his assistants Vice-Chairman Daniel Heineman in Brussels, Secretary William Hulse in Brussels, 
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head of the CRB Rotterdam Office Captain T.F. Lucey, and Secretary Millard Shaler in London.  
These gentlemen considered it essential that there should be no overlapping of functions.  In 
order to do so each committee was made independent within its own area of operations and its 
activities were confined to the specific parameters of the overall commission.  With a keen 
interest in localized relief it was decided that money raised in a district should be spent on the 
products of that area…as long as it was economically practicable.234 
Separation of duties and responsibilities among functional committees became 
increasingly important as the work grew more complex.  In particular, the work of benevolence 
(collecting charity) and provisioning (distributing charity) were divided into separate and distinct 
departments.  The Provisioning Department was set up with a business enterprise structure which 
provided foodstuffs for the portion of the population that was unable to pay for them.  Charged 
with the care of the destitute, the Benevolence Department by contrast saw to it that every 
individual was either furnished with the means to purchase food or receive it through free 
canteens established for that purchase.  The Benevolence Department was supported by public 
donations and by a fund generated a small marginal charge levied on all foodstuff sales by the 
Provisioning Department.  Out of this fund the Provisioning Department also made advances to 
the Benevolence Department from time to time.235 
 The ability of the Provisioning Department to obtain rations at the lowest possible price 
for the Benevolence Department was a critical component of the commission’s ability to provide 
for the millions of destitute in Belgium.  Outside observers marveled at the ability of the CRB to 
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sell rations at a price usually at or below the market prices for the same items in Britain, 
Germany, France, or the United States.  Under commission requirements the maximum sale price 
for foodstuffs allowed a margin varying from 10 to 50 percent profit that the Comité National 
was able to use as subsidy for the Benevolence Department to the less fortunate.  The low prices 
charged to consumers combined with the millions in profits earned for the benefit of the destitute 
were not obtained through a reduction in the quality of food delivered to Belgians.  T.B. 
Kittredge believed that the low cost of foodstuffs and the support it was able to give to the 
destitute spoke to the efficiency of the commission.  Dr. Holland Fletcher concurred with 
Kittredge on the point that efficiency across the board contributed significantly to the success of 
the commission.  In an article published in the New York Times, Fletcher reported that overhead 
costs were reduced to less than one percent thanks to the engineering exactitude and honesty of 
Hoover and the volunteer services provided on the part of competent and experienced 
engineers.236 
Cost accounting was another feature of relief work that Chairman Hoover paid particular 
attention to.  At every level of the commission he demanded that the books were maintained 
meticulously not only as a matter of expediency but as a matter of public record.  At one of the 
first meetings of the commission Hoover spoke of the importance of strict accounting: “We are 
going to receive and expend millions.  Some swine, someday, somewhere, may say that we 
grafted on this money.  Therefore I intend that we shall have such accounting, such checks and 
balances, such glass pockets, that nobody can ever harbor even a suspicion of our honesty.”  
Vernon Kellogg maintained that the commission’s stringent accounting that was certified by 
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reputable auditors and published before the general public assisted the commission in 
negotiations with belligerents even in the bitter partisanship of political debate.237 
Cost accounting also allowed the CRB to answer any charges of abuse, graft, or 
profiteering.  The spring months of 1915 swarmed with persistent stories that the commission 
was a vast trading organization engaged in wringing out profits from the unfortunate situation in 
Belgium.  The British newspaper Field explained that while profits resulted from the selling of 
commodities to those who could pay the actual price of the foodstuffs were lower than in 
London.  In its explanation the paper cited the “triumph of management” as the primary reason 
why the commission was able to sell food at such a low price.  Much of the “profits” the 
commission generated were a product of the services that American businessmen rendered in 
making the commission efficient.238 
The CRB developed three methods for organizing benevolence in Belgium.  The first 
aspect of benevolence involved the extension of existing charitable institutions to cover all 
Belgian children.  The second step involved enrolling professions and trades to assist in caring 
for members of their industry.  The third part called the creation of benevolent committees in 
each commune to establish public eating places and to supervise care in conjunction with other 
agencies through the issuing of ration cards.  Overseeing the entire structure of benevolence were 
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a series of checks and balances that determined the truth of the destitution claim, maintained the 
morale and efficiency of administration, and promoted honesty in service.239 
Financially the benevolent fund created by the sale of foodstuffs was divided into three 
parts.  In this work Hoover endeavored to minimize the dangers of pauperization.  Anyone who 
could pay for rations was required to do so.  In many cases even those who had no money 
received food in return for a promise to repay the cost of their rations after the war.  Once funds 
were generated the vast majority of this cache was distributed in the form of subsidies from the 
Comité National to the provincial committees and then from them to the local committees for 
distribution to the various classes in need.  The committee also decided to supplement these 
forms of charitable relief with assistance to members of the professional classes.  In total the 
benevolent fund was providing a total of 31,350,000 francs a month in late 1915.240 
Subventions received by the Benevolence Department were classified into two categories 
according to their original source.  The first category of public charity was derived from the 
profits of the Provisioning Department.  Hoover announced in June 1915 that it was the general 
intention of the CRB to make approximately ten percent profit on all commodities for the benefit 
of the destitute.  The profits from the sale of foodstuffs were to form a tax for the benefit of the 
poor that if maintained at about 2,500,000 francs per month could support the soup kitchens.  Of 
a distinctly different origin but serving the same purpose were state aid subventions comprised of 
equivalent sums of money turned over to the commission by the Belgian government for the 
purpose of meeting the financial obligations of citizens and institutions within Belgium.  Funding 
from the government went to benevolent institutions (beyond the commission), pensions, 
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Belgium, p. 205.  Provincial relief committees also received regular monthly subsides from the Comité National.  
Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 83-84.  Loc cit, p. 206. 
 
140 
 
separation allowances, salaries of civil servants, etc.  In total these sources expended over 
$558,000,000 for the care of the destitute in Belgium.241 
Throughout the war Belgians expressed a tremendous debt of gratitude to the commission 
for the gifts of benevolence they received from various sources around the world.  The provincial 
offices of the CRB were literally filled with souvenirs for the American people testifying to 
Belgian gratefulness.  Most touching and original to Edward Eyre Hunt were the finely 
embroidered tributes made from American flour sacks.  Their needlework read “Homage to 
America,” “Thanks to America,” “Out of Gratitude to America,” “Grateful Belgium to Kind 
America,” “To the Savior of Belgium,” or in simple Flemish or French, “Thanks.”  Letters from 
Belgian children struck a similar chord with commission representatives.  Every child in the 
town of Tamise wrote a letter that was given to Hunt so it could be sent to America.  Nine-year-
old Jozef Segleras wrote, “If I had a flying machine I would fly to America to thank the brave 
people there.  I haven’t one, so I write a little letter, and I tell you that I shall pray very much for 
you and never forget you.”  An unsigned letter from a girl about ten years old said, “I often saw 
Mother weep when we came downstairs in the morning, because she could not give us the bread 
we asked for, because there was no flour.  But you have dried her tears with the good flour which 
you have sent.”242 
In conducting its business the CRB employed a business hierarchy akin to many of the 
top corporations in America.  Indeed many of the strategies and structures outside of the 
commune used by the commission were rooted in American business practice and staffed by men 
with commercial experience.  At the same time there were other reasons why Americans were 
well-suited for positions as CRB functionaries.  Delegates were almost exclusively Americans 
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because no other neutral power had sufficient prestige or could furnish a sufficient number of the 
right type of men necessary to make ravitaillement successful.  Spain and Holland gave support 
through diplomats and carried on the work after America’s entrance into the war; but from 
October 1914 through Aug 1919 the commission was essentially an American organization.243 
At the top of this hierarchy was Chairman Herbert Hoover.  Serving below him during 
the CRB’s first year of operation were the commission’s directors that included Lindon Wallace 
Bates (director in the U.S.), John Beaver White (head of shipping and purchasing), C.A. Young 
(director in Holland), J.F. Lucey (director in Holland and Belgium), Millard Hunsiker (director 
in Great Britain), Oscar Crosby (director in Belgium), Daniel Heineman (director in Belgium), 
and Albert N. Connett (director in Belgium).  Working in conjunction with Hoover and his 
directors was the commission’s executive committee that included the additional personnel of 
Don Jose Congosto, Millard K. Shaler, Edgar T. Rickard, William Hulse, Robert P. Skinner, 
Edgar Sengier, Hugh S. Gibson, Marshall Langhorne, Herbert R. Eldridge, Perrin Galpin, J.A. 
Nash, G. Nauta, and L. Van den Branden.  Added to this group were Honorary Secretaries Shaler 
(in London), Rickard (in London), Hulse (in Brussels), Robert McCarter (in New York), Galpin 
(in Brussels), E.D. Curtis (in Brussels, and Honorary Treasurer A.J. Hemphill (in New York).244 
Beyond this core group of executives, the CRB was staffed by a large contingent of 
representatives around the world.  At the administrative level in the U.S. there were on average 
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(including personnel and supervising staff) 55 employees on staff at all times.  Below them were 
a contingent of nearly 2,000 committee scattered throughout across the globe.  In the occupied 
territories under the three separate principal committees handling ravitaillement (the CRB, 
Comité National and Comité Français) there were nearly 5,000 separate groups dealing with food 
supplies and an almost equal number dispensing charity.  In the U.S. an estimated 50,000 people 
were directly associated with appeals (charity) through state, city, and special committees.  
Within the British Empire (including Canada) an additional 26,500 individuals participated in the 
appeals process.  Within the communes, nearly 40,000 people participated in work of the Comité 
National and its subsidiaries while 15,000 worked with the Comité Français and its subgroups.  
In total approximately 131,555 people participated in relief organizations.  One demand issued 
by Chairman Hoover was common among all whom participated in relief: that all who serve in it 
be swallowed up by the organization and be forgotten in service to Belgium.245 
Among the most important members of the commission were its delegates—the 
individuals who performed the actual service of ravitaillement while providing a vital link 
between the committees and CRB administration.  The work of delegates fell into four main 
phases: general duties, maintaining guarantees, coordinating/monitoring transportation, and 
keeping detailed statistics.  According to the commission the most important function of the 
delegate were to maintain neutrality in the provinces and to exemplify its ideals in constantly 
rendering aid and moral support to the people and to care for the destitute.  In the commission’s 
view absolute neutrality in word and act, vigilance and firmness in guarding the interests of the 
population, and tact in official duties by delegates were essential to the success of ravitaillement.  
Nevertheless, it was a position difficult to sustain for the delegates.  To Hoover, “(preserving) 
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absolute neutrality was difficult enough for me and all the American members of the commission 
because of our sense of outrage at the German invasion of a helpless people and the barbarities to 
which they were subjected.”  Eyre Hunt understood that he was “honor bound” to know what 
became of every item of supply because it was only on terms like these that Britain would 
modify its blockade for Belgium.246   
An important part of protecting neutrality was protecting the delegate and vice versa.  In 
an attempt to do both the commission decided that all food should be considered property of the 
CRB under the nominal control of the delegate until it was distributed to the consumer.  
Reportedly Hoover repeatedly stressed that “There is only one way in which you American 
delegates can do your duty, and that is by ignoring the war.  You are only stewards of grain, of 
bacon, and of dried peas.  It is your business to see that they arrive safely, to count and weigh 
them accurately, and to make sure that they reach the mouths for which they were intended.” 
Under this system the business of the delegate was to attend to the reception of all merchandise 
shipped by the CRB to his district and to control/transfer supplies to the Comité Provincial under 
the conditions and in the manner specified.  In dealing with Germans during this process the 
relationship between the delegate and the German authority was to be purely one of “friendly 
intermediary.”247 
Diversity of experience among the ranks of commission representatives necessitated the 
CRB to take clear process and position of delegates.  Frequent changes in personnel and the 
reality that not every agent proved up to the task demanded the creation of a framework with 
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expectations and benchmarks for performance.  Working in most cases as volunteers the 
delegates were from all sorts of professions including engineers, businessmen, lawyers, doctors, 
clergymen, and students.  Colleges were equally important contributors to the commission 
supplying delegates from Amherst, Dartmouth, Georgetown, Kansas, MIT, Michigan, Arizona, 
Alabama, Pomona College, West Point, Minnesota, Gettysburg, Western Reserve, Indiana, 
Wisconsin, Virginia, Rutgers, North Dakota, Nevada, Texas, Nebraska, RPI, Maine, Illinois, 
Wofford, Haverford, Colorado, Utah, Penn State, Brown, and Lehigh.248  
As volunteers commission delegates received little and were demanded much.  Directors 
and delegates received allowances to cover actual expenses instead of salaries.  Hoover 
personally paid the expenses of these volunteer delegates out of pocket to the tune of 
approximately $35,000 a year.  According to William C. Edgar the unpaid work of volunteer 
delegates kept commission costs small and in his view this savings was “probably unparalleled in 
this respect by any charitable organization in the world.”  It was well known that volunteers 
could not continue the work for long periods of time and remain in good spirits and health.  To 
alleviate personal strain the chairman also arranged a series of vacations for delegates.  For 
Edward Eyre Hunt the crossing of the border into Holland for these holidays was like a “spiritual 
experience.”249 
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A group of volunteers that attracted particular attention were the American Rhodes 
Scholars.  Ten “Rhodesters” departing for Belgium on December 3, 1914 were part of the first 
flood of young Americans eager to assist the commission in any way they could.  Initially, they 
were told that their duties would include protecting food from Germans, riding on freight trains 
and canal barges, and roughing it in a devastated country amid all sorts of dangers and 
difficulties.  The job was made all the more difficult when the first batch arrived in Brussels on 
December 7 and the CRB office didn’t know what to do with them.  Nevertheless their young, 
fearless, energetic attitudes and initiative quickly inspired confidence in the committees that at 
first looked at them as rookies.250   
One of the best tributes to the efficiency of the Rhodesters was the fact that food supplies 
were being distributed in every province and in almost every village within six weeks of their 
arrival in Belgium.  Whitlock commented that the Rhodes Scholar volunteers worked for no 
reward other than the satisfaction of helping a great humanitarian cause.  He added that the work 
of the commission could never have been done without them.  “I suppose the world has never 
seen anything quite like their devotion,” Whitlock continued, “it use to amuse, when it did not 
exasperate us, to see the Germans so mystified by it; they could not understand it and were 
always trying to find out the real reason for their being there.”251 
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CHAPTER SIX: Funding the “2,500 Mile Long Breadline” 
Two Leading Figures at the Fore: Herbert Hoover and Brand Whitlock 
A distinguished career in engineering and business management prepared Hoover for the 
task of directing Belgian relief.  A commitment to science and scientific principles was a part of 
his character since his days of youth.  Hoover recalled about his childhood in Oregon that he was 
“determined to become an engineer.”  As a young man he also developed a keen eye for business 
and bookkeeping.  In the following years these skills overshadowed any aspirations he had for 
other potential careers.  His organizational zeal first became evident when he switched from 
being the shortstop on Stanford’s baseball team to manager.  Serving as the squad’s de facto 
athletic director, Hoover arranged games, met operating expenses, raised money, and collected 
gate receipts.  Shortly afterward he was also asked to help the school’s football team.  In 1892 he 
assisted in organizing a game with the University of California that was attended by 20,000 
people yielding a gate of over $30,000.  In addition to his work with athletics Hoover was 
elected the school’s first student financial manger as a senior.  Foreshadowing his future 
commitment to open books and financial reporting, Hoover set up a full system of accounts for 
all student enterprises and published them regularly in the college paper.252   
Hoover’s interest in finance followed him from Stanford after graduation in 1895.  He 
frankly recalled that after leaving college “I needed at once to find person with a profit motive 
who needed me to help him earn a profit.”  Initially Hoover’s career found him working as a 
laborer in California despite his college degree.  After pushing a car inside the Reward Mine near 
Nevada City, CA for $2 a day working ten-hour shifts for seven days a week he became the 
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personal assistant of engineer Louis Janin.  It was through Janin that Hoover came in contact 
with the British mining firm of Bewick, Moreing, and Company who were searching for an 
engineer skilled in American gold mining practices for a job in Australia.253 
Hoover began his employment as a general engineer for a group of ten mines and a 
number of prospecting ventures for Bewick, Moreing, and Company in October 1897.  His base 
of operations was the desert mining town of Coolgardie, Australia located some 350 miles east of 
Perth.  After two months of work Hoover took stock of the operation and instituted a set four 
reforms that reduced costs by 53 percent.  The following year he was named manager of the Sons 
of Gwalia mining interest the company recently acquired under Hoover’s advice.  A report 
issued by Bewick, Moreing in August of 1898 announced that under his management the mine 
had substantially reduced its working costs.  In three months the mine generated a profit of 
£1,638 through economies of scale, lower wages, longer hours, and a reorganization of company 
personnel.  As manager few questioned whether Hoover was earning his $10,000 a year salary.  
During his nearly seven months on the site he wrote more than 600 letters detailing the mine’s 
operations.254 
In March 1899, Hoover arrived on assignment in China as the Chief Engineer for a large 
cement and coalmining interest named the “Chinese Engineering and Mining Company.”  
Resuming his now familiar role as reorganizer, he instituted wide-ranging reforms in finance 
including the stipulation that none of the company’s funds were to be distributed without his 
personal authorization as the company’s temporary general manger in early 1901.  One of the 
greatest challenges Hoover faced as manager was dealing with the Chinese business practice of 
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“squeeze” (known as graft in nineteenth century American terminology).  In analyzing the 
finances of the Chinese Engineering and Mining Company he discovered that about 6,000 names 
of the alleged 25,000 employed by the firm were fictitious.  To combat the problem, Hoover set 
up a parallel structure of his “own men” in every department.  By reducing squeeze alone the 
company turned a losing venture into a profit of $150,000 Mexican in 90 days.  His seven 
months as manager revealed not only his talents as a negotiator and battlefield technician but 
also a brilliant ability in administration and organization.  For his efforts Bewick, Moreing, and 
Company made Hoover a junior partner after he resigned from the Chinese venture later that fall.  
He was twenty-seven years old.255 
With a twenty percent share in the company, Hoover’s job as junior partner was to 
operate the mines as both an engineer and an administrator.  In his day-to-day duties Hoover 
became responsible for the technical, engineering aspects of their reorganization efforts.   Over 
the next few years he concentrated his efforts increasingly on improving the company’s mining 
interests throughout Western Australia.  To assure performance and diminish costs he sent for 
fifteen university-trained managers, metallurgists, and mechanical engineers from the United 
States.  In a move that would be replicated in Belgium during WWI, Hoover also established 
stronger systems of inspection under the control of a central office and consolidated the purchase 
of supplies into one office.  Once in place the reformed program of organization reduced costs by 
40 percent.256   
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Both scientific and economic motivations contributed to Hoover’s relentless drive for 
efficiency and lower costs at Bewick, Moreing, and Company.  Under a typical contract they 
were obligated to operate the venture at a specified level above net profits.  Under Hoover’s 
direction lower overhead costs meant greater profits for the company.  Hoover in 1903 pointed 
out in an article he wrote that successful mining firms shared the common characteristics of 
specialized partners, strong field organizations, and competent general staffs at each mine headed 
by capable engineers with assistants trained in metallurgy, accounting, secretarial work, and 
other important skills.  He added that in an ideal organizational structure each individual mine 
would operate independently with its own managerial team working under the supervision of the 
firm’s general administration.  Later that year Hoover bragged that his own company searched 
the world over for talented individuals and promoted men for proven efficiency.257 
Honesty was another virtue that Hoover was becoming known for.  Another of the major 
reforms pursued by Bewick, Moreing was the drive to eradicate fraud and the establishment of 
public rapport.  Pursuant to this goal the firm introduced the custom of opening its mines up 
twice a month for public inspection in 1903.  A journalist commenting on the move called it 
refreshing in contrast to the “idiotic policy of secrecy” still popular among many mining firms.  
The reporter added that Hoover’s company in particular was acquiring a reputation for 
thoroughness and precision in its mining studies and its willingness to make those reports 
available to the public.258 
In 1908 Hoover sold his share in Bewick, Moreing to W.L. Loring for more than 
$150,000 and retired from the business.  During his six and a half years as a partner the firm’s 
business tripled.  At the time of his departure the company operated forty-five mining concerns 
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with an annual distribution of £895,000 in wages to its representative companies around the 
world.  In Western Australia alone the firm’s mines produced approximately 1,000,000 tons of 
ore per year valued at $18,000,000.  Despite the impressive gains, Hoover surmised that the 
company’s output (and profits) had peaked and it was time to move on.  With the money made 
through the sale of his share of the business and through his growing income as a “financial 
expert,” Hoover entered retirement worth more than $400,000 in mid-1908.259 
Retirement for Hoover allowed him sufficient time to develop his personal engineering 
and business interests as a mining consultant and venture capitalist.  In 1908 he set up an 
organization with offices in New York, San Francisco, London (in the location that the CRB 
would later call home), Petrograd, and Paris.  Working in association with a group of young, 
skilled engineers, Hoover and associates operated under the assumption that there would be 
numerous sound engineering projects to undertake because many ventures used out of date 
methods that yielded little or no profits.  Under his leadership the group’s goal was to bring their 
clients operations up-to-date and manage them efficiently in return for a fair share of the profits.  
Both Hoover and outside observers called the group “engineering doctors to sick mines.”  Once 
competent management was instituted within a firm the “youngsters” took over the details while 
Hoover increasingly focused on locating and financing new mining propositions.260 
In his new, private venture Hoover brought the mindset of an engineer to the world of 
finance.  Mining promotion in particular was an industry wrought with ignorance and scandal.  
Hoover’s goal was to reform people’s perceptions by bringing trained, scientific intelligence to 
the business world.  In doing so he firmly believed that there were clear differences between the 
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professional speculator who could determine the accurate value of a mine and then provide 
means for obtaining capital and the scoundrels who searched for mere profit.   Mine valuation 
and finance was a risky business.  Hoover traversed this difficult industry by applying rationality 
and expertise to his work.261 
By the early 1910s, Hoover was involved in an ever-diversifying range of undertakings.  
One of his most ambitious projects began in 1910 with the transformation of mining operations 
on the Kyshtim estate near Ekaterinburg, Russia.  After reorganization the property produced 
over 25,000,000 pounds of copper each year alongside other ores at an annual net profit of 
$2,000,000.  Shifting his attentions elsewhere, Hoover also became a member of the Board of 
Trustees at Stanford in 1912.  Upon accepting the volunteer position he instituted a program 
aimed at making some “long needed changes,” including the first publication of the school’s 
financial records.  In the two years immediately precluding war, Hoover’s business interests 
ranged oil in California to coal Wales.  As tensions began rising throughout Europe in 1914, 
Hoover was in London working on the reorganization of the mining interests of the Panama-
Pacific Exposition.  Observers commented that Hoover was capable, self confident, aggressive, 
combative, clever, and unconcerned with obstacles.  Working tirelessly on the Panama-Pacific 
project he appeared to be exhilarated by the exercise of power and behind the scenes 
maneuvering.  When war began Hoover handed technical control of the project over to his staff 
and began working to assist Americans stranded in Europe.262  
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Hoover’s work as an engineer, financier, and soon-to-be coordinator of Belgian relief 
solidified his personal commitments to individualism, voluntary cooperation, and cooperative 
capitalism.  To Hoover, American individualism manifested itself in individual initiative, 
freedom of opportunity, and self-expression.  Within the drive for individual initiative and self-
expression, Hoover found voluntary cooperation as a vital link between personal interests and the 
greater success of society.  From his vantage point as a scientist and engineer, Hoover 
recognized the economic and technological advantages offered by voluntary cooperation among 
the multifold groups that comprised modern society.  In a similar manner, voluntary cooperation 
offered benefits to both society and the individual in the form of gains in equality of opportunity, 
and an enlarged field for individual initiative while at the same time reducing the waste of 
reckless competition among production and consumption factors.  Voluntary cooperation, so it 
seemed to Hoover, would promote efficiency, stability, and market development without 
resorting to excessive government regulation or the institution of state capitalism.  In his work, 
Hoover became known as an exact and quantitative thinker with a zeal for efficiency and a 
flexibility that encouraged cautious and orderly change arising from voluntary cooperation rather 
than legislation.263 
Voluntarism as a source of public service played a vital role in the administration of 
programs that served community needs.  By playing upon a common sense of pride and 
character, voluntarism functioned for Hoover as an informal means of social control among a 
diverse set of individuals working within voluntary agencies.  In finding common ground 
between members of an organization, voluntarism was designed to resolve tensions inevitable in 
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decentralized administrative practices.  In the case of the CRB, the ideology endeavored to close 
off questions about the ambiguities and contradictions that emerged in practice surrounding 
polarities including decentralization-centralization, civilian-state, and private-public spheres.264   
 In the business environments of America after 1890, a sense of cooperative capitalism 
was an important component of protecting individual initiative from governmental intervention.  
Hoover maintained that, “Progress is born of cooperation in the community—not from 
governmental restraints.  Business has by cooperation made great progress in the advancement of 
service, in stability, in regularity of employment, and in the correction of its own abuses.”  
Regulation preventing the restriction of trade was paramount to the economic success of United 
States because it preserved the equality of opportunity in American markets.  To Hoover 
cooperation was not socialism, but the initiative of self-interest blended with a sense of service.  
Applying lessons from both his Quaker upbringing and his experience as an engineer, Hoover 
blended voluntary cooperation and individualism into his own version of cooperative 
capitalism.265   
Hoover approached his position as director of the CRB from the perspective of an 
engineer-financier.  He claimed that by bringing efficiency to society the modern intellectual 
engineer assumed a new, important role in the modern industrial order by creating peace and 
prosperity.  Engineers, he claimed, performed the “job of clothing the bare bones of science with 
life, comfort, and hope.”  Hoover observed that within his lifetime the discipline of engineering 
transformed from a trade into a profession that dealt with the “sort of exactness (that) makes for 
truth and conscience.”  In his professional life Hoover described himself as a scientifically-
trained professional with the independence, disinterestedness, and ethics of an expert.  A 
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colleague commented that one of Hoover’s outstanding traits was that he never complained 
about anything and did not make the mistake of thinking his rank conferred omniscience.266   
Hoover sternly disliked ostentation in any form.  In public he abhorred attention that 
focused too directly on him or appeared to be overtly self-serving.  While Hoover loved to 
engineer publicity he shrank from personal accolades to the point that he was averse to having 
his picture taken for public use.  The traits of his thoroughly Quaker upbringing were evident in 
both his personal and professional life.  Hoover in his dealings abhorred over self-
aggrandizement and display.  As a manager he hated idle gossip and was quiet and direct in 
speech.267     
Fellow administrators, delegates, and committee members alike credited Hoover with 
possessing the organizational ingenuity and ability that kept ravitaillement going in Belgium and 
Northern France for the better part of five years.  In performing his duties he maintained that the 
value of any administrative effort ultimately depended on the extent to which an individual can 
develop an institution to carry on the work at hand.  The precision by which the chairman 
conducted CRB business was particularly noticeable to his peers.  Madame Taillandier 
commented that the look of intelligence in Hoover’s face was like that of a surgeon.  Vernon 
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Kellogg added that with all his training in the industry of engineering and his experience in 
business the chairman looked on the U.S. not simply as a nation of fields, factories, mines, 
railways, motor cars, and steamships but as a nation of men, women, and children.268 
Hoover also possessed an eye for detail and a mind for aspects of relief efforts that many 
failed to consider.  In the first year of the war for example he stressed the peculiar relation 
between a sufficiency of fats in the national diet and the contentment and courage of the people.  
Studies revealed that the human body experiences a psychological and physiological need for 
fatty foods which leads in cases of fat reduction to nervousness, helplessness, and discontent.  
Regardless of the situation, Hoover stressed the importance of the commission in the lives of 
Belgians.  “An intolerable wrong is being committed in the world, and we cannot allow it.  It is 
true we have neither the traditions nor the habits of a military nation; we shall not feel the war in 
our body and our blood, but we shall feel it in our souls, and our action will be all the more 
rapid.”269 
Another commonly observed feature of Hoover was his demeanor.  Edward Eyre Hunt 
observed that the chairman was astonishingly youthful with cool eyes, clear brow, and full 
mouth.  At work Hoover appeared to be passive and receptive; Hunt observed that there were 
times when he was “so silent that it hurt.”  As an American he displayed a proclivity towards 
acting first and explaining afterward.  But his explanations, like his actions, were direct and self-
sufficient.270 
In his leadership of the commission Hoover applied a no-nonsense approach to his 
dealings with everyone from rank-and-file commune members to heads of state.  Vernon Kellogg 
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explained that the chairman was an organizational man who as a leader was not the dictator type.  
He depended on the mobilization of every agency that could help and sought the cooperation of 
everyone who could be of assistance.  As director of relief efforts, Kellogg believed that Hoover 
had that primary sense of organization that led to the proper delegation of authority.  “Above all 
he inspires ideals of service in every member of the vast staffs which he builds almost overnight 
for his great enterprises of mercy,” Kellogg added.271 
In conducting business Hoover also had a talent for concentrating on the most critical 
aspects of the situation.  His habit of going straight to the highest authority with anything 
allowed for quicker, more decisive, and influential decision making.  When he wanted an 
obstacle removed from his path, the chairman went directly to the man who could remove it or 
excised the issue himself.272   
By the course of his actions and the directness of his tactics Hoover made enemies.  
Edward Eyre Hunt wondered how there were so few adversaries considering his boldness.  In 
forging the commission Hoover used men, threw them aside, and forgot them as any architect 
does.  Hunt observed that Hoover had along with his diplomatic skill a frank way of dealing with 
men as well as he dealt with conditions.  These skills made him a diplomat in the high—not 
trivial—sense of the word and a constructive artist in human destiny.  The chairman was a leader 
too busy to waste time flattering the petty pride of those he led or negotiated with.  Whitlock 
himself told stories of the “terrible Hoover” heading the commission in Belgium who was 
terrible to the Germans, terrible to the British and French, terrible to most of his American 
associates, and terrible because of his relentless and unconquerable determination to keep 
Belgium alive.  In his dealings the chairman scolded, threatened, and out-bullied every human 
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obstacle and by the course of his actions changed the policies of nations and thwarted the 
resolute determination of cabinets, governments, and military establishments.  It was from these 
attributes that Hoover commanded the respect of others.  “Listen to no one but Chief Hoover,” 
Horace Fletcher explained in a letter to fellow commission members, “it is he who is managing 
this miracle on the loaves and the fishes and who is reconstructing Golden Rule practical 
Christianity on solid (engineering) lines.”273 
Brand Whitlock was himself an important asset to Hoover and the commission in his role 
of directing relief once it arrived in Belgium.  Unlike the chairman, Whitlock brought with him 
extensive experienced in politics and diplomacy acquired before the war.  Born in Urbana, Ohio 
in 1869, Whitlock observed justice at its worst as a newspaper reporter in Chicago early in his 
career.  In 1905 his professional career as a lawyer changed when Lincoln Steffens persuaded 
him to run for the mayor in Toledo, Ohio.  Nominated on an independent ticket, Whitlock was 
swept into office.  With the election of Woodrow Wilson to the Presidency in 1912, Mayor 
Whitlock retired voluntarily to secure an opportunity to pursue his literary ambitions by 
becoming an American diplomat.  In December 1913, Whitlock replaced Theodore Marburg as 
American Minister to Belgium.  Whitlock looked forward to enjoying the culture of the “Little 
Paris” of Europe and its assured peace guaranteed by treaties among its neighbors.274 
The outbreak of war tested the will of the American Minister.  Newton Baker observed of 
Whitlock that he had never in his life been neutral between right and wrong—dating back to his 
days as a reporter in Chicago and as Mayor of Toledo—and did not try to be impartial when he 
was in Belgium.  Baker believed that the minister was better than neutral because of his espousal 
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of a lofty moral philosophy and elevated idealism.  Nevertheless, Whitlock had to suppress his 
feelings and be painfully neutral as an organizer of ravitaillement efforts.  His tenure in Brussels 
once the war erupted depended on his neutrality especially after the Belgian government fled to 
The Havre.  Baker believed that despite his outward disposition the people of Belgium never 
failed to divine his opinion of the war and never ceased to regard him as a stone wall between 
helplessness and the harshness of the German occupying forces.275   
In carrying out his duties the minister was relentless in his dedication to Belgians.  For a 
time Whitlock personally arrived at the Brussels markets at five a.m. to see that the German 
commissariat was not stripping them clean.  In total his greatest service in the first dark months 
of the war was that he showed the frightened population that someone cared.  As time passed the 
minister’s popularity grew alongside his reputation.  In November 1915, J.F. Lucey found 
Whitlock to be the most powerful figure in Belgium as far as the people were concerned.  “The 
Belgians hold (for) him a reverence and affection as great as that which they entertain their 
heroic King,” Lucey added.  Many people, Germans included, owed their lives to the courage 
and tactfulness of Whitlock according to Lucey.  King Albert conferred the highest decoration of 
the country (the grand cordon of the Order of Leopold) upon Whitlock after the conclusion of the 
war.  At the conclusion of the Armistice he was awarded the Croix Civique and made a Burgess 
of Brussels, Liége, and Ghent.276 
Funding Necessities in Belgium 
By late 1914 it became clear that the modest funds that the commission currently 
possessed were wholly and woefully inadequate to meet the ever-growing needs of Belgium.  
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The CRB agreed that its benevolent funding was, and never could be, sufficient under current 
levels to gratuitously distribute all of its supplies.  In August 1915, Hoover reported to Lindon 
Bates at the CRB New York office that the commission had abandoned its appeals everywhere 
except in the most critical phases because there no longer appeared to be a legitimate 
undercurrent of support for relief in America.  The only legitimate appeal at the time seemed to 
be for food, money, and clothing—any other basis for appeal was subject to refutation as 
dishonest and would lead to criticism.277 
Financial support for the CRB had two problems at the time—it was inconsistent in its 
appearance and was seemingly never enough.  In 1915 the commission was raising huge sums of 
money every month through charity, banks, and governments but it was barely enough to provide 
a back food ration that kept the “body and soul together.”  The need in Belgium was great.  
Hoover explained to Baker that “We have got to bolster them by taking better care of their 
greatest need—their old fathers and mothers and their children—and by showing them that 
somebody in the world cares enough to keep them hopeful for the future.”  Hoover worried about 
the rations provided to the people of Belgium that by his own admittance were entirely 
inadequate and barely enough to keep strong people alive.278 
The inconsistent flow of charity to the CRB was in reality an old problem exacerbated by 
increasing destitution across Belgium.  Hoover summed up the situation in a letter to Edward 
Grey on November 25, 1914 saying that the flow of charity was at best irregular and unreliable, 
while the commission was compelled to purchase considerable quantities of food to supplement 
donations just to keep the program alive.  At the time some effort was being made by the Belgian 
government to assist in accumulating working capital that could be used to purchase foodstuffs 
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for resale—but this only benefitted those who still had money.  By the end of January 1915 the 
commission had taken “the gloomiest possible view of the ultimate future.”  With the help that 
the commission endeavored to secure (which Hoover noted was rapidly growing beyond the 
reach of private philanthropy) and the financial agreements for loans the CRB made it hoped to 
be able to sustain relief through the end of March.  Before that time, however, three new forces 
would intervene and make the situation worse.  These forces include the rapid exhaustion of 
vegetable and meat supplies in Belgium, the addition of Northern France to ravitaillement efforts 
(bringing the total from 7,000,000 to 10,000,000 people), and the worsening of conditions that 
drove larger numbers to the soup kitchens.  If these people were to be kept alive the commission 
would need fifteen million dollars worth of food per month from April to August 1915.279 
Solving the financial puzzle of such a vast operation was one of the most difficult 
challenges that the CRB faced.  Estimations made in 1914 calling for about $5,000,000 per 
month grew into actual spending amounts of $30,000,000 in 1918.  Initially, Daniel Heineman 
believed that if the commission could arrange for a guaranteed government subvention of 
£400,000 per month with private charity paying for the rest the CRB could handle the situation.  
Belgium’s pre-war reliance on the importation of between 275,000 and 300,000 tons of cereals 
per month made matters worse.  On November 4, 1914 the CRB calculated that the maintenance 
of a 10 ounce ration per day would cost at least between £800,000 and £1,000,000 over the next 
eight months.  Hoover reported that the situation was far beyond charity and philanthropy—it 
called for a government guarantee of at least £400,000 to £500,000 per month.280 
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To survive the commission would have to broaden its appeals through both private and 
public channels.  Hoover reported to Lord Eustace Percy in London on January 6, 1915 that it 
cost the CRB about £1,200,000 a month to provide a minimum ration in Belgium with about 
£600,000 of that total coming from the portion of the population that can still pay for it.  At the 
time about £400,000 a month was a “dead loss” going to the support of free canteens and soup 
kitchens.  With the number of destitute on the rise the private subsidy of £100,000 a month given 
by the Rockefeller Foundation combined with other various charities was all the commission had 
to rely on.  On February 11, Vice Chairman Lindon Bates told the New York Times that $100,000 
per day or nearly $3,000,000 per month was needed to feed the destitute in Belgium.  Within a 
few weeks Bates estimated that ravitaillement would require $12,000,000 a month.  He 
concluded, “Within a few months the breadlines will be 2,500 miles long, which would reach 
from New York to Salt Lake City.”  Urgent appeals of this sort in America became standard 
practice throughout the war.  In total over four and a half years of operation, Hoover estimated 
that the CRB shipped over 56,000,000 tons of supplies.  Extended over a nine-year period of 
relief spanning both the conflict itself and the aftermath he estimated that the total value of 
assistance topped $8,000,000,000.  Of these totals, American contributions played a crucial role 
in the relief of Belgium and Northern France.  Loans by the US government and the giving of 
over 211 charitable institutions accounted for more than $7,450,000,000 in assistance.281   
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Spreading the financial necessity out among its recipients was proving increasingly 
ineffective however.  In February 1915, the Comité National determined that about $3,000,000 
was needed for relief.  Of that sum the communes were to assume one-third of the funds while 
the other two-thirds was to be raised from external sources.  The New York Times reported that 
this meant that the “friends of Belgium” would have to supply $2,000,000 per month.  In August, 
Hoover reported that about £1,000,000 per month was being generated abroad to supply the 
communes combined with an additional £200,000 from communal taxation (the sale of 
foodstuffs to those who could pay).  This sum amounted to a share of less than thirty centimes 
per day per person among the destitute.  With the minimum upon which life could be preserved 
sitting at sixty centimes per day, it was evident to Hoover that the money currently available was 
merely supplemental to the £2,500,000 now required per month.  In total during the first twelve 
months of operation (October 1914 to October 1915) the CRB expended £17,257,591 on the 
purchase of food and its delivery into Belgium.282 
Planning out the exact details of funding was no easy task for the commission.  At the 
center of all operations was a complicated financial system that handled the distribution of 
supplies.  In Northern France scheme was even more complex given the three organizations that 
worked in conjunction with each other.  As the intermediary between the CRB and the Comité 
Français the Comité National worked in each French district receiving relief.  When supplies 
were received the Comité Français billed the Comité National for the materials.  Immediately the 
Comité National turned around and re-billed the district committees of the Comité Français for 
supplies at the same price it was charged by the CRB.  Through this interaction the CRB fixed a 
                                                          
282 New York Times, Feb 16, 1915, p. 4.  Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, 
p. 2:8.  Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 235. 
 
163 
 
maximum sale price for consumers which allowed enough of a margin to cover costs of 
transportation into the French communes.283 
The financial methods of the Provisioning Department were of equal complexity.  If there 
had been no economic or legal restraints on exchange the department would have been able to 
survive on a moderate supply of working capital.  This was not the case however.  Given the 
constriction of economic markets and the disappearance of all metallic currency inside Belgium 
it could only function as far as local currency could go.  In effect the disappearance of hard 
(metallic) currency created a convertibility crisis—meaning that the only money that existed in 
the country was inconvertible local emergency currency issued by banks and municipalities.  
Compounding the issue was the Allies refusal to allow the securities to pass out of Belgium.284   
In an attempt to remedy the situation the commission was able to obtain small 
concessions from belligerents allowing the CRB to accept gold values abroad for the payment of 
foodstuffs at a fixed rate of 25.40 Belgian francs to the pound inside Belgium. Although the 
Belgian exchange rate in Holland was quoted at a deprecated value of 25 percent the commission 
decided that maintaining the gold value was necessary.  The CRB surmised that allowing food 
prices to rise uncompensated by any advance in wages would have added to the misery of the 
nation.   This form of commercial exchange required no actual money to change hands because 
the food itself served as the medium of exchange.285   
As a system the expense of ravitaillement was partially covered by gifts from abroad and 
partially by the surplus generated from the Benevolence Department.  Generally the amount of 
money available from these resources was insufficient.  To make up the difference the 
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Provisioning Department used its operating funds to close to gap.  These advances to the 
Benevolence Department were debited against the government subsidies set aside for the 
destitute by the commission.  In an attempt to achieve better economy and close the gap between 
actual funds on hand and subsidies the Rotterdam office of the CRB set up its own finance 
company.  The commission was also able to lower its bulk wheat expenses by approximately 60 
percent—equaling about £500 to £650 a month—by purchasing four grain elevators within the 
city.286   
The coordination of charity was a crucial component of commission’s work given the 
fact that the success or failure of relief hinged in the CRB’s ability to secure adequate funding.  
“The Mobilization of Charity” was the term used by the CRB to describe both the appeal it made 
for charity and the measures it took to turn the response into money.  The London Times 
explained that the word “benevolence” was apt because it described the universal feelings of 
sympathy that were aroused by situation in Belgium and the technical term “mobilization” was 
true in that the commission used scientific, practical methods to enhance and utilize these 
feelings.  In total the commission secured funds from four primary sources—government 
subsidies, commercial activities, world charity, and operating surpluses—amounting to 
$894,797,150.40.287 
Funds under each category were gathered from a variety of sources that were principally 
American, British, and Belgian in origin.  The common denominator in the process was the 
coordination of all financial operations at Hoover’s central office in London.  The drive desire to 
take disparate operations and combine them into one functional system was a central tenet of 
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CRB organization.  The acquisition, shipping, and distribution of relief supplies generally 
followed a basic pattern: procurement in North or South America, transshipment to warehouses 
in Rotterdam, and final transfer into the communes by way of Antwerp on river and canal boats 
(lighters).288   
In the first stage of relief accumulation it was important for the commission to present to 
the world a vivid picture Belgian suffering through a wide propaganda campaign.  In the early 
days of the war Hoover strongly believed that the story of Belgium had tremendous news value 
as a vehicle to create a public opinion in support of the commission’s objectives.  As time passed 
the story of Belgium naturally became common knowledge and of diminishing value.  To the 
chairman the continued use of propaganda lacked the dignity apropos to the prestige the 
commission achieved and was becoming a source of resentment and embarrassment to the 
Germans.  Eventually it was a tool that the CRB passed on to the local committees once the 
commission established an international reputation.289 
Hoover held the view that decentralized publicity provided the strongest means of 
generating charity at the committee level.  In doing so the CRB decided in mid-1915 to supply 
press material to the committees only.  Hoover’s idea at the time was to have the chairmen of all 
state committees cooperate with the commission’s central press agency in forming a national 
body in support of the CRB.  This did not mean that the commission was ceasing all press 
release material—it simply meant that the information was going to be disseminated to the local 
bodies for their use as opposed to broad based nationalized propaganda.  In the early days of 
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CRB press coverage the story centered on the plight of Belgium.  As people steadily became 
aware of the horrible conditions within the country the commission transitioned its publicity 
towards generating charity and focusing on how individuals could become involved.290 
The organization of appeals for public support was guided by a set of general policies 
that remained in use throughout the entire CRB period and were later adopted by the ARA 
(American Relief Administration) in Europe.  Organized by Hoover, the commission announced 
a detailed program of need based on the reports of competent investigators in relation to the 
current resources available.  When conditions in respect to needs or resourced changed the 
commission issued a new program.  In the second phase the commission issued appeals through 
the press and cooperating committees consisting of a clear statement of need (free from 
hysterical exaggeration), the details of the program to be undertaken, previous accomplishments, 
and the methods to be employed.  As a part of this program the commission made it clear that it 
would not dictate to the cooperating committees the methods they should employ in the 
solicitation of support.  Once funds were received the commission employed what it called the 
“economic and efficient methods of large scale business operations” with careful and detailed 
accounting for all contributions before allocating them to the Provisioning Department.291 
In October 1914 the commission decided that the best way to collect funds and arouse 
public opinion was to bring moral pressure through a systematic press campaign.  Under the 
directorship of Hoover the venture had an immediate impact.  Edward Eyre Hunt recalled that by 
the beginning of January 1915 all the world “knew” Hoover—knew that he was the person most 
responsible for the creation and maintenance of the CRB, knew that it he was trying to feed over 
                                                          
290 Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 2:270.  Hoover also proposed that 
the CRB would pay the out-of-pocket expenses for setting up the central support organization.   
291 Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 2:235.  The first appeal called for 
80,000 tons per month at a cost of $5,000,000.  Loc cit, p. 2:236.  Loc cit, p. 2:237.  An important part of this final 
process was securing the labor of volunteers.  Loc cit, p. 2:236. Volunteer service allowed the CRB to lower costs at 
every step of the ravitaillement process. 
 
167 
 
7,000,000, knew that he was trying to enlist the sympathy of the world on their behalf, and knew 
that the commission and its volunteer staff were involved in a business with an annual turnover 
of almost $100,000,000.  In a call to voluntary arms, Hoover said, “The neutral world and future 
generations will lay the responsibility for the decimation of these people at the proper door, and 
no mixture of military reason and diplomatic excuse will cloud the issue.”292   
People responded generously to the commission’s call for benevolence.  During the first 
four months of operation (November 1914 to February 1915) the commission secured 
£3,600,000 from various sources.  A CRB office assistant in London recalled that after the first 
days of November (1914) the “money came from everywhere.”  Under Hoover the press appeal 
yielded committees in Britain, America, Australia, Japan, and China.  Opening the mail at the 
CRB London office was reportedly like “the working of a magic spell; checks from all (quarters) 
of the globe were piled up in heaps.”293 
Working extensively through press appeals meant that the commission was forced to deal 
with both good and bad press publicity.  The extensive size and scope of the CRB press 
campaign notwithstanding the appeal the commission made did not always have the desired 
effect.  In other cases the successful raising of funds was almost detrimental to its success.  At 
times the public wondered about the altruistic motives of the commission; if they were indeed 
the only hope for Belgium, and whether the situation was always as grave as it appeared and if 
funding was in such constant, desperate need as the CRB explained.  In many instances the 
perceptions of the commission were beyond their control.  In early 1915 for example the critical 
situation of relief funding was misunderstood in America largely through the inaccurate wording 
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of independent announcements in the press that led the public to believe that the entire 
responsibility for Belgian relief was shouldered by the Allied governments.  As time passed the 
vigor of CRB press appeals declined.  Public interest waned when independent committees 
across the country relaxed or terminated their efforts.  Under the decentralized structure this was 
one aspect of charity that the commission was unable to control.294   
In an attempt to better systematize the charitable appeals and to coordinate it with 
shipping and purchasing arrangements the CRB established a branch office in New York City to 
supervise the commission’s work in America.  An important function of the CRB New York 
office was to prepare and distribute press information relating to the day-to-day conditions in 
Belgium and the progress of relief.  To improve efficiency Hoover hired Chairman A.J. 
Hemphill of the Guarantee Trust Bank as treasurer of the New York office to supervise its 
financial transactions in March 1915.  Two months later the commission was put in a peculiar 
position after the sinking of the Lusitania on May 7.  Although the American public was 
engrossed by the event the circumstances did not allow the neutral commission to take advantage 
of any potential momentum.  With its future hanging in the balance the CRB was forced for 
several months to adopt a passive benevolent strategy.  After the Lusitania incident settled the 
commission set about to strengthen its position in the US by establishing a permanent, 
nationwide organization comprised of state, county, and town committees.295   
On both sides of the Atlantic the commission asked a number of prominent men in public 
life to organize special committees to raise funds to support the charitable department.  In April 
1915 the British National Committee for Belgian Relief was founded with the Lord Mayor of 
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London as its chairman and an executive committee comprised of the most distinguished names 
in the country.  The result was the replacement of dormant or overlapping committees with a 
permanent, decentralized structure through which the entire general public could be reached.  In 
November, the CRB launched its new, energetic campaign across the country that generated 
$500,000 in clothing and $1,250,000 in cash before March 1, 1916.296 
The Public Relations of the CRB (1914-1915) 
Public relations were a critical component of CRB work for no other reason than the 
depth of involvement it called for from the citizens of the world.  The London Times reported 
that what the world was asked to provide by the commission was not only money and material 
commodities but also personal service on a scale that led to more than a thousand committees.  
Hoover and colleagues shrewdly used publicity to press for Belgian assistance.  The Chairman 
first came in contact with American press correspondents in London after the outbreak of war 
during his work with the American Relief Committee.  Based on his previous relationships with 
American journalists at home he only had to explain what he had in mind to gain their approval.  
In particular, the tendency of the belligerents to “toss the ball of responsibility” around for 
feeding the civil population in Belgium was advantageous for the commission.  Hoover believed 
that if the rights of the civil population could be made a question of public interest second to the 
war itself then a strong sympathy for Belgians would be created.  The CRB built an extensive 
press campaign around this concept that yielded tremendous results.297 
Increasingly CRB calls for benevolence transcended practical necessity into the realm of 
moral and religious duty.  Hoover himself referred to Belgian relief as moral and religious 
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phenomenon, adding that an alarm had been sounded that aroused national consciences.  Pope 
Benedict XV considered the work of the commission “so humanitarian and holy” (especially for 
the children of Belgium) that he “endorsed it most heartily.”  CRB press appeals also referred 
increasingly to the work as historic.  On January 10, 1915 the New York Times printed a 
commission statement saying that “In all history there has never been such an exhibition of 
nationwide generosity as the people of the United States are giving in their efforts to save 
Belgium from starvation.”  The portrayal of relief work as monumental gave weight to the 
CRB’s drive for private benevolence.  The press campaigns had to be reinvigorated periodically 
as the commission pressed for more money over longer periods of time while the message 
remained fairly consistent.298   
Raising money—private money—was a crucial part of the relief work with publicity 
playing a critical role as the direct messenger of the commission’s program to the individual 
donors and the CRB’s committees around the world.  Hoover explained to Lindon Bates at the 
CRB New York office in April 1915 that despite its slump in fund raising after the initial jolt the 
commission simply could not abandon the benevolent side of relief because governmental 
support only operated as a matter of exchange that did not include providing support for the 
destitute.  Publicity was important because the attention of American, Allied, and neutral nations 
had to be called upon in an emphatic way to the situation in Belgium and the possibilities of 
saving them from what T.B. Kittredge called “the greatest imaginable calamity that such (a) 
nation whose courageous fight against its invader had aroused universal admiration, and whose 
sad fate had been the occasion of equally universal sympathy.”299 
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The CRB established a vigorous press campaign in Britain similar to the one in place in 
the United States.  Unlike in America, a sense of guilt pervaded British attitudes towards the 
invasion of Belgium after the war began.  For the enthusiastic majority there was also a strong 
sense of shame at the inability of British forces to halt the German invasion.  As foreigners and 
as people in distress the Belgians were of great interest to many Englishmen during the war.  In 
the British press The Daily Chronicle reported that the longer the war lasted the greater duty the 
British public and its government had in assisting Belgium.  The paper explained that France was 
doing all it could and the Americans were chipping in as a neutral power, but the fact remained 
that Belgium was unable to support itself.  The Huddensfield Daily Examiner added on the 
subject that “The destitute in Belgium are wards of the world.”300 
The British press resoundingly focused on the recurring theme that their countrymen 
were in a position like no other nation to assist the Belgians.  Combined with Allied partisanship 
the sentiments heightened the sense of duty impressed upon Englishmen.  The Times reported in 
early 1915 that without outside aid the Germans would allow the Belgians to starve.  Press 
statements also conjured up images of suffering that played well to public sympathies.  The 
Scotsman Edinburgh published an article saying that “When you think of Belgium, think not 
only of the black lines before the soup kitchens, of the black groups of men without work in the 
squares of the day, of the villagers pitch black at night; think too of the tens of thousands of the 
once well-to-do who now have lost or are losing all that they have hitherto enjoyed.”301 
Members of Parliament frequently spoke on the subject of Belgian relief before their 
constituents as the British government became more heavily involved in the funding of 
ravitaillement.  M.P. G.K. Chesterton of Beaconsfield wrote in a letter that was published in the 
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Buxton Advertiser that Belgians not only paid the ultimate sacrifice for their own nation but did 
so for all of Europe.  “The things of shameless shame that have been done are something worse 
than prodigies, worse than nightmares, worse than devilries, they are facts,” M.P. Chesterton 
added.  M.P. and Belgian National Committee member Percy Alden explained that “I do not 
really think that the British people quite fully comprehend the need of Belgium today.”302 
By October 1915 the sense of urgency regarding food supplies in Belgium was a major 
issue covered in the British press.  On October 2 the South London Press reported that hundreds 
of thousands of Belgians would starve without further assistance.  It added that despite the 
situation the system of distribution in Belgium was doing its part in keeping foodstuffs away 
from German soldiers.  Minister Whitlock in a message from Brussels promised the British 
public that to date there was not a single instance in which a pound of food sent under the 
commission’s guarantees with the Allies and Germany had been touched by German authorities.  
Although the commission kept its promises the article still held the Germans responsible for the 
situation in Belgium.  The paper declared in condemnation that the Germans “will not, or cannot, 
save the 7,000,000 people from starving to death.”303 
To supplement its press campaigns the Commission issued several series of 
advertisements that included brochures, pamphlets, and endorsements from famous literary 
figures among others.  The commission’s “A Million a Month to Save the Belgium’s Hungry 
Children” advertisement aimed at Americans explained that while the “efficiency and devotion” 
of Hoover and his associates had an enormous impact on prestige abroad the nation was not 
giving it share.  “Less than one-twentieth of the total contributions for Belgian Relief have come 
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from this country,” explained the appeal.  With British and French government subsidies 
reaching their limits the population of Belgium looked to America as its savior.  “America and 
America alone can avert the ultimate, unthinkable tragedy which the failure of the Commission’s 
finances would mean to Belgium,” the advertisement concluded.  In a similar pamphlet entitled 
“Have You Done Your Bit for Belgium,” the commission stated that Britain, Australia, and New 
Zealand contributed 22 cents, $1.34, and $2.29 respectively towards Belgian relief.  Americans 
by contrast donated 10 cents per person.304  
The Women’s Section of the CRB also issued advertisements and appeals aimed at their 
constituents in America.  Women, these advertisements claimed, were the individuals in 
particular who needed to come to the rescue of Belgium.  Duty and honor were a common call in 
commission advertisements—the Women’s Section being no exception.  They asked “American 
women to recall and deserve anew the immortal tribute they won from our great Lincoln, and to 
highly resolve that this people, under God, shall not perish from the earth.”305  
A large number of CRB advertisements focused on babies and children in particular as 
the innocent victims that suffered most tragically.  “The most helpless victims of the war are 
children,” the CRB Pamphlet “Les Petites Abeilles” (The Little Bees) explained, “and their 
preservation in health is one of the most vital as well as the most appealing problems of the 
times, since on their conservation (depends) the future of the Belgian nation.”  As one of the 
most prominent relief organizations for the children of Belgium the “Little Bees of Brussels” 
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managed 60 canteens that provided a nourishing meal for more than 25,000 children and nursing 
mothers every morning.  In a similar advertisement the pamphlet “Babies’ Milk Funds,” declared 
that milk was the most indispensible yet expensive weapon in the fight to save children.  Despite 
all its efforts to coordinate milk production in the provinces it was still unable to provide milk at 
a reasonable price for the destitute.  Only private initiative could assist the commission in 
supplying milk at an affordable rate to Belgium.306   
Written appeals by famous authors of the era also gave credence to both the work being 
performed by the commission and the drive for increased levels of support that it needed through 
private charity.  Arnold Bennett in the third edition of “The Need of Belgium” bluntly told 
readers that those which charity cannot reach will die.  He added that the commission would not 
succeed unless it existed in a permanent state of “active well-doing.”  Speaking to personal 
responsibility, Bennett added that relief efforts would be futile if individuals would not realize in 
their own hearts the immensity of need in Belgium that in his opinion surpassed “all the needs of 
history.”307   
Author Anthony Hope in his contribution to the volume also spoke to the necessity for 
Americans to do more.  Hope added that enough could not be said “to fire the imagination and 
touch the heart” so that people would understand the “imperative need and extreme magnitude” 
of the work that the CRB was doing.  Explaining the situation further, he believed that a “spasm 
of emotion” was not enough; the efforts of a few societies or impassioned individuals could not 
save an entire nation.  What was called for was a truly national effort.308   
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In the final two articles authors of the piece A.E.W. Mason and George Bernard Shaw 
summarized the realities of Belgian relief both physically and ideologically.  Mason explained in 
his contribution that Belgians were without food, earnings, shelter, and other basic needs.  The 
result was that people either living in squalor or as refugees.  George Bernard Shaw by contrast 
discussed the moral aspects of Belgian relief, telling readers that Belgium was the only nation in 
the war that had conflict forced upon it.  According to Shaw it didn’t matter what side an 
individual supported; what mattered was that Belgium was “utterly powerless” to prevent what 
had happened.  People for that reason were compelled to assist the beleaguered country caught 
between the great European powers.309  
Beyond orchestrating the extensive press campaigns of the CRB, Chairman Hoover also 
participated in benefit dinners as the keynote speaker.  From New York to Colorado he gave 
impassioned, articulate, first-hand accounts of the situation in Belgium.  Hoover was not a man 
to mince words at these events.  His depictions explained the seriousness of the situation and the 
ongoing need for American benevolence.  The job of organizing Belgian relief and serving as its 
most recognized spokesman was difficult and time consuming.  George Barr Baker in 1915 
noticed how worried Hoover appeared to be under his “imperturbable exterior” after a charity 
dinner in New York City.  After his speech, the chairman came and sat next to Baker and said, 
“My name is Hoover.  I (have) one of the worst jobs in the world.”310 
Urgency and the seriousness of problems in Belgium were common themes in the 
chairman’s personal appeals to Americans at dinners and speaking engagements.  Hoover at 
another charity dinner that raised $500,000 in New York personalized the experience of Belgians 
by painting a picture of what life would be like in America if they faced similar circumstances.  
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He explained that for 10,000,000 people there was no salvation or solution—their only ease was 
the commission.  As the provider to the commission the Belgians looked at Americans as their 
only hope.  “The Belgians have come to look upon the Americans as their sole saviors; to look 
upon the American flag as the flag which is fighting to protect them,” Hoover added.  In regards 
to urgency, the chairman told listeners that the CRB was between $3,000,000 to $5,000,000 short 
a month.  Only public charity could provide this money he explained.311 
At an address to the National Geographic Society the chairman reiterated the precarious 
position the commission was in.  Throughout the war CRB storehouses held from one to two 
months food supplies for Belgium at the most with a goal of never letting stocks fall below this 
minimum.  While Hoover emotionally appealed to audience he made it clear that his words were 
not exaggerated.  “We make no attempt to present to you pathetic, heartbreaking pictures of 
emaciated or dying children,” the chairman explained, “all we represent to you (are) the happy 
faces of children well cared for, well nourished, the objects of our particular solicitude.”   “Ours 
has been an ambition to maintain the laughter of children, not dry their tears,” Hoover 
concluded.312   
The speech also included an honest assessment by Hoover on the role Americans were 
playing in the ravitaillement of Belgium and Northern France.  Personally, the chairman hoped to 
write a bright chapter of American history in this war through efficiency, humanity, devotion, 
and self-sacrificed through the commission’s work but instead feared that “this chapter will 
never be completed, and that we may have failed in the great task which we set for America in 
the saving of ten (million helpless people).”  Much like at the New York dinner, Hoover 
explained to the crowd that the commission was short between $3,000, 000 and $5,000,000 a 
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month and added that five months ago an American-based initiative to raise $1,250,000 a month 
failed.  The chairman himself was embarrassed by the “apathy of the (this) country (that) caused 
failure.”  Hoover lamented, “I have stood ashamed before a thousand children who, on my 
entrance from their daily meal, warbled the opening stanzas of ‘The Star Spangled Banner.’”313 
Press appeals, media campaigns, and speaking engagements combined with local 
committee efforts to produce results in America.  In New York City the local committee 
collected more than $250,000 over a two month period.  The New York Times assisted their work 
by publishing the names of donors and the amount that they contributed to the cause.  During the 
first months of the war the Rockefeller Foundation became one the largest private donors by 
providing nearly $700,000 up to its retirement at the end of January 1915.  In total the various 
institutions and groups cooperating with or directly organized by the CRB collected over 
$52,000,000 during the war worldwide.  According to commission records the United States 
donated $34,521,027 of this total.314 
Over the first two years of the war these sums proved invaluable before larger 
government subsidies were granted, and more importantly private benevolence generated by the 
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CRB demonstrated the strength of moral support behind the undertaking which played an 
important role in securing governmental assistance.  Appeals through newspapers, periodicals, 
and mailings generated this public support which was rooted in the people’s knowledge of 
conditions inside Belgium and of the commission’s objectives for ravitaillement.  As time passed 
an informed public was of tremendous value for Hoover in his negotiations with belligerent 
governments for subventions and guarantees.  In Britain the press campaigns of the commission 
were generating both awareness and substantial sums of charity.  During the course of its two 
years of work the British National Committee collected £2,411,222 (an average of over £100,000 
a month in cash).  Combined the British Empire donated $16,641,035 worth of world charity 
during the war years.  Of this sum nearly three-fourths came from British dominions overseas, 
with Australia, New Zealand, Canada, India, and South Africa each making major 
contributions.315 
During the winter months of 1914 and 1915, Hoover worked towards the dual goal of 
securing funding through private charitable donations and government subventions.  By January 
1, 1915 it became evident however that the current program of the commission requiring almost 
£1,500,000 a month could not be carried on unless larger sources of capital—governmental 
funds especially—could be accumulated.  In a letter to Walter Hines Page, Hoover recalled that 
although the CRB’s initial appeals were met by a generous response it soon became evident that 
the “task was far too great for private philanthropy alone; it was necessary to secure financial aid 
on so large a scale that nothing less than the most generous governmental assistance could 
provide for our work.”  Not only were the sums advanced by Allied governments inadequate to 
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cover the full requirements of the commission but they were also insufficient to cover the capital 
costs of purchasing foodstuffs through existing monetary exchanges.316   
Beginning in March 1915, the CRB received monthly governmental subventions of 
approximately $5,000,000 for Belgium and $2,500,000 for Northern France with no guarantees 
that these advances would extend beyond June of that year.  For a few months at least the 
commission was assured the ability to meet its financial requirements.  By this point however the 
flood of charitable contributions generated in the first few months of the war were not slowing 
down to a trickle.  By the summer of 1915 the commission was finding it impossible to meet the 
ever-increasing needs of ravitaillement.317   
From mid-1915 forward, Hoover and the CRB pressed harder for governmental 
assistance.  Their efforts proved fruitful.  At the end of the war government subsidies totaled 
$700,540,443.38.  Of this total, $386,632,260.44 was donated by the U.S. government, 
$109,045,328.73 was provided by the British, and $204,862,854.21 was supplied by the French.  
Combined, benevolence (charity), commercial exchange donations, and governmental 
subventions provided the commission with $759,159,607.19 of basic capital.318   
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CHAPTER SEVEN: Coordinating the “Perfect Transport System” 
The CRB Procurement Structure 
Procurement of supplies precluded the long journey of CRB benevolence to the mouths 
of people in Belgium and Northern France.  In coordinating the flow of benevolence the 
commission was called upon to conduct business in all parts of the world.  As an organization, 
the businessmen who made up the CRB were specially trained to deal with the issues and 
complexities of worldwide commerce.  In handling the commission’s business its representatives 
were in touch with firms that made large foreign purchases a matter of daily routine.  Through 
their assistance the process of shipping and receiving was made significantly easier.  Some 
wrangling occurred over selling prices and freight charges, but the majority of the work was 
discharged almost mechanically by a staff of experienced clerks.319 
In America the CRB New York office not only handled the commission’s press 
campaigns but also served as the center for purchasing and shipping.  Out of this location the 
arrangements for wheat and pork products were coordinated.  Through the end of the second year 
of operation, the New York office dispatched a total of 1,587,890 tons of cargo—1,227,420 of 
which was wheat.  Over that same period the office also collected approximately $8,750,000 in 
food, clothing, and money.320 
Through the efforts of volunteers with practical business backgrounds the CRB New 
York office reached a high degree of efficiency in purchasing and shipping in its early days of 
operation.  With the assistance of Brand Whitlock the New York office secured free 
transportation for all goods donated to the commission from numerous railroad companies across 
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the country.  Through these arrangements special reductions were granted by express companies 
while agreements were made with postal authorities for expeditions handling of parcels 
consigned to the commission and for payment of charges by the CRB at the final destination 
point.  In order to efficiently coordinate purchasing and receiving, Hoover believed that it was 
essential to initiate a mechanism of single control to assure a non-competitive, continuous flow 
of foodstuffs.  Representatives of Armour & Company, the Chicago Board of Trade, and Mr. 
E.G. Broenniman helped the commission achieve this goal by carefully watching the markets 
and making purchases on behalf of the CRB.  In doing so the commission was able to secure 
foodstuffs at a price considerably less than market averages. 321   
At virtually every step of the purchasing and receiving chain there were volunteers and 
cooperating businesses that rendered invaluable assistance.  Whether it was through railway 
concessions, reduced freight costs, or careful purchasing, the generosity of volunteers saved the 
commission from middlemen.  The extra savings made more than just a marginal difference in 
ravitaillement efforts.  In Belgium for example it allowed the commission to turn a profit of 
£156,000 per month in early 1915 off of the sale of bread offered at the ruling market price in 
London.  What this meant was that by paying no more than the average Londoner for bread the 
well-to-do in Belgium were giving £150,000 a month to fellow destitute countrymen.  Whitlock 
commented that the stupendous organization that gathered wheat from the pampas in Argentina 
to the prairies of the Dakotas and shipped it overseas to Belgium was so scientifically created 
that it absorbed numerous shocks and fluctuations without failing.322   
Problems of numerous varieties notwithstanding, the efforts of the CRB system and its 
participants to efficiently coordinate relief supplies steadily improved.  By 1916 the commission 
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upped its shipping totals from improved from 983,808 tons to 1,278,946.  Despite the 
tremendous efforts made by the committee, Hoover reported that many sacrifices had already 
made and much work to still be done: “Cold statistics do not express the suffering of people or 
their anxieties for their future.  Nor do they acclaim those who died on sea or land for the 
millions who were saved.”323   
In the next phase of provisioning the procurement of ships to transport foodstuffs into 
Belgium and Northern France was no less important than the accumulation of funds and the 
purchase of supplies.  Logistically, the initial problem the CRB was force to deal with was the 
securing of the necessary amounts of ships and tonnage to bring ravitaillement in to Belgium.  
Economically, the demands of governments and private commerce after the war began drove 
charter rates to unprecedented heights.  Obliged to compete, the commission found itself forced 
to spend an increasing amount of its inadequate funds on transportation costs instead of actual 
food supplies.  Realizing that this condition would get worse rather than better, Hoover in 
December 1914 instituted a program with the objective of securing a permanent relief fleet that 
would make the commission virtually independent of the market.324 
Hoover’s attempt to secure a neutral fleet was hampered by restrictions placed upon 
shipping by the Allied governments.  While shipping deals struck between the CRB and neutral 
vessels had gained the support of the British government in early 1915, the French government 
refused to grant its approval to the program.  Months later when the French government became 
desperate for shipping they gave support to the commission’s efforts only to witness the German 
government block any additional tonnage of relief supplies the country would have received.  In 
                                                          
323 Hoover, An American Epic, p. 1:164 and 267-268. 
324 Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 1:304.  Loc cit, p. 1:322.  The CRB 
was forced to compete with the Allied and neutral governments who were pressed for ships to transport supplies for 
civilian and military needs.  Loc cit, p. 2:476. 
 
183 
 
total the French government’s failure to approve the CRB’s plan for neutral shipping probably 
cost the Allies hundreds of millions in freight charges.325   
The chairman felt the full force of pressure to secure neutral tonnage.  On February 26, 
1915 he reported that it was “utterly impossible” for the commission to deliver one pound of 
food to Rotterdam unless ships are allowed to sail directly from Britain and unless the German 
government is prepared to instruct its navy that ships bearing CRB markings traveling on this 
route were to be respected.  Without the opening of the blockade and freedom on the seas the 
“whole business becomes absolutely hopeless.”  Prohibitions of shipping also made it 
increasingly difficult to transport foodstuffs from the United States to Britain.  The only 
alternative was to seek food supplies from other parts of the world at a much higher price.326 
Once the commission began securing neutral vessels a number of Belgian-owned crafts 
became an important part of the shipping program.  In general these ships were bargained for by 
the CRB for each individual trip in the same manner that British and other neutral charters were 
secured.  The acquisition of these vessels was also hampered by complications including the 
reticence of the Shipping Control Committee to allow Belgian ships flying the British flag to be 
under the exclusive dominion of the CRB.   Despite Hoover’s on-going appeals to the Allies, the 
commission was forced to continue purchasing tonnage on the open markets.  Nevertheless, the 
CRB finalized its basic program of railroad and ocean system in January 1915.  Working in 
conjunction with 65,000 post offices, six express companies, and the principal American railroad 
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lines the commission amassed a fleet of thirty-one steam ships under its command.  Each ship 
was provided with a large flag bearing the words “Commission Belgian Relief, Rotterdam.”327 
Hoover also believed that there was only one way to handle the shipping problems of the 
commission within Belgium as well.  Over its first four months of existence the CRB was only 
able to secure the transport of 2,000 tons a month over the Belgian railway system that would 
need to bring 10-15,000 tons monthly.  The chairman rationalized that even if railway supply 
was practicable there was the serious risk of shipping foodstuffs through German lines.  The 
solution was to initiate a program using the extensive canal system of Belgium through a fleet of 
shallow draft barges.  While representatives understood that there would be some difficulties in 
securing personnel, in April 1915 the commission made arrangements for ten boats as soon as 
they could be made ready and placed orders for more vessels as fast as captains and crews could 
be hired.  John Beaver White told Hoover that once in place the program could expect the arrival 
of large tonnages in Belgium within a month (May 1915).  Slowly but surely the CRB began 
leasing 300 Dutch barges at Rotterdam to complete the final phase of shipping.  The hundreds of 
idle Dutch lighters combined with the hundreds of Belgian canal boats sent to Holland during the 
initial invasion to become the commission’s first permanent fleet of vessels.328 
Initial CRB Shipping Agreements 
A key component of the CRB’s shipping program was the development of the “dispatch” 
clause in ship’s charters.  Originating in the Rotterdam office, the clause was created to increase 
overall efficiency in the commission’s shipping system.  Traditionally, charters had always 
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provided for demurrage—permitting a certain number of days for loading and unloading while 
charging a specified sum for each day in excess of the numbers allowed.  In lieu of the record 
times in unloading achieved on the docks of Rotterdam the commission conceived of the idea 
that the ship should pay for every day that could be saved from the minimum allowed.  While 
vessel owners resisted at first, the plan was eventually put into operation as a component of 
practically all CRB shipping charter agreements.  Through this arrangement the commission 
saved more than $1,250,000 while setting a new pace for the turn-around of cargo vessels 
between Atlantic ports and Rotterdam.329 
Before the shipping system and its proposed measures of efficiency could be 
implemented the CRB had to negotiate with the British government for a partial relaxation of the 
blockade.  During the last week of October 1914, Hoover and Edgar Rickard sought a personal 
audience with Chancellor of the Exchequer and Future Prime Minister David Lloyd George to 
arrange for the forwarding of supplies into Belgium.  In their meeting Lloyd George spoke of the 
difficulties the commission stood to face in securing the shipping of cargoes across the North Sea 
to Holland, adding that it would probably be impossible for the CRB to purchase the food it 
wanted in Britain let alone find railway transport to the coast and across the sea.  Hoover 
countered that the subjects Lloyd George spoke about were no longer a matter of discussion—the 
food was already purchased, shipped to the docks, and loaded on small steamers chartered for 
Holland.  All these ships were waiting for was the authorization to set sail.  After a moment of 
contemplation, Lloyd George promised that the necessary licenses would be issued at once.  
Impressed by the chairman’s bravado, the Chancellor told Hoover, “You know, young man that 
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other men have gone to the tower for less than you have done.  But such commendable energy in 
such a cause deserves to win.  I congratulate you.”330 
The concessions granted to the commission in late October 1914 were little more than a 
moral victory for relief.  Even when the British government extended authorizations to neutral 
ships it was difficult to obtain charters to carry the cargo.  These problems notwithstanding there 
remained the impact that a partial relaxation of the Allied blockade would have on CRB efforts 
in America and Europe.  Hoover saw tremendous value in the issuance of safe conduct passes by 
the British Admiralty as an encouragement to the people who contribute gift ships, but at the 
same time recognized the risks that neutral shipping would be perceived as a weakening of the 
blockades effectiveness while providing German with potent propaganda to undermine civil 
resistance in Belgium.331   
The British government also recognized the tepidness of the situation.  They had to 
decide which alternative would place the least strain on their resources, cause the least friction 
with allies and neutrals, and give the least comfort to its enemies.  In the end the British agreed 
after considerable discussion that English ships could be used if the German government would 
guarantee protection to these vessels on their way to and from Rotterdam.  This promise was 
made with serious reservations however.  In a statement released on March 18, 1915 the British 
government explained that “The right to stop foodstuffs destined for the civil population must 
therefore in any case be admitted if an effective ‘cordon’ controlling intercourse with the enemy 
is drawn, announced, and maintained.”332 
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By November 1914 the commission was also negotiating with the Germans regarding its 
importation plans for Belgium.  On November 23, the Imperial Government announced that until 
further notice (and without reservation of any recall which may become necessary at any time) it 
consented to the transportation of CRB foodstuffs to Dutch harbors and agreed to offer safe 
guarantees to non-neutral vessels carrying relief supplies.  A month later the Germans clarified 
their position through the “Note Verbale” explaining their demands for non-neutral ships 
carrying the commission’s cargo.  In it Germany declared that a vessels’ captain must abstain 
from any and all actions on the return that would assist the enemy.  The decree further designated 
that a certificate of passage was good only for a single voyage and that possession of 
authorization papers did not bar a search of the vessel.  The statement concluded with the 
warning that an offense against these provisions will result in the forfeiture of all rights to 
preferential treatment.333 
Shipping missions were anything but safe despite the promises made by both belligerents 
and the clear marking with huge illuminated signs reading “Belgian Relief Commission” which 
ships carried that were visible for miles.  Hoover himself admitted that, “these protections were 
not infallible.”   On the high seas the Germans almost immediately issued caveats regarding the 
safety of relief shipments.  On February 15, 1915 the German Embassy informed the CRB New 
York office that although the “German commanders will do their best to avoid any mistake, any 
ship entering the war zone will be in danger.”  It added that any letters of safe conduct given to 
relief ships will not remove this danger because as the Germans explained it was practically 
impossible for submarines to examine papers inside the war zone.  In early March, Germany 
attempted to give some reassurances as to its shipping guarantees through a letter sent to 
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Ambassador Gerard in Berlin stating that the Imperial Admiralty promised that CRB ships would 
be able to proceed “undisturbed” by the approved English Channel route bearing the 
commission’s recognizable insignia.  German submarines were subsequently given similar 
instructions.  In an official statement that followed the diplomatic release, the government 
explained that “it would not undertake to use their submarines to attack mercantile or any flag 
except when necessary to enforce the right of visit and passage.”  On April 18 the German 
government addressed the situation again with a statement fully appreciating the work of the 
CRB and that “every support would gladly be lent to it,” while restated the importance of 
carrying clearly recognizable marks of identification.  In return for its renewed promises the 
Germans wanted the commission to prevent all misuses of its insignia.  It also recommended that 
un-neutral vessels should carry a certificate from American authorities and a pass from the 
German Ambassador in Washington testifying that the ship was headed for Holland and carrying 
relief supplies only.334   
Securing neutral shipping and safe passage remained a difficult issue to resolve.  In April 
1915, Hoover was disappointed that German authorities refused to grant further safe-conduct 
passes unless the ships proceeded directly to the U.S. for additional cargo without stopping at 
British ports.  Two months after receiving assurance from Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg that 
relief voyages would be safe the Harpalyce became the first CRB ship to be torpedoed by a 
German submarine on April 10.  After discharging its cargo in Rotterdam the ship was blown up 
in the stern without warning and sank immediately.  The ship displayed CRB markings, bearing 
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“Belgian Relief Rotterdam” in 5 feet by 100 feet lettering on either side of the vessel and was 
readable for five miles.  The sinking of the Harpalyce set a dangerous precedence for relief 
vessels sailing in hostile waters for the remainder of the war.  According to the chairman this 
“gross violation” of agreements threatened the ability of the commission to secure charters and 
insurance policies protecting cargoes.  On behalf of the commission, Walter Hines Page appealed 
to Ambassador Gerard in Berlin explaining that the CRB must have the right to secure safe 
conduct passes or else the British Admiralty will refuse any permits of its own for British ships 
to proceed to Rotterdam.  The result would be the effective end of relief work in Belgium.335   
In searching for alternative methods of shipping, Hoover first proposed to create a neutral 
fleet from interned German ships.  With a fleet of between 40 and 50 ships the commission could 
use all the extra tonnage it could.  Early in 1915 the chairman met informally with officers of the 
Hamburg-American line regarding the feasibility of the idea.  Hoover explained to Sir Edward 
Grey in London that by his figures the use of interned ships could save the commission upwards 
of £80,000, not to mention the cargo space it would free up for British needs.  In March the 
British Foreign Office presented the CRB with a list of six conditions governing the use of 
interned German ships, highlighted by the demand that the vessels be transferred to a firm from a 
neutral country and manned by crews composed entirely of neutrals.336   
Progress towards a final agreement halted however when both Germany and France 
protested the plan.  In Berlin the pressures of the military party seeking a policy of unrestricted 
submarine warfare overpowered those supporting the humanitarian aspects of the commission’s 
work.  The French by contrast listed several reasons why they disapproved of the measure.  A 
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letter sent to Hoover in early October 1915explained that although the ships would have neutral 
crews there was a distinct risk that German sympathizers might be on board.  The note further 
explained that a hostile press would take the opportunity to say that German submarines were so 
successful that the Allies were forced to take such measures.  Hoover’s counter argument that the 
program’s monthly savings of £100,000 to £150,000 would benefit Northern France directly fell 
upon deaf ears.  The French were far too fixated on issue of shipping losses to change their 
minds.  During the extended period of negotiations for interned ships (January through October 
1915) the commission lost six ships by mines or torpedoes in the North Sea.  Under criticisms 
that the program was nothing more than “dealing with the enemy” the initiative was dropped.337 
The CRB Shipping Process  
Voyages made by CRB-chartered vessels were dangerous regardless of the mode of 
transport or the origin of the vessel.  Armed with German safe conduct guarantees the 
commission began purchasing enormous quantities of foodstuffs from North America in late 
1914 using large ocean going vessels.  The CRB also purchased vast amounts of supplies in 
London which were transported across the dangerous war zone in small cross-channel boats.  
After discharging their cargoes at Rotterdam, all CRB vessels received another safe conduct pass 
and were directed across the dangerous war zone once more towards Britain for refueling.  
Despite its precarious location the commission chose Rotterdam as its port of entry because of its 
excellent harbor, equipment, and direct connection with the canal system leading into Belgium.  
It was not until April 1915 that the German government under the vehement protests of Hoover 
allowed ships to cross the English Channel immune from attack.338 
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Private shipping interests realized full well the risks involved in chartering vessels to the 
neutral commission for Belgian relief.  Hazards created by mines and submarines were great; 
many owners chose to employ their ships elsewhere on equally profitable and less dangerous 
voyages.  Potential issues were complicated further by the crossing and re-crossing of CRB 
chartered ships across the Germans lines.  In order to best assure safety, vessels dealt with a 
multitude of regulations that changed frequently.  Notable among these were requirements to 
bear the CRB flag, special markings, safe-conduct passes, and special sailing instructions.339   
The nearly universal troubles that shippers faced were exacerbated by the CRB’s large 
tonnage requirements and because ships had to cross the narrow North Sea where the underwater 
naval war was at its most intense.  On February 4, 1915 the German government designated the 
waters surrounding Great Britain including the English Channel and Ireland as the War Zone.”  
After February 18, every enemy merchant ship met in these waters was to be destroyed.  Neutrals 
(including the CRB) were warned that it might not be possible to prevent attacks on their ships 
since the British were allegedly using neutral flags.  Although paragraph six of the German 
Admiralty’s instructions to U-boat commanders demanded the sparing of CRB ships the 
commission was advised to avoid the War Zone entirely by sailing around the north of Scotland 
through the eastern part of the North Sea through a sea lane twenty miles long along the Dutch 
coast.340   
Safe passage guarantees and new shipping lanes could not prevent losses however.  The 
commission lost a total of 38 cargoes en route to Rotterdam—of this number 20 occurred by 
torpedo, 14 by mines, three by submarine fire, and one by collision.  Fourteen other vessels and 
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cargoes were partially damaged en route.  In total the 52 accidents involving CRB chartered 
vessels lost 114,000 tons of cargo.341 
The commission found ways to charter vessels nevertheless.   In the first months of relief 
the CRB was able to charter its initial tonnage requirements through the usual commercial 
channels.  Gradually the commission built a continuous charter fleet of approximately 23 Belgian 
vessels carrying 117,355 dead weight tons.  By early 1915 this fleet was entirely obsolete 
however and the commission began searching for additional ships to meet its minimum program 
of 179,000 dead weight tons.  At a requirement level of 110,000 tons per month (133,000 dead 
weight tons) the average round trip took over two months for each vessel.  To meet these 
demands the CRB was compelled to keep a continuously operating fleet of 290,000 dead weight 
tons or 58 steamers holding 5,000 tons.  During this process the CRB also made the decision to 
centralize all shipping arrangements under the guidance of the British firms of Bird, Potter, & 
Hughes and Trinder & Anderson with the goal of efficiency in mind.  The commission wanted to 
improve its methods which to date was bringing £4 to £5 worth of food for every £1 spent on 
transportation costs.342 
Transportation for cargo into Belgium once it reached Rotterdam was also in need of 
coordination.  According to Edward Eyre Hunt’s figures, if each province was to have supplies 
for at least fifteen days in stock or on hand it meant that 3,000 to 20,000 tons valued from one to 
eight million francs needed to be constantly on the move.  In the early days of the war this meant 
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that approximately 20 ocean going vessels were required to arrive at Rotterdam each month.  In 
later periods the commission often had as many as 75 ships under charter headed for this 
destination point at the same time.  In order to handle these shipments, Hoover in March 1915 
pressed for the placement of at least 50 people on staff to handle logistics.343 
The process of shipping goods from Rotterdam to Brussels was no less complicated than 
the voyage from New York or London to Rotterdam.  Until September 1915 all cargoes were 
consigned to Brand Whitlock and admitted duty free under the cover of his diplomatic immunity.  
After that time, all cargoes were assigned to the commission itself with lighters arriving without 
paying duties.  In both cases the commission followed similar receiving procedures.  Upon 
arrival foodstuffs were received by agents of the different regions and sent to various distribution 
centers.  At the distribution centers the foodstuffs were counted, re-allotted, and followed step-
by-step until reaching the village depots where they were sold or given away.344   
On November 13, 1915 the newly-created ship-owning department of the CRB assisted 
shipping and receiving efforts by assuming the task of providing the lighter necessary to 
transport goods via the canal system.  Less than a year later the CRB managed a fleet of 29 tugs 
and 137 lighters.  Through the department’s efforts a fleet of over 500 barges and canal lighters 
was assembled, moving goods from CRB warehouses to Belgium and Northern France.  Before 
the close of operations the commission possessed a fleet of 495 lighters and 36 tugs.345 
Combined the CRB’s lighters and the canal system of Belgium became a critical 
component of the commission’s distribution infrastructure.  Edward Eyre Hunt commented that 
                                                          
343 Hunt, War Bread, p. 258.  Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 56.  Gay and 
Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 1:53-54. 
344 Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 127.  Taillandier, The Soul of the “CRB,” p. 
109. 
345 Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 214.  Loc cit, p. 212.  Loc cit, p. 215.  By 
September and October 1915 the new shipping program for 1915-1916 left the commission with a shortage of 
lighters however.  Kittredge, Californians with Hoover in Europe, p. 1:6.  Cahalan, Belgian Refugee Relief in 
England during the Great War, p. 126. 
 
194 
 
no other nation had “so perfect of a transport system.”  While this may have been true, the war 
took a tremendous toll on the supply routes.  When the CRB began work in late 1914 it inherited 
destroyed canals, blown up locks, broken dikes, missing bridges, sunken barges, and other such 
man-made impediments.  Before shipments could reach the communes the commission engaged 
in massive preliminary efforts to clear up the congestion.  Once removed, food flowed speedily 
into Belgium.  Employing a fleet of several hundred canal boats and a collection of floating grain 
elevators the commission was able to unload a 9,000 ton ship loaded with bulk wheat and send it 
down the canals in 36 hours.  Journalist Arthur Mason was impressed by what he saw in 
Rotterdam, writing that what he observed was a great work of enterprise, skill, and business 
acumen on a grand scale.  “It is work which in its first stage is concerned with the supply of a 
million tons of goods in a single year, and in its last stage with the supply of (an individual’s) 
daily dole of bread to some destitute applicant in a far-off Belgian village,” Mason added.346 
Food flowed in increasing quantity into Belgium once questions of logistics were 
handled.  During the first two years of operation (October 1914 to October 1916) 393 full 
cargoes averaging 4,980 tons and another 823 cross-channel partial cargoes averaging 315 tons 
reached Rotterdam for a grand total of 983,708 tons received in Rotterdam during year one and 
1,300,322 tons received in year two.  On average, Rotterdam received approximately 15.5 full 
cargoes a month carrying 87,976 tons of goods.  In the second year the average increased to 17.5 
cargoes bearing 108,360 tons of goods, an increase of approximately 33 percent.  Actual receipts 
confirmed the commission’s average figures.  In December 1914, 17 ships arrived bring 58,000 
tons of supplies.  The following month (January 1915) 20 ships arrived carrying roughly 70,000 
tons.  By May 1915 the commission received 36 ships bearing 125,000 tons of goods.  Five 
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months later (October 1915) 44 ships discharged 136,000 total tons.  Combined over the five 
years of operation the CRB imported and distributed 5,174,431 metric tons of foodstuffs and 
other supplies valued at $927,681,485.08.347 
Economy and efficiency were again the defining factors of the commission’s work in 
shipping and distribution.  Arthur Mason noted that the costs of the CRB’s handling of 951,000 
metric tons of foods at Rotterdam during the first year of operation were no more than 3 
shillings, 6 dimes per ton.  Of that figure transshipment charges amounted to 44 cents Dutch (10 
cents equaling an English penny) while extra costs (overtime, night work, etc.) added 14 cents, 
freight and towage accounted for 2 shillings, storage and warehouse expenses totaled 10 cents, 
and office expenses added 15 cents.  Looking closer at the statistics, commission member Daniel 
Heinemann calculated that for every £10-£12 spent on food approximately £2 of the total 
represented transportation costs.  Given this ratio the CRB secured £5 of food for every £1 
expended on shipping.348 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: Preventing the “Hopeless Debacle” 
CRB Diplomacy with Belligerents  
The cornerstone of CRB efforts to import food into Belgium and Northern France was its 
diplomatic relations with belligerent nations.  Away from the dangerous waters of the open seas, 
the battlegrounds of Belgium, and the hostile negotiations with the British, French, and British, 
the commission constantly searched for ways to keep the organization afloat.  The CRB would 
have faced a premature death without agreements allowing the commission access to supplies, 
deals stipulating the quantities of imports, and the permission to perform ravitaillement duties.  
Recognition as the official relief organization operation in Belgium was an important component 
of the commission’s hard-earned status.  Within months of the start of the war the CRB flag was 
a well-known and respected emblem of benevolence.  The commission ostensibly became a new 
neutral government after its formation with its own diplomatic representatives, its own colors to 
protect its fleet on the high seas, and its own passports for members that were accorded 
preferential recognition by European nations.  According to CRB member T.B. Kittredge, the 
commission became “the expression of the spirit of humanity throughout the world which 
insisted that Belgium must be saved.”  To Kittredge the commission remained in the midst of 
world war the only vestige of internationalism and of the solidarity of civilization.349 
Away from the battlefields of Belgium hard-boiled militarists in Germany, France, and 
Britain at one time or another opposed the work of the CRB and demanded its suppression.  
Conducting relief efforts in a manner that would appease all three nations proved to be an 
ongoing difficult problem for the commission.  The CRB frequently found itself caught between 
belligerent disputes over military blockades.  German militarists stated that they would gladly 
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feed the occupied peoples of Belgium if the British abandoned the “illegal” food blockade.  
Moreover, they insisted that they could not be called upon to feed Allied sympathizers by 
depriving their own women and children.  Meanwhile, French and British militarists claimed that 
without the CRB the Germans would be compelled to feed their occupied populations.  As a 
result of their actions the commission relaxed the pressure of the Allied blockade against 
Germany and prolonged the war.350 
With its elevated status the commission appeared to be the only institution with the power 
to save Belgium.  In The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, T.B. Kittredge stated 
as a matter of fact that without the intervention of the CRB any importation of food would have 
been “quite impossible.”  “It was only the diplomatic activities of the commission, in securing 
concessions from both belligerent groups, that saved the people of Belgium from famine and its 
consequences,” Kittredge concluded.  His wife, Mable Hyde Kittredge concurred.  She reported 
that because of its status commission members were granted immediate audiences with cabinet 
members in Europe and were issued special passes allowing members and agents the rights of 
free movement in Belgium.  No other institution or individual were granted these same special 
privileges.351  
The reputation of the commission would be leaned on heavily especially in regards to 
funding.  Throughout the war the commission relied on government subsidies as well as world 
charity for funding.  In February 1915, Hoover wrote to President Woodrow Wilson about the 
financial problems of relief.  In his correspondence, Hoover explained that the CRB found it 
difficult to meet its operating expenses of $7,500,000 per month.  Although the flow of charity 
was generous, it was entirely inadequate for the critical demands placed on the organization.  
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The only recourse left for the CRB was to seek financial assistance from the belligerent powers 
themselves.  Throughout its existence the CRB was mainly supported by government subsidies.  
Between 1914 and 1919 Britain provided $109,290,328 and France another $204,862,260 in 
direct assistance to the commission.  Combined with the $52,290,795 generated from charity, 
total contributions to the CRB were nearly $1,000,000,000.352 
In dealing with belligerent governments the commission followed a general line of 
strategy.  Its work with officials was based on loosely formatted contracts between the 
belligerent governments with the commission serving as a negotiator and executive agent for 
enforcing the contract.  This form of arrangement combined with the realistic application of 
strategic diplomatic compromise allowed the commission to press for the most amiable results 
possible.  By a rigid adherence to the principles of neutrality and by an impressive track record 
of producing results and staying committed to its duty the commission was able to win the 
confidence of the belligerent powers and persuade them to make agreements with each other 
through the intermediary of neutral diplomats.  All objections from the various governments 
were overcome by persuasion, personal appeals based on humanitarian principles, exact 
statements of the situation free from poetic license, moral pressure from public opinion, and as a 
last resort through threats of imposing the burden of responsibility for the termination of relief 
directly on the nation in question.  Commission diplomat Prentiss Gray found in his work that 
threatening to terminate relief was particularly effective in negotiations with the Germans.  
Hoover himself used the strategy several times during the war.353 
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Threats of cessation and moral appeals to belligerents would have been of limited value 
without a strong central figure to serve as the guiding power behind multi-national negotiations.  
Shortly after the war began, Ambassador Walter Hines Page not only realized the seriousness of 
the situation but also identified the fact that if anything more than first aid or temporary relief 
was to be administered in Belgium there would have to be a concentration of efforts behind a 
vigorous and resourceful leader.  If at the time Ambassador Page did not see the form that the 
commission would eventually take he did recognize clearly the man who was to guide, maintain, 
and direct ravitaillement throughout the war—the American engineer Herbert Hoover.354   
Commission member Will Irwin commented that in negotiations the chairman’s 
reputation grew once word spread that he was backing the statesmen of Europe into a corner.  
Stylistically, Irwin observed that Hoover used “American methods” applied to a situation in 
which an individual was trying to negotiate a contract through which both sides would profit.  
The critical component of Hoover’s diplomacy was his directness—an approach that European 
diplomats were not accustomed to.  Having dealt primarily with the “oblique method” of 
diplomacy, they were caught off-guard by the chairman.  Hoover was in many cases the bridge 
between Germany and Britain in negotiations regarding Belgium.  “Of course they (Germany) 
can do nothing without Hoover,” Whitlock commented, “for the English will consent to nothing 
unless Hoover is there to guarantee it.”355 
Experience quickly informed Hoover of the proper way to deal most effectively with 
belligerent powers.  Hoover learned from both previous experience and his initial forays into 
diplomatic relations that the only way to get what he wanted from governments was to 
personally go to the ultimate authority and frankly state his position.  In carrying out his duties as 
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chairman, Hoover cared little about diplomatic nicety and was steadfastly resolved to leave no 
effort untried to attain his ultimate goals.  Relentlessly the chairman combated the idea that the 
Germans would ever feed Belgium and declared that the commission undertook its work with the 
greatest reluctance only after they were convinced that the population of Belgium would starve 
without American intervention.  Of equal value were the personal reputation he possessed and 
the confidence that belligerents placed in his sincerity and abilities.  As the British government 
came to know Hoover better they were increasingly inclined to accept his word as to conditions 
in Belgium and accepted the value and importance of the CRB system.356 
Minister Brand Whitlock played an equally important part in placing the ravitaillement of 
Belgium on stable diplomatic footing among the belligerent governments, especially in regards 
to the provisioning of relief within the country itself.  Among other services rendered, Whitlock 
gave Hoover indispensable aid in smoothing over troubles with both the Germans and the 
British.  There were military men in England (Lord Kitchener included) who felt that relief was a 
mistake and that Germany ought to be compelled to support the Belgian people or face their 
desperate uprising.  On the opposite side there were military men in Germany who declared that 
they had the right to take all produce from Belgian fields and compel the blockading Allies to 
furnish the Belgians with one-hundred percent of the food they consumed—not merely the 
seventy percent guaranteed in initial promises.  Whitlock specifically had to dispel British 
suspicions that Germany was diverting relief shipments across the Rhine and the German 
suspicions that Britain was importing munitions on relief ships.357   
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Caught in between the British and the Germans, Whitlock pressed both sides equally on 
behalf of the Belgian population.  Speaking on the difficulties of his job, the minister lamented 
that the hatred Germans bore for the British made the task all the more difficult.  Whitlock found 
the hatred towards Britain a “wild, implacable thing not to be overcome.  It had a quality almost 
personal in intensity.”  In Brussels, the minister nevertheless did what he could to protect the 
Belgians from oppression and to help solve the problems of relief.  Beyond these duties he 
served as an arbitrator between commission’s volunteers, smoothing out the intermittent friction 
between CRB and Comité National workers.358   
American sympathies towards the British position in the war did little to make 
negotiations with the Allies more hospitable.  Securing the passage of foodstuffs from Allied and 
neutral nations proved to be a constant struggle for the CRB.  The problem that was the most 
difficult of all for Hoover to solve was that of shipping.  Within months of the organizations 
creation it became clear that the success of the venture depended on the willingness of the Allied 
powers to allow relief to pass the German blockade.  In allied nations the commission faced 
considerable opposition to Belgian relief on the grounds that it was advantageous to the Germans 
since it relieved them of the responsibility to supply food to the regions they invaded.  During the 
winter of 1914-1915, relief operations were seen by the Allies as a concession around the 
blockade they had installed around Europe.  The 40,000,000 francs per month levy (war ransom) 
against Belgium in January 1915 only made the situation worse by pushing the British further 
into a position of refusing to offer support as long as Germany extorted money from them.359 
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The Allies had no desire to see Belgians starve, but at the same time were put in a 
difficult situation given the exigencies of war.  For strategic reasons they could not allow food 
into Belgium unless the distribution and enforcement of German guarantees were supervised by 
the American representatives of the commission.  After the first series of negotiations were 
complete the Allied governments made it an indispensable condition of its continued support that 
the Germans reserve all native food stocks for the civil population and promise not to requisition 
any supplies in Belgium.  British authorization of relief efforts were viewed with cautious 
optimism at best, fearing that imported foodstuffs would directly or indirectly benefit the 
occupying armies despite the written guarantees of the Germans.360   
Throughout the process of negotiations the British stood ready to remove it support.  
Reports of small infractions were numerous despite the fact that the Germans generally adhered 
to their initial guarantees announced on October 16, 1914.  On April 1, 1915, Lord Eustace Percy 
informed Hoover that any attempt by the Germans to go back on their promises regarding 
requisitions or native crop seizures would lead Britain to immediately reconsider its whole 
attitude on Belgian relief.  Before the end of 1915 the British government threatened to withdraw 
if the violation of guarantees did not stop.  This tenuous footing put the commission in a 
precarious situation.361   
While Britain kept a watchful eye and a hesitant attitude towards Belgian relief it was 
also one of the biggest supporters of ravitaillement efforts.  Although the first decisive 
benevolent actions taken in England were made by private individuals, large pockets of concern 
for the plight of Belgium’s civil population did exist in the British government.  As the branch of 
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government most-closely associated with the Belgian situation the British Foreign Office became 
the second group in England to assume some of the responsibilities of ravitaillement.  In 
performing their duties the members of the Foreign Office prided themselves on being more than 
mere professionals.  Where lesser departments of government were disposed to cloaking their 
personal convictions, Lord George Hamilton and his colleagues expressed their own views 
unabashedly and were less inclined to draw a line between their public and private roles.  As a 
member of this group, Lord Eustace Percy was from the beginning extremely sympathetic to the 
commission and its purposes.  His effective assistance and continual advice were invaluable to 
the work of the CRB.362 
The Germans by contrast cited the British blockade as the primary reason they could not 
feed Belgium.  The German government argued that the naval barrier left Germany a garrison in 
a besieged fortress with barely enough to feed its population.  As early as October 9, 1914 
(weeks before the official creation of the CRB), Baron von der Lancken talked about relieving 
Brussels but said that The Hague Convention made no mention of their responsibilities towards 
the native population  in general.  In late November, the Imperial Government issued an official 
statement declaring that the starvation of Belgium would be due to the actions of the Allies in 
cutting off normal imports.  Because of these actions and the character of the blockade the 
Germans could and would not feed Belgium.363 
Despite German denunciations of the Allied blockade, the occupying general government 
made a clear attempt in its rhetoric to prove that it would live up to all requisition guarantees but 
would not give up all claims to native production.  The stiffening of the German position did not 
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result entirely from the breaking down of negotiations or because the British were softening in its 
attitude towards ravitaillement.  Upon making his first visit to Berlin in February 1915, Hoover 
found the Germans immovable in regards to both requisitions and indemnities.  The German 
general government also strengthened its stance on the commission’s work within Belgium, 
informing Daniel Heineman on February 20 that Americans should limit themselves solely to 
controlling the distribution of supplies.364   
Before the commission was official created a series of diplomatic negotiations between 
the belligerent powers laid the foundation for what would be the first stages of ravitaillement in 
Belgium.   In early October 1914 a Belgian contingent sent from Brussels to London found the 
British government ready to assist its work.  While the English consented in theory to 
ravitaillement it insisted on explicit assurances from the German governor-general that 
provisions imported by the Comité National would be the sole property of the Belgian civil 
population.  The British government also stipulated that the importation of food should be under 
the protection of the American and Spanish ministers until shipments reached their final 
destination.  In a final stipulation the English demanded that the governor-general reserve the 
Belgian wheat and rye for the civil population.  On October 16, German authorities gave written 
assurances accepting all of these stipulations.  With tentative agreements in place the CRB began 
work six days later.365 
While these agreements provided a base for negotiations they did not necessarily give the 
commission an advantage pursuant to any previous deals.  Given the propensity of belligerent 
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countries to alter its position regarding the work of the CRB or the actions of other warring 
nations the commission worked inside a milieu of continual change and sudden demands.  
Money was one of the first critical challenges the CRB faced.  In the winter of 1914-1915 the 
commission required large amounts of cash in order to purchase provisions for Belgium.  Fund 
raising in Britain in particular during this period was damaged by the Allied stance that it would 
never consent to the importation of food if it were to constitute a replacement of native supplies 
requisitioned by the German army.366   
After private subventions decreased after the first waves of war fervor died down Hoover 
laboriously negotiated a basic income for the commission from Allied governments.  The 
chairman remained optimistic as to the CRB’s prospects for continuing its work regardless of its 
financial dearth.  In a letter to American Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan, Hoover 
explained that the Allied governments had “every confidence in the integrity of the commission 
and its ability to carry out the work.”  He added that through this support the CRB should be able 
to find ample funding for the carrying on the task of ravitaillement.  Governmental support of 
ravitaillement appeared to be a matter of common sense in the views of the chairman.  Hoover 
told Eustace Percy that he could not see from a British perspective that there should be any 
objection to the commission doing its work in Belgium.367 
By January 1915, most of Hoover’s attention and energy was paid to the CRB’s 
campaign to secure governmental funding.  During this time problems of hearsay and rumor 
injured the commission’s appeals for funding and frustrated the chairman to no end.  According 
to Hoover the “constant lying” taking place in the British press with regards to requisitions made 
                                                          
366 Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 1:508-509. 
367 Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 115.  Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the 
Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 1:65.  After another series of negotiations, the Germans agreed not only to live 
up to their original guarantees but also promised in principle to reserve native crops for the civil population.  
Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 115.  Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the 
Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 1:226. 
 
206 
 
the government suspicious.  In spite of the new demands made by the British government 
refusing to fund relief as long as Germany was extorting money from Belgium, Hoover 
continued to press for more support.  Hoover in a cable to Lloyd George explained that Belgium 
“will starve or be slaughtered in thousands unless we give this support.”  “No plea based on 
military exigency can divest us of responsibility in such a tragedy,” he continued.  Hoover also 
used the naval blockade as a point of moral diplomatic pressure, claiming that the allies would be 
responsible for starvation in Belgium.368  
The chairman’s vigorous efforts paid off.  On January 21, Lloyd George consented to the 
establishment of the exchange plan as one means of financing relief.  Less than two weeks later, 
Hoover was pressing his point directly with the Germans in Berlin.  With subventions secured 
from the British, the mission of the chairman’s visit was to assure the German government that if 
they would agree to stop all requisitions the Allies would provide adequate funding for the 
commission.  In an attempt to put even more pressure on Berlin, the commission announced on 
February 12 that “with the first requisition of so much as a bag of flour by the Germans it would 
stop any further shipments of food and cease all relief, telling the whole world the reason for its 
action.”  The warning was a direct result of Hoover’s anger with the occupying army’s refusal to 
accommodate the work of delegates.369   
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A month later, Hoover and Prentiss Grey reviewed the status of funding negotiations 
between belligerents to date.  Grey recalled that when work began the commission was operated 
through the efforts of the American and Spanish ministers in London on behalf of the Belgium 
and that at the time the government agreed that all food supplied from neutral countries would be 
allowed to pass without interruption under the guarantees given by the Germans before 
ravitaillement began.  At the time the British government also contributed £100,000 to relief but 
according to Hoover the sum was wholly inadequate for the commission’s needs given its 
monthly expenditures of £400,000 to £500,000 per month.  In response the CRB asked for a 
monthly subvention to supplement the generous public contributions made by the American 
public.  Eventually the British government recognized that the work of the commission was 
operating on sound lines and possessed adequate guarantees from the Germans that imported 
foodstuffs would be free from requisition and interference.  The sense of trust established 
between the commission and Britain by Hoover combined with the softening of the English 
position on the needs of relief cleared the way for larger governmental subventions in 1915.370 
Basic agreements regarding funding and general moral support for the commission’s 
ravitaillement efforts did not mean that the CRB was in the clear.  Hoover felt that the 
diametrically opposed views of the belligerents only injured the greater efforts of the 
commission to secure funding from private sources and perform its duties in Belgium.  While 
many in France and England now argued that Allies should be willing to give away some of its 
military advantage by supporting the commission, most still felt that they could not be compelled 
to do so as long as the Germans bullied Belgium.  Recognizing this point, Hoover made it clear 
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that the commission was doing everything possible to protect and enforce German guarantees.  
In a memorandum to Lloyd George on February 17, the chairman promised that “there has never 
been any interference with the foodstuffs introduced by us.”  “We can account to the satisfaction 
of any auditor for every sack of wheat from the time it leaves Rotterdam until it reaches the 
Belgian civil consumer…”  Hoover pointed to the payment of restitution by the Germans for 
products billeted by troops as evidence of accuracy and honesty within Belgium.371   
The chairman also recognized the difficult position of German as well.  On January 30, 
the commission found plausibility in Berlin’s claim that they possessed insufficient domestic 
food supplies to extend a program of relief to Belgium.   Several weeks later, Hoover told 
Whitlock in a letter that it was practically impossible to make it clear to the delegates in Brussels 
what a “delicate balance” the entire business was.  Considering the “natural antagonisms” 
between both sides the desire of the commission to conduct its business in a manner that it had 
the absolute confidence of the belligerents became a “mighty difficult job.”  “Our German 
friends do not always realize how easy it is to plunge us into difficulties with the English—and 
vice versa,” he added.372 
The series of talks regarding the 1915 Belgian harvest again demonstrated the difficulties 
of operating between the two belligerent positions.  T.B. Kittredge believed that in a way this 
deal was one of the most significant triumphs of the commission in regards to the enormity of 
concessions that the CRB was able to wring from hard pressed belligerents who were themselves 
beginning to feel the effects of the blockade and the consequent food shortage.  One of the major 
sticking points at the time was the conflicting views of not only the belligerents, but of the 
commission and Belgium as well.  When talks began in May the commission believed that its 
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work would end in the middle of August unless the Germans promised to protect the harvest 
from requisitions.  The Belgians saw things quite differently.  They contended that the British 
promised in October of 1914 that supplies could be sent to Brussels by the commission under the 
protection of neutral diplomats as long as German authorities operating within the country 
respected the agreement signed by Baron von der Goltz on October 16 stating that all supplies 
were under the exclusive control of the Comité National.  Hoover calmly pointed out to Comité 
National member Emile Francqui that what this attitude did was give credence to Germany’s 
claim that they had the right to seize Belgian crops.373 
The chairman forged a dialogue between all interested parties nonetheless.  At several 
stages of negotiations it appeared that affairs had come to an impasse and that no compromise 
could be reached between the irreconcilable attitudes of Germany and England in particular.  In 
negotiations Hoover always found at the critical moment some way of bringing special pressure 
to bear.  He pointed out specifically that the guarantees made by the commission made it 
necessary for the CRB to see that all foodstuffs were distributed equitably to the entire 
population without interference.  Hoover also insisted that the commission should be allowed to 
institute a system of food rationing in Belgium.  In order to do so the commission and the Comité 
National would have to be able to cut off the supply of any local commune not in compliance 
with the program.  As a result of these talks, the chairman was not only able to continue to 
demand import permits for CRB foodstuffs, but he also successfully petition for the increased 
governmental subsidies required to support larger ration sizes and higher food prices while 
increasing the powers of the commission within Belgium.374 
 Diplomatic Relations with Britain (1915)  
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Dealing with the British specifically proved problematic throughout 1915.  While the 
year began with optimism it soon settled into a struggle with the future of the commission at 
stake.  Hoover began the year with high hopes stemming from another series of German 
assurances from Zimmerman in Berlin and von Bissing in Belgium.  In the chairman’s views 
they were exactly what was needed at that stage of negotiations with the Britain.  The mood was 
quickly sobered after the British Foreign Office announced in a January 13 meeting that they 
required the Germans to abandon specific policies before England would commit to any financial 
assistance.  Speaking on behalf of the English, Edward Grey explained that if the Germans 
would eliminate their program of indemnities against the Belgians then they would assume most 
of the obligation of supporting the commission.375 
David Lloyd George was at the time an even stronger critic of the commission’s program.  
Hoover reported on January 21 that the Chancellor of the Exchequer vetoed the government’s 
support of the CRB because it was assisting the enemy in several different ways.  In the first 
case, he believed that relief was simply giving the Belgians more food that could be requisitioned 
by the Germans and more resources that could be seized via indemnities.  Beyond these points, 
Lloyd George felt that ravitaillement directly prolonged the war by relieving Germany from the 
necessity of feeding the civil population.  By offering relief to Belgium the CRB was in his 
opinion blunting the economic pressure that the Allies brought to bear against the Germans.  
Lloyd George alleged that Germany would provision Belgium as a last resort.  For that reason he 
wholly opposed the commission’s work, as benevolent and humane as it was.376   
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Hoover intensely argued with Lloyd George over his fatalistic view of Belgium relief.  
The chairman specifically pointed out that the Germans had impressed none of the commission’s 
supplies to date.  Moreover, Hoover contended that Germany did not have sufficient foodstuffs 
to feed 10,000,000 in Belgium and support its native population as well.  Lloyd George 
nevertheless continued to denounce his position as a “monstrous attitude.”  The chairman 
countered with the argument that Britain fought the war for the avowed purpose of protecting the 
existence of small nations, for vindicating the guaranteed neutrality of smaller powers, and for 
guaranteeing to the world the continuance of democracy.  Hoover added that the hostilities of 
Belgian citizens discomfited German plans.  Through passive acts they were still assisting the 
allied cause, and by deriving an advantage from these actions they were morally obliged to assist 
the civil population.  Hoover told Lloyd George, “it would be a cynical ending if Belgium were 
discovered in the end to be but an empty husk; that compared to the cost, either from a military 
or financial point of view, it is not worth taking the risk that this should happen; that the 
extension of the war through the import from abroad to the Belgian civil population of 80,000 
tons per month can amount to the lengthening of this conflict by only a few days; that the war 
will be won, not only by compelling the Germans to give up six percent of their foodstuffs to the 
Belgians, but by pressure on the other ninety-four percent.”377 
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Lloyd George began changing his mind concerning Belgian relief in late January.  More 
than anything else the Chancellor was becoming alert of the humanitarian aspects of relief 
operations and more than some members of the British government he appreciated the force of 
world opinion supporting the CRB.  While there might have been questions in Britain whether 
America was pro-Ally or pro-German, there was little doubt that the United States was 
overwhelmingly pro-Belgian.  Lloyd George stated in a February 17 meeting with Hoover that 
while Germany refused to give up its program of monthly indemnities in Belgium it was 
impossible for the British government to make direct subventions to the commission but it was 
instead willing to offer indirect assistance through loans.  The chairman in response reaffirmed 
that unless foreign aid was introduced the “decimation of this population will begin within thirty 
days.”  Having recently returned from Berlin, Hoover also reiterated the fact that with food 
already in short supply and that the Germans stated emphatically that they would not starve their 
own people to feed an enemy population.378 
Swayed by Hoover during their negotiations, Lloyd George presented the chairman’s 
arguments to the British cabinet on February 18.  After deliberation the government decided to 
recommend to the French a budgetary allowance of £1,000,000 for “Mr. Hoover’s Fund.”  Under 
the agreement the French and British governments would underwrite the sum until the end of 
June 1915.  From the English perspective, the government clarified in public that it was not 
offering direct assistance—even though Lloyd George had informed Hoover that finance would 
be supplied through the next harvest.  While the subvention was not direct relief, it amounted to 
the same thing as far as the commission was concerned.  Beyond money, the first formal 
recognition and financial support of ravitaillement by the British government would in the future 
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have a tremendous bearing on the subsequent attitude of the French government towards 
relief.379 
After the announcement of the £1,000,000 allowance the British public remained 
skeptical about the government’s decision to support relief.  A letter critical of the commission 
written by Edward Grey was reprinted in the English press pointing out that before the Germans 
made requisition guarantees in December 1914 they carried away everything that they could, 
cattle included.  In its response to Grey’s letter the Pall Mall Gazette blamed the Germans for the 
problems within Belgium.  The paper explained that “the Huns will not consent to release their 
prey.  All that they will promise to do is to stop making requisitions of food in continuing their 
enormous exactions of money from a people suffering the extremities of destitution.”  “They will 
have their pound of flesh and their quart of blood, and those friends whom the victim has they 
will cynically make accessories of their own oppression and pillage,” the article concluded.  
Speaking on the same subject, the Yorkshire Daily Post wondered if the Germans only gave 
requisition promises to the commission after there was nothing more for them to take.  It added 
that while the CRB was scrupulous in its enforcement of guarantees there was clear evidence that 
the Germans had circumvented the agreement.  In its view the ravitaillement of Belgium 
rendered an equivalent or greater amount of native produce available for enemy consumption.  
“We have no guarantee that presents to relieve Belgian destitution will not be used for the 
German army,” the article flatly stated.380 
Hoover was upset with the unfavorable opinions circulating about relief even though 
initial governmental subventions were secured for the upcoming months.  In a letter to Whitlock 
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on March 6, he expressed growing alarm over the situation from the British point of view 
especially as the military party gained greater power.  The chairman was particularly worried 
about the limited support staff the commission had in Belgium and that if the British found out 
that a mere twenty-five individuals were managing its affairs they would conclude publicly that 
the CRB was physically unable to execute its guarantees.  To remedy the issue, Hoover cabled 
Ambassador Gerard in Berlin with a request to put before the German government for creating a 
special department within the CRB to handle foodstuffs properly.  The chairman also wanted 
guarantees stating that these foodstuffs would not be interfered with in any manner and that 
commission members should be allowed have freedom of movement in the superintendence of 
distribution.381 
The German response to Hoover’s requests on March 21 was unsatisfactory to both the 
commission and the British government.  On the key issue of guarantees regarding the upcoming 
harvest of 1915, the Germans stated that its army administration had a “free hand” because they 
supplied the components essential to securing the crop and compensated individuals for the use 
of land and French labor.  Hoover replied to Gerard in Berlin on March 27 that under these 
stipulations it was “utterly useless” for the commission to raise funds from British financial 
institutions.  The chairman feared that “No one is going to lend us money with which to buy food 
when the probability stares us in the face that the German army will take possession of the 
harvest or that the English will suppress our operations.”  By late March the commission was in 
“desperate financial straits” according to Hoover, citing its 32,000,000 mark debt on Belgian 
accounts as evidence of the fact.  With public support drying up the CRB was faced with the 
challenge of purchasing over 40,000,000 marks of food a month with philanthropic support of 
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only about 8,000,000 marks.  Without further financial assurances the chairman predicted that by 
May 1 the commission would face a “hopeless debacle.”382 
Over the next few months the commission struggled for its financial life.  Both Hoover 
and Whitlock reported that the increasing influence of the military element in the British cabinet 
complicated issues further.  Whitlock commented that it was barbaric and selfish for Britain to 
assume that England could be saved only by sacrificing Belgium.  Within the British government 
the perception persisted that the commission’s work was strafing towards failure.  Eustace Percy 
in a letter to Hoover believed that the CRB’s work would have to stop by mid-August unless the 
Germans gave guarantees that they would scrupulously respect harvest yields.  More 
disconcerting was the realization that the clock of support for Belgian relief in Britain was 
running out.  Percy foresaw that unless harvest guarantees were secured quickly the British 
public would see no reason why the commission should continue its operations until that point 
when the Germans would be able to relieve themselves off of Belgian crops.383  
As the harvest approached tensions grew.  Without a definite deal regarding native 
products the commission’s apprehension increased day-by-day.  In early July, Hoover feared the 
limitations and stipulations placed on the CRB by the Allied governments were blunting the 
greater potential of the commission to import a wider assortment of foods and increase the 
minimum ration of 250 grams of four per day per person currently in place.  Central to the Allied 
position was the British stipulation clearly dividing the feeding and maintenance of the civil 
population of Belgium from that of the occupying army.  Without strict and rigid adherence to 
this principle the Allies could offer no assistance to the commission.  Moreover, the British still 
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maintained that the Germans showed their determination to divest themselves from responsibility 
in Belgium through requisitions and seizures.  Frustrations among commission members 
mounted as the days passed.  Whitlock commented on July 8 the English government was 
“nothing but an inert mass of stubborn inefficiency, incapable of checking Germany, or of doing 
anything, and so interfering with those who can accomplish something in the world.”384 
In mid July a breakthrough was reached, allowing a glimmer of hope for the fall of 1915.  
On July 17 a statement was released to Walter Hines Page via the British Foreign Office with the 
British government’s demands for the commission.  Beyond the reaffirmation of previous 
promises to protect foodstuffs from German requisition, the letter proposed that the entire yield 
of the present harvest of breadstuffs in Belgium should be acquired, controlled, and distributed 
by the CRB and the Comité National alone under terms similar to those already in place.  In the 
meantime, Hoover continued to press the British government and criticize their unswerving 
commitment to the blockade.  In a meeting at the British Foreign Office the chairman called it an 
illegal and inhuman thing that was stupid politically and economically.  Hoover advised that if 
the blockade was lifted against food the Germans could no longer justify its piratical submarine 
warfare on the basis of English cruelty.385  
By early August the subject of Belgian relief was hotly contested in Parliament with the 
British press following their every word.  Resoundingly by thins point most British politicians 
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sympathized with the plight of “Belgium the Brave.”  In a speech published in the Yorkshire 
Herald, T.P. O’Connor, MP found the Belgians “pre-eminent” in the wartime virtues of 
patriotism, self-sacrifice, and endurance.  In the same edition of the Herald, M.P. Sir George 
Toulmin added that Belgium was “bludgeoned by the Germans.”  In Toulmin’s view the German 
army left those who had not suffered from torture and murder to die from starvation.  “Belgium 
was suffering from a deliberate disregard on the part of Germany of the law of nations,” he 
concluded.386 
Over the next few weeks the British press carried numerous speeches and letters detailing 
the plight of Belgium.  The Huddersfield Chronicle, the Universe, the Middlesex County Times, 
and the Local Government Chronicle were among the newspapers that printed a letter written by 
G.K. Chesterton on current conditions inside Belgium.  Focusing on four “truisms,” Chesterton 
reported that the “badness” of the situation in Belgium was “almost too big to be held in mind.”  
“If we do not do a great deal more even than we have already done,” he exclaimed, “it may yet 
be said of us that we left it to the very butchers of this nation to see that it did not bleed to death.”  
The ice was beginning to break in the court of public opinion.  By the middle of August, Emile 
Francqui received word from the British government that they would permit the import of 
foodstuffs into Belgium as long as the Germans lived up to their guarantees to respect these 
supplies.  The most crucial component of the authorization was its unlimited character.  In this 
case the British did not require a German guarantee regarding native produce—including the 
1915 harvest that was just about to start.387 
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Hoover found the process of negotiating financial assistance for the following year in 
September 1915 as challenging as any previous exchange despite Britain’s limited acquiescence 
on the subject of foodstuffs granted the month before.  During this round the sticking point was 
the failure of German guarantees in Northern France instead of Belgium.  In particular it was 
said that there was a marked lack of uniformity in the enforcement of crop agreements regarding 
requisitions for cash payment.  Again, the British contended that imports into the Belgian Etapes 
amounted to provisioning the enemy.  Commission director in Brussels Oscar Crosby reported to 
Hoover on September 14 that whether these contentions were right or wrong the issue threatened 
to break down ravitaillement.  Britain quickly renewed its protests against the requisitioning of 
the harvest in Northern France.  In a letter to Hoover on September 17, Eustace Percy demanded 
on behalf of the British government that the upcoming harvest be delivered to the civil 
population without coercion or imposition of any form and coupled with no conditions given by 
the German army.  In a second letter to Hoover on September 30, Percy stated that the minimum 
concession acceptable to the British was for the French to receive the entire wheat harvest along 
with a sufficient reserve of animal food for their own stock.  Upon receiving this message the 
chairman realized that his personal intervention in Belgium was required once more.388 
Hoover’s perceptions were correct; the British government embarked on another series of 
curtailments that began in October and stretched into the spring of 1916.  Exaggerated reports of 
German requisitions collected by the Foreign Office’s intelligence service fueled the opposition 
to relief.  By the end of November another set of guarantees covering Britain’s concerns proved 
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insufficient to please the British Foreign Office.  In December, Hoover pressured the British to 
allow an increase in blockade permits from 80,000 tons per month to 126,400 in order to 
maintain an average daily ration of 1800 calories per person.  While sympathetic to the efforts of 
Hoover and the CRB, the British Foreign Office under the pressure of militarists in England and 
France instead reduced the allowed tonnage of food by 30,000 per month.  As the year ended the 
commission turned to the Germans again for a new series of guarantees.  By this point the 
circumstances were beginning to change for the occupying forces however as the Germans were 
beginning to feel the effects of the naval blockade.389   
Knowing full well the situation, the British government in the final days of December 
1915 stepped up its diplomatic pressure on Germany.  On December 31, Edward Grey reiterated 
that the Germans made no attempt to conserve native food stocks.  In a statement dated the same 
day the British government decried that in light of the numerous proven violations of guarantees 
the permission granted by the Foreign Office to import food supplies was subject to cancellation 
unless Germany gave explicit promises of reform.  The Germans considered the terms quite 
stiff.390 
Diplomatic Relations with France (1915) 
Negotiations of a different character but of equal importance were carried on 
concurrently in 1915 regarding the local crops of the Army Zones that included East and West 
Flanders (the Belgian Étappen) and Northern France.  Diplomatically the processes of 
negotiation were profoundly different than that found elsewhere for the commission.  In the 
Army Zones the CRB negotiated directly with the commanders of the general government 
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outside of the normal channels of diplomacy.  Once agreements were reached the acquisition and 
distribution of supplies were carried out by six separate army commands without the central 
organization structure found in Belgium.391     
Like their British counterparts, the French were equally reluctant to assist the 
commission.  Ultimately they held the position that France could not directly make subventions 
to the CRB but did pledge their support by promising to reimburse the Belgian government for 
any funds that it might disburse or pay to the commission for the purchase of foodstuffs in the 
occupied region.  Similar to Britain, the French also held Germany directly accountable for the 
lives of those in the invaded districts.  For this reason both belligerent Allied nations eventually 
made significant contributions to the commission.392 
Initially the commission was hesitant to take on the extra burden and responsibility of 
feeding Northern France.  Hoover stated publicly in early January 1915 that it was up to the 
French government to support its own people.  The major stumbling block for the chairman was 
the refusal of the French to contribute towards the feeding of its citizens in the occupied 
territories.  Hoover reported that while the CRB was not averse to taking up the work the 
commission felt that because its labor was voluntary the least that the French government could 
do was give a cash subvention to the cause.  The commission waited through the rest of January 
and into February 1915 for word from the French government that they would provide 
governmental assistance to the CRB in occupied France.  Hoover told Walter Hines Page on 
January 26 that if the people of this region were about to starve and if the French government 
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wanted these people to be fed all they had to do was make a formal request to the commission 
and it would take the matter in hand with the same enthusiasm displayed in Belgium.393 
During February the situation in Northern France became more acute.  On February 17, 
Hoover told President Henry Poincare that the commission’s goal was to keep the population 
alive until the war was over.  Due to the recent financial strain placed on the commission it 
would be unable to direct any foodstuffs into the occupied territory after March 1 if a 
government subsidy was not arranged however.  Similar to the situation in Belgium, the CRB 
could not sustain its support of 400,000 in Northern France without assistance.  Hoover 
explained to Poincare that the commission was also in jeopardy of complete failure owing to a 
lack of shipping.  “It is of no use dividing the food between the Belgians and the French in order 
that all may die,” the chairman warned.  “In the interest of common humanity,” Hoover 
concluded, “if the French government can help us financially we will feed these people.”394 
Several days later the French government partially conceded to the commission’s appeal.  
On February 23 Minister of Finance M. Ribot declared that while France could not give formal 
approval for CRB funding it would furnish money to the Belgian government.  With this promise 
the Finance Minister asked that the 400,000 people already being fed by the commission should 
not be deprived of their food supply and that the CRB should press the Belgian government for 
any further funds it would need for the region.  A month later the agreement was finalized.  At a 
meeting in Paris on March 22 the French government announced that it wished to have no 
official relations with both the CRB and the Comité National, but would be grateful for the two 
organizations to kindly help the civil population of its occupied territory.  Four days later on 
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March 26 the Belgian government under the approval of Paris advanced 25 million francs to the 
CRB.  The money was earmarked for the immediate purchase of provisions for Northern 
France.395 
While the French refused to give direct assistance to the commission it became one of the 
strongest supporters of the CRB.  Throughout the rest of the war the French government insisted 
that the commission should be able to continue its work and that the people of Belgium and 
Northern France should be fed in spite of all political and diplomatic obstacles that appeared.  At 
the beginning of its operations in the occupied territory the commission had five months’ relief 
experience in Belgium to apply to the situation.  This familiarity enabled the CRB to secure in 
April 1915 a much more comprehensive guarantee than had been possible in Belgium when at 
the time it was impossible to foresee all the matters on which agreements depended.  During 
negotiations Hoover addressed any misconceptions about relief work the French government 
may have harbored, explaining that all activities were done voluntarily and that any profits made 
off of the sale of foodstuffs would be directly reinvested in the destitute.  While there were some 
minor disagreements regarding the appointment of trustees and warehouse managers handling 
ravitaillement in the region, on April 13 the new deal defined the relationship between the 
commission, the French committees, and the German authorities went into effect.396 
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Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 1:400.  Ribot added that the French government was unwilling to undertake 
feeding of its people in the occupation zones because to do so put into the minds of Germany the argument that since 
France was permitted to feed its citizens the Germans should be allowed to feed its people too.  Kittredge, The 
History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 147 and Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for 
Relief in Belgium, p. 1:406.  Loc cit, p. 1:409.  The advance was a loan that the French government pledged to 
reimburse later.   
396 Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 147.  Nevertheless, between August and 
November 1915 the French Government declined to give the commission strong support in the discussions 
respecting local crops.  Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 1:569.  Ibid, 
2:425.  Loc cit, p. 1:419.  Loc cit, p. 1:411 and Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 
328. 
 
223 
 
Through a complex series of negotiations the basic agreements regarding the importation 
of foods in Belgium and Northern France were in place by the beginning of 1916.  The year 1915 
was particularly significant to the diplomatic history of the commission because the deals it 
forged served as a transition from inconsistent set of early-war agreements into a steady base 
agreements and stipulations that served as a sturdy base for the commission’s operations and 
future negotiations.  A key centerpiece to these agreements was the securing of native harvests 
and the protection of imports from requisition.  While the developments of the war would change 
the circumstances under which all interested parties operated in 1916, 1917, and 1918; the 
baseline requirements remained relatively unchanged.   
The year 1915 was also critical for the progress made by the commission in terms of 
securing governmental funding.  With the CRB constantly teetering on the edge of failure in 
regards to supplies and the funding to pay for it the commission worked quickly to establish a 
solid reputation of honesty, integrity, and efficiency in Britain.  While the commission existed as 
a private benevolent institution it recognized early on that it could not exist on localized funding 
efforts.  For the first two and a half years of the war the British and French governments 
provided the subsidies critical for the CRB’s survival until the U.S. government became directly 
involved in 1917.   Without the diplomatic concessions won by the commission on all fronts 
during 1915 the CRB quite possibly would not have survived war.  
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CHAPTER NINE: Dealing with “Endless Difficulties” 
Diplomatic Relations with Germany (October 1914-December 1915) 
Negotiations with the Germans completed the diplomatic circle between belligerent 
governments and the commission.  In theory the importations agreed upon by the Germans and 
the CRB in late 1914 were supposed to supplement local products in sufficient supply to provide 
the people of the occupied regions a ration adequate to maintain health.  On this supposition the 
Allies believed that all ravitaillement efforts were predicated on guarantees by the Germans 
abstaining from local requisitions and to reserving harvests for the civil population.  All the 
while Allied worries about the certainty of German guarantees and their willingness to comply 
were anything but baseless.  Brand Whitlock complained that Germany violated The Hague 
Conventions no less than four times between October 1914 and March 1915 by imposing war 
indemnities, fines, and taxes on Belgium.397   
The issue of who assumed the ultimate responsibility for feeding Belgium quickly 
became a critical point of debate.  The French and the British held the position that the invading 
Germans were compelled to support the Belgian civil population.  In November, General von 
Frankenburg argued that the contrary was true; explaining that while Belgium was not self-
sustaining in its food supply in times of peace it was able to obtain supplies in Holland and 
elsewhere.  He added that an “inter-communal commission” had been organized at their 
suggestion to make sure all districts were supplied.  In a separate argument von Frankenburg 
ostensibly turned the argument for American relief on its head, asserting that if the U.S. had not 
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been so “tender-hearted” and if the food supply would have run out the Germans surely would 
have considered it their duty to import food.398   
The commission knew full well that Germany faced harsh public criticisms that 
undermined any international support it possessed.  In late November 1914, Hoover seized on 
negative perceptions and German sympathetic attitudes towards American relief by appealing for 
a twenty million mark per month subvention.  According to Hoover the subsidy was critical to 
the Germans because it would “immediately silence” any criticisms relating to their lack of 
sympathy for those suffering in Belgium.  Moreover, it would motivate the French and British 
governments to act likewise in order to support their contentions.  While the German general 
government refused to provide direct assistance, they did sign the first in a series of guarantees 
protecting native supplies on December 31.  After taking effect on January 21, 1915 the 
agreement was supplemented later in the summer, including a July 4 promise to leave the 
forthcoming Belgian harvest of breadstuffs to the civil population with a supplemental letter 
written by General von der Lancken promising to enforce previous requisition and harvest 
contracts.  Agreements on paper did not always mean compliance in deed however.  After 
signing the first series of agreements the Germans failed to set up a mechanism by which these 
promises could be monitored.  Generally, the Germans agreed it was wrong to seize commission 
supplies but felt quite differently about the food produced within Belgium believing strongly in 
the rights of the conqueror over the conquered.399   
The Germans seemingly nonchalant view towards enforcing their guarantees was 
juxtaposed by a strong interest in the flow of relief goods and the system of distribution put in 
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place by the commission.   When negotiations began again in early 1915 the CRB incorrectly 
estimated that the military authorities would prefer not to be troubled with the issue of 
transportation.  Whitlock observed that the general government seemed committed to refusing 
the turning over of the Belgian harvest to the native population or even to the commission.  
Throughout 1915 it appeared that while the Germans eventually agreed that the native crop 
should be given to Belgium they were determined to keep it in their own hands as long as 
possible and dole it out at specified intervals.400 
Beyond initial agreements the issue of native foods proved the most difficult point of 
negotiation between the commission and the Germans.  As the British predicted it was not 
difficult to induce Germany to make a promise—the real vexatious regarded distribution.  
Arguments in this case centered upon the CRB’s desire to distribute crops by region squaring off 
against German demand to centralize the process under their close supervision.  Complicating 
the situation was the time sensitive nature of the debate.  The CRB clearly understood that the 
two sides needed to reach an agreement satisfactory to British before they rescinded support.  In 
early 1915 when Hoover discussed alternative means of financing relief in Berlin and Brussels 
the question of native produce again rose to the fore.  The chairman knew that German 
assurances regarding native cops would literally have to be engraved on the face of certificates 
before Allied and neutral nations would consider offering assistance.401 
In the end an agreement regarding native produce was reached in what Whitlock called 
“just the nick of time,” with contentious issues regarding the mode of distribution being left for a 
later time.  The new Governor-General von der Lancken both reaffirmed previous assurances 
given by von der Goltz and issued new requisition promises.  The new guarantees came at a 
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fortunate moment when the commission was under intense scrutiny from external sources 
claiming that the Germans were seizing all foodstuffs and that work ought to be stopped.  
Beyond promising to refrain from interfering with supplies the Germans added provisions 
assuring American representatives of the CRB full liberty of action in supervising distribution 
and promising that food ships en route to Belgium would be immune from attack.  In addition, 
the general government asserted that “no German soldier would ever think of violating these 
guarantees more than any other military order” and that if violations occurred they would be 
investigated and dealt with by military authorities in the same way as other infractions.  Using 
this clause shrewdly, the Germans claimed that any attempts to inspect or oversee whether these 
orders were observed were unnecessary and moreover an intrusion into military matters of a 
purely domestic nature.402 
Complications aside, the commission insisted that the Germans leave the native products 
of Belgium for the civil population and the Germans promised to do so.  Under the agreement the 
commission seized grains while other articles of food produced domestically were sold in the 
usual way through local markets.  While the deal was a sign of progress it was less than perfect.  
In Belgium, basic rations were supplied and the rich still could buy almost anything they wanted.  
Many continued to live as they did before, only now it became more costly to do so.  The final 
agreement between the commission and Germany for 1915-1916 set an increased ration of 100 
grams of flour and 200 grams of potatoes per day per capita for Belgians.  In Northern France the 
totals were slightly different, allowing 150 grams per day of flour, 20 grams per day of rice, 20 
grams per day of beans or peas, 20 grams per day of coffee, 10 grams per day of salt, 10 grams 
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per day of sugar, 30 grams per day of lard, and 30 grams per day of bacon.  The total cost of 
these rations to the consumer was estimated at 35 centimes per day or approximately 10 francs 
per month.  The CRB estimated that it would require approximately 22 million francs to provide 
this program.403 
The chairman’s visit to Berlin in early 1915 marked an important step towards securing 
guarantees for the upcoming year.  In early February, Hoover asked the German government to 
confirm its previous promises that all imported foodstuffs would be free from requisition, 
seizure, or interference by military authorities and that these supplies should be the property of 
the civil population exclusively.  The commission also desired that the foodstuffs should be free 
from all import duties and taxes.  In its final requests the CRB wanted freedom of movement for 
delegates to supervise distribution and guarantee neutrality and that all ships carrying relief 
should be protected from attack.  Going beyond the usual demands, Hoover added that 
considering the Allies newly-pledged financial support for the commissions’ program of 60,000 
tons per month of relief the Germans should in turn abandon their monthly indemnity of forty 
million francs and promise to end all other levies or taxes during the remainder of their 
occupation.404 
On February 4, Hoover summarized the points the Germans conceded to when he was in 
Berlin.  Leading the list was the recognition by both parties that if the civil population was to be 
kept from starvation the amount of imports must not only be maintained but probably increased.  
Germany for its part recognized that the feeding of this population was of the greatest military 
importance to the Germans “for a starving population on the lines of communication would be 
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the greatest menace.”  The chairman also discussed with the Imperial Government the fact that 
without governmental aid of some kind the commission would fall far behind the necessities of 
life.  The commission subsequently argued that without support from the German government all 
ravitaillement efforts would fail.  In its official statement, the commission explained that as a 
component of the CRB’s sole desire to ameliorate the conditions of helpless Belgians it felt that 
it should receive considerations from Germany commensurate to previous commitments 
made.4
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The issue of finance also dominated Hoover’s conversations in Berlin.  Throughou
meetings the chairman was particularly frustrated by the Germans reluctance to subsidize 
Belgian relief.  In his conversation with Imperial Finance Minister Dr. Karl Helfferich, Hoover 
explained the voluntary character of the commission’s work, the philanthropic origin of its funds
the additions made to it from Belgian sources, and the vital importance from a military point o
view that the CRB should continue its work.  The chairman also made it clear to the Finance 
Minister that unless it was properly recognized and helped out by the German government the 
commission would dwindle down to a service completely unable to serve millions of peop
Belgium and Northern France.  Afterward the meeting concluded he complained that Dr.
Helfferich failed to realize that as the money received from Belgium through the sale of 
foodstuffs disappeared the problem would evolve into one of raising forty million marks pe
month for at least the next twelve months.  Hoover felt that the Germans had to offer their 
assistance because it was absolutely beyond the CRB’s capacity to raise 100 million dollars 
through existing channels of funding.  “What is the use of pouring money into Belgium in order
to enable the German army to extract the last drop of blood from these people?” Hoover ask
405 Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 1:243.  Loc cit, p. 1:243-244.  Loc 
cit, p. 1:244.  Loc cit, p. 1:245. 
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after the meeting concluded.  As a final argument the chairman endeavored to explain that 
general sentiments in the United States were not pro-Britain but instead were pro-Belgian and 
that as long as the Germans continued to put itself in the wrong it was absolutely impossible for 
them to
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 secure American sentiment.406 
Despite the difficulties Hoover press forward with his appeal for the Germans to cance
all indemnities against Belgium.  Again the chairman found the German commitment to war 
levies unrelenting.  In a meeting with German Minister of Foreign Affairs Herr von Jagow he 
was told that the Germans could not abandon the monthly indemnity against Belgium.  At the 
moment Hoover despaired over the possible impact that the commission was having on the i
observing that apparently the levies were assessed only after the work of the CRB was well 
established.  He worried that the commission was directly to blame for the affliction because if 
the people of Belgium would have been in bad of a position as Poland the fines might never have 
been imposed.  As with the Finance Minister, Hoover declared to von Jagow that if the Germans 
would take a generous position and release Belgium fro
 win American opinion than any other act.407   
Hoover in his final round of discussions in Berlin met directly with Chancellor H
Bethmann-Hollweg on February 7.  In the beginning of their talks the Chancellor stated 
emphatically that the Germans would never give up the indemnity while on the other hand the
recognized the necessary character of relief and were prepared to find some other method of
financial assistance.  Bethmann-Hollweg further asserted that in the face of both world and 
German public opinion they could not for one moment retreat from an act fully confirmed under 
The Hague Conventions.  Hoover then stepped up the diplomatic pressure after hearing the sam
406 Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 1:246.  Loc cit, p. 1:249-250.  Loc 
cit, p. 1:250. 
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bullheaded argument for the third time in as many days.  He told the Chancellor that upon his 
arrival back in London the British government would immediately demand to know whether the 
Germans had accepted the commission’s proposal and that the chairman would be compelled
inform them that it was refused.  Upon hearing this news the British would announce to the 
world that they had offered to pay for the feeding of Belgium themselves if the Germans would 
have withdrawn their indemnity claims and added that once the statement went public the United
States would not facilitate in the matter.  Hoover then went a step further in his argument saying
that the issue might give Britain reason to withdraw from relief responsibilities completely.  
the chair
 to 
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Although Hoover was unable to convince the Germans to abandon indemnities he 
returned from Berlin with a stronger series of guarantees and an emboldened attitude.  In 
Brussels, the chairman sent a letter to Governor-General von Bissing reminding him that relief 
work continued despite complaints by the British that ravitaillement was a great advantage to th
Germans and a disadvantage to the Allies.  Hoover also reminded von Bissing that after nearly 
four months of work there was not one bona fide report of abuse or misconduct by commission 
representatives.  On those grounds he warned that unless friendly and trustworthy relations could 
be established between the CRB and German authorities the com
w the stream of food imports and terminate its work.409 
The response to Hoover’s letter by von Bissing was both quick and decisive.  As far as
guarantees were concerned the governor-general assured the CRB of faithful adherence to all 
promises.  On February 20, a detailed response informed Hoover that he shared the chairman’s 
408 Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 1:253. 
409 Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 1:48.  Loc cit, p. 1:48-49.  Loc cit, 
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opinion that there was a strong need for friendly and coordial cooperation between the Germans 
and the commission.  General von Bissing added that in order to maintain this both sides needed 
to strictly adhere to regulations regarding the freedoms of delegates.  Extending an olive branch 
he promised that representatives of the commission would not be searched unless it warrante
well rounded suspicions or directly ordered by the general government itself.  On March 5, 
American Minister Henry Van Dyke at The Hague reported that the Germans were now anxious
to give every possible sup
d by 
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lish Channel.410   
Brand Whitlock worked in concert with Chairman Hoover to keep the pressure turned up 
on General von der Lancken.  “It would be easier to feed milk to a lamb in a cage between a lion 
and tiger than to feed the Belgians between the Germans and the British,” Whitlock told von der 
Lancken on March 11.  The Minister’s primary complaint about both belligerents was that each 
government seemed to think that they were doing America a favor by permitting the commis
to spend $8 million dollars a month to feed Belgians.  By mid-March the Governor-General 
acknowledged that foodstuffs of all kinds imported by the Comité National were exclusively 
reserved for the civil population but countered that he could not agree with the interpretation 
all products from the soil should be free from requisition.  General von Bissing added to his 
position several complaints about rumors involving war munitions smuggling on CRB ships.  In 
particular it was rumored that both the Doria an
 with relief supplies in Rotterdam.411   
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In the meantime the Allied governments pressured the Germans themselves, in this case 
demanding that the general government surrender the entire native crop of Belgium and Norther
France.  The main issue complicating negotiations regarding indigenous crops in both 1915 
1916 proved to be the fact that German soldiers cultivated fields in some districts and provided 
seed, labor, and beasts of burden in others—validating their claim to domestic yields.  The 
chairman recommended that the first step in this process required Ambassador James Gerard in 
Berlin to secure an estimate of harvest from German authorities and the proportion whi
claim was raised by their work.  The next phase involved taking these figures into consideration 
and working with Walter Hines Page to secure an agreement satisfactory to the Allied 
governments.  For his part General von Bissing extended his requisition guarantees to Northern
France on March 21.  Hoover knew that the stakes regarding the 1915 harvest were high.  On 
March 27 he told Ambassador Gerard that if the present military situation continued there
“nothing in G
n 
and 
ch they 
 
 was 
od’s world” that will save Belgium except for their own produce, and “if these are 
going t
om 
e 
pril a 
d 
                                                          
o be taken away from them we may just as well throw up our hands today as next 
August.”412 
No sooner had the commission secured promises to protect foodstuffs and subsidies fr
the Allies that it was plunged into the more difficult series of negotiations to protect the nativ
crop of 1915 and establish a program of imports and rations for 1915-1916.  In early-A
convention held in Brussels worked out the initial details regarding produce in Belgium an
France.  At the meeting the supreme command of the German army consented to the 
commission’s program of ravitaillement for Northern France and promised that all goods 
imported for relief would be free from seizure.  The concession came with a caveat however.  
412 Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 1:417, 587.   Loc cit, p. 1:587.  Loc 
cit, p. 1: 410 and Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 148.  Loc cit, p. 159. 
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The agreement stipulated that if military exigencies required the deal could be cancelled by the 
German Governor-General at any time without giving reason.  On April 19 representatives of 
both groups (Oscar Crosby for the commission and Major von Kessler for the Germans) signed 
the agr  
f 
r 
n 
h 
the req
 after the 
out 
 
                                                          
eement extending American relief into the German Zone of occupation in France, adding
140,000 people to relief efforts.413 
While the agreement marked progress in the relations between occupational forces and 
the CRB it did not alleviate many of the problems the commission currently faced.  The issue o
the 1915 harvest crop continued to loom large in the minds of commission members.  Hoove
reported to Ambassador Gerard on May 1 that if the Germans wanted to keep the CRB alive it 
needed to make a broad and immediate commitment to reaching an agreement regarding all 
foodstuffs within the occupation zone.  The chairman recommended that if the commission was 
going to continue on after the harvest it needed to secure definite support as soon as possible.  
Four days later Gerard relayed Hoover’s message to von Jagow almost verbatim.  The America
Ambassador also informed the German Minister that if the Imperial Government complied wit
uest for protection of the native crop throughout both Belgium and Northern France the 
CRB was confident that it could create an institution for financially securing the endeavor.414 
General von Bissing responded personally to the inquiry on May 13, a few days
sinking of the Lusitania.  The Governor-General reported that naturally he was concerned ab
the upcoming harvest but wanted to secure ownership of the yield for his soldiers and 
government.  In regards to helping Belgium and agriculture in general, von Bissing found it
413 Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 123.  Loc cit, p. 150 and Gay and Fisher, 
Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 1:414.  In working out the details it was stipulated that 
food would be distributed according to the commission’s program in conjunction with the German military 
authorities by French trustees who were nominated by both groups (the CRB and the Germans).  Loc cit, p. 1:415.  
Hunt, War Bread, p. 315. 
414 Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 160.  Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the 
Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 1:531. 
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impossible to offer assistance for the reason that Belgian practices were advanced far behind 
those of Germany.  Whitlock was displeased with the response.  While Germans did some 
agricultural work and provided limited assistance the seeds that were planted in Belgium were 
sent by the American commission and were cared for by peasants on their own land in their own 
way.  H  
 the 
 the 
y 
 
 
t in 
a perso re 
an forces.  
                                                          
e reported that no one, except possibly for von Bissing himself, thought that the Germans
were responsible for the domestic crop.415 
In June, Hoover pressed forward with negotiations regarding the upcoming harvest.  The 
chairman worried that the intervention of the Germans would remove the character of neutrality 
and privacy from relief work and would imperil the very existence of the Comité National as
French, Belgian, and British governments would be forced to decide that the committee and
commission no longer possessed the necessary independence to see that ravitaillement was 
performed properly.  Having brought considerable pressure on the Germans from different 
quarters to prevent requisitioning, Hoover again went to Brussels to take the matter up personall
with German authorities.  As a last resort the chairman was prepared to take his appeal straight to
the Imperial Government in Berlin once more.  On June 10, Hoover wrote Ambassador Gerard
detailing his desire to take the issue of crop requisitions with the Kaiser himself, thinking tha
nal interview the chairman could possibly settle all the hard points.  The final measu
was not necessary.  Hoover found the Germans in a more conciliatory mood than before.416 
Nevertheless, Hoover was still frustrated with the Germans.  In the days before the 
meeting the chairman was furious over the treatment of commission delegates by Germ
415 Marquis Villalobar discussed the Lusitania incident with the Governor-General who according to Whitlock 
“made the usual excuses” saying it was Britain’s fault.  Nevins, The Letters and Journal of Brand Whitlock, p. 
2:141.  Loc cit, p. 2:146. 
416 Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 194.  Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the 
Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 1:534.  Nevins, The Letters and Journal of Brand Whitlock, p. 2:159.  Gerard 
reported back that the idea of meeting the Kaiser was not necessarily the best strategy.  Gerard responded to 
Hoover’s inquiry that he recently had a meeting with the Kaiser and was so “grossly insulted” that he would never 
speak to him again.  Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 1:534. 
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Whitlock reported that Hoover was so worked up he threatened to withdraw altogether, spelling 
the end of the commission because Britain relied wholly on the chairman’s advice on 
ravitail e 
, 
 
two, 
e up the 
 what assurances would they have that once consumed the British wouldn’t 
interve
e harvest 
n 
essions were granted the agreement was of 
lement.  The chairman knew that he could not withdraw personally on a whim, but at th
time was more than willing to make use of the threat.417 
The much anticipated harvest negotiations started on June 15 with a meeting between 
Whitlock and General von der Lancken.  Following the guidelines set by Hoover months before
the Germans informed the CRB that the new crop would provide approximately one-fifth of the
Belgians food supply.  Whitlock responded that the general government had two options: one, 
give one-fifth to the Belgians and allow the commission to import the other four-fifths or 
take the one-fifth native crop and import from Germany the remaining four-fifths to mak
deficit.  The General immediately questioned that if they surrendered the one-fifth to the 
commission
ne.  Whitlock in return promised to provide satisfactory assurance from Britain on the 
subject.418 
Two days later on June 17 the two principles reached an agreement.  On the German side 
they agreed that to surrender the Belgian crop to the civil population and consented to the 
continuation of relief by the Comité National and the CRB.  The two parties also agreed that the 
Comité National and the CRB would continue to import foodstuffs into Belgium until th
of 1916.  In return the Governor-General retained in his possession the portion of the 1915 grai
harvest used for bread making.  While conc
                                                          
417 Nevins, The Letters and Journal of Brand Whitlock, p. 2:162.  The problem Whitlock said, and Hoover knew 
was that he couldn’t retire and let the poor Belgians starve unless the Dutch were willing to take up the work.   
418 Nevins, The Letters and Journal of Brand Whitlock, p. 2:163.  Loc cit, p. 2:163-164.  Loc cit, p. 2:164. 
it, 
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tremen o 
 
f 
issing 
yre 
by the 
f abuses committed by millers.  Whitlock believed 
that the  
al of 
dous importance because it not only saved the local harvest for the Belgians but it als
rescued the commission from disaster.419   
The difficult task remaining for Hoover was to work out a formula for applying the
agreements given the current demands of both the Germans and the British.  Whitlock himsel
agreed that the next stage of negotiations would not be easy.  He reported that getting the 
general-government to leave the harvest for the Belgians was not difficult; the real problems 
arose when debate began on the scheme of distribution.  In negotiations General von B
demanded that despite the agreement the Comité National would not be allowed to give special 
instructions directly to the communes and would not be able to make inquiries, send 
interrogatory lists or circulars, or compile statistics without first consulting with the German civil 
commissioner.  This request in particular put the commission at a disadvantage.  Edward E
Hunt recalled on June 26 that although he made an estimate as to the damages occasioned 
war he was no longer allowed to make inquiries into the subject of requisitions.  Equally 
frustrating was the sudden inability of committee inspectors to make statements about the 
excesses of the general-government outside o
 information blackout was done deliberately as part of a greater attempt by the Germans
to seize the funds of the Comité National.420 
In early July the Germans clarified their position regarding the upcoming harvest.  On 
July 4, General von Bissing confirmed that the general government would hold at the dispos
                                                          
419 Whitlock reported the deal first on June 17.  Hoover followed with a memorandum detailing the agreement on 
June 18.  General von Bissing made an announcement regarding the German agreement on June 25.  All thre
reports contained the same information.  Nevins, The Letters and Journal of Brand Whitlock, p. 2:166.  Loc c
e 
it, p. 
2:168 and Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 162.  Nevins, The Letters and Journal 
of Brand Whitlock, p. 2:168 and Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 162-163.  The 
deal related to wheat and rye bread specifically.  Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in 
Belgium, p. 1:534. 
420 Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 1:534-535.  Nevins, The Letters and 
Journal of Brand Whitlock, p. 2:167.  Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 
1:56.  Hunt, War Bread, p. 309.  Nevins, The Letters and Journal of Brand Whitlock, p. 2:174. 
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the Belgian civil population the product of the grain harvest used to make wheat and rye
while the Comité national and the CRB would continue to import relief foodstuffs until the
harvest of 1916.  Two days later the mechanics of the agreement were worked out in detail.  An
important feature of the deal in regards to enforcem
 breads 
 
 
ent involved the duties of the German 
Étappe
ent 
  
ent 
mall list of articles from seizure.  
Even m f 
                                                          
n-Inspektion agency.  Under its jurisdiction the general-government assured the 
commission that the inspection agency would give strict orders to subordinates that relief 
supplies were not to be seized.  Similar to other promises, the Étappen-Inspektion reserved the 
right to cancel the new agreement at any time.421   
Beyond reaffirming its previous promises the Germans offered another important 
concession.  On July 7, the general government assured the commission that they would handle 
the question of administration in accordance with The Hague Conventions.  The announcem
was met with skepticism in Britain especially.  Taking recent events into account the British 
Foreign Office saw little evidence that the Germans were taking active steps to assist the 
commission and moreover they were using agreements against the completion of ravitaillement.
In an official response to recent German promises, the Foreign Office complained that the 
scarcity of foodstuffs in Belgium was a deliberate result of German requisitions and that rec
guarantees made to end such practices merely excluded a s
ore troubling to the British were allegations that general-government took advantage o
the commission by depriving Belgians of their native products.  The Foreign Office charged that 
the German government by their actions and attitudes showed their determination to divest 
themselves of all responsibility to the civil population.422 
421 Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 1:539.  Loc cit, p. 2:439. 
422 Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 195.  Loc cit, p. 163. 
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British denunciations of German behavior in Belgium were accompanied with a ne
series of Allied demands governing relief work.  Whitlock in a meeting with von der Lancken
July 16 informed the General that chief among Britain’s requirements were that the feedin
Belgians and the Germany Army were to be kept completely separate—especially in regards to 
cereals.  The British also demanded that the Belgian population received the total benefit of 
w 
 on 
g of 
secours
o force to 
.423 
itlock 
e 
ts to control the CRB and the 
Comité rding 
per 
                                                          
 provided by the Comité National and that in providing this service the two relief 
committees (the Comité National and the CRB) should enjoy liberty of action at all times in 
accordance with their mission.  On the issue of labor, Britain also stated that the German 
authorities were prohibited from using the Comité National and the CRB as a means t
civil population into working either directly or indirectly for the benefit of the Imperial Army
The steady stream of criticisms had an immediate impact on the general government in 
Belgium.  In the face of resolute opposition from the Comité National, protests from Wh
and Villalobar, and the uncompromising attitude of the British, General von der Lancken becam
more willing to modify his position.  On July 29, the Governor-General gave an oral 
commitment to the commission that he was giving up on effor
 National directly.  Concurrently the Germans issued several other assurances rega
foodstuffs, including an agreement to resell 100 grams of supplies per day to the entire 
population of Northern France without profit and to provide 200 grams of potatoes per day 
person.  In early August the Germans added a provision to include a daily per capita ration of 
100 grams per day of indigenous flour in occupied France.424 
As was demonstrated throughout 1915 the process of negotiations involving food 
supplies was both ongoing and subject to change.  In early fall the commission resumed talks 
423 Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 1:546. 
424 Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 195.  Loc cit, p. 169.  Gay and Fisher, Public 
Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 1:431. 
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with the general government under a new series of British restrictions stemming from two 
German decrees regarding animal fodder issued July and August.  To date the allies allowed the 
commission to freely import supplies in quantities stipulated by necessity and the amount of 
financi
 
ent’s 
arding 
as the fact that these crops were not covered by the 
guarant o allow 
 
ed 
                                                          
ng available.  Now the British Foreign Office closely scrutinized the relief program in 
detail and only authorized shipments that it approved.  Negotiations in the fall of 1915 were also
of increasing importance in regards to German guarantees.  Following the general governm
announcement that they would return a specified percentage of local crops the commission took 
up the task of securing as high of a return to the civil population as possible.425 
Once negotiations began Hoover became personally engaged in the discussions reg
indigenous crops.  In particular the question of produce in Northern France was a critical hinge 
point.  Complicating matters further w
ees secured during the summer.  Further stressing nerves was the British refusal t
any more food into regions where peasants raised the entire crop unless the Germans relaxed 
their seizures of foodstuffs.  After some discussion Germany agreed to make concessions 
regarding animal fodder (a sticking point for the British), but refused to turn over the whole crop 
of cereals to the civil population.426   
After months of laborious negotiations a final breakthrough in the discussion of 
indigenous products was reached in October 1915.  Hoover hastened to break the deadlock by
claiming that the commission could not extend its activities as long as German officials seemed 
unwilling to cooperate with the work already underway.  American Minister Hugh Gibson aid
the cause by impressing upon Baron von der Lancken the point that the commission had put up 
425 Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 1:553-554.  Loc cit, p. 1:554.  For 
example, as early as August 1915 the British Foreign Office demanded that Hoover cease the importation of corn 
into Belgium.  Loc cit, p. 1:569. 
426 Whitlock, Belgium: A Personal Narrative, p. 2:76, Nevins, The Letters and Journal of Brand Whitlock, p. 2:209.  
Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 170. 
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with bad treatment and many serious outrages for many months and the time had come when the 
CRB could no longer ask American volunteers to subject themselves to that sort of treatmen
anymore.  He added that Hoover and his colleagues were seriously thinking about withdrawing
from Belgium.  The direct result of this pressure was th
t 
 
e creation of the Vermittlungsstelle to 
regular ral von 
l 
r 8 
here 
e individual resign their position and leave the country immediately.  As was the 
case a m
rn 
ize relations between the commission and German authorities.  In addition, Gene
Bissing guaranteed that Belgian boats chartered in Holland for the purpose of relief work would 
not be requisitioned by the military.  Finally, after making a series of counter-proposals the 
Germans agreed to turn the whole crop of wheat in Flanders over to the civil population.  The 
agreement was a major victory for the commission.427 
On the heels of the Flanders concessions the commission faced a new series of 
complications in Belgium through a series of espionage charges leveled by the German genera
government.  Speaking on behalf of the commission, Hugh Gibson responded on Novembe
that in over a year of work the CRB fulfilled its duties as a neutral scrupulously and that t
had yet to be a single confirmed incident of improper action by any of its members.  Gibson 
added that if there was evidence of improper behavior that he and Hoover would be the first to 
insist that th
onth before Hoover threatened to end all relief efforts if von der Lancken did not 
consider withdrawing the charge of espionage.  In October, the chairman used threats of 
retirement to successfully improve relations between the CRB and the general staff in Northe
                                                          
427 Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 1:72.  Loc cit, p. 1:74.  Gibson also 
informed von der Lancken that the only reason why the British allowed the shipment of food into Belgium was 
because of public pressure and to avoid giving the Germans the opportunity to say that the British were starving it
allies.  According to Gibson “the American people would not for one moment stand that men engaged in work 
which in effect
s 
 represented the American people should lower the dignity of their country by acceptance of such 
treatment.”  Loc cit, p. 1:73.  Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 213.  Loc cit, p. 
172. 
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France.  Hoover at this juncture desired to use the same pressure to steady relations in Belgiu
as well.
m 
d 
 
s by the behavior of the Germans.  He lamented that instead of 
offering
 happy to 
he 
ople the CRB would not tolerate any treatment incompatible with personal 
dignity  
n 
 
                                                          
428 
In a meeting with Baron von der Lancken the commission addressed issues well beyon
those of espionage charges.  On November 30, Gibson complained that conditions under which 
Belgium were being fed were rapidly deteriorating and that the entire work of the CRB was
threatened in many direction
 sympathetic cooperation and maintaining the spirit of the guarantees it signed the 
German authorities were placing “endless difficulties” in the way of the commission’s work.  
Standing firm, Gibson pointed out that the CRB did not want to withdraw and would be
remain in Belgium if a satisfactory solution could be found allowing the commission to be 
treated as “gentlemen.”429   
Hoover used the incident as an opportunity to demonize the Germans and celebrate the 
virtues of the commission.  Responding to the charges the chairman emphasized the fact that t
lives of ten million people depended on the continuance of the commission and that its 
representatives were “Americans of the best type.”  Because these individuals truly represented 
the American pe
 and self respect.  To Hoover the very idea of espionage was simply abhorrent in the view
of the nature of the work.  As commission member T.B. Kittredge described it, the chairma
viewed the commission as “more Catholic than the Pope.”  The pressure of Hoover and the
428 Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 226.  Loc cit, p. 227.  Loc cit, p. 226.  Loc cit, 
t the 
 importance that the President and the 
p. 227.   
429 Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 228.  Loc cit, p. 229.  Gibson felt tha
chief difficulty in this situation was that the Germans failed to designate a competent official to assist the 
commission and its work even though the work was of such tremendous
Secretary of State in the United States gave it their personal attention.   
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commission again worked.  On December 8, Baron von der Lancken withdrew the allegations of
espionage.
 
 to 
t time a direct means of cooperation between the 
commi lle 
icers 
 the 
he civil population of Belgium and 
Northern France and through its efforts increases the program of importations during the year.  
While the CRB admitted that it did not completely win the day in most of its negotiations what it 
did accomplished in 1915 was impressive nonetheless.  Over a span of twelve months the 
                                                          
430   
While at the time the incident created some tense moments in the long term it served
regularize relations between the CRB and the Germans through the Vermittlungsstelle.  In 
addition the episode provided for the firs
ssion and the general government.  Once in place the officers of the Vermittlungsste
were men of high character who had extensive experience in dealing with Americans.  Their 
attitudes were almost uniformly sympathetic towards the commission and overall these off
were unyielding in their efforts to assist the CRB in solving the difficult problems that arose 
from the day-to-day operations of ravitaillement.  This union of German officials and CRB 
representatives marked another step in the improvement of both diplomatic relations and the 
overall efficiency of the commission.431 
Although many questions were left unsettled regarding foodstuffs in Belgium and 
Northern France, the series of negotiations and agreements secured in 1915 by the commission 
established the baseline for diplomatic relations and guarantees between the CRB and the 
belligerent governments for the remainder of the war.  The first full calendar year of the conflict 
was diplomatically noteworthy for the vast changes that the program underwent combined with 
the plethora of changing demands the commission dealt with.  Trapped at times between
belligerents, the commission maintained its commitment to t
430 Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 230.  Loc cit, p. 233-234. 
431 Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 234. 
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commission estab d Northern 
France, s 
lished its legitimacy as the official relief agency for Belgium an
 increased its program of imports, secured deals and concessions with both government
in Berlin and London, pressed for liberties among its representatives, and significantly 
influenced belligerent perceptions regarding Belgian relief. 
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CHAPTER TEN: Responding to “An Appalling Situation” 
The commission found conditions in Belgium most disconcerting as 1915 began.  The 
destruc s that 
e 
ew York Times, Hoover described 
 in the Meuse Valley where 10,000 people were “absolutely without 
food.” use 
t 
ern 
, 
es, 
                                                          
tion of property, paralysis of economic life, and the general displacement of people
followed the German invasion enormously increased the total number of destitute Belgians.  By 
this point the CRB realized that the chief problem in Belgium was not providing succor for the 
destitute and the afflicted; it was instead the issue of providing basic foodstuffs for the entire 
country.  As February began the situation was critical.  Hoover reported that without CRB 
imports there would not be one ounce of bread in Belgium today.  At the time, 7,000,000 
Belgians were surviving on a meager allowance of 250 grams of flour per day.  Of this total, 
about 1,500,000 people were “entirely destitute” and wholly supported by the commission.  Th
chairman estimated that by the time of the fall harvest another 2,500,000 would be added to 
destitute totals.432 
The situation was equally troubling in the areas of Northern France recently added to the 
commission’s responsibilities.  In an article appearing in the N
an “appalling situation”
 A CRB investigation into conditions revealed that a large number of deaths in the Me
had already occurred due to starvation.  Commission member Dr. Vernon Kellogg observed tha
privation was already taking an enormous toll on the populations of both Belgium and North
France.  The consequences of emaciation included reduction of physical and mental capacity
loss of will power and mental balance, the reappearance of suppressed or controlled diseas
432 Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 2:310.  Ultimately over seventy-
f 
d Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 1:263.  Loc cit, p. 
  
t, p. 1:264. 
five percent of the population became dependent upon charity.  Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relie
in Belgium, p. 4.  Gay an
1:263-264.  In February 1915, the cost of feeding the destitute in Belgium averaged 12 francs a person per month.
Loc ci
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increased infertility, weakening of the immune system, and dramatic increases in mortality and 
morbidity—especially among the elderly and the young.433 
Over the first nine months of operation the CRB overcame a series of diplomatic, 
financi  
e CRB.  
e 
e effort 
stily formed in Brussels with Brand Whitlock and 
the Ma
al, and physical obstacles to assist the needy.  Early 1915 marked a critical juncture in the
commission’s efforts to assist Belgium, serving as the transition point from the first agreements 
and guarantees to the actual provisioning of the population under the system created by th
Jump starting the commission’s program proved to be anything but easy however.  In February, 
Captain J.F. Lucey reported that when he arrived in Rotterdam the CRB had not received any 
additional shipments for the past two weeks due mostly to impediments created by the British 
Foreign Office.  Once shipments began flowing into Rotterdam and Brussels the CRB and th
Comité National/Français moved quickly to efficiently distribute relief supplies.  By July 1915 
the programs and organizations handling Belgian relief under the umbrella of the Commission 
for Relief in Belgium had imported 650,000 tons of provisions costing $44,000,000.  Th
saved an estimated 9,000,000 from famine in the process.434 
The Comité National  
Belgium was in crisis almost immediately after occupation begun.  To deal with the 
situation a Central Relief Committee was ha
rquis Villalobar y O’Neil as its patrons.  The committee was presided over by Ernest 
Solvay with the assistance of Emile Francqui who immediately enlisted American’s Daniel 
Heineman, William Hulse, and Millard K. Shaler.  At a meeting on October 30, 1914 the 
committee officially changed its name to the Comité National de Secours et d’ Alimentation and 
                                                          
433 New York Times, Jan 7, 1915, p. 4.  Kellogg, Vernon.  Germany in the War and After. (New York: MacMillian 
Company, 1919), p. 39. 
434 New York Times, Feb 28, 1915.  Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 
1:65. 
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announced that its primary purposes were to centralize relief, fix the prices of merchandis
look after the delivery of supplies to the communes.  By the very nature of its name, the Com
had two responsibilities: relief and provisioning.
e, and 
ité 
tional from an organizational perspective was its 
interact
ribution of 
joy 
ution 
 were also 
cific 
terms w
 
                                                          
435   
A critical component of the Comité Na
ion with provincial committees and local communes.  Comprised of mostly Belgians and 
a select number of American representatives of the CRB, the Comité with its provincial, 
regional, and communal subcommittees by self-definition was responsible for the dist
relief throughout Belgium.  In establishing a direct relationship with the provincial committees, 
the Comité National determined that they should maintain constant communication but en
complete independence of action except for general executive measures enacted at the top.  
Additionally, the provincial committees were responsible for assuming an equitable distrib
of food and a wise administration of charity.  In regards to finance, the local groups
asked to maintain a running account with sufficient funds to cover at least one month’s 
shipments of food.  Summarizing the system, Francqui explained to Hoover on November 23 
that the Comité National had the mission of controlling the subcommittees, providing them with 
food in accord with the CRB, centralizing correspondence and book-keeping, and arranging for 
the regular payment of goods received.436   
In a letter to the German general-government the Comité National defined in spe
hat its purposes were.  At the center of its duties was the intention to not only aid the 
poor of Brussels but to also organize relief for other committees that came into existence in other
communities.  In order to do this, the Comité claimed that it was “unconditionally necessary” to 
435 Nevins, The Letters and Journal of Brand Whitlock, p. 1:lvii.  Ernest Solvay was the richest man in Belgium and 
Francqui was a well respect Belgian banker.  Francqui had previously dealt with Heineman, Hulse, and Shaler 
r 
y 
 Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 77.  Loc cit, p. 84. 
during Whitlock and Hoover’s repatriation efforts of August 1914.  Kittredge, The History of the Commission fo
Relief in Belgium, p. 77.  Loc cit, p. 60. 
436 Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 2:465-466.  Kittredge, The Histor
of the
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receive definite assurances from the Germans regarding imports and requisitions.  These 
guarantees were asked to include signed placards for all transport vehicles (everything from 
wagons to lighters) carrying the order that military authorities would permit and facilitate the 
shipment of food via rail, canal, and road.437   
As the arm of relief conducting business directly in Belgium, the Comité National ma
its organizational structure clear to all interested parties.  Edward Eyre Hunt explained that the 
Comité never sought a monopoly over Belgian relief work and enacted federal—not 
monopolistic—policies governing the provisioning of relief.  Its aim, plain 
de 
and simple, was relief 
in Belg
 of 
 they 
tion.438 
By mid-1915 the Comité National and the CRB were working to clearly delineate the 
 
ium and nothing else.  Scores of existing relief groups received patronization and 
subsidization from the Comité under the guise of humanitarianism and neutrality.  From the 
beginning the Comité believed that its work was a purely Belgian affair to be handled by 
Belgians exclusively.  While assistance from Hoover and the CRB was welcomed 
enthusiastically, the leadership core of the Comité did not intend for the commission or its 
representatives to have an executive voice in the control of food or relief in Belgium.  At the 
same time however, the Comité found it an advantage to use the reputation of the CRB to garner 
support.  Throughout the war the tendency of Belgians to give credit to the CRB for the work
relief within Belgium caused immense displeasure within the Comité National.  In reality
were the individuals who organized and set the machinery of distribution into ac
re etter define its executive structure.  In a meeting 
between the two groups on July 20, it was decided that for administrative purposes the functions
                                                          
sponsibilities of each group in an attempt to b
437 Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 34.  The Comité National also asked for 
passports allowing Shaler and assistants to travel to Holland and Britain to purchase relief supplies.   
438 Hunt, War Bread, p. 312.  Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 196.  Loc cit, p. 
197. 
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of both
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a kind of government resting entirely upon good will and voluntary association 
compri
                                                          
 institutions should be conducted in three separate departments including provisioning, 
benevolence, and exchange.  Under these stipulations the provisioning department handled the 
ravitaillement of the entire population while the benevolent section took care of the destitution 
and the exchange division facilitated financial operations.  A month later on August 20, plan
regarding the cooperation between the two agencies were finalized along these parameters.  
Working in the meantime to effectively provide relief, the Comité National put a defined system 
of rationing into place in October.  Under this structure the CRB and the Comité enlisted som
40,000 Belgians to assist in the relief of provinces, districts, and towns.439 
At the apex of the Comité National were the guiding hands of President Ernest Solva
Executive Committee Chairman Emile Francqui, and Patron Minister Marquis de Villalobar y 
O’Neill.  As Belgium’s richest man and one of its most spirited citizens, Solvay became directo
and prime mover of the Comité.  Having organized a committee for the care of refugees in
first days of August 1914, he took the lead in creating a strong committee of larger scope and 
influence.  In his view the Comité Central needed to be enlarged so as to make it a truly nationa
body operating as 
sed of representatives from all provinces.  While the new committee was to take on a 
quasi-governmental form, Solvay emphasized the necessity of putting aside the political 
implications and insisted on absolute impartiality in the distribution of relief.440 
 
 Avilla y Barnabeau, Jose Allard, Louis Cousin, E. van Elewyck, Emissary Janssen, Michael Levie, and 
 that 
m.  
s 
etty jealousy. Loc cit, p. 2:91.  Nevertheless, under the proud exterior he had a 
439 Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 201.  Loc cit, p. 204.  Loc cit, p. 180.  Nevins, 
The Letters and Journal of Brand Whitlock, p. 2:lviii.   
440 Vice Presidents of the Comité National included Jean Jadot and L. van der Rest.  The executive committee also
included CRB members Oscar Crosby, Hugh Gibson, Daniel Heineman, and William Hulse along with Manuel 
Alonso De
F. van Bree.  The London Times, History of the War, p. 443-444.  Edward Eyre Hunt first met Villalobar in 
December of 1914, observing that he was a trained diplomat with keen eyes, charming manners and force of 
character whose influence with the Belgians was great.  Hunt, War Bread, p. 185.  In action, Whitlock observed
Villalobar displayed great personal vanity and sensitiveness to slights, adding that the minister was “the worst of 
all,” undoubtedly engaging in a conspiracy to discredit the Americans and make himself the sole savior of Belgiu
Nevins, The Letters and Journal of Brand Whitlock, p. 1:lix-lx and Loc cit, p. 2:253.  Whitlock added that for all hi
charm, Villalobar could show p
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One of the central figures in the creation of the Comité was Emile Francqui, a man of 
strong will and executive capacity who became one of the most capable directors of the Soci
Générale de Belgique (one of the largest banks and financial organizations in Brussels).  As one 
of the directors of the Comité National, his job was complicated by German militarists and 
British Tories who “made the work of the CRB seem like feeding a lamb placed between a tig
and a lion” according to Whitlock.  The American minister observed that Francqui was “who
fitted by nature, by experience, and by training for the heavy task” and was a man shrewd in 
judgment, polished in travel, trained in affairs, and possessing relentless will and untir
été 
er 
lly 
ing energy.  
His tac  
at 
 
 
                                                                                                                                   
t, wit, good humor, and perseverance were known to solve many delicate problems. 
Speaking about Francqui, Edward Eyre Hunt found him to be the exception to the rule that gre
financiers were usually dictators.  Moreover, he was the type of business executive familiar to
most Americans—self made, brusque, bourgeois, sometimes intolerably rude, but always 
efficient and the “man of the hour” in Belgian financial affairs.  To Hunt, Francqui resembled an 
American trust magnate and was a man with large ambitions and little sentimentality or cheap
ideas of glory.441 
In looks and in character Emile Francqui was quite different than Hoover.  More than a 
dozen years before the outbreak of war the two men had met in China during the Boxer 
Rebellion.  Francqui was described as a man of strong will and dominant personality that 
                                                        
sensitive heart and was full of expedients, unlimited resources, and was wholly without fear.  Whitlock, Belgium: A 
Persona   
Loc cit, p
 
441 Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 12 and Whitlock, Belgium: A Personal 
 grew 
hitlock, Belgium: A Personal Narrative, p. 1:347.  
ge 
l Narrative, p. 1:240.  Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 12.  Loc cit, p. 45.
. 76.  Whitlock commented that Emile Francqui and other Belgians did have political ambitions, but did 
not use the Comité National to advance them during the war.  Nevins, The Letters and Journal of Brand Whitlock, p.
2:lix.   
Narrative, p. 1:346.  Founded in 1822 with a capital of 50 million francs, the Société Générale de Belgique
into one of the foremost financial institutions in Belgium with Francqui as its head.  Hunt, War Bread, p. 272.  
Nevins, The Letters and Journal of Brand Whitlock, p. 2:91.  W
Hunt, War Bread, p. 272.  Loc cit, p. 272-273.  Hunt also observed that the situation within the Comité National 
usually called for a dictator in order to make any progress.  Hunt called the weekly meetings of the Comité “sta
plays purely.”  Loc cit, p. 272. 
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impressed others by his abilities that led others or drove them to follow because they realized 
that he was the best man to handle a crisis.  Both Whitlock and Kittredge saw Francqui as a 
dominating figure; a man who estimated the standards of the world at their proper value with no 
illusions as to the motives of people.  CRB and Comité National members observed that it was a
great tribute to the two men that they were big enough to pu
 
t aside whatever differences they 
may ha
e 
e 
nd 
 
.  
r the Belgians built up under terrible circumstances a strong institution that 
                                                          
ve had or what unpleasant memories they may have harbored.  In loyal cooperation, 
Hoover and Francqui devoted themselves to the task before them.  Working together the two 
deserved a large part of the credit for the results achieved according to Kittredge.442   
From the beginning the work of the Comité National and the CRB was assisted by 
previously-existing structure within Belgium that performed crucial duties once relief efforts 
were underway.  After the Comité Central expanded into the Comité National it found in th
communes an organization for distribution that greatly simplified the task of provisioning.  As 
patron minister, Whitlock proposed in November 1914 that all food should be turned over to th
Comité upon arrival in Belgium and that the whole work of supplying should be done by the 
committees exclusively.  To begin its operations the Comité National provided Shaler a
Couchman with £20,000 (500,000 francs) to purchase foodstuffs at the lowest possible price to 
provide bread and soup for the destitute of Brussels.  With this money the two Americans were 
instructed to purchase 500-2,000 tons of flour, 100 tons of beans and peas, and 100-200 tons of
rice depending on prices.443 
Outside observers quickly saw the Comité National as a symbol of the nation’s resolve
According to Hoove
442 Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 48.  Whitlock, Belgium: A Personal 
Narrative, p. 1:346.  Whitlock observed that Francqui was sociable and genial with dignified reserve.  Kittredge, 
lgium: A Personal Narrative, p. 1:345.  Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in 
The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 48.   
443 Whitlock, Be
Belgium, p. 88.  At the time he believed that the CRB would limit itself to investigating reported violations of 
German agreements.  Ibid, p. 35. 
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serves gn-
rked to 
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ing 
lgium over the entire task of 
ravitail e.  
 
e 
                                                          
as a rallying point for national sentiment and solidarity undiminished by parallel forei
based organizations.  Commission delegate James Harder added that at Brussels, Antwerp, 
Ghent, Malines, Liége, and other towns the local committees were harmoniously administered by 
the national committee.  When it became necessary they created canteens and soup kitchens in 
order to support an ever-increasing number of destitute.444 
Working in conjunction with each other, the CRB and the Comité National wo
clearly delineate the responsibilities of each organization respectively.  At an elementary level 
they established that the commission purchase and ship foodstuffs to Belgium while the Com
handled distribution down to the communal level.  What Emile Francqui really wanted however 
was for the CRB to send food into Belgium and maintain representation within the country to 
give prestige to the Comité but be restricted to whatever functions assigned to them by the 
domestic agency.  As an international organization the commission refused to accept these terms 
unless it knew from its own agents and activities that guarantees with belligerents were being 
enforced.  In the CRB’s opinion it was impossible to maintain assurances without possess
independent powers of control and supervision within Be
lement.  The desire for autonomy did not mean that the Comité wanted the CRB to retir
When Hoover threatened to withdraw the commission from all relief activities in October 1915 
the Comité declared that the continuation of the CRB was essential to the entire work of relief
and that it was impossible for the organization to retire.  This frank recognition of the importanc
and the necessity of the commission settled for the moment the questions that created friction 
between the two.445 
 the 
lief 
444 Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 1:106.  Taillandier, The Soul of
“CRB,” p. 48. 
445 Nevins, The Letters and Journal of Brand Whitlock, p. 2:48.  Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Re
in Belgium, p. 366.  Loc cit, p. 201. 
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The Comité National also struggled with the issue of sovereignty as it related to the 
German general-government.  The only way to prevent abuses by the Germans was to install a 
strict system of control over local committees and then coerce them into obeying orders.  General 
von Bis e 
 
y, 
e 
e the 
rd with instructions given by the Belgian government.  Once the procedures were 
in place
rchased 
 
bread and a half-liter of soup per person shortly after the war began.  By the end of September 
1914, local canteens distributed 120,000 daily rations.  For breakfast Belgians ate bread with a 
little lard and drank a hot mix of roasted grains.  At noon adults ate soup and bread from relief 
sing in particular appeared determined that Imperial officials should be able to exercis
influence by attending the meetings of subcommittees in charge of local relief.  After a series of 
negotiations the Germans agreed to maintain communications with the president’s of 
subcommittees instead of exercising direct control.  Once the commission secured government
subsidies the Comité National was able to exercise greater control in Belgium.  Structurall
subventions were given to the CRB as the only organization permitted to transfer funds into th
country and were then handed over to the Comité National who was expected to distribut
money in acco
 the Comité and the commission decided that the chief executives of both organizations 
would work collaboratively to determine the nature and quantities of foodstuffs to be pu
abroad, the prices that supplies would be sold at within Belgium, and the regulations for 
distribution of ravitaillement down to the communes.446 
Once established the Comité National worked in conjunction with the CRB to provide 
both food and financial support to Belgium.  Using the commune system as a base of operations
the Comité Central established nearly sixty canteens providing a daily ration of 200 grams of 
                                                          
446 Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 191.  Nevins, The Letters and Journal of 
Brand Whitlock, p. 2:138.  Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 190.  At the time (in 
early 1915) the sum handed over to the Comité National was £1,000,000 a month (equivalent to approximately 
25,000,000 francs).  Loc cit, p. 201. 
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soup lines while children ate a charity-school lunch.  For supper families ate rutabagas and 
of the soup and bread saved from the noon meal.  Daily rations p
some 
rovided by the CRB attempted 
to appr
i 
nd 
  Beyond this the 
Comité
n 
pant 
              
oximately 30.5 ounces per day and included 45 grams of protein and 43 grams of fat.447   
Within weeks the Comité National and the CRB realized the inadequacy of this relief 
program as it stood.  On November 5, Hoover released a statement prepared by Emile Francqu
showing that the problem went beyond the problem of supplying food to the unfortunate a
unemployed into the a question of provisioning 6 to 7 million people.  With its new approach 
toward relief on a national scale the Comité worked to establish the maximum ration and 
maximum price for foodstuffs sold to consumers by communal committees.
 National determined a broad set of principles governing the distribution of relief 
supplies.448   
The Comité National and the CRB also worked in concert to coordinate the production of 
local foodstuffs as a vital supplement to imports.  As the staple of the Belgians diet the 
production of bread was absolutely crucial to their survival.  The problem was that grains were i
tremendous short supply.  Recognizing the situation the CRB and the Comité National contracted 
with the Belgian milling industry to meet specified costs and quality controls.  A key partici
in this process was Minnesotan William C. Edgar, editor of the Northwestern Miller who upon 
his arrival in early 1915 suggested that the commission adopt a lower milling percentage below 
                                            
the necessity of the population” because of deficiencies in overseas transport, not to the actions of the communes
The CRB recognized that due to shortages the communes were compelled ever further to make sure that “they m
447 Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 16.  Eventually this ration also fell “far below 
.  
ake 
no disposals otherwise than in the proper manner.”  Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in 
ttredge, The History of 
Belgium, p. 1:84.  Kellogg, Fighting Starvation in Belgium, p. 166.  Loc cit, p. 162. 
448 Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 1:218.  Ki
the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 84. 
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the 90-100 percent flour composite currently being used.  After much discussion the CRB 
decided on a more efficient milling percentage of 82 percent.449 
Beyond foodstuffs the Comité National and the CRB also assumed important financial 
responsibilities in Belgium.  As stipulated in an agreement between the two agencies the C
took full financial responsibility for all foodstuffs once they entered the commune system for 
final distribution in both Belgium and Northern France.  To support the transaction many 
wealthy men in the various districts gave personal guarantees for the repayment of funds in case
of emergency.  In the finance industry the Comité National also established a loan bank to 
provide funding with proper security at a low rate of 3 percent interest.
omité 
 
 of an 
le food 
 three illion francs a week to some 750,000 unemployed workmen in 
Belgiu
l 
relief in food rather than money.451   
Under close scrutiny the Comité National worked out the exact details of the 
unemployment plan in mid-1915.  During the developmental phase of the project the Comité 
                                                          
450   
One of the larger projects the Comité and the CRB participated in was the creation
unemployment benefit plan for Belgians in April 1915.  Once in place the system greatly 
supplemented the ordinary relief program and gave the average working class family amp
to survive.  The program was not without its criticisms by the Germans however.  After the plan 
expanded to offer nearly  m
m the German general-government became increasingly suspicious of its activities.  From 
the beginning the Germans criticized the program for drawing labor away from the genera
government.  Eventually in 1916 this problem would be remedied by the general-government’s 
highly controversial plan of interning unemployed Belgians for forced labor.  In the interim the 
Comité National tried to avoid arbitrary action by the Germans by distributing unemployment 
e History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 345.  Loc cit, p. 190-191.  Loc cit, p. 191.   
449 Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 85.  Loc cit, p. 182. 
450 Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 155.  Loc cit, p. 17. 
451 Kittredge, Th
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established two central purposes for the program.  The first was to provide a minimum level of
assistance incl
 
uding food, clothing, shelter, fuel, and other necessities to maintain the “family 
life” of
 
t 
   
.  
s.  These individuals would require the same kind of 
ravitail
 the working class.  The second part involved the providing of actual employment as a 
remedy to the rapidly deteriorating morale of Belgian society.  Once in place the program 
stipulated that the Comité provided nine-tenths of funding while the communal administrations 
covered the remaining one-tenth.  Breaking down the provisions, the plan designated that 
bachelors received three francs per week while heads of households received an additional one 
and one half francs for his wife or housekeeper and fifty centimes for each child under sixteen 
living at home and not working.  As a measure of protection the communes were required to
furnish the provincial committees and the National Committee exact, certified lists of the 
unemployed subject to frequent examination of benefactors to preventing fraud.  Enrollmen
skyrocketed immediately after the program was put in place totaling over 760,000 initial 
applicants.  Including dependents this figure added up to 1,347,922 people seeking assistance.452
The Comité Français  
The occupied regions of France were in a similar desperate situation to that of Belgium
In a short period of time two million Frenchmen exhausted their food supplies and faced 
starvation like their Belgian neighbor
lement supplies and services which meant that the commission would be required to 
perform its previously-defined duties on an even large scale.  Edward Eyre Hunt recalled that the 
                                                          
452 Hunt, War Bread, p. 306.  Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 191, Hunt, War 
Bread, p. 304-305.  Loc Cit, p. 305.  Under the system an unemployed female industrial worker received the sa
sum as a man 
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misery was “as great or even greater” and the people were less energetic and resistant than in 
Belgium.453   
In structure the ravitaillement of Northern France was less complex than that of Bel
Under a system of occupied rule akin to an internment camp where practically all economic 
activity and movement was suspended the same measures of self-help and benevolenc
in the Belgian communes were out of the question.  Similarly, unlike the system in Belgium 
where the degree of dependency was determined on a day-to-day and person-to-person bas
situation in F
gium.  
e instituted 
is, the 
rance necessitated the on-going provisioning of the entire population.  Within this 
structur
t.  In 
 
e the French government provided funds to the CRB via subsidy.  Dissimilar to the 
Belgian population, the responsibility of the citizenry of France was to repay the government 
within his means after the war ended.  From the commission’s perspective the question of 
finance also made relief efforts in France different and distinct.  Unlike in Belgium, the direct 
subsidization of relief forced the CRB to be directly accountable to the French governmen
regards to distribution, the situation in Northern France also required the commission to use a 
different system under a new set of guarantees negotiated with the Germans.  The securing of
these agreements marked the first time the CRB came into direct contact with the military 
administration of the Army Zone.454 
Despite the differences in character the matter of feeding Northern France was arranged 
rather quickly in 1915 without much direct mediation by the commission.  Commission delegate 
                                                          
453 Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 1:393.  Loc cit, p. 1:391.  Hunt, 
War Bread, p. 316. 
454 Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 2:312.  Loc cit, p. 1:391.  The 
Comité National included Flanders on a similar basis as in other Belgian provinces as well despite the differences 
between the military regime in the occupational district and the Étappen.  Kittredge, The History of the Commission 
n was considerably larger than that in Flanders due to the 
s 
 
for Relief in Belgium, p. 135. In general the French ratio
fact that a much large quantity of native produce was available there.  Loc cit, p. 157.  Distribution in Flanders wa
similarly handled by the provincial committees subordinate to the Comité National.  Loc cit, p. 157.  Gay and
Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 1:392. 
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M. Gue
 Northern 
 off of the system of relief in Belgium the CRB made arrangements for the 
extensi l 
 of 
ine 
 
ent on the CRB meeting strict demands of neutrality and accountability.  
Commi  tin—
rin completed the final arrangements for ravitaillement on a trip from Lille to Paris while 
Hoover discussed the situation directly with the German General staff during his trip to Berlin in 
February.  The speed in which the organization took shape was directly attributable to the 
progress made in general by the commission over its first six months of existence as a reputable, 
efficient, and benevolent relief organization in Belgium.  Through its newly garnered 
international reputation the CRB used prior precedence to extend relief operations into
France without many of the obstacles that slowed the initial pace of relief organization in 
Belgium.455 
Building
on of ravitaillement in the anticipation of adding Northern France.  Hoover in his initia
preparations for the addition drew on the commission’s accumulated credit to secure a supply
flour for France without diminishing Belgian rations.  Having made arrangements for a basel
supply of additional relief, the chairman then used his diplomatic successes in Berlin and 
Brussels as a springboard for securing guarantees with the Germans in France.  In establishing 
ravitaillement for the region, Hoover believed that the situation could be handled entirely by 
government subsidy.  Unlike in Belgium, every individual in occupied France was considered 
destitute precisely because the French government provided direct assistance to the commission. 
This funding was conting
ssion representatives were told “above all, be careful not to let the Germans get any
not so much as the lid of a sardine box.”456 
                                                          
455 Whitlock, Belgium: A Personal Narrative, p. 1:547. 
456 Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 1:403.  Loc cit, p. 1:469.  It was 
also for this reason that the CRB made no general appeal for charitable funds on behalf of France in its press 
campaigns.  Loc cit, p. 2:471.  Taillandier, The Soul of the “CRB,” p. 185-186. 
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For accounting purposes the CRB accepted receipts from the communes and held them as 
final records of all transactions.  Under the program the commission sold food at prices that w
regularly reevaluated and fixed.  These adjusted sale prices included a small marginal 
served as a guard against excessive exchange, deterioration, or destruction losses.  Clarifying the
decision, Hoover reiterated that the CRB, Comité National, and Comité Français were “entirely 
humanitarian institutions working without profit,” but explained that while individual 
participants take no personal liability for imported provisions the institutions assume the assets 
and liabilities for all materials they have on
ere 
profit that 
 
 hand for the French.  For that reason protection was 
warran
France 
 the 
system  
                                                          
ted.457   
In practice the CRB charged the entire price of the imported foodstuffs to the district 
committees at a fixed level which was then in turn sold to the communes at a small advance 
sufficient to cover the cost of local distribution.  At the final stage the communes resold the 
foodstuffs without profit to the general population in Northern France.  While destitution was 
more widespread than in Belgium, the commission’s benevolent expenditures in Northern 
were less in relation to the sums disbursed for general revictualment.  Due to differences in
 and sources of funding (the direct subventions of the French government in particular)
approximately $558,000,000 went toward benevolence in Belgium while $55,000,000 was used 
in Northern France.458   
From an organizational perspective the largest difference between relief efforts in 
Belgium and Northern France was the designation that everyone was to receive a full ration 
whether they could afford it or not.  Realistically the lack of native food supplies compelled the 
c 
 
457 Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 1:469.  Loc cit, p. 1:428. 
458 Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 2:471.  Loc cit, p. 2:312-313.  Lo
cit, p. 2:313.  Of the grand total of $615,237,147.47 spent on benevolence, France received $54,782,601.85 of that
figure while $558, 386,857.67 went to Belgium.  Also included in this grand total is an additional $2,067,687.95 
spent on clothing.  Loc cit, p. 2:313. 
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commission to provide nearly the entire diet for people in the region.  The Germans for their pa
provided a percentage of the flour consumed by the French from the domestic harvests they 
controlled as a condition of negotiations with the CRB governing the continuation of 
ravitaillement.  Derived from combined supplies the average cost of rations per week was set 
approximately three to four francs in mid-1915.  Once in place the system provided a minimu
program of relief for Northern France.  CRB delegate T.B. Kittredge recalled that while the 
rations were “never really sufficient,” they were enough to carry the population throug
armistice without any actual starvation.
rt 
at 
m 
h to the 
arch 1915 the CRB extended relief into Northern France through the Comité d’ 
Alimen
r 
ed that in 
onal it was necessary to secure 
guarant n 
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459 
In M
tation du Nord de la France (the Comité Français).   After inception the Comité Français 
became responsible for the internal administration of relief in occupied sections of France unde
the guidance of the commission.  By definition the French committee was headquartered in 
Brussels and included representatives of both the CRB and the Comité National.  Under a shared 
power structure the district, regional, and communal committees were responsible for the 
distribution of relief in Northern France managed by CRB representatives in the field.460   
In structure the Comité Français resembled the Comité National but in practice faced 
more severe German limitations than its Belgian counterpart.  Emile Francqui suggest
order to organize the work on similar lines to the Comité Nati
ees from the general-government protecting all imported foods complete with permissio
to ship it to France.  Once these preliminary agreements were in place the French were then
promised assistance with transportation and distribution by the Belgian National committee.  Th
 
cs per week.  Kittredge, Californians with Hoover in Europe, p. 5:284. 
 
e Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 2:466. 
459 Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 156.  Kittredge, Californians with Hoover in
Europe, p. 5:284.  Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 156.  Once shipping totals 
declined the average price rose to 6-8 fran
460 Surface and Bland, American Food in the World War and Reconstruction Period, p. 186.  Gay and Fisher, Public
Relations of th
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actual task of coordinating ravitaillement proved highly problematic after the Comité received 
initial authorization to provision the population however.  In occupied France it was harder to 
organize local committees due to the largely missing male segment of the population.  This 
removal of family breadwinners combined with the suspension of many French industries to 
produce a greater relative degree of destitution than was found in Belgium.  By July, Hoover 
comme
n 
.  
munal 
two 
n with 
Once food reached the communes it was distributed in the French districts in much the 
nted that in general the Comité Français was well organized and the communes were 
providing good and efficient services.  The problem before the commission involved 
administration and the challenge of supporting a universally destitute population on £500,000 a 
month.461 
Both organizations shared a similar commitment to decentralized policy making based o
the normal political divisions existing in Belgium and France.  Under both central committees 
were systems of provincial, district, regional, and at the lowest level communal organizations
Headed by the burgomasters (mayors) in Belgium and maires in Northern France the com
committees were staffed by both officials and volunteers.  By contrast the provincial committees 
in Belgium were composed of representatives of all sections of the province and headed by 
delegates from the Comité National while in Northern France the chain of communicatio
Brussels was maintained through a minimum of two representatives of the CRB who 
collaborated with each provincial and district committee.462   
same way as in Belgium, except that the communal administration directly controlled and 
managed the foodstuffs whereas in Belgium the service was done by local committees and not 
                                                          
461 Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 1:412.  Kittredge, The Histor
the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 139.  Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in 
Belgium, p. 1:417.  Loc cit, p. 1:420. 
462 Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 2:467.  Loc cit, p. 2:467-468.  Loc 
cit, p. 2:468. 
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official  
tly with 
g within 
 office at the German general headquarters in Charleville.  At the 
headqu
r an 
ly by communal administrations.  According to the commission the fact that distribution
was handled officially by the communes in France made for a more effective system of control 
than was possible in Belgium.  Assisting this process was the CRB’s ability to deal direc
military authorities.  In Northern France the Comité Français did not have to negotiate through 
diplomatic patrons or German officials.463   
For the purposes of provision and distribution the occupied territories of France were 
divided into six districts coinciding with the territory of the five German armies operatin
the area.  Each of the six districts were subdivided into regions containing a group of communes 
(also known as syndicates) with each region having its own committee.  These district and 
regional committees handled the details of distribution under the limitations of German orders 
and worked in close cooperation with the CRB who assigned two American delegates to each 
district and set up a central
arters of each district (which included Lille, Valenciennes, St. Quentin, Vervins, 
Charleville, and Longwy) an American was stationed with a German officer.  Operating ove
area of 8,100 square miles with a civil population of 1,794,506 the system contained 2,133 
communes served by 106 regional warehouses.  With each German army existing as an 
independent government this was the best practical method for dividing relief operations in 
Northern France given the diversity of conditions in the various districts.464   
                                                          
463
in Europe, p. 5:284.  Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 207.  American delegates in 
Northern France were generally met with few complaints as they journeyed across their districts managing the 
 Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 156 and Kittredge, Californians with Hoover 
distribution of food.  Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 1:412. 
 of 
 151.  
f needed.  At the executive level the central committee headquartered at Brussels handled all accounting 
its total 
464 Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 151.  The only exception was the division
the Sixth Army that between Lille and Valenciennes.    Loc cit, p. 151 and Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the 
Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 1:495.  Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p.
At Charleville the commission allowed a delegate of the Comité National to take the place of one of the two 
Americans i
and served as a central control mechanism with the CRB office.  Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the 
Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 1:412.  Loc cit, p. 1:495.  Loc cit, p. 2:468 and Surface and Bland, American 
Food in the World War and Reconstruction Period, p. 186.  In 1915, Lille contained 107 communes for 
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The management of each district varied from others based on necessity and the curren
situations found within its borders.  At the center of the system the commission explained to the
Allies was its obligation to see that foodstuffs were distributed equitably over the entire 
population while making sure that the Ge
t 
 
rman authorities did not interfere with its distribution.  
In the p
e 
 
tion.  Generally each region made deliveries every two weeks 
with th  
h 
is.  
rovince of Hainaut for example the organization of relief was markedly different from 
other areas in that volunteers played a tremendous vital and prominent role in ravitaillement.  
Once in place the province shared responsibility for the Maubeuge area with the Mons 
committee.  Consequently, the Mons group supplied the food while the Hainaut committee 
sheltered the financial responsibility for the supplies and arranged for later repayment from the 
people of Maubeuge.  The success of this province in particular highlighted the structure of th
system that coordinated volunteer activities through official action rather than spontaneous acts 
of local administration.465 
Distribution of relief in Northern France officially began in the districts of Valenciennes 
on April 6, 1915 and in Lille on April 10.  Over the next few weeks other regions received 
shipment of their first relief supplies with Guise and Ternier being last to receive initial delivery
on May 6.  When food arrived it was divided in each district between the various regions in 
proportion to the overall popula
e communes being required to come to the regional depots to secure their rations.  The
rations themselves were usually fixed at the head office of each district either by the Frenc
committee directly or by an American delegate working in cooperation with the Comité França
                                                                                                                                                                                           
population of 622,596 people; Valenciennes contained 339 communes for its 591,155 population; St. Quentin 
contained 511 communes for its 450,424 population; Vervins contained 431 communes for its 222,646 population; 
Charleville contained 339 communes for its 150,476 population; and Longwy contained 409 communes for its 
 
ission for Relief in Belgium, p. 1:49.  The CRB also stipulated that 
 
um, p. 21.  Loc cit, p. 136.  Loc cit, p. 137.  Loc cit, p. 21. 
112,218 inhabitants (totaling 2,133).  Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 154.  Loc
cit, p. 151. 
465 Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the Comm
as a humanitarian body it endeavored to treat the rich and poor in the same manner.  Loc cit, p. 1:59.  Kittredge, The
History of the Commission for Relief in Belgi
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In its early days the Comité National working with the Comité Français set a definite ration 
program that for the most part maintained was throughout the war.  Every family used a ration 
card in order to receive provisions which were received from the communal depots at stated 
intervals—usually every fifteen days.466 
In provisioning Northern France the CRB and the Comité Français interacted with the 
German general government in a more direct manner than in Belgium.  Commission and C
members reported that on the whole the Germans faithfully adhered to the guarantees signed on
April 13, 1915.  Few cases of food seizures were ever reported.  When an incident did oc
German authorities themselves showed “great energy” in punishing the offenders and preventin
further violations.  The agreements signed in April were supplemented by an order from the 
general-government on August 23 providing for the delivery of 100 grams of flour per day from 
German stocks.  This ration was to be issued by officers assigned to work
omité 
 
cur the 
g 
 with the American 
delegat  
estic 
y food unless American delegates were permitted to 
inspect conditions and maintain the system.  As a part of the original accord extending relief into 
                                                          
es under the same protections as foods imported by the commission.  On September 3, a
supplementary order was issued providing 200 grams of potatoes to the civil population for six 
months under the same arrangements put in place for flour distribution.  These two agreements 
were adjuncts to the larger negotiations between the CRB and the Germans that secured dom
harvests for 1915 and 1916.467 
In Northern France the experience of CRB delegates was considerably different than 
those stationed in Belgium.  Before ravitaillement was officially offered the commission 
proclaimed that it would not distribute an
lief in Belgium, p. 1:570. 
466 Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 1:411.  Kittredge, The History of 
the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 155.  The quantities available for this ration were changed from time to 
time depending on the situation.  Loc cit, p. 156. 
467 Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 153.  Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the 
Commission for Re
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upied territories the Supplementary Agreement No. 1 dealt with delegates specifically.  
Setting the stage for shared responsibility, the agreement specified that commission delegates 
were authorized to distribute goods in accordance with the agreement while the German militar
authorities promised to assist them in carrying out this duty.  The agreement also stipulated
the Americans allowed to reside in the army districts were to be assigned a French and English-
speaking Begleits-offiziere (accompanying officer).  As a part of his detail the officer was 
required to accompany the representative on all of his journeys for their “personal safety” and 
was required to assist them in “every possible way.”  In practice, John Lowrey Simpson 
observed that the role of the delegate was to serve as both a custodian of guarantees and as 
agent of Brussels sent to report on the “exact and special needs” of the district.  The German 
officer by contrast combined with his functions as a “detective extraordinary” a considerable role 
in facilitating the move of foodstuffs and the elimination of obstacles.468 
The commission issued its own set of expectations for American delegates in 
   Primary among them was the obligation to “carry on his duties in such a manner as may 
be expected from an honorable citizen of a neutral state.”  Considering the pressure of relievin
millions under the watchful eye of German officers the task of maintaining strict neutrality 
proved extremely difficult.  Hardest of all was resisting the temptation to verbally spar with or 
criticize the accompanying officers.  Delegates understood that any resentment they harbored o
bitter remarks they uttered would only make their position increasingly unpleasant and the work 
correspondingly less more difficult.469   
468 Kittredge, Californians with Hoover in Europe, p. 5:277.  Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission 
for Relief in Belgium, p. 1: 415.  Kittredge, Californians with Hoover in Europe, p. 5: 277.  Gay and Fisher, Public 
Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 1:416.  Loc cit, p. 1:494. 
469 Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 151.  Kittredge, Californians with Hoover in 
Europe, p. 5:278. 
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As a permanent fixture of the relief structure in Northern France the relationship bet
delegates an
ween 
d German officers often complicated the process of ravitaillement.  Compounding 
these d
 them, 
that inspections were made 
and that food was getting to the French only.  This close relationship put Americans in the 
“sorrowful” position of being considered pro-Germany by a considerable part of the French 
population that did not know the circumstances of their forced association with officers.  Despite 
the difficulties this relationship was not without its advantages in establishing better control over 
distribution and improving direct relations with the general government however.470 
Due to these complexities many American representatives reported that the experience in 
Northern France took a larger toll on them than in Belgium.  Higher turn-over rates in France 
confirmed this belief.  In general there were few delegates who could remain at their post for 
more than six months at a time.  As part of their duties the representatives traveled to Brussels 
every weekend to attend a conference on Saturday morning.  These weekly meetings served a 
dual purpose of allowing directors to keep in personal touch with developments in France while 
allowing the delegates some breathing space from their German officers.  T.B. Kittredge 
described the weekends in Brussels as a “genuine nervous relaxation” where representatives 
                                                          
ifficulties were feelings that representatives were shackled to their officers without any 
personal liberties.  Speaking on the subject of accompaniment, commission delegate T.B. 
Kittredge recalled that, “We lived with them, fed with them, worked with them, drank with
quarreled with them, and through them came to revile Prussianism (and) all its work in a way 
some of never had dreamed possible.”  Kittredge added that in order to perform their duties the 
delegate was forced to adjust his relations in such a way to make sure 
t their elbow.  Kittredge, Californians with Hoover in Europe, p. 5:278.  Loc cit, p. 5:277.  Loc 
470 Kittredge explained that delegates could go nowhere, attend no conference, or hardly even take a walk without 
having an officer a
cit, p. 5:278.  Loc cit, p. 5:284. 
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cou
freely.471   
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ld associate with whom they liked without being spied upon and express their opinions 
Sometimes the strains of working in Northern France were too much for Americans to 
handle.  T.B. Kittredge reported that numerous delegates suffered from nervous breakdowns as a 
result of the “continuous strain, and the pressure of pent-up desire for expression of one’s 
opinion of the Huns.”  On occasion the strains would grow too great and a stressed official woul
compromise his position by telling an officer exactly what he thought about them personally, the
war, or Germany.  Reports of such events were quite rare though.472   
471 Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 323.  Kittredge, Californians with Hoover in 
Europe, p. 5:284. 
472 Kittredge, Californians with Hoover in Europe, p. 5:278. 
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APTER ELEVEN: “A Major Crisis Once A Month, A Minor Crisis Once A Week” 
Ravitaillement in the Belgian Communes 
Providing relief for millions of people in Belgium and Northern France required careful 
planning, preparation, and execution.  With agreements in place the CRB simultaneously
attention on securing diplomatic authorizations while placing increasing focus on the actual 
provisioning of the civil population.   As the “second phase” of relief, the action step of 
supplies in the hands of the beleaguered required an organizational structure as complex as any
the commission worked with during the war combining international politics with the logistics of 
cooking thousands of hot meals on a daily basis.  Hoover commented in early January 1915
the problem of ravitaillement fell into two phases: the first providing bread for all those who 
were able to pay, and the second provisioning the 1.4 million destitute who were fed by public 
canteens.  At the time the cost of this program was approximately $2,500,000 a month and 
growing steadily.473   
One of the most daunting features of ravitaillement was the size of its opera
pective of actual recipients of relief and the amount of individuals and organizations 
participating in program the complexities of managing such an operation were numerous.  At the
executive level the CRB managed over 2,000 volunteer support committees scattered throug
the world.  Working in cooperation with the Comité National and the Comité Français the 
commission dealt with another 5,000 separate committees handling food supplies and an almost 
equal number engaged directly in distribution.  Covering an area of 19,455 square miles
population of 9,084,500 people the CRB worked directly with 240 regional warehouses and 
4,731 communes inside of the 17 provincial relief districts.474  
                                                          
473 New York Times, Jan 7, 1915, p. 4. 
474 Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 2:466.  Loc cit, p. 2:468. 
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To effectively manage the extensive system of tasks and processes the CRB employed a 
decentralized structure that relied heavily on the pre-existing communal structures.  Observing 
the pro
e 
as 
lost and
 its 
t 
entire operation throughout the war.  Whitlock commented that the “whole history” of 
occupation was one of contests between German stolidity and brute force against the nimble wit 
 representatives in Brussels.  At times it seemed to those working inside the commission that 
gress of work The Economist in September 1915 commented that the only rational manner 
that the commission could handle the revictualing of seven million people was through 
decentralization.  Within this framework the local committees were empowered to perform th
three essential functions of relief in Belgium: provisioning the population, carrying out 
financing, and providing for the destitute.  A critical component of the commission’s focus on 
localized management was the relationships forged between benevolent activity and the German 
general-government.  In Belgium the available supplies of food and the morale of the civil 
population were proportionally related, giving added importance to the ability of the communal 
representatives and commission delegates to prevent requisitions.  Belgian Minister M. Hymans 
believed that his nation was splendidly resisted the invader and avoided demoralization, but 
added that if CRB supplies were cut off the people of Belgium would “feel that their cause w
 that they had been abandoned by their own government and its allies.”475 
While Belgians realized the nobility of the cause, the commission was not without
critics.  Journalist Arthur Mason explained in a syndicated article that the CRB faced two kinds 
of common criticism.  The first involved the belief that relieving Belgium ostensibly mean
relieving Germany.  The second questioned whether relief supplies were actually reaching 
Belgians.  Doubts regarding the commission’s ability to get supplies to the people hung over the 
of
they would be unable to complete their task.  Whitlock found the challenge of feeding Belgium 
                                                          
475 The Economist, September 4, 1915.  Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 252. 
 
270 
 
“impossible” and “almost beyond human power.”  From his perspective the work “seemed to be 
handing by very slender threads with almost insuperable difficulties surrounding it.”476 
r 
t no 
hat 
 
ce 
f the 
ected relief operations to potential 
breakdo  
 
tions 
                                                          
Commission members in general maintained a sense of cautious optimism regarding thei
work.  Whitlock recalled that attempting to perform such deeds were “a piece of temerity tha
one but a set of God’s own fools would ever have undertaken…”  The work of the CRB was 
initially as misunderstood within Belgium as it was across belligerent and neutral nations.  
Captain J.F. Lucey reported that Belgians in the beginning did not know who they were or w
they wanted and believed that the commission was trying to sell them something.  He added that 
many of them had never heard of the United States and were unaware that a group of people 
would send free shiploads of food to them.  Lucey believed that by February 1915 the Belgians
understood what the mission of the CRB was.  Questions regarding the reason for the appearan
of a foreign contingent in Belgium were common nevertheless.  Throughout the war most o
misconceptions about the commission’s work were due to the complexity of its activities.477 
Indeed the complex nature of operations subj
wns and perhaps even failure.  Dr. Vernon Kellogg recalled that the commission
expected “a major crisis once a month, a minor crisis once a week.”  Even though the Germans
generally respected their guarantees there were always a plethora of ancillary difficulties 
preventing the commission from completing its task hassle-free.  According to Whitlock the 
German general-government believed it was doing the CRB a favor in allowing relief opera
476 Morning Post, April 22, 1916.  Whitlock, Belgium: A Personal Narrative, p. 2:35-36.  Loc cit, p. 1:545.  The 
work was indeed challenging.  Whitlock reported that the Legation received quantities of letters from people who 
“had evidently gone mad.”  Loc cit, p. 2:55. 
477 Whitlock, Belgium: A Personal Narrative, p. 1:537.  New York Times, Feb 28, 1915.  Kittredge, The History of 
the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 5. 
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to continue that absolved them from any feelings of gratitude towards the recipient by adher
to its promises.
ing 
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 view 
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 Belgian with the exception of those within the fighting zones were receiving “their 
just and
nism 
 
 
478    
Despite the difficulties presented the representatives of the CRB were expected to meet 
their objectives.  Dean Howard McClenahan of Princeton told the New York Times in early 
February that after returning from Belgium that the only flour in the country was provided by the 
commission.  By that point a reported 170,000 out of 600,000 residents of Brussels were fed on 
the bread line with Belgians everywhere expressing “undying gratitude for what America is 
doing for them.”  McClenahan concluded that from his perspective “the speed, thoroughness, an
efficiency with which the commission is doing its welcome work is from every point of
admirable.”  J.F. Lucey reported on February 28 that he could “state with absolute assuran
that every
 proper share of the American bounty” regardless of income.  Representative T.B. 
Kittredge added that the commission’s extraordinary efficiency, altruism, and humanitaria
were “an expression of Americanism at its best.”479 
Within the organization of relief the provisioning department and the provincial 
committees themselves were due a large share of the credit for the commission’s successes in
Belgium and Northern France.  In theory the CRB decided that the actual work of handing 
shipments within the provinces was to be left to the provincial committee and the communes 
who were instructed to provide delegates with receipts for all supplies received.  Working 
collaboratively the provincial committee decided to transform their provisioning department into
                                                          
478 Kellogg, Herbert Hoover As His Friends See Him, p. 9.  Whitlock, Belgium: A Personal Narrative, p. 1:365.  The 
 
Times on February 13, 1915 confirmed that the Germans were keeping their promises.  The Times, Feb 13, 1915. 
479 Kellogg, Herbert Hoover As His Friends See Him, p. 9.  Kellogg personally attributed the ability of the 
commission to overcome tremendous obstacles to Hoover’s “genius and superhuman labor.”  New York Times, Feb
2, 1915, p. 3.  New York Times, Feb 28, 1915.  Kittredge, Californians with Hoover in Europe, p. 4:164. 
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a cooperative society based out of Antwerp.  Once in place the executive committee of the 
cooperative acted as head of the provisioning department for the provisional committee.480   
As an operational division of the CRB the provisioning department performed several of 
the mos
y the 
RB 
 
 
and No
 
rice 
e 
doled out in the form of “scientifically calculated” daily rations containing the proper amounts of 
t vital ravitaillement tasks.  Serving as the purchasing, transportation, and distribution 
agency the department provided relief supplies through the 4,731 communal stores set up b
commission.  During the first year of operation (October 22, 1914 to October 31, 1915) the C
delivered a total of 988,852 tons of foodstuffs through the provisioning department.  At a total
value of £11,401,637, the delivery of these supplies required 186 full cargoes (averaging 4,647 
tons) and another 308 partial cargoes (averaging 209) to complete the job.  In total the 
provisioning department transported over five million tons of supplies between 1914 and 
1919.481 
Statistics regarding shipment totals only partially explain the service rendered to Belgium
rthern France by the commission through the provisioning department, provincial 
committees, Comité National/Français, and communes.  Over this same twelve-month period
(October 1914 through October 1915) the CRB was able to deliver its food at an average p
lower than those found in London.  Several products in particular including ice, beans, peas, 
bacon, and lard in particular were actually cheaper in Brussels.  To maintain cost-efficiency th
normal program of the CRB provided for the delivery of over 100,000 tons of food each month 
protein, albumin, and carbohydrates with the minimum total calories that would sustain life and 
                                                          
480 Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 95.  Hunt, War Bread, p. 259.  Loc cit, p. 261. 
Edward Eyre Hunt believed that this reorganization was a critical step for the commission, ending the “days o
disunion and divided efforts.”  
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the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 235.  Including transportation and insurance costs (totaling £2,215,473
final cost of these foodstuffs to the CRB was£13,617,110.  This total excludes the native products of Belgium an
Northern France.  Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 2:474.   
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health.  In order to make sure the proper amounts of food were available and that current stocks 
did not decay or go to waste the commission instituted a rigid inventory control system for all 
warehouses done at the end of every month.482   
Even with the system of rations and inventory in place the complexities of the program at 
times went beyond the abilities of CRB representatives.  From a planning perspective the 
program required a three month implementation period before any theoretical changes could 
begin.  In practice the commission struggled to keep up with supply issues within the system, 
importing bread grains in great excess of the amounts produced locally but never being able to 
consistently maintain its theoretical program.  For the most part this failure was due to external 
factors rather than want of effort however.  Major problems notwithstanding, the CRB w
to meet requirements close enough to the normal program to save the populations of occupie
Belgium and Northern France from famine or serious deterioration from undernourishment.
as able 
d 
he 
provisi
n 
 to 
 that 
483 
Operating beyond the commission’s theoretical program of imports and the work of t
oning department were its representatives.  Serving as the people who actually made 
ravitaillement possible the CRB placed two American delegates inside each of the eleve
Belgian and six French provinces.  In fulfilling their duties these representatives were asked
perform “varied, unconventional, and interesting” tasks.  Their contributions helped the CRB 
lower its costs across the board.  Speaking on the value of these individuals the CRB regaled
                                                          
482
white bread in Brussels was 44 centimes per kilo while in London the price was 45 centimes and 47.5 centime
Rotterdam.  Rice was 61 centimes in Brussels and 94 centimes in London.  For beans and peas the price w  7
 Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 235.  During this time the average cost of 
s in 
as 8 
centimes in Brussels and 82 centimes in London.  For bacon the maximum price averaged 2 francs/kilos in Brussels 
while the price selling for 2.75 in London.  For lard the price in Brussels averaged 1.70 while staying at 1.90 in 
London.  Kittredge, Californians with Hoover in Europe, p. 1:6.  This ration system was carefully checked and 
enforced by the communes with allowance in the program being made for the food products available and/or 
ncluded lack of funding, shortage of ships, arbitrary 
arine warfare, and world food shortages.   
obtainable through local sources.  Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 
1:125. 
483 Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 1:125-126.  Loc cit, p. 1:510.  
Factors injuring efforts to provide the theoretical program i
restrictions created by the British Foreign Office, u-boat/unrestricted subm
 
274 
 
the dist
idge the gap.  All the while the Germans denied responsibility for 
provisi
 
 
inguished services provided by volunteers in all spheres of activity were in great measure 
directly responsible for the success of its operations, allowing the commission to keep overhead 
and administrative costs below one-half of one percent.484   
At the commune level the “harmonious and cordial” collaboration between the American 
delegate and the Belgian committee was maintained throughout the war.  The experience of 
delegates confirmed the value of volunteer work and its place within the commission’s work.  
Rhodes Scholar T.H. Jones explained in May 1915 that the “real value of the work” in Belgium 
was being done by Americans themselves.  At the time the situation was particularly critical as 
other sources of supplies were cut off from access while the Dutch government refused to export 
foodstuffs to make br
oning the civil population.   Considering the circumstances the fact that “every bit of 
bread eaten by a Belgian now comes into this country via Rotterdam through the agency of the 
commission” was clear evidence of the value of American delegates according to Jones.485  
Interpersonal and inter-group relationships formed the critical interlocking components of
the commission’s system of ravitaillement.  At the administrative level the cooperative 
association between the CRB and the Comité National provided the vital link between the 
coordination of relief supplies and the final distribution of relief to the civil population.  Both 
organizations worked with the commission’s provisioning department and cultivated direct
relationships with the communes through American delegates.  Finalized in December 1914, the 
association provided the flexibility needed to maintain relief efforts throughout the war.486  
                                                          
484 Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 1:477.  Loc cit, p. 2:236.  Loc cit, p. 
2:236-237. 
485 Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 98.  Nottingham Guardian, May 2, 1915.  
ief in Belgium, p. 99. 
Jones was a student at Exeter College serving in Belgium. 
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Working in concert with each other the CRB handled the strategic work of ravitaillement 
while the Comité National planned and executed its tactics.  In a joint planning session the two 
organizations agreed that the general relationship between the commission and the Comité was 
one of joint cooperation and collaboration in general policy, general direction, and control of th
distribution of commodities and benevolence.  Outside observers began seeing the results of 
unified efforts within a few weeks join
e 
t action.  In February 1915 the Rockefeller Foundation 
reporte nd 
y, 
 and the 
yond 
o 
m for 
n 
de of the 
purview of international and/or neutral interests persisted throughout the war era.  Disagreements 
d that the “magnitude and complexity” of relief required a “high order of intelligence a
administrative ability” provided by the two organizations.  “We are satisfied as to the integrit
ability, and high purpose of the men who are conducting these organizations and their work,” the 
report concluded.487 
Representatives and delegates also agreed that the collaboration between the CRB
Comité National improved the effectiveness and efficiency of relief efforts in Belgium.  Be
its performance the association served as an important connection between domestic (Comité 
National) and international (CRB) groups which showed the potential for conflict detrimental t
the civil population.  The relationship also brought together divergent groups within Belgiu
a common goal as well.  Edward Eyre Hunt commented that the collaboration brought together 
groups in Antwerp that were the “bitterest rivals” beforehand.  While participants were unable to 
put aside their animosities overnight, Hunt found that there was for maybe the first time a 
“definite feeling of the pettiness of politics in the face of national calamity.”  This did not mea
that participants and the two organizations saw eye-to-eye on all issues however.  Nationalistic 
sentiments within Belgium believing that ravitaillement was a domestic program outsi
                                                          
487 The London Times, History of the War, p. 444.  Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in
Belgium, p. 1:112.  New York Times, Feb 28, 1915. 
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tee 
ous governments, making purchases, organizing transportation, and 
maintai
elays to 
her 
n 
e functions of the CRB were also an ongoing part of the relationship.  While both agree
that the work of the commission was “indispensable” to the success of relief operations and that 
American delegates should perform supervisory duties to make sure that food and benevolence 
were efficiently handled and fairly distributed it was repeatedly argued that the actual work of 
distribution was essentially a domestic problem that could be best handled by Belgians who were
better equipped to handle the task.488  
Considering issues of internal politics, national demands, and logistics within the pre-
existing communal structure the two organizations maintained a cooperative relationship as 
nominally distinct entities.  The essential difference between the commission and the commit
lay in that the CRB was composed of neutrals while the Comité was staffed by Belgians.  In 
conducting the business of relief the commission was responsible for the observance of 
agreements to the vari
ning control of supplies until they reached the Comité and the communes that served as 
the “retail distributors.”  As a part of this responsibility the CRB assumed an obligation to the 
public by promising that the supplies sent into Belgium would not be requisitioned by the 
Germans and that these foodstuffs would be delivered into the country with no undue d
the communes under the direction of the Comité National.  The commission also advanced funds 
to the communal governments by taking their obligations and pledging them abroad for furt
resources.  In doing so the communes were able to procure money to pay communal officers, 
maintain schools, and keep up municipal works.  These vital funds enabled Belgians to carry o
the duties of local government that saved the country from the dangers of anarchy.489 
                                                          
488 Hunt, War Bread, p. 253.  Loc cit, p. 254.  Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 96. 
om the sale of provisions within the communes would be converted into 
489 The London Times, History of the War, p. 444.  New York Times, Feb 28, 1915.  The commission also promised 
to the public that the money derived fr
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The commission made it clear that its sole objective was “to help the Belgians.”  In a 
meeting between the CRB and the Comité National in July 1915 the commission explained th
once the Belgians were in a position to “obtain free play” with their abilities and resources th
assistance of any other nationality would no longer be needed.  At the moment the CRB believ
that Belgium was nearing the point of self-sufficiency and began planning its withdrawal.  This 
departure would never take place however—the need for its guidance was too great.  In order 
at 
e 
ed 
to 
assure 
on 
 
f 
d 
Belgians would “alone enjoy the advantage of relief distributed by the Comité 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
that foodstuffs were imported in sufficient quantities and equally distributed the CRB 
placed a staff of volunteers inside of the Belgian communes.  For its part the Comité National 
instituted a “Controlling Service” in every province to avoid irregularities in the distributi
process.  The result of this joint-operation was the centralization of efforts in Brussels and the 
control of relief throughout the communes under Hoover and the Executive Committee of the
Comité National.490   
As a part of this collaboration the CRB imported foodstuffs that remained the property o
the commission until they were delivered to the communal committees.  In order to do so the 
commission and the Comité agreed in June 1915 that they needed to determine domestic crop 
supplies so that districts requiring immediate imports could be assisted first.  The two 
organizations also agreed that the CRB should do its best to insure that domestic harvests shoul
be reserved exclusively for the civil population in each district.  A month later the German 
general government responded to the collaborative effort by promising that the provision and 
“up-keep” of the civil population would continue to be kept separate from that of the German 
army and that 
 
elief 
bread, soup, clothing, and other items for the destitute while keeping exact open records for all operations and 
expenditures.  New York Times, May 17, 1915, p. 5.   
490 CRB and CN meeting in Brussels, July 20, 1915.  Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for R
in Belgium, p. 1:67.  Loc cit, p. 1:85. 
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Nationa
 
ees 
ll together and as a unit functioned “admirably efficient” according to 
Whitlo
t 
 
ystem 
the Comité 
National.”492 
                                                          
l,” and that the Comité National and the CRB would continue to enjoy the liberty of 
action necessary to fulfill its mission.  General von der Lancken also promised in the July 29 
letter that under the agreement between the commission and the belligerent governments in 
violation of The Hague conventions the German general government would allow the Comité 
National to purchase cereals in occupied territory and that the distribution of these cereals would
be under the control of the Comité under the same stipulations governing imported goods.491 
Combined over a hundred principal committees and nearly 4,000 regional subcommitt
dealt with the CRB and the Comité National.  Despite their differences the commission and the 
Comité worked we
ck.  In late-July 1915, William C. Edgar commented that it had probably never occurred 
before that representatives of a neutral nation voluntarily came forward to interject between 
conflicting armies for the preservation of a civil population.  He added that without a doubt no 
group had ever worked with a provisional organization composed of leading citizens in a join
operation for a common objective.  For this reason, Edgar believed the cooperative arrangement
was an “unexampled” illustration of what could be accomplished by “American business, joining 
with that of Belgium, when it applies itself to humanitarian work with the same energy and 
intelligence that it ordinarily exerts in industrial and commercial channels.”  Edgar offered his 
highest praise for the performance of the commission and the Comité, concluding that “I have 
never before seen one that can compare in efficiency, thoroughness, and wisdom with the s
now being employed in Belgium through the combined efforts of the commission and 
491 Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 1:97.  Nevins, The Letters and 
 
Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 2:236.  Within the CRB itself 
.  Nevins, The Letters and 
Journal of Brand Whitlock, p. 2:166.  Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 165.
492 Gay and Fisher, Public 
approximately 75,000 people were engaged in the direct mobilization of public support
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At the final stage of ravitaillement were the communes and the communal structure.  T
commission decided to use these pre-existing structures o
he 
f local government in Belgium as the 
centers
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 of distribution for relief instead of attempting to forge an entirely new system in the 
sinews of war.  Initially the CRB worked with the communes in Brussels and the surrounding
jurisdictions and then extended the structure to the entire nation.  For the purposes of relief the 
country was divided into ten areas corresponding to the provinces with an extra committee being 
formed for the city of Brussels apart from the province of Brabant where the city is located.  
Under each provincial committee were regional subcommittees and the communal committees a
the local level.493 
Even under the pressures of occupation the communes continued to perform the du
local government.  Each commune elected a common council that governed the community 
much like American city councils.  Out of the common council a burgomaster (or mayor) 
chosen along with a number of échevins who served as heads of departments that in essence 
created a commission form of government.  Across Belgium the communes were grouped into 
223 cantons that were a part of the 41 arrondissements inside the nine provinces.  Electe
governed each corresponding level of government from the cantons to the arro
vinces up to the national parliament.  Whitlock credited the communal system’s struggle
for freedom as the critical factor in the Belgium’s “genius for self government” and the factor
which allowed the nation to survive stubbornly under the successive domination of Spain, 
Austria, Holland, and Germany.  He believed that without such a strong, fundamental 
 
, p. 1:34. 
Journal of Brand Whitlock, p. 2:90.  Field, July 31, 1915, Bristol Observer, Aug 7, 1915, and North London 
Guardian, Jul 31, 1915.   
493 Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium
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organization uniting people in a common ideal and satisfying the needs of the population the 
country would not have survived German occupation.494 
With a long history of self-sustaining local government the communes appeared as the 
natural entity to handle the final distribution of relief goods imported by the commission.  In 
setting igh 
ce 
e 
orld 
the communal system provided a pre-existing structure for local distribution the 
virtual 
g 
ce 
atters of civic administration. 
up the system of distribution in Belgium the CRB had to overcome obstacles due to h
levels of independence and self-protection found within the communes that only intensified on
German forces pushed across the nation.  At heart many Belgians felt that the care of their peopl
and the distribution of food and benevolent funds were essentially a domestic problem and that 
local leaders were sufficiently capable, self-sacrificing, and patriotic enough to administer the 
relief supplies unaided.  They also believed that money used for the purchase of food was 
donated by the Belgian government to the Comité National directly or by the sympathetic w
to the Belgian nation and found it proper that funding should be disbursed by the Comité 
accordingly.  Within a structure dominated by local control of relief, Belgians believed that the 
CRB was to function as an executive agent of the Comité National outside of Belgium and as a 
useful cooperating body of neutrals inside the country with the ability to negotiate with 
belligerents and to offer protections to supplies distributed by the Comité.495  
While 
power struggle over the ownership of relief responsibility complicated the process of 
organization.  One of the greatest difficulties in establishing efficient methods of controllin
relief belonged to the character of the Belgian people and the nature of their system of local 
government.  Before the outbreak of war the communes enjoyed high levels of independen
fr
                                                          
om the national government and a great amount of power in m
494 Whitlock, Belgium: A Personal Narrative, p. 1:344.  According to Whitlock the municipal system of Britain and 
America was derived from Belgium.  Loc cit, p. 1:344-335.  Loc cit, p. 1:345. 
495 Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 104. 
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Composed of communal officials the local committees were naturally inclined to object to any
attempt by external organizations to dictate the terms under which they should distribute food.  
They consistently regarded the instructions they received as unjust and unnecessary intrusio
matters that were communal concerns only.
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Gaining a quick understanding of the situation the principles upon which relief were 
based granted local and provisional committees broad based powers of independent action to
adapt the system of food distribution to the specific needs of the commune.  Initially the role o
the provincial committees were rather small, concerning itself chiefly with financial matters and
the reception of food before exercising greater autonomy and influence.  As the structure of r
aking shape a system of nearly 5,000 communes worked in cooperation with the 
National to assure the distribution of ravitaillement.  Edward Eyre Hunt observed that the 
communal authorities were for the most part left in possession of their normal powers, subject
military oversight.  At the local level the court system was not greatly disturbed, the police kept
order, and civil servants manned fire departments, maintained prisons, and managed street and 
light rails along with other municipal services.  The burgomasters and aldermen continued to 
perform some of the functions of local self-government outside of the German sphere of 
influence.497  
Local governments under the communal system of distribution held diminished civic 
powers but possessed tremendous responsibility in the provisioning of ravitaillement.  All 
expenses of relief operations were bore by the provincial committees, including charges for 
lighters beyond original destination points, demurrage fee, costs of unloading and storing 
of 
the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 1:482.  Loc cit, p. 1:482.  Kittredge, The History of the Commission for 
Relief in Belgium, p. 83.  In April 1917, Hoover cited a total number of 2,770 communes in the occupied portion of 
 
d, p. 173.  Loc cit, p. 173-174. 
496 Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 238. 
497 Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 82-83 and Gay and Fisher, Public Relations 
Belgium serving an average population of approximately 650 families each.  Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the
Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 2:318.  Hunt, War Brea
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supplies, and expenses of distribution to the communes.  To prevent the stoppage of relief the 
Comité National agreed that if a commune could not pay its one-third responsibility for the costs 
of supp
n 
problem tion of 
ere 
n 
in 
lies distributed at its canteens the Comité would provide sufficient funds to meet its 
obligations.  This did not free the commune from financial responsibility for supplies it 
distributed however.  In accordance with agreements made by the commission with the French 
and Belgian governments the communes were required to assume an obligation to repay the 
value of all supplies received within six months of the end of conflict.  Hoover credited these 
pre-war institutions with providing an “extraordinary network of charitable effort covering the 
entire country,” caring for approximately 300,000 people through over 4,000 institutions.498 
In deciding to use the communal structure as the basis for relief distribution the 
commission carefully positioned itself within the preexisting system of Belgian government in a
attempt to best maximize the efforts of both groups.  According to commission delegate T.B. 
Kittredge, Hoover and the cadre of American volunteers never desired to interfere in domestic 
s or to criticize Belgian methods.  The CRB simply desired to control the distribu
supplies in a manner that would allow it to give assurance to the Allies that guarantees w
being maintained and continue its program of imports.  The Germans themselves took the 
position that the Belgians should distribute relief supplies under the control of military 
authorities and attempted to limit the freedoms of American delegates as much as possible withi
the communes.  General von Bissing told Hoover in February 1915 after his first visit to Berl
that the Americans were “altogether too active in Belgium.”  In his view it would be sufficient 
for the CRB to attach delegates to the various communal and regional warehouses and not travel 
around the country performing inspection duties.  The Germans also pressed the communes as 
                                                          
498 Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 181.  Loc cit, p. 155.  Gay and Fish
Relations of the Commission for Relief in Bel
er, Public 
gium, p. 2:317. 
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well.  In June 1915 the general-government decreed that the committees were not allowed t
any instructions or make any rules or regulations for the communes.
o give 
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For the first several months of operation the commission left local committees alone to
their work except for sporadic visits from an American delegate or members of the provincial 
committee to make sure all was right.  In March 1915 the CRB became mo
munes by making a complete tour of all warehouses.  After that point the commission 
worked with the Comité National to improve the efficiency of distribution.  By mid-Dece
the CRB directly controlled a system of 125 district warehouses that received foodstuffs ship
under the commission’s own seal and flag for the supply of communal committees.  Hoover
reported that as a check on this system the commission maintained a series of inspections
required monthly reports from the communal warehouses detailing the exact total of foodstuffs 
used during the month.  This system expanded to eventually contain 134 regional warehouse
serving 2,598 communes and nearly 5,000 communal stores employing over 35,000 Belgians.500
The first relief measures taken by volunteer committees and the communes were 
designed to relief distress to those without resources and then expanded to include large 
segments of the population.  In late-1914 the work of the commission touched 165 communes, 
requiring the creation of a meticulous system of distribution and control to avoid waste or 
misuse.  As one of the first cities to partici
e municipal government (much to the displeasure of local officials) in order to allow 
businessmen with experience in managing such a complex structure to handle relief.  By earl
499 Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 105.  Loc cit, p. 189.  Hoover’s visit to Berlin 
y gone over their heads in pressing the demands of the commission directly with the Imperial 
n Europe, p. 1:6. 
in February 1915 upset members of the general government in Belgium at the time because they felt that the 
chairman had ostensibl
Government.  Loc cit, p. 193. 
500 Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 263.  Nevins, The Letters and Journal of 
Brand Whitlock, p. 2:112.  Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 242.  Loc cit, p. 242-
243.  Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 2:468 and Kittredge, 
Californians with Hoover i
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1915 the actual processes of distribution centered in Rotterdam were firmly established on 
business lines.  Observers noted that Belgians received food from two sources—the local baker 
and the communal office.  In order to provide jobs the CRB and the Comité National ground
wheat at mills in Brussels, Liége, and Louvain while soup was made in large quantities at centra
depots and sent by wagons to the communes where it was served cold.
 
l 
Foodstu
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501 
In general the machinery of food distribution was the same in all of the eleven districts.  
ffs for most of the provinces came directly from Rotterdam via the canals.  Each 
province was subdivided into regions according to area and population and provided with a 
regional depot under the supervision of the provincial committee.  Once unloaded from the 
canals the food was either sent directly to the regional warehouses for storage until final 
distribution by the communes or was placed in large general warehouses located near the poin
where the cargoes were discharged.  The first thing observer Arno Dosch noticed about the 
warehouses in April 1915 was that no distinctions were being made between foods supplied by 
the United States and Belgium.  The communes then made out requisitions for quantities of food
they needed and sent the information to the provincial committee where the department of 
alimentation checked over the request and filled it either completely or to the best of its ability.  
The regional warehouse usually did not issue food to a commune without a delivery order 
verified by the provincial committee.502   
Once foodstuffs were transferred from the provincial committee to the communes 
system became highly decentralized.  Local representatives were allowed to deliver food to 
501 Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 10.  Hunt, War Bread, p. 251.  Glasgow 
Herald, Jan 22, 1915. 
502 Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 181.  There were three main arteries that 
brought food supplies Holland to Belgium.  The first went from Terneuzen and Sas van Ghent to Ghent, the second 
nto from Roosendaal to Antwerp and Brussels or Louvain, and the third from Rotterdam via Dordrecht and Weert i
Limbourg.  Loc cit, p. 68 and 69.  World’s World, April 1915, 436.   Kittredge, The History of the Commission for 
Relief in Belgium, p. 181. 
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consumers without much check and control from higher authorities, meaning that at times they 
paid little heed to regulations regarding distribution.  Under the system the communes received 
supplie sch 
 
lse, 
503 
Belgian 
 ration 
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ood how to cook American food staples, using high quality corn as chicken feed 
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s from the CRB every two weeks, allowing everyone to get something.  Arno Do
reported that by April 1915 most Belgians knew how Americans felt as a people towards them
and were conscious of the generosity offered by the United States.  More than anything e
Dosch believed that they were even more appreciative of the way in which relief was handled.
At the base of the relief operations was the CRB’s commitment to see that every 
over two-years-old received a ration of 250 grams a day of bread.  The creation of a bread
program proved most challenging despite the perceived simplicity of the goal however.  
attempts by the commission to relieve the population through cornmeal and oatmeal yielded
rations with little nutritive value.  Compounding the difficulties was the fact that few people
Belgians underst
mple.  To address the situation the commission hastily organized committees to educ
communal administrators and its residents about the proper use of imports.  Under the program
teachers of domestic science from the city of Antwerp traveled to the villages giving lectures on 
how to properly cook cornmeal.  The native prejudice against using corn for human consumpti
persisted in Belgium, requiring the commission to rechristen cornmeal and hominy as cere
idealine, and other more appetizing names.  The commission faced other peculiar challenges in
providing rations that at times conflicted with the dietary culture of Belgium.  One of the 
strangest requests the commission received was for dog-bread.  As a proletarian animal of vital 
ium, p. 177.  Eventually this laissez faire policy 
Soul of the “CRB,” p. 199.  World’s 
503 Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belg
developed problems of illicit traffic that had to be dealt with.  Taillandier, The 
World, April 1915, p. 436. 
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use to p d as 
off the profits of bread making to keep the prices as low as possible for 
consum
 
easants the CRB worked out a program to supply dogs with a cheap supply of brea
well.504   
The limited supply of white flour threatened all ration programs created by the 
commission.  In an attempt to deal with the issue the commission imported wheat and mill it 
locally at a 90/10 cornmeal mixture to reduce the price by about ten francs per hundred 
kilograms.  To meet this demand the CRB contracted with ten provincial steam mills; one for 
maze belonging to the Comité National, one for wheat for the provincial committees of 
Limbourg, one serving the needs of Waesland, and seven for the provincial committee of 
Antwerp.  In the realm of sales and distribution the CRB also established a partial flour 
monopoly over baking.  Under the system local bakers were kept in competition while the 
commission paired 
ers.505   
By March 1915 the commission had worked out a definite program of imports that 
became the base of the ration offered to Belgians.  Under its guidelines the CRB was asked to 
import a minimum of 60,000 tons a month of wheat and flour along with 1,000 tons of lard and 
bacon.  The plan also desired increased imports for rice and maize while the Comité National 
offered to make up for any deficiencies in potatoes until the end of July.  In addition, the 
commission also planned to import significant quantities of rice, salt, dried fish, and meats as 
well.  The demands of this program were not maintained for long however.  Hoover issued a 
memorandum on June 21 stating that in the future the CRB would confine its imports to wheat or
flour, rice, peas and beans, lard, bacon, and maize.506 
                                                          
504 Hunt, War Bread, p. 280.  Loc cit, p. 282.  Loc cit, p. 283. 
505 Hunt, War Bread, p. 285.  Loc cit, p. 291.  Loc cit, p. 362.  Loc cit, p. 291. 
Loc cit, p. 1:124. 506 Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 1:122.  
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Other factors beyond the availability of supplies directly impacted the theoretical 
program of importations issued by the commission.  Of primary importance was the minimum 
ration requirement designated by the CRB.  Calculated by the number of people being fed, 
calorie requirements per person per day and the calorie production of the food available locally 
or by im  in 
s between 
 the 
d 
ly meals served at canteens.  
At the s d 
ed 
s in 
 
.  
ethods to prevent duplication and other abuses.  It soon became apparent however 
portation stayed relatively consistent.  The caloric value of the commission’s program
particular varied from year to year and was the subject of numerous negotiation session
the commission and belligerent governments.  In addition the protection of local harvests also 
had an important influence on the CRB’s ability to determine its program of importation that by 
its nature was required to cover the deficit between the amount of local food available and
minimum ration needed to sustain the population “without immediate and serious physical 
deteriorations.”507 
Once the program of importations and rations were set the Comité National and the 
communes began distributing foodstuffs to the population.  In the larger towns most of the foo
distributed gratuitously was given to the destitute in the form of dai
ame time there were rations available for sale at communal depots for those who coul
afford it.  The price of these for-sale foods were arranged so that a small percentage was charg
over the actual cost in order to generate a profit that could be added to the benevolent funds 
given to the destitute.  Under this system the foodstuffs were distributed in a variety of way
practically every province by early 1915.  The use of household ration cards was not universally
adopted by the Comité National and the communes until relief distribution was well underway
Until that time each commune devised individual methods for distributing food to consumers and 
checking its m
that in order to function properly the system needed a uniform method of controlling local 
                                                          
507 Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 1:509. 
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distribution.  For the destitute the commission issued ration cards (carte de ménage) usable a
public feedings for adults, canteens for infant children, and schools for youths.  By October 191
approximately 6,000,000
t 
6 
 people were issued a carte de ménage with an additional 2,800,000 
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g assistance through public kitchens.508 
Underlying the adoption of ration cards was the commission’s desire to insure honest 
bread at an honest weight in an honest distribution among the population.  After some 
experimentation the carte de ménage (household ration card) was issued for bread and sundry 
supplies distributed at the communal kitchen.  On these cards the family’s name and the time o
weekly and bi-weekly distribution was listed.  Offering universal assistance was another 
important priority for the commission.  According to Arno Dosch, no one applying for a relief
card was pauperized or made to feel ashamed.  William C. Edgar was impressed by the system 
that had taken shape by August 1915, commenting that he could hardly believe that the CR
the Comité was able to issue an index card to 500,000 people in Brussels with
tion on it and the ration they were supposed to receive.509   
A critical component of the ration card system initiated by the CRB was its ability
accurately determine the need of applicants.  Under the system the commission required t
when an applicant went to the Communal Charity Committee to ask for assistance they must 
possess documentation bearing civic status, means of subsistence, certificates of pension, 
certificates of assistance from the Bureau de Bienfaisance, a list of property holdings, marriage
certificates, and the names and ages of spouse and children.  These documents were checked
against records held by the communal committee consisting of employers list of workers, 
508 Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 84.  Loc cit, p. 4.  Loc cit, p. 180.  Gay and 
s offered a meal every day at 
d, 
an, August 7, 1915. 
Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 1:166.  The kitchen
noon for forty centimes (eighty cents).  Withington, In Occupied Belgium, p. 34-35. 
509 Hunt, War Bread, p. 287.  Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 85.  World’s Worl
April 1915, p. 435.  North London Guardi
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benevolent society rosters, pension lists, and other important data including police records.  
When the committee desired more information on an applicant it sent a member to investigate 
the situation further.510  
Once an individual was enrolled the commission kept close track of their attendance
Each person in the program received the same eight ounces and a half-pint of soup as those who
could afford to pay.  Those who paid for their rations were required to have their cards punc
in the same manner as the destitute.  At the end of the day the ration cards allowed the CRB to 
.  
 
hed 
recogn of the 
ant 
r-
aillement, the work of the delegate was 
classifi
l 
ize who failed to appear and within an hour the mayor of the district or the priest 
parish would visit the home to find out if something was wrong.  Economy was also an import
part of the soup kitchen and ration program.  To maintain accuracy each family was revisited 
every month to reassess their status of need individually.  As a control mechanism to avoid ove
issuing rations the communes were also required to pay sixty cents a month to the Comité 
National for every card used—regardless of destitute or able-to-pay usage.511 
As active participants in the process of ravit
ed under four primary categories: general services, supervision of guarantees, the 
handling of transportation, and the gathering of statistics.  According to an internal CRB 
memorandum the most important functions of the delegate was to maintain representation in 
provinces and exemplify the commission’s ideals in the constant rendering of aid and mora
support.  Edward Eyre Hunt concurred with the assessment, adding that among the variety of 
services provided by Americans in Belgium the top two were preventing requisitioning and 
seeing that every man, woman, and child received their daily bread.  One of the hardest aspects 
                                                          
510 Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 2:322. 
511 Honnold, The Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 7.  Another reason for handling ration cards in this manner at 
the soup kitchens was not to stigmatize the destitute.  World’s World, April 1915, p. 437.  Honnold, The 
Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 7.   
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of the delegates work was maintaining neutrality and though occasionally irritated by German 
attitudes they performed their duties admirably.  According to commission representative T.
Kittredge the question of keeping Belgium from starvation was infinitely more important than 
individuals’ personal feelings.  He recalled that undoubtedly their very presence, ceaseless 
moving about on inspection tours, communications wit
B. 
h ministers in Brussels, and connection 
with th  
uch 
e 
nd distribution of food supplies, and personally investigate 
the Ger
 
rk 
of the Belgian committees and enforcing belligerent agreements.  In total approximately 130-150 
e outside world materially affected the conduct of the Germans.  Kittredge credited
Hoover’s firm stance and presence with being able to check the German general-government.512 
For large measure the delegates were allowed a high degree of autonomy in the 
provinces.  In many areas the American delegates attempted to work out for themselves some 
sort of control of operations within the communes.  Local committees were also allowed so m
independence that abuses began taking place.  The CRB could not discharge its ravitaillement 
obligations in this capacity without an adequate force of Americans to act as delegates in th
provinces to keep in close touch with the details of work.  In the face of rogue behavior the 
commission decided to become more hands on.513 
Once shipments began the commission began building up an American staff inside of 
Belgium to supervise the handing a
man commitment to guarantees.  To fulfill their duties the delegates would be required to 
work in daily association with the leading men of Belgium and with high-ranking German
authorities, and be obliged to exercise diplomatic tact and discretion in both supervising the wo
Americans served at various times as commission representatives between December 1914 and 
April 1917.  Generally the CRB employed about 35 men at one time to serve its needs.  Perrin 
                                                          
512 Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 203.  Hunt, War Bread, p. 280.  Kittredge, The 
, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 262.  Loc cit, p. 128. 
History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 288.  Kittredge, Californians with Hoover in Europe, p. 4:160. 
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Galpin of Yale was among the first ten selected to work in Belgium.  Upon entering the 
was lectured upon the importance of the task and the great responsibilities he held and was 
cautioned of the necessity of maintaining absolute neutrality in word, act, and even in thought.  
Perrin recalled that commission delegates were so neutral “it hurt,” fearing to accept a smile for 
fear it would be misconstrued as an un-neutral act.
field he 
the 
 the provinces it was his 
job alo
n 
514  
In the early days of the war the commission delegate found his work enormously 
challenging.  Francis Cogswell Wickes reported that Americans spent much of their time on 
road, bouncing from one series of emergencies to another.  The stresses of dealing with 
destroyed bridges blocking canals, derailed trains, wrecked trucks, and the imminent dangers of 
running out of food caused extremely high levels of stress.  Delegates had a central office to 
work out of, but spent little time to spend there.  When problems arose in
ne to solve.  Primary among the tasks of the delegate was to first see that sufficient 
foodstuffs arrived in the province, and then make sure that the supplies move properly into the 
regions and to the communes for consumption.  In performing these duties the delegate was to 
act as an intermediary of communication between the various committees, the central committee, 
and the Germans and the CRB.515 
By February 1915, the commission had issued a clear set of directives guiding America
delegates through their duties in the field.  On February 5, they were authorized to make 
investigations of the methods adopted by the provincial, regional, or communal committees in 
                                                          
 Kittredge, Californians with Hoover in Europe, p. 2:54.  The commission preferred to use men with “European 
experience” and some knowledge of business and foreign languages, but admitted that individuals of this skill were 
Relief in Belgium, p. 1:478.  Loc cit, p. 1:478.  Under the initial plan for commission delegates the CRB estimate
that it would use approximately 40 men at a time for the task.  The usage of 37 delegates at any point met with 
514
hard to come by on such short notice.  Loc cit, p. 1:8 and Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for 
d 
commission expectations between 1914 and 1917.  Kittredge, Californians with Hoover in Europe, p. 2:54.  Loc cit, 
p. 2:55. 
515 Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 1:481.  Loc cit, p. 1:482.  Loc cit, p. 
1:482-483. 
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order to ensure that supplies were distributed equally across the entire province.  When 
difficulties or outright abuses were discovered the representative was instructed to make a 
thorough examination in the company of the provincial committee and give recommendations in
accordance with that body.  Admittedly, 
 
American delegates could not personally supervise and 
inspect
Americans 
ortant 
ion of business 
connec
 
warehouse managers.  T.B. Kittredge recalled that in Belgium the delegate served as inspector 
generals and diplomatic representatives more than anything else.  In the field it was “our 
business to know everything that was going on, (and) to see that the general policies were being 
 the entire operations of the ten to twelve regional warehouses within his district.  
Generally they received daily, weekly, and monthly reports from the provincial committees 
regarding the distribution of food from the warehouse to the communes in absence of direct 
inspection.  Delegates served in other important capacities beyond inspection and control of 
distribution as well.  Education in particular was another valuable service rendered by 
in the communes.  In late-February, J.F. Lucey reported that Belgians were learning imp
things about American canned goods that come in the relief cargoes.516   
In Belgium the delegate played a considerable role in the administrat
ted with the shipment and distribution of food imported by the CRB.  Delegates in France 
however did not share the same freedoms of travel and inspection as the business of relief was 
handled almost exclusively by German officers and the French committees within the relief 
structure set up by the CRB and the general-government.  While Belgian delegates traveled
about in automobiles overseeing the progress of distribution, the French representatives spent 
most of their time riding around with a German officer or talking to French committee and 
carried out,” Kittredge added.  Delegates also formed a close relationship with the provincial 
                                                          
516 Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 175.  Kittredge, The History of the 
e Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 181.  New York Times, Feb 28, 1915.  Lucey also observed that Belgians wer
“simply crazy” for American pork and beans.   
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committees by respecting the line between what was the business of the commission and the 
commune respectively.  On the whole, Kittredge found that the authority of the delegates was 
never q
f 
 
embers 
uired in his opinion because if the CRB imported more 
than wh
ads of 
                                                          
uestioned and that for the most part they agreed with Hoover that power should only be 
exercised in the case of emergency.517   
With immense freedom of action came great responsibility for the American delegates.  
Realizing that the success of ravitaillement depended on the character, ability, and versatility o
the delegates, the commission carefully selected the individuals that worked directly with the
Belgian population.  At times the influence exercised by American delegates irritated m
of the Comité National and the provincial committees however.  James Morton of the 
commission in part agreed with the criticism, admitting that they “had to be very stingy 
stewards.”  Behaviors of this sort were req
at was called for the entire project would have been questioned.518   
Overall, T.B. Kittredge observed that the Belgians treated Americans “royally.”  He
the provincial committees knew the work of the American delegate was valuable and realized 
that there was no reason to fear any abuses of power.  At the local level they understood that the 
only aim of the delegate was to help the Belgians in every way possible.  While delegates 
maintained their neutrality they were indeed sympathetic to the Belgian cause and formed close 
relationships through the experience.  The fact that at least six members of the commission 
so responsive to the suggestions of the 
, p. 
urope, p. 1:8.  Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in 
517 Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 152.  Kittredge, Californians with Hoover in 
Europe, p. 4:164.  Kittredge also found that the provincial committees were 
delegates that they accepted them sometimes on the spur of the moment without really thinking about it.  Loc cit
4:164. 
518 Kittredge, Californians with Hoover in E
Belgium, p. 196.  Taillandier, The Soul of the “CRB,” p. 124. 
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married women they met in Belgium served as an example of the personalized nature of relief 
work.519 
In an internal memorandum the commission explained in July 1915 that the most val
function in which it will stand out in memory is the relief of the destitute.  At the heart of this 
program was the providing of food on a daily basis through the efforts of the communes and the
commission.  Covering the entire country the CRB created a system of canteens that supplied
meals to the destitute for about eight cents a day.  Since the outbreak of war the commission 
noticed steady increases destitution.  By December 1914 the city of Brussels expanded 
operations to include fifteen
ued 
 
 
 canteens that fed more than 35,000 each day.  While at times the 
supplie
d 
 what 
 to 
 
and meals between the hours of 11:30am and 1:15pm.  During this lunch 
                                                          
s of food were sporadic, the bread lines and soup kitchens universally accepted that its 
first duty was to care for the destitute.520 
Within the canteen system the commission paid careful attention not just to the 
distribution of relief but also to the quality of product it was serving as well.  Mable Hyde 
Kittredge observed in mid-1915 that every recipe for soup was carefully worked out by traine
dieticians and even the best way to peel potatoes was studied scientifically.  The result was
Edward Eyre Hunt described as a ration of soup and bread of “excellent quality” for about ten
twelve cents a day per person.  At the soup kitchens there were four varieties of soup including 
pea, bean, vegetable, and bouillon with variations being made to the recipe through the amount
of rice available.521   
Each morning work began at 2am with the lighting of gas stoves and culminated with the 
serving of several thous
519 Kittredge, Californians with Hoover in Europe, p. 4:159.  Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in 
Belgium, p. 288.  Kittredge, Californians with Hoover in Europe, p. 4:159. 
canteens also provided special food for babies and meals for school 
520 Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 1:71.  Nevins, The Letters and 
Journal of Brand Whitlock, p. 2:90.  The 
children as well.  Hunt, War Bread, p. 294. 
521 Kittredge, Taking Care of Belgium, p. 7.  Hunt, War Bread, p. 294. 
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hour a relay
e line.  Every individual that received food 
brough
t 
e were 
e 
d, 
ivil population 
held fo
e 
h 
 see that 
 of hot cauldrons kept soup coming so that those who arrived at the last minute were 
taken care of just as well as those at the front of th
t their own spoon and carried a ration card with them baring the name of the station, 
recipient, and containing blank spaces to indicate the date of delivery.  Arno Dosch observed tha
workers and managers of the kitchens figured rations out down to such a detail that ther
not fifty portions of bread and soup left when the doors closed in the afternoon.  Most of th
people serving meals at the kitchens were volunteers that included teachers, nuns, and priests 
specifically.  Everyone had work assigned to them whether it was peeling potatoes, serving foo
or supervising cooking.522 
The strict discipline employed at the soup kitchens allowed them to provide daily meals 
as efficiently as possible.  Edward Eyre Hunt was also struck by the apparent cleanliness of the 
Belgians themselves despite the rising levels of destitution.  The fact that soup was never 
distributed for free during the war demonstrated the striking “self-respect” the c
r itself.  Mable Hyde Kittredge on separate occasions observed that unlike most bread 
lines the Belgians displayed no looks of shame or humiliation.  Efficiency of the kitchens 
combined with the self-respect of Belgians to create a remarkable system.  In late-December 
1914, Arno Dosch watched the provisional committee of Liege distribute bread to 50,000 peopl
over a three hour period.  Moving through a line four-deep the commission was able to keep a 
record of every loaf of bread distributed was kept.  After seeing the impressive sight Dosc
commented that “anyone who saw that hungry throng would stop eating bread himself to
the Belgians got it.”523 
                                                          
522 Kittredge, Taking Care of Belgium, p. 8 and Hunt, War Bread, p. 295.  World’s World, April 1915, p. 438.  Hunt, 
Observer, December 24, 1914. 
War Bread, p. 295.  Loc cit, p. 295-296. 
523 The soup kitchens were also known for their clean appearance as much as its efficiency as well.  Hunt, War 
Bread, p. 295. Kittredge, Taking Care of Belgium, p. 8.  Yorkshire 
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CHAPTER TWELVE: Providing the “Last Bread of a Final Freedom” 
The German Army of Occupation in Belgium 
n 
s.”  In 
 
ing them for spoiling their plans.  
“Nothin  
th 
ved 
ed 
immediately.  While the occupational forces pressed to consolidate power they raised no 
,000 
In Belgium the German general government quickly assumed the powers of the Belgia
state after occupation began.  The general contempt the civilian population held for the German 
interpretation of public interests led to administrational problems throughout the war.  
Regardless of the situation the tense relationship created animosity on both sides.  Vernon 
Kellogg reported that German officers literally referred to Belgians as “idiots and ingrate
Berlin a dispatch from the Wolff Telegraph Agency explained on November 25, 1914 that the
Germans thought of Belgians with angry bitterness, blam
g is too bad for the Belgians,” they exclaimed, “let the Belgians take care of themselves.” 
Governor-General von Bissing agreed with the assessment.  In a February 1915 interview wi
the Associated Press he described the Belgians as “politically undisciplined children,” but added 
that the situation was “as good as could be expected in the circumstances.”524   
Resentment combined with suspicion to create a precarious situation.  Whitlock obser
that the general-government was constantly haunted by fears that the Comité National might 
become a government within a government and challenge the Germans for power across the 
country.  In June, 1915 the governor-general informed the minister-patrons of the CRB that all 
tendencies on the part of the Comité to monopolize the distribution of charity must be stopp
objections to ravitaillement.  In April 1915 von der Lancken reaffirmed that the general-
government would continue to respect all assurances given through the CRB.  By the 1915 
harvest the commission was officially recognized as the stewards of Belgium, receiving 15
                                                          
524 Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 2:32.  Kellogg, Vernon.  
Headquarter Nights. (Boston: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1917), p. 65.  Kittredge, The History of the Commissio
for Relief in Belgium, p. 101.  New York Times, Feb 7, 1915, p. 4. 
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tons of domestic wheat from the Germans and importing an additional 55,000 tons for the ci
population.
vil 
f all power and privilege in Belgium was 
held by e 
 
 
 clearly 
nd 
gs and actually participating in 
the proceedings.  In addition, the general-government set up the Central Crop Commission 
                                                          
525 
In Belgium the Germans set up a civil rather than a military government based out of 
Brussels.  At the top the supreme authority and source o
 the governor-general.  Appointed by the Kaiser, the governor-general answered to th
Emperor alone and wielded complete political authority as the head of the occupying 
government.  By decree the powers formerly appertaining to the King of Belgium were 
transferred to the governor-general.  Once in place the general-government was divided into
several departments and sections to serve its needs.526   
As the general government expanded its powers in Belgium it took a particular interest in
burgeoning efforts relieve hunger.  The unexpectedly rapid expansion of relief in scope and 
importance under the CRB and the Comité National convinced the general-government that they 
needed to both limit the powers of benevolence and expand their official participation in 
ravitaillement measures.  In 1915, Governor-General von Bissing asks the Comité to
define its actions and intentions in order to avoid conflict.  To better understand the purpose a
mission of the committee he instructed German authorities to maintain closer contacts with the 
provincial committees by attending their sub-committee meetin
urnal 
 parts of 
s the political department headed by 
:444. 
525 Whitlock, Belgium: A Personal Narrative, p. 1:576.  Hunt, War Bread, p. 312.  Nevins, The Letters and Jo
of Brand Whitlock, p. 2:128 and Whitlock, Belgium: A Personal Narrative, p. 1:576.  Loc cit, p. 1:576. 
526 Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 136.  Whitlock, Belgium: A Personal 
Narrative, p. 1:442.  Loc cit, p. 1:444.  Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 27.  In 
1914, the Imperial government appointed a governor-general that presided over the entire country except for
Flanders immediately behind the front lines.  Kittredge, Californians with Hoover in Europe, p. 5:277.  The 
department that the CRB and the Comité National dealt with most directly wa
Baron von der Lancken who bore the title of Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Governor-General in Belgium. 
Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 28.  The general-government also announced that 
Military governors were assuming the powers of the Provincial governors and the roles of the Commissioners of 
Arrondissements were now filled by German Kreischefs.  Whitlock, Belgium: A Personal Narrative, p. 1
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govern
 
eral 
 relief.  Through its operations the general-government kept in closer 
contact
r 
 and 
                                                          
ed by five Germans, one Belgian, and one American to handle crop requisitions and 
native harvest distribution.  Under its direction a maximum price was set for crops purchased 
from farmers and flour sold to Belgians with the goal of assisting the Comité National and the
CRB in its purchase and distribution of foodstuffs.527   
After the 1915 harvest the general-government took a final step toward normalizing 
relations with relief by creating the Vermittlungsstelle.  Aimed at eliminating much of the 
confusion and competition among departments for authority in the affairs of relief the bureau 
became the official channel through which the CRB and the Comité National secured new 
guarantees from the Germans while functioning as an intermediary between the governor-gen
and the patron-ministers of
 with the CRB and as a result viewed benevolence with much greater sympathy than 
before.  The Vermittlungsstelle also improved the efficiency of decision making by allowing the 
commission to receive immediate information on matters that could potentially delay the process 
of ravitaillement by directly intervening.  Despite their differences the CRB and the 
Vermittlungsstelle continued to work collaboratively until American delegates resigned thei
posts in April 1917.  During this period their relations were generally marked by a harmony
close cooperation not found before the collaboration began.528 
members included the governor-general himself, an official from the civil department, an official from the bank 
department, an official from the military department, an official from the political department, a Belgian from the 
Comité National, and an American from the CRB.  Vernon Kellogg commented that while the Belgian and 
American members received full voting privileges within the harvest commission they were “tolerated rather than 
welcomed.”  Kellogg, Headquarter Nights, p. 73.  Hunt, War Bread, p. 314. 
528 Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 2:374.  Kittredge, The History of 
the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 234.  The creation of the Vermittlungsstelle could not eliminate all sources 
of conflict however.  Even after the department was in place the periodical searches of delegates continued to make 
Loc cit, p. 235. 
527 Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 1:55.  Whitlock, Belgium: A 
Personal Narrative, p. 1:658.  Hunt, War Bread, p. 314.  Also known as the Central Harvest Commission, its 
life extremely unpleasant for those who were stationed near the border.  Loc cit, p. 287.  
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For administrative purposes the German general-government also made distinctions 
between what it considered the Army Zone and the Occupational Zone in Belgium.  Covering a 
strip of
 
y.  
 
f 
ational and German civil officials.  In 
general
 the 
 
 the 
 territory fifty miles wide between the Verdun and the North Sea, the Army Zone was 
controlled by the German armies directly.  In addition, two other regions known as the 
Operations Zone and the Étappen Zone made up a twelve mile section extending behind the
actual front lines and the Zones of Operation and Occupation.  Subject only to the higher 
authority of the supreme commander the German army imposed absolute rule on the Operation 
and Étappen Zones.  In both regions the armies assumed control of property, food, and currenc
Personal freedoms were also eliminated creating a situation for the population akin to being 
actual prisoners of war.529 
The division of administration in the Occupation and Army Zones had an important 
bearing on the problems of native produce specifically.  Relief negotiations covering areas in the
Occupation Zone were handled in large measure through diplomatic channels while the details o
control were worked out in conjunction with the Comité N
 there were fewer disturbances of local institutions and greater individual freedoms 
available in the Occupation Zone than in regions closer to the front lines controlled by the 
military.  The situation in the Army Zone was also more complicated and delicate because
Germans had a direct hand in producing crops.  At the front lines the commander-in-chief of the
military (Étappen) zone was not bound by documents signed by the governor-general and in
experience of the commission was often difficult to deal with.  In this case the CRB was forced 
                                                          
529 Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 1:392. 
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to deal directly with military authorities in regards to both protection and distribution of native
produce.
 
 were 
lgian 
iring 
CRB th
ission 
 as 
 a part of this process the general-government also 
endeav
e 
                                                          
530 
On occasion the relations between the commission’s delegates and German military
strained, but for the most part the influence of Americans were always significant enough to 
allow the CRB to discharge its duties without severe breaks in service.  With its operations 
firmly set in the Occupation Zones the commission began extending relief into the Be
Étapes where it secured an extension of import guarantees for the region.  The problem requ
further negotiations involved the Germans refusal to apply guarantees from the Occupational 
Zone to these regions however.  In response the British Foreign Office warned Hoover and the 
at unless they secured further concessions from the German military they would prohibit 
future imports into the Étappen.  During negotiations the jealousy German officers held for the 
authority of American delegates slowed the process of negotiation.  Undaunted the comm
made the best of the situation, presenting its case for benevolence through informal channels
well as through direct relations with military officers.531 
Throughout Belgium the Germans adapted their administrative system as much as 
possible to the existing political divisions.  As
ored to keep the structure of Belgian local government intact.  Within the general-
government structure the two principal departments (general and civil) extended down into the 
nine provinces through a military governor with the rank of General and a president of the 
Zivilerwaltung who replaced the Belgian governor.  At the communal/arrondissement level th
Germans also placed a Kreischef with the rank of Colonel.  Although the general government 
2.  Loc 
he 
sion for Relief in Belgium, p. 1:510. 
ief in Belgium, p. 1:561. 
530 Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 1:510.  Loc cit, p. 1:391-39
cit, p. 1:510.  Nevins, The Letters and Journal of Brand Whitlock, p. 2:91.  Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of t
Commis
531 Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for Rel
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structure was intricate and exact, the entire country was not treated as a single administrative 
unit.  Governor-General von der Goltz and later von Bissing controlled only about two-thirds of 
the occupied territory that included Antwerp, Brussels, Liége, Namur, Dinant, and Mons.  
Separately, Ghent was controlled by a general of Étappen-Inspection and while Bruges was 
under the stewardship of the Admiral of the Imperial Navy.  Along the front lines, each army 
corps composed a separate unit of government responsible only to the General Staff 
Headquarters at Charleville or the Kaiser himself.  The result according to Whitlock was a 
heavy, cumbersome, complicated machine that rumbled on remorselessly. He added that o
was set in moti
nce it 
on there was not stopping, turning aside, or adapting it to sudden exigencies.532   
s 
 in close 
—
 
n 
licated 
lines of
Cracks in the façade of German administration quickly became apparent to the delegate
of the CRB stationed across Belgium.  To many of the commission’s delegates working
contact with the German general-government the experience revealed an “absurdly over-
managed and inefficiently managed” system.  Vernon Kellogg confidently believed that the 
German government proved itself incapable—except in cases where brute force alone worked
of managing affairs in Belgium.  He predicted that eventually the “Frankenstein” machine would
turn on its own creators and self-destruct.533   
Initially the supervision of the Belgian communes and the details of food distributio
were turned over to Dr. von Sandt of the civil government.  Under his guidance the comp
 authority within the German government made it difficult for the commission to secure 
prompt responses in matters of relief from the general-government and at the same time also 
made it harder for the Germans to know exactly what the CRB was doing.  The consequence was 
                                                          
532 Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 27.  Whitlock, Belgium: A Personal 
Narrative, p. 1:449.  Loc cit, p. 1:450.  Hunt, War Bread, p. 170.  Whitlock, Belgium: A Personal Narrative, p.
1:440. 
533 Kellogg, Headquarter Nights, p. 75.  Lo
 
c cit, p. 83. 
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a continual friction and an increased level of suspicion that culminated with a series of espiona
charges against the commission.  It was not until the Germans created the Vermittlungsstelle tha
these problems were at least in part resolved.  Meanwhile, the occupying forces continued to r
roughshod over Belgium.  On May 19, 1915 the Morning Post in Britain reported that “it i
that the theft and plunder which has taken place could only have gone on with the complicity o
the German authorities.”  Whitlock concurred with the assessment of the British paper.  In a 
letter to President Wilson he explained that “the fact is that the Germans have not governed 
Belgium at all; the
ge 
t 
ide 
s clear 
f 
y have simply exploited it, wrung from it the fruits of its toil and of its 
industr
l-
s 
d 
e penalties for distribution, the 
newspa
e 
                                                          
ies.”534 
Maintaining order was one of the most difficult tasks the German general government 
faced in its administration of Belgium during the war.  Embodied by the personality of 
Governor-General von Bissing, no detail of control was beyond the interests of the genera
government.  Among these interests was one of the aspects of administration that the German
struggled with the most—negative public opinion, patriotism, and resistance.  Efforts by the 
general-government to control all means of press and propaganda failed to thwart the continue
appearance of an underground newspaper called La Libre Belgique.  Despite a bounty of fifty 
thousand francs for the paper’s editor (or editors) and sever
per “puzzled and exasperated” the Germans according to Edward Eyre Hunt.535   
A critical component of the German efforts to maintain order and control in Belgium was 
couched in the legal system it adopted in the occupied territories.  Field Marshal von der Goltz in 
particular came to Belgium announcing that “the punishment for hostile acts falls not only on th
534 Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 189.  Morning Post, May 19, 1915.  Nevins, 
The Letters and Journal of Brand Whitlock, p. 2:222. 
e engine. 
535 After his death on April 18, 1917, Kellogg concluded that the governor-general “died from too much telling the 
Belgians to do things—some important, many trivial—and too much trying to make them do them.” Kellogg, 
Headquarter Nights, p.  61.  Hunt, War Bread, p. 332.  Rumors circulated that the paper was printed in an obscure 
garage by means of an automobil
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guilty, but on the innocent as well.”  As time passed the Germans tightened their control over
Belgium through the mechanisms of their military-legal framework.  By late summer 1915 the 
general-government executed larger numbers of individuals as spies or traitors under a broa
legal definition for perpetrators of the crime as anyone who committed an act considered 
 
d 
inimica
is 
ry 
 
 of anything.  The 
accuser re 
erty 
s told about 
Germans entering villages, taking hostages, and demanding money and supplies.  When relations 
turned sour within a couple of days they murdered, burned, pillaged, raped, and massacred the 
l to German interests.  Serving as a functional component of the general-government’s 
“wearing-down process,” Robert Withington observed that people of all ranks were taken.  In h
opinion the fact that Germans considered them “undesirable” was sufficient to render a trial 
unnecessary.536   
Accompanying the legal system was the installation of the complex German milita
code which allowed the general-government to issue affiches (decrees) at its convenience to suit
their needs.  Whitlock reported that it was standard practice for the Germans to arrest people “on 
suspicion” and investigate afterward.  Expediting this process was the fact that at least in 
Brussels the word of a German soldier was sufficient to convict a Belgian
 was not required to give any evidence of fact, much less prove the accusation—me
assertion of wrongdoing was to prove guilt.  For those who were arrested and put on trial the 
tribunals that dispatched justice were known to disregard every principle of justice and lib
that defined the Latin and Anglo-Saxon legal systems.537   
The influence of the German military in Belgium was in many respects universal.  
According to Whitlock there was a “certain gruesome monotony” in the stories he wa
                                                          
536 Whitlock, Belgium: A Personal Narrative, p. 1:219.  Loc cit, p. 2:62.  Withington, In Occupied Belgium, p. 8
537 Whitlock, Belgium: A Personal Narrative, p. 1:464.  Whitlock explained that the German military code was a 
complex mystery that no lawyer of Latin or Anglo-Saxon culture would attempt to explain.  Loc cit, p. 2:87-89.  Lo
cit, p. 1:224.  Loc cit, p. 1:463.   
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town.  When Kellogg pressed his officer for an explanation about the wrecked villages they 
passed he received a “stereotyped” answer of “punishment.”  In his experience he was certain 
that eve
d.538 
d the 
 
g Belgium.  Robert Withington added that German logic 
was “pi ad 
 
f 
the 
n the officer didn’t exactly know why.  Even with all the explanations used by the 
Germans claiming biological superiority the treatment of Belgians still could not be justifie
At times the steadfast mindset of the Germans proved almost too much to deal with for 
members of the commission.  Whitlock wrote in his journal on September 22, 1915 that there 
were two distinct German elements present in Belgium: the civil that could be reasoned an
military element that had “gone crazy.”  He concluded that there was nothing to be done but try 
to realize that there was a vast gulf between the two irreconcilable points of view and the
antipathetic attitudes towards the preservation of life.  The only thing the commission could do 
from his perspective was keep on feedin
tiless,” believing that you were either with us or against us.  In his view the Germans h
no place for neutrality in their scheme unless it helped them directly.539   
In a situation Whitlock labeled as “fortunate,” the CRB dealt exclusively with the 
German civil government in Belgium.  While they were generally polite and affable, Whitlock
found them at the same time to be obnoxious, slow, and extremely bureaucratic.  Robert 
Withington added that the Kreischef of his district was considered a “Belgian-hater” and out o
touch with the people.  Kellogg succinctly summarized the situation from his perspective that 
Germans “never got it.”  In his view the absence of Belgian approval of the German 
                                                          
538 Whitlock, Belgium: A Personal Narrative, p. 1:215.  Kellogg, Headquarter Nights, p. 54.  Loc cit, p. 54-55. 
539 Nevins, The Letters and Journal of Brand Whitlock, p. 2:212.  Whitlock, Belgium: A Personal Narrative, p. 
1:541.  Withington, In Occupied Belgium, p. 60.  Withington added that if relief efforts benefited the German
they would have lost their neutrality status.  He also observed that many Germans did not understand why the US 
s than 
 belligerents.  Loc cit, p. 60-61. was not an automatic ally of Germany once it stopped all shipments of munitions to
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administration combined with a complete lack of any rapprochement between German officers
and the civil population to demonstrate that they utterly lacked “human consideration.”
 
atters of civil administration belied a general inability 
to unde
 
 because 
ermans caused tremendous 
 p rforme r ravitaillement.  Whitlock complained 
in Marc nor 
 
540 
Problems the Germans faced in m
rstand the sentiments of Belgians and the motivations of the commission.  Kellogg 
eventually gave up on answering the question “Why do you Americans do as you do?”  German
officers told him and other members of the CRB that fundamentally “everything you do surprises 
them, disappoints them, (and) dismays them.”  When the tables were turned in regards to 
questioning, Edward Eyre Hunt was told that, “We must obey.  We trust our government
it is wiser than we and because it does better for us than we can do for ourselves.”  The 
difference to the Germans was clear, “Your country is so different from ours that you do not yet 
understand the virtue of obedience.”541 
The perceived irrationality and misunderstanding of the G
difficulties for the commission as it e d its duties o
h 1915 that the general government never understood the organization of the CRB 
comprehended the difficulties of feeding nearly eight million people a month.  He added that 
even General von Bissing failed to understand the demands of relief, thinking that it was a small 
charity created by Daniel Heineman to distribute a little food in soup kitchens and a few old 
pieces of clothing to the poor.  Conflict between the commission and the general government 
came to a head over a comment made by von Bissing in an interview saying that “the work of 
America in Belgium was not charity at all, but a business, if not something worse.”  Hoover in
                                                          
540 Whitlock, Belgium: A Personal Narrative, p. 1:441.  Whitlock reported that the bureaucratic machine was a times 
problematic when important letters or requests would become “caught in the cogs of the terrible machine” and 
become lost for weeks if not forever.  Withington, In Occupied Belgium, p. 93.  Kellogg, Headquarter Nights, p. 80.  
d, p. 45. 
According to Kellogg the “mal-administration” of Belgium was also sufficient proof that the Germans were unable 
to help the world in its efforts to humanize and socialize mankind.  He believed moreover that it was wholly 
unnecessary and inefficient for the Germans to imposed pseudo-control over all affairs in Belgium.  Loc cit, p. 95. 
541 Kellogg, Headquarter Nights, p. 63.  Loc cit, p. 63-64. Hunt, War Brea
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response threatened to terminate all relief efforts unless the general retracted his statement
was these dual elements of immaturity and constant bewilderment on the part of German officer
that particularly irritated Whitlock.
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542   
Resentment towards the commission and its representatives accompanied doubts as to t
CRB’s true intentions in providing relief.  German Lieutenant Herbster told Edward Eyre Hu
in late 1914 that America was “a nation of sentimental fools,” wondering why “you want to feed
these franc-tireurs, these barbarians of Belgium.”  “If you did the right thing,” he added, “you 
would give the German army the food that you are bringing over for these wretches…”  
Representatives of the commission persevered under the constant pressures of the general
government.  James Morton commented that delegates settled on the conviction that they would
not altogether see the Germans as the “Beasts of the Apocalypse.”  Their belief was that relief 
was in a manner of speaking the last bread of a final freedom.543 
The Problem
August 20, 1915 marked the one year anniversary of the Belgian invasion.  Brand 
Whitlock wrote in his journal that over the past year the “effect upon the life of the Belgians h
been death.”  Edward Eyre Hunt succinctly summarized the situation by saying that the Ge
wanted two things from Belgium: quiet and cash.  Whitlock observed that increasingly during 
1915 the civil population was depressed and beginning to lose hope in the wake of steady efforts
by the Germans to demoralize and humiliate the people.  According to the American minist
process was all part of a methodical plan that began with terrorizing Belgium by committing 
atrocities followed by unconscionable oppression and completed by crushing the people’s sp
  
  
, War Bread, p. 167.  Taillandier, The Soul of the “CRB,” p. 128. 
542 Nevins, The Letters and Journal of Brand Whitlock, p. 2:107.  Loc cit, p. 2:144.  On February 23, 1915 Whitlock 
wrote in his journal that Heineman appeared to be the one person that the Germans trusted.  Loc cit, p. 2:104.
Whitlock, Belgium: A Personal Narrative, p. 1:578.  Nevins, The Letters and Journal of Brand Whitlock, p. 2:xix.
543 Hunt
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one discouragement at a time.  By the end of 1915, after fifteen months of occupation the 
Germans continued to dictate the terms of law in Belgium, claiming and exercising the right to 
eliminate laws and make new ones through decrees issued by the governor-general.544   
hen 
s of 
g 
on 
t 
egic advantages.  Keeping military exigencies in mind, the Germans 
maintai
 
                                                          
The work of the commission became all the more important especially at a time w
resolve in Belgium was put to the test.  Representative Prentiss N. Gray commented that the 
presence of Americans helped to turn a measure of Belgians thoughts away from the horror
occupation and allowed them to emphasize the fact that there was still human kindness in this 
world.  Grey believed that delegates found joy in thinking about the institution that was savin
them from starvation as the only piece of constructive work in a war of destruction.  The 
Germans themselves also found the CRB valuable.  Beyond its efforts in conjunction with the 
provinces and the communes to distribute food, the general-government saw that the commissi
possessed an advantage in securing permits and funding from Allied and neutral countries for 
imports.545   
While the general-government allowed food to enter the country it did so in a manner tha
did not sacrifice its strat
ned control of the Belgian railway system which forced the CRB to use canal and 
waterway system to transport goods.  Claims of military exigency forced the commission to be 
constantly vigilant against requisitions.  Whitlock complained in early 1915 that despite having
all the assurances in the world they were seemingly valueless in preventing food seizures.  
Slowly the Germans began to realize that the commission had only one objective in Belgium and 
that was to feed the civil population.  Although it took a considerable amount of time, T.B. 
d 
ission for Relief in Belgium, p. 
544 Nevins, The Letters and Journal of Brand Whitlock, p. 2:205. Hunt, War Bread, p. 174.  Nevins, The Letters an
Journal of Brand Whitlock, p. 2:142.  Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 27. 
545 Withington, In Occupied Belgium, p. 136.  Kittredge, The History of the Comm
104. 
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Kittredge concluded that the consistent record of the two hundred Americans that served in 
Belgium ultimately proved even to the general-government that they were faithfully living up to 
the pled
e 
ssed a 
rom 
committees and the commission were permitted to 
punish 
s 
 
g a 
 
ges given to the CRB, Hoover, Britain, the neutral world, and Germany.546 
The weight of German administration was everywhere to be found in Belgium.  
Everything from raw materials to butcher shops, playhouse shows, and schools were regulated 
by the general-government.  While the Germans were fascinated with controlling the civil 
population they apparently were utterly inept at understanding the work of the commission.  Th
work of the CRB’s delegates was immensely complicated under the constant accusations of 
spying or interloping.  According to Whitlock the German military had no respect for civil 
authority whatsoever.  Over approximately the first six months of relief the CRB posse
self-policing power that removed some of the direct pressure of the general-government f
them.  Until July 1915, both the provincial 
infractions of the rules by either levying fines or withdrawing supplies for a specified 
period of time.  Afterward the commission was subject to the same processes of Belgian law a
the civil population.547 
German obstacles to relief intensified under the guise that the commission enjoyed too
many liberties in Belgium.  The general-government wholeheartedly disliked the idea of havin
considerable number of Americans freely traveling about a conquered territory so close to the 
front lines.  In January 1915, von Bissing commented that the commission only needed a few 
men permanently stationed at the central warehouses while Belgians attend to the entire work of
distribution under their direct supervision.  They regarded Americans working for the CRB as 
                                                          
546 Taillandier, The Soul of the “CRB,” p. 121.  Nevins, The Letters and Journal of Brand Whitlock, p. 2:85.  
hitlock, p. 2:88.  Hunt, War Bread, p. 309. 
Whitlock observed that Americans were seen as “a precious lot of soft fools for sending over the food to this poor 
people.”  Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 132. 
547 Hunt, War Bread, p. 47.  Nevins, The Letters and Journal of Brand W
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“troublesome intruders” that should not be allowed to have an active role in distribution beyond 
seeing that relief supplies were not requisitioned by German troops.548  
The resulting actions by German officers in lieu of these beliefs frustrated commissi
representatives to no end.  In an article appearing in the February 28, 1915 edition of the New 
York Times, J.F. Lucey reported that “it looked to us as though we had to fight for every foot o
ground to get into any commune or to enter any city.  We seemed to be interfered with in every
effort we made to perfect our distribution organization.”  In many cases the positive reception
on 
f 
 
 
that the s 
 that 
l 
 before news of their 
                                                          
 American members of the commission received was in particular seen as a dangerou
subversive threat.  In their view the CRB was keeping Belgium from maintaining its naturally 
submissive position.  Conditions for the American delegates were as a result made as 
uncomfortable as possible in order to combat the tendency of the commission to foment 
opposition to the general-government.549   
In order to blunt the influence of the commission its delegates were subjected to many 
kinds of petty annoyances at the hands of German authorities.  Vernon Kellogg observed
constantly the American contingent was told that their efforts would not count.  T.B. Kittredge 
recalled that “at first we were all regarded as possible spies…”  Under such suspicions many 
representatives were arrested by local commandants.  Even when mass accusations of spying 
subsided in 1915 the general-government continued to conduct extensive searches.  In severa
cases a few unfortunate delegates languished for days in German prisons
548 Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 128.  Loc cit, p. 130.  Loc cit, p. 104.  
t 
eption 
 
According to Kittredge the appearance of Americans working for the CRB gave the people of Belgium a sense of 
security that made them feel that they possessed a bit of protection from the Germans.  Kittredge observed that i
was undoubtedly galling to the Germans, who regarded themselves as masters of the country, to see Americans, who 
were themselves unafraid of them and beyond their direct control, dashing about the country in automobiles 
overseeing relief.  He also added that accompanying officers were also infuriated by the enthusiastic rec
American delegates received from Belgians as they passed.  Loc cit, p. 128. 
549 New York Times, Feb 28, 1915.  In his estimation the Germans never considered that a neutral nation would enter
the same occupied territory with the purpose of feeding and building while they were killing and destroying.    
Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 129. 
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incarce is 
 
a 
requiring that all incoming and outgoing letters pass through English 
and Ge
ef 
ration reached Brussels and orders for release could be secured.  J.F. Lucey added that h
men were constantly held up and often detained (himself included).  Eventually as German posts
became more accustomed to the passing of delegates they made less trouble but still found 
excuses to delay representatives for an hour or two at checkpoints.  Even a decree issued by the 
governor-general which gave assurances that no member of the commission would be bodily 
searched unless directly ordered failed to change the situation.  James Morton summarized the 
position that representatives were in as one of “superintendents who were superintended.”550 
Under constant suspicion for any number of acts against the general government the 
representatives of the commission were all the more compelled to maintain strict neutrality.  As 
result the CRB took steps to protect both the future of relief and its participants by promising not 
to carry verbal or written messages from Belgians under any circumstances.  An added level of 
oversight was created by 
rman censors.  Six specific rules governing all correspondence were also set in agreement 
between the CRB and the general-government.  In behavior the commission’s delegates 
understood that as long as the Germans kept their word and did not interfere or requisition reli
supplies it was the CRB’s business to keep silent.  Chairman Hoover explicitly instructed 
representatives that “you have nothing to do there except to see that the wheat arrives, that it is 
made into bread, and the bread is eaten by those for whom it was meant.  If it is hard to say 
nothing, remember that silence is the price of food for those people.”551 
                                                          
 Kellogg, Germany in the War and After, p. 72.  Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, 
p. 188.  Kittredge, Californians with Hoover in Europe, p. 4:159.  New York Times, February 28, 1915.  Lucey 
550
added that passes/passports were their only protection and even when they possessed them they were still taken into 
custody.  In his view the military problem was “the most annoying in the lot.”  Kittredge, The History of the 
Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 188.  Loc cit, p. 189.  Taillandier, The Soul of the “CRB,” p. 146. 
xceed 
ten, (3) no references 
 
) stated that the New York, London, and Rotterdam offices 
551 Withington, In Occupied Belgium, p. 31.  Loc cit, p. 30.  These rules included: (1) that letters were not to e
four pages in length, (2) that letters were to be typewritten if possible or very clearly handwrit
were to be made directly or indirectly to matters concerning the war or operations/affairs of the CRB, (4) specified
the addresses to send all correspondence to for censor, (5
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Remaining silent was one of the toughest parts of the job for delegates.  Americans in 
Belgium were subject to constant criticisms and threats claiming that among others accusations 
their re
s 
en 
 
o as 
s “a 
ow, a parliamentary debate, and important 
quantit  
to 
it was 
  
lief work was in no sense neutral because it kept hostages alive whose suffering might 
otherwise affect the minds and fighting power of the enemy.  In plain terms the commission wa
constantly accused by the Germans of prolonging the war.  Robert Withington commented that 
under such pressure the delegates had to steer a delicate course in not getting too familiar with 
either the Germans or the Belgians in a manner that would cause suspicion.  The only time wh
representatives showed any trace of partisanship was when they spoke of Hoover.  Still the task 
of performing duties under the yoke of the general-government and in the sight of the suffering 
and horror in Belgium was heart wrenching.  “I went into Northern France and Belgium to act as 
a neutral, and I did act as a neutral all the time I was there,” Vernon Kellogg concluded, “but I 
came out no neutral.”552 
In order to perform their duties each representative of the commission was provided with
an accompanying officer, a home, orderlies, and as set of circumscribed powers within the 
assigned province.  The German officer detailed to the delegate was commonly referred t
their “nurse.”  The relationship between the two was described by John Lowrey Simpson a
composite of the Siamese twins, a Punch and Judy sh
ies of high explosives.”  He added that the situation was “essentially and fundamentally
peculiar” in that the American was sent to watch the food and the German officer was sent 
watch the American.  Speaking on the relationship, Whitlock commented that under the best 
circumstances the interplay would be difficult; under the conditions that actually prevailed 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
ons would render letters undeliverable.    Taillandier, The Soul of the “CRB,” p. 147. 
of the CRB were notified weekly about the “health of members in Belgium,” and (6) failure to observe these 
regulati
552 Taillandier, The Soul of the “CRB,” p. 124.  Withington, In Occupied Belgium, p. 31.  Taillandier, The Soul of 
the “CRB,” p. 81.  Kellogg, Headquarter Nights, p. 55. 
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almost intolerable.  Under their supervision the eyes of the German officers were never off the 
CRB delegates as they “watched him when he rose to eat and when he knelt to pray.”553 
While the general-government and the accompanying officers looked upon delegates as 
unpleas
 
to 
s found it 
nstant 
admirable 
Conditions for commission members changed in step with the nature of relief work in 
Belgium.  In the first four months of relief work (October 1914 through January 1915) the 
ant intruders the commission possessed an advantage in that the Germans realized the 
necessity of its work and was willing to yield on many points rather than face the discontinuance
of ravitaillement.  American representatives often found that while officers absolutely refused 
permit any definite action or individual initiative, they would usually carry out the change or 
measure demanded by the delegate under their own authority.  In general, the German
exceedingly humiliating to feel that as rulers of an occupied territory they were being monitored 
by an agency from the outside whose activities they regarded as suspicious.  Officers particularly 
did not like delegates complaining to Brussels when things were not going well in the provinces.  
Whenever possible the accompanying officer would personally remedy any abuses while 
adamantly refusing that there was any base to the delegate’s complaint.  In the face of co
pressure the American delegates performed their duties with what Whitlock called “
patience.”  German officers commonly asked commission representatives “what are the 
Americans getting out of it?”  The answer was that millions of people received their daily 
bread…that was “all the Americans got out of it.”554 
general-government was gracious in granting passes and allowing delegates to exercise freedom 
of movement.  Once the work of the commission expanded in volume and importance the 
                                                          
553 Kittredge, Californians with Hoover in Europe, p. 5:277.  Kellogg, Headquarter Nights, p. 50.  Gay and F
Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 1:494.  Whitlock, Belgium: A Personal Narrative, p. 
1:572. 
554 Kittredge, Californians with Hoover in Europe, p. 4:159.  Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Rel
Belgium, p. 328.  Loc cit, p. 132.  Loc cit, p. 329.  Whitlock, Belgium: A P
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attitude
 one hand and the German army on the other.  According to Simpson as time 
passed n 
h 
ith 
ent.556 
                                                          
 of the governor-general became less accommodating.  The Germans in particular feared 
that the supposedly-neutral body was becoming too powerful in a territory where German rule 
was theoretically absolute.555   
The balance of power between the commission delegate and the German accompanying 
officer often created a delicate situation.  John Lowrey Simpson commented that in focusing on 
the arrogant usurpations of power made by German officers the commission was at times too 
little inclined to remember the valuable services rendered by these individuals in regards to their 
handling of municipal affairs, controlling soldiers, and facilitating the work of CRB 
representatives.  In general these officers served as a buffer between the American and domestic 
organizations on the
the accompanying officer became more than just a Begleitoffizier.  When personnel bega
to change the officers gained the advantage of an “old hand” over a “green” delegate.  Wit
every new American replacement in the communes the accompanying officer edged his 
advantage further.  Eventually these individuals were no longer officially called an 
accompanying officer; they assumed the title of Verpfleugungsoffizier, an “officer dealing w
matters of feeding.”  The commission was well aware of the greater powers assumed by German 
officers and labored on its part to check the gradual encroachments of the general governm
they traveled on inspection tours. 
556 Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 1:501.  Simpson explained that 
accompanying officers specifically dealt with railway officials and local commandants; arranged to have storehouses 
and offices put at the disposal of the provincial committees; sent telegrams on behalf of delegates; ousted soldiers 
from bakeries; and escorted representative into villages well within the zones of artillery fire.  Simpson also 
recognized at the same time that the accompanying officers’ control of communication gave them considerable 
power over delegates by censoring all incoming and outgoing letters.  The tension created some heated exchanges 
e, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 325. 
555 Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 1:46.  Loc cit, p. 1:46-47.  In part 
the general-government also disapproved of the enthusiasm that Belgians showed towards American delegates when 
between delegate and officer, particularly over the power to censor.  Loc cit, p. 1:501-502.  Loc cit, p. 1:502.  
Kittredg
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In the provinces the accompanying officers had other duties assigned to them beyond the
watching of delegates including the supervision and distribution of imported food and contro
 
lling 
the nat e 
e 
For 
t of 
and 
d 
ters to assume a more direct role in relief operations.  James Harder commented that 
“our duties in the CRB brought us into contact with some officers who were almost good-
natured.”  Kittredge added that “the officers assigned to work with us had the interests of the 
 
ive produce.  Over the course of time the Begleitoffiziers and Verpfleugungsoffiziers cam
to take into their hands most of the details involving the work of provisioning in Northern Franc
specifically.  As a part of their responsibilities they were to accompany the delegates about the 
district and keep them out of “mischief,” intervene on their behalf with the military authorities, 
read their correspondence, and send their communications through telephone and telegraph.  
the most part these officers showed a great deal of interest and took an immense pride in the 
work of the commission.  Some of the German officers even came to consider themselves par
the CRB effort.557   
In Northern France most of the officers adhered to the obligations of their position 
genuinely cared about the welfare of the population.  Because it was their duty to see that 
promises were kept these individuals came to regard any violation of German guarantees in 
France as a personal reflection upon themselves.  As a rule these officers were efficient an
mature men that gradually began under their own initiative or by the inspiration of general 
headquar
population at heart, for the most part, and they were as zealous as we in seeing that everything 
went well.”  He concluded that as a rule the accompanying officers were “well disposed towards
                                                          
557 Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 325.  Loc cit, p. 152.  Loc cit, p. 324.  L
p. 152. 
oc cit, 
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us, cosm
 
 at 
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en the 
le the Germans ended 
up trus
n 
opolitan in culture, conscientious in the performance of their duty and in helping us to 
make sure that the food was fairly distributed and that none of it went to the Germans.”558   
The dichotomy in Northern France was that while officers gradually encroached on the
privileges and powers of the delegates they were also a source of consistency in the process of 
ravitaillement as turn-over rates among CRB representatives grew.  As new delegates arrived
their posts ignorant of the conditions within the district they became increasingly depende
the accompanying officers for assistance in acclimating them to the situation.  No reports of
serious difficulties between the CRB and German authorities surfaced during the first year of t
commission’s work in Northern France.  The troublesome and petty difficulties which led to
constant friction in Belgium were alleviated in France through the close cooperation betwe
American delegate and the German officers.  Relations between the CRB and the general-
government improved as time passed.  Kittredge recalled that “on the who
ting us, and it must be said that in many ways they greatly facilitated our work.”  The 
German officers that were in personal contact with the CRB were known to be extremely 
courageous and more agreeable beginning in late 1915 until the deportation of workers began i
1916.559 
                                                          
violation of German agreements and guarantees were taken as personal affronts to the authority of accompanying 
things well.”  Kittredge, Californians with Hoover in Europe, p. 5:284.  Kittredge, The History of the Commission 
for Relief in Belgium, p. 324.  Taillandier, The Soul of the “CRB,” p. 43.  Kittredge, Californians with Hoover in 
558 Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 152.  T.B. Kittredge observed that any 
officers.  According to Kittredge, “with the support of the German Headquarters we had little or no trouble keeping 
Europe, p. 5:284.  Kittredge explained that any violation by local German authorities (in regards to agreements and 
guarantees) were taken.  Loc cit, p. 5:278.  Kittredge also concluded that some of the accompanying officers too a 
sincere interest in the population and did all they could to help in the often difficult work of getting the meager 
rations spread equitably so that the population could be spared the possibility of interruptions of supply.   
559 Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 153.  Loc cit, p. 206.  Kittredge, Californians 
with Hoover in Europe, p. 4:159.  Specifically, the Germans kept the commission supplied with railcars, helped 
shipments move promptly to the distributing centers, permitted the CRB to use military telephone and telegraph 
lines for urgent business, and were careful to avoid seizing any relief supplies.  Kittredge, The History of the 
Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 288. 
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While relations between the CRB and the general-government became more normalized 
in 1915 this did not mean that an amiable relationship between the two organizations was 
perman
ily to 
 to be 
ved little in the first months of 1916.  By this point many German officers 
were in
 
wayed 
, 1916 
ently in place.  Whitlock worried in the late 1915 that everyone was near the breaking 
point.  At the time the number of Germans in towns across Belgium seemed to increase da
the point that they swarmed everywhere.  Whitlock complained that the additional numbers 
became so great that it created a new problem for ravitaillement.  Representatives of the 
commission began to wonder that if the Germans could not requisition imported food then 
maybe they were gradually shifting their entire population over the border into Belgium
fed.  Vernon Kellogg reported that as German control intensified the new national sport of 
Germany appeared to be lying.  Making matters worse, the commission observed that the 
Vermittlungsstelle hampered rather than facilitated relief work in moving beyond its original 
intent of observation into outright intervention after December 1915.560   
Relations impro
clined to assume a domineering attitude in their administration of affairs in Belgium.  
With a lofty conception of their duties to the German army and responsibility to their country
these officers considered it part of their work to sidetrack American delegates.  The American 
representatives by contrast were for the most part capable and energetic individuals who 
harbored no fear or respect for the German military system.  The only considerations that s
them were their obligations to the general population and the CRB.  While delegates endeavored 
to perform their duties admirably the situation was beginning to take its toll.  On March 31
                                                          
560 Whitlock, Belgium: A Personal Narrative, p. 2:174-175.  Loc cit, p. 2:57.  Kellogg, Germany in the War and 
After, p. 31.  Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 292. 
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Whitlock reported that of the 150 men who came to Belgium there were two in insane
while thirty other men suffered from nervous breakdowns.
 asylums 
as 
the pilfering soldier the work of ravitaillement had to deal with an army of 
brokers he 
 of 
 
 
  
ing 
lear demarcation among the many “wheels and parts of the 
                                                          
561 
By 1916 the commission had other complicating factors to deal with in providing relief 
well.  Beyond 
, speculators, smugglers, and knaves who were in Whitlock’s words “trafficking in t
misery and suffering of the land.”  Despite the best efforts of the commission and General von 
Bissing himself the wily efforts of profiteers could not be stooped.  Smuggling became such a 
problem that by mid-1916 soldiers entered farms to try to buy eggs or chickens to feed 
themselves.  Meanwhile the general-government expanded its powers further through decrees
the governor-general.  Whitlock complained in the summer of 1916 that it was quite impossible 
for the commission to live up to so many regulations and still perform its duties.  The major
obstacle to relief at the time was that the Germans believed that the Belgians had more to eat 
than the Germans.562   
As fall of 1916 began the commission recognized that the situation was growing more
difficult to control.  Under the supervision of the Vermittlungsstelle if the CRB reported that 
soldiers were taking food the military darkly responded with renewed accusations of spying.
Vernon Kellogg commented that overall the relationship between representatives and German 
officialdom made relief work difficult under the most favorable circumstances.  Constant 
harassment, delays, tricks, and bullying under the cover of sophisticated and specious reason
made the work of delegates extremely trying.  Kellogg added that one of the most prolific 
sources of difficulty was the lack of c
561 Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 325.  Nevins, The Letters and Journal of 
Brand Whitlock, p. 2:252. 
tween von Bissing, Hoover, and Kellogg the governor-general suggested that Belgium should be rationed 
562 Whitlock, Belgium: A Personal Narrative, p. 2:327.  Loc cit, p. 2:324.  Loc cit, p. 2:383.  Loc cit, p. 2:378.  In a 
meeting be
on the same scale that the German civil population was being restrained.   
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German administrative machine g these bits of the 
is mind was that sharp specialization and thorough 
coordin
d 
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ts from each other the commission exemplified the freedom that still existed 
somew
 had 
                                                          
” and a “lack of coordination amon
mechanism.”  The contradiction in h
ation were purportedly the cornerstones of the German reputation for organization and 
efficiency.563 
Working directly with the Germans had a marked influence on American delegates 
during the war in Belgium.  For Kellogg the experience signified a conversion of an idealistic 
group of young, open-minded Americans with fairly neutral attitudes into a band of convince
men who after forced retirement from the country in April 1917 devoted their efforts to 
annihilating the German machine or rescuing and restoring its victims.  After two-and-a-half 
years of silent devotion these men could take mo more.  During their tenure in Belgium the wo
of the Americans meant so much to the civil population because according to Kellogg they 
represented the sympathy of a great nation far away.  Cut off from the rest of the world and in
many respec
here and the hope that freedom would return again.  In retrospect, T.B. Kittredge also 
marveled at the uniqueness of their position.  No group of young men from a foreign land
ever before enjoyed such an elevated status as representatives interposed between the hated 
military rulers of Belgium and the civil population.  In a sense the members of the commission 
were the representatives of the outside world accepted by the Germans to supervise the execution 
of a solemn promise that Belgians would never starve.  Through thought and deed the CRB 
endeavored to keep its word.  “Possessing little actual power,” Kittredge exclaimed, “we yet 
wielded an enormous influence.”564  
159. 
563 Whitlock, Belgium: A Personal Narrative, p. 2:413.  Kellogg, Headquarter Nights, p. 86.  Loc cit, p. 87-88.  Loc 
cit, p. 88. 
564 Kellogg, Headquarter Nights, p. 84.  Loc cit, p. 52.  Kittredge, Californians with Hoover in Europe, p. 4:
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POST SCRIPT/CONCLUSION 
The CRB (1916-November 1918) 
Allied forces provided additional obstacles to relief efforts in 1915 and 1916 through
refusal of letting greater amounts of food through the blockade.  In December, Hoover pressured 
the British to allow an increase from 80,000 tons per month
 the 
 to 126,400 in order to maintain an 
average d 
er 
rom 
done: “
 
canal boats that handled about 350 tons each.  On October 16, 
 daily ration of 1800 calories per person.  While sympathetic to the efforts of Hoover an
the CRB, the British Foreign Office under the pressure of militarists in England and France 
instead reduced the allowed tonnage of food by 30,000 per month.  Throughout 1916, the 
commission worked to secure a greater flow of foodstuffs.  Shipments of food and efforts to 
provide relief were proving generally effective until the harvest of 1916.  The problem in this 
case involved a disputed compensation claim made by the CRB for German food usage in 
Belgium.  In the face of vehement opposition the CRB adjusted its estimates to avoid furth
conflict.565 
Problems of numerous varieties notwithstanding, CRB shipments of relief improved f
983,808 tons in 1915 to 1,278,946 in 1916.  Despite the tremendous efforts made by the 
committee, Hoover reported that many sacrifices had already made and much work to still be 
Cold statistics do not express the suffering of people or their anxieties for their future.  
Nor do they acclaim those who died on sea or land for the millions who were saved.”  By the end
of 1916 efforts to prevent German requisitioning saved an estimated 600,000 tons of food.  
Although difficult to master, improved logistics contributed to an increase in CRB shipping 
tonnage.  On June 1, 1916, 31,342 tons of foodstuffs arrived in a single day.  Once in Europe 
these supplies were loaded on 
                                                          
565 Hoover, An American Epic, p. 1:179.  Loc cit, p. 1:186.  In the fall of 1916, the dispute centered along the CRB 
bject to committee remuneration.  German officials disagreed with the estimated crop surplus.   
officials claim that abandoned farms used by the Germans were part of the programs surplus food figures and were 
therefore su
 
320 
 
19,557 tons of foodstuffs were transported to Belgium via a fleet of nearly sixty canal boats
single day.  The year was not without its losses in the process of relief however.  Between 
November 1915 and November 1916, eight CRB vessels were lost to torpedoes and mines, 
taking an estimated 44,000 tons of food with them.  Despite the losses, “no one died of starvat
during the year—and the children were fully cared for.”
 in a 
ion 
 
 at 1522 per 
day.  D f 
 
 
d 
 
566 
A decrease in shipping tonnage in 1917 to 767,895 was attributable to several different 
factors that were not unique to the situation.  Through the course of the year eighteen ships were 
lost to submarines, mines, and other various reasons, causing the loss of 229,500 tons of food en 
route to Belgium.  Despite the reduction in shipping, the CRB saved 302,503 tons of food from
German requisitioning and managed to keep an average caloric intake per person
uring the first four years of operation the CRB incrementally enacted a measure o
efficiency and economy that reduced overhead expenses to less than three quarters of one 
percent.  Operating in dangerous seas under their own special flag and markings the CRB lost 
only eighteen shiploads of cargo destined for Belgium through July 1, 1917.  Over the same 
period 484 overseas vessels and 1,008 cross-channel cargoes had been unloaded in Rotterdam by
the CRB before 7,084 canal-boats dispatched the supplies to Belgium and Northern France.567 
The year 1917 marked a turning point in the war through the declaration of unrestricted 
submarine warfare by the Germans.  Knowing that such actions would most likely draw the US
into the conflict, the Germany high stakes gamble hoped to end the war before America coul
make the critical difference.  For the CRB, unrestricted submarine warfare crippled shipping 
efforts.  On January 31, all shipments of relief were postponed indefinitely until guarantees could
                                                          
566 Hoover, An American Epic, p. 1:164 and Loc cit, p. 1:267-268.  Loc cit, p. 1:164.  Loc cit, p. 1:267-268.  
Kellogg, Fighting Starvation in Belgium, p. 121.  Depending on the final port of destination, CRB supplies carried 
on canal boats traveled between 88 and 235 miles.  Hoover, An American Epic, p. 1:267-268. 
c 567 Hoover, An American Epic, p. 1:345-347.  Kellogg, Fighting Starvation in Belgium, p. 120.  Loc cit, p. 115.  Lo
cit, p. 120. 
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be secured with the Germans.  Although the CRB reached an agreement with Germany on 
February 9, the sinking of relief ships continued, causing a total loss of 200,000 tons of food.  
Norma
 
sels 
 
 
 
for the 
tral cargoes.  This board according to Hoover took a “dim view of our independent 
shippin
 
on American ships en route to Europe.  Allied and American emphasis on military needs in 
          
l shipments did not resume until February 24, and even then the risks were still great.  In 
the spring and summer of 1917, German unrestricted submarine warfare reached its deadliest 
intensity.  According to Hoover, matters were complicated because the CRB’s little fleet (mostly
ships requisitioned and donated by the exiled Belgian government) were too small to carry even 
half of the supplies needed per month.  The only alternative was to again charter neutral ves
at a greater expense.  “The CRB tried frantically to compensate by drawing upon its reserves and
by increasing food purchases in nearby Holland,” Hoover reported, “It was not enough.”  He
added that, “because of torpedoing, CRB transports were almost paralyzed.”568 
Decreases in shipping due to unrestricted submarine warfare combined with low 
agricultural yields to severely cripple to effectiveness of the CRB in 1917 and 1918.  By mid-
1917 the surplus of American crops was exhausted while a drought threatened harvest yields. 
Domestic yields in Belgium and France also suffered.  In late October the CRB called 
import from overseas of a minimum of about 130,000 tons per month in an attempt to make up 
the balance.  As the US prepared to enter the conflict the CRB faced another shipping crisis.  To 
manage combined efforts the Allies and the US created an Inter-Allied Chartering Executive to 
handle neu
g arrangements with neutrals.”  At this critical juncture in the war, President Wilson 
agreed that relief came second to military demands.  Massive German offensives on the Western
Front from March to July 1918 meant an increased concentration of troop transport and materiel 
                                                
 568 Hoover, An American Epic, p. 1:271.  Nash, The Life of Herbert Hoover, p. 3:445-446.  Hoover, An American
Epic, p. 1:329. 
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shipping meant that only 408,000 tons of food reached Rotterdam between November 1917 and 
March 1918—267,000 short of the minimum that the Allies had sanctioned.569   
As the war in Europe began to climax CRB food deliveries faltered, bringing with it d
consequences.  On March 15, relief officials reduced daily bread rations by nearly 25 percent.  
Eight days later, the London office of the CRB confessed that it had “miserably failed” to meet 
its import quotas for five months, thanks to the Allies failure to grant it priority in food and sh
Hoover appealed personally to President Wilson in an attempt to influence Allied shipping 
policy.  On April 8, 1918 he reported to Wilson that the CRB fleet was only able to transport an
average
ire 
ips.  
 
 of under 60,000 tons of food per month presently.  This was about half of what the 
commi
 
e nick of 
al of Belgium.  In June 1918, a cable to Wilson explained a series of issues 
that the Allies and America had to work out in order to assist the starving populations of Europe.  
                                                          
ttee considered as the minimum of which the population could be maintained on.570 
Unable to sway President Wilson, Hoover took his case directly to British Prime Minister 
Lloyd George a month later.  In their meeting he asked George (who had supported the CRB in 
the past) to issue the appropriate orders and convey his approval of “necessary diversions” to
President Wilson.  Direct intervention on the par t of the Prime Minister proved to be 
unnecessary.  On May 22, 1918, Wilson assented to the request after the British allocated four 
ships to relief operations.  “A ghastly situation in Belgium” had been averted; Hoover told W.B. 
Poland, “one of the most difficult crises” ever endured by the CRB was over—and in th
time.571   
With shipping tonnages devoted to relief on the increase, Hoover focused on other issues 
critical to the surviv
:364.  Loc cit, p. 1:373.  Nash, The Life 
4. 
  Loc cit, p. 3:460-461.  Loc cit, p. 3:461. 
569 Hoover, An American Epic, p. 1:329.  Loc cit, p. 1:357-358.  Loc cit, p. 1
of Herbert Hoover, p. 3:454. 
570 Nash, The Life of Herbert Hoover, p. 3:454.  O’Brien, The Hoover-Wilson Wartime Correspondence, p. 18
571 Nash, The Life of Herbert Hoover, p. 3:460.
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o the end 
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er the 
g Hoover’s list of demands was the need for an arrangement of a cereal program for
based upon the real need of the Allies.  Organization was a key concern for the head of the C
especially in regards to the handling of cereals, meats, fats, sugar, vegetable oils, and fiber.  
Public image was another component of relief administration that Hoover found to be of absolut
importance.  On June 13, Hoover told Wilson that, “I believe it will have a considerable effect on
the psychology of American production and consumption if we can present to the American 
people a definite statement that our food supplies must be pooled with Allies’ and set out to them 
a definite program we must fulfill and to be able to state to them accurately what this program 
is.”572 
Participation by the United States in World War I changed the nature of American relief 
in Belgium for Hoover and other fellow committee members.  From the spring of 1917 t
of the war Hoover simultaneously chaired the US Food Administration and the CRB.  Until Apr
1917 the CRB was staffed almost exclusively by American volunteers.  Once neutrality was 
broken the American contingent serving in Belgium withdrew from the commission and were 
d by Spanish and Dutch representatives.  The US entrance in the war also changed the 
financial character of the CRB.  Until the spring of 1917 the committee received 90 percent of
funding from the British and French governments with the rest coming from charitable 
contributions.  After months of behind the scenes work by Hoover, the US government 
announced on May 9, 1917 that it would take over the financial responsibility for relief ov
next six months.573 
                                                          
572 O’Brien, The Hoover-Wilson Wartime Correspondence, p. 204-205. 
573 Nash, The Life of Herbert Hoover, p. 3:444.  Most of American members of the CRB staff joined the US army.  
Hoover, An American Epic, p. 3:7.  Nash, The Life of Herbert Hoover, p. 3:445.  $120,000,000 in charitable 
contributions to the CRB came from the US.   
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CRB shipments of ravitaillement continued to reach Belgium and Northern France 
despite the increased complexities of American involvement in the war.  On July 11, 191
Hoover reported to President Wilson that during the 1917-1918 fiscal year the value of CR
food shipments totaled $1,400,000,000.  For all the problems encountered over the past twelve 
months (including unrestricted submarine warfare by the Germans and the complicated
of the Inter-Alli
8, 
B 
 policies 
ed Chartering Executive), CRB shipments of meat had increased by 844,600,000 
er those in 1916 and 1917.  October 1918 was 
an impo  
m.  
 the 
report he 
 
ing 
ng 
oover reported to 
Wilson that there was an immediate need for 500,000 tons of shipping to Belgium.  In addition, 
Hoover recommended that Allied governmental aid increase from the current $15,000,000 to 
pounds and cereals by an additional 80,900,000 ov
rtant time in the war, not only because it marked the coming of the armistice, but also
because it marked the yearly high in CRB shipping with 151,889 tons of food reaching Belgiu
In 1918, thirteen committee ships had been lost en route.  “(As) bad as the situation was for the 
six months from January to June (1918),” Hoover reported, “there was little death from 
starvation, and the 2,500,000 children in our canteens were fully cared for.”  Shortly before
armistice, Hoover cabled Wilson with his projections for food exports in 1919.  In his 
projected an increase in relief shipping to Belgium by 5,730,000 tons to a total of 17,500,000.574 
The work of the CRB did not end with the signing of an armistice.  Immediately after the
fighting stopped many former committee members returned to Northern France.  In addition, 
Hoover secured a crew of approximately 150 naval officers-sailors and a vast amount of build
materials to build temporary relief shelters.  Almost overnight these men erected barracks alo
roadsides and fitted them with beds and kitchens.  The continued avoidance of famine in 
Belgium required a continued flow of food into the country.  On October 18, H
                                                          
574 O’Brien, The Hoover-Wilson Wartime Correspondence, p. 229-230.  Hoover, An American Epic, p. 1:377-379.  
 The Hoover-Wilson Wartime Correspondence, p. 265. 
Five ships had been torpedoed, four sunk or damaged by mines, and four were lost due to unknown causes.  
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over $3
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econstruction of Europe that would purchase, transport, and finance the costs of 
their su
tance.  
0,000,000 per month.  Justifying his request, Hoover explained to Wilson that, “with 
these resources over twelve to eighteen months I believe the people could be made self-
supporting.”  Although the shelling had stopped and submarine attacks had subsided, the 
available amount of food for relief was insufficient.  Hoover reported to Wilson on Nove
that, “there is a deficiency below what we consider is desirable to preserve health and 
tranquility.”575 
The CRB in the Armistice Period (1918-1919) 
With the conflict over the future of the CRB was in doubt.  Considering the lingerin
problems of food relief in Belgium, Hoover pressed fo
ccording to Hoover, “The large experience of the CRB, the character of its organiz
without profit, its established use of shipping, and the sympathetic bond which it now form
the Belgian people point to its continuation and enlargement as the natural agency for
purpose.”  In strengthening the CRB, Hoover proposed that the US government offer 
$200,000,000 in aid to Belgium under the direct administration of the committee.  On Nov
28, 1918 Hoover proposed that the Belgian government should appoint a representative to each 
position in the CRB and that the country should become part of the new organization for the 
Relief and R
pplies.  Belgium resisted this proposal, urging that they needed the continuation and 
protection of the CRB to prevent being crowded out by other nations seeking post war assis
In lieu of this request the committee agreed to continue relief temporarily.576 
                                                          
575 Hoover, An American Epic, p. 3:8-9.  O’Brien, The Hoover-Wilson Wartime Correspondence, p. 273-274.  Loc 
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 The CRB faced a final crisis in May 1919 with the proposal by the Treasury Departme
to withdraw relief credit from Belgium.  Hoover warned the U.S. government that under the 
provisions o
nt 
f its proposal the Belgians would be out of food in sixty days.  With the retirement of 
the CR
h the 
conflic
ct 
d been 
 CRB.  
 
interests in particular blunted the ability of the conference to reach a lasting peace.  In Paris, 
Hoover reported, “Destructive forces sat at the peace table.  The genes of a thousand years of 
                                                          
B forthcoming on July 1, Hoover pleaded with the government to allow the time 
necessary for post-committee planning to take effect.  In addition to arranging a reduction of 
monthly aid for Belgian food programs from $20,000,000 to $15,000,000 per month, Hoover 
also sold capital stock to the Germans with the intention of reinvesting the realized sums in 
foodstuffs.  Hoover’s final CRB demand was that the U.S. Treasury extent relief credit to 
Belgium until their food supply was taken care of.577 
In four and a half years of operation, Hoover estimated that the CRB shipped over 
56,000,000 tons of supplies.  Extended over a nine-year period of relief spanning bot
t itself and the aftermath he estimated that the total value of assistance topped 
$8,000,000,000.  Of these totals, American contributions played a crucial role in the relief of 
Belgium and Northern France.  Loans by the U.S. government and the giving of over 211 
charitable institutions accounted for more than $7,450,000,000 in assistance.  Through the dire
work of CRB and its army of volunteers across the globe an estimated 20 million lives ha
saved.578   
Herbert Hoover’s relief work in Europe did not finish with the dissolution of the
As a personal attendant of the Paris peace negotiations, Hoover saw first hand the political 
difficulties that plagued the proceedings.  From the beginning it appeared that British and French
577 O’Brien, Francis William (Ed.).  Two Peacemakers in Paris: The Hoover-Wilson Post-Armistice Letters, 1918-
M University Press, 1978), p. 146-147. 1920.  (College Station, TX and London: Texas A&
578 Hoover, An American Epic, p. 3:526 and 528. 
 
327 
 
inbred hate and fear were in the blood of every delegation.  These emotions of hate, revenge, 
desire for reparations, and a righteous sense of wrong were in fever heat with their peoples at 
home.”
ere just 
n 
ver 
e of hunger demanded immediate 
attentio  
s 
y Congressional appropriation for relief in former enemy countries.  Hoover’s plan 
                                                          
579   
The seeking of retribution clouded both long-term and immediate implications of post 
war peace.  Although the shooting had stopped, in many cases the problems for Europe w
beginning.  Among them was an issue that Hoover considered of far greater importance.  While 
European leaders squabbled over the terms of peace, the continent struggled with the greatest 
famine since the Thirty Year’s War.  Power politics based on personal interests fragmented the 
process of reaching any meaningful agreement.  To Hoover the combating of hunger was a
issue demanding immediate attention because without it Europe could not be expected to reco
in a generation or create the social stability necessary to maintain a lasting peace.580 
Shortly arriving in Paris, Hoover began pressing for the elimination of the Allied 
blockade of neutral and enemy nations.  To Hoover the issu
n because without food Europe could expect to recover.  While the Germans in a manner
of speaking had been his enemy throughout the war, Hoover found the blockade to be at odd
with his personal humanitarian beliefs.  “I do not believe in the food blockade,” Hoover 
explained in retrospect, “I do not believe in starving women and children.  And above all, I did 
not believe that stunted bodies and deformed minds in the next generation were secure 
foundations upon which to rebuild civilization.”  Meanwhile, the Lodge Amendment prevented 
the use of an
2. 
579 Lochner, Herbert Hoover and Germany, p. 33. 
580 Lochner, Herbert Hoover and Germany, p. 31-3
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to institute a CRB modeled canteen system in Germany for the rehabilitation of children was
seen as a virtual impossibility.
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581   
The Allied blockade of Germany designed to drive the nation to signing a peace 
agreement was disastrously successful as negotiations continued into the spring of 1919.  At this
critical juncture many observers feared that the situation in Germany fostered a sense of 
hopelessness among the population that could devolve into a state of Communism or anarchy. 
a secret report made to the British Embassy about the status of Germany in early 1919 found two 
types of peoples in the nation: those who are afraid of Communism or those who are convert
to Communism either as an inevitable evil or as a possible solution.  In February of 1919, 
Alonzo Taylor observed similar startling scenes: “The entire industrial population…
eight; and emaciation has proceeded to the point of lassitude and apathy, against which 
even the willing worker is hardly able to successfully contend.”  Taylor was equally concerne
with the rampant nature of crime ravaging the country.582   
Reports of the horrendous conditions in Germany had little effect on the Allies decision
to continue the armistice blockade.  In early March 1919, Hoover proposed a plan allowing 
Germany to purchase food from Allied sources.  The French government blocked the initiative.  
On March 5, a frustrated and concerned Hoover made a cursory report of his progress: “French
(are) still blocking food deliveries to Germany.  Situation is alarming.  Cables all show stat
ion.  Americans in Germany (are) being attacked.  My opinion, we are living on top of a 
volcano.”   
Less than three weeks later on March 21, Hoover rationally explained why American-
based relief organizations were feeding Germany from four different points of view.  “From
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329 
 
point of an economist,” he related,” it is because there are seventy million people who must 
either produce or die…”  From an administrational perspective, Hoover reported that, “it is 
because famine breeds anarchy, anarchy is infectious, the infection of such a cesspool will 
jeopardize France and Britain, and will yet spread to the United States.”  As a representative of 
peace, 
ng 
 
 
 
e 
 
eam 
                                                          
Hoover explained that maintaining order and stability in Germany was crucial because 
without it there will be no one to sign peace with.  From a Reconstructionist position, Hoover 
argued that unless Germany was fed the nation could not resume industrial production.  Creati
a casual link between food, productivity, and general well being, he argued that without the 
resumption of manufacturing in Germany the economy would remain crippled and unable to
maintain order, governmental stability, or repay the damages it owed the world.583 
In April the British requested that Hoover increase the volume of food to the Germans. 
Later that month Lord Robert Cecil urged the Supreme Economic Council to take steps that 
would foster the resumption of normal trade with Germany and other European countries as soon
as possible.  On May 14, Hoover cabled President Wilson with a final warning concerning th
future of Germany without Allied relief.  “The margins on which the German people must live
(on) from now until the harvest are so small,” Hoover reported, “that any cessation of the str
of food, even for a short time, will bring the most wholesale loss of life.”  Without assistance, 
Hoover predicted that military occupation would be necessary in order to save Europe.584  
Allied restrictions on Germany ended with the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles on 
July 9, 1919.  As relief began reaching the beleaguered nation it appeared that permanent 
political damage had accompanied personal privation.  “The delay of food supplies (over the) 
four months following the armistice promise was not only immoral, but inhumane, (and) it 
 p. 42. 
ed by 
583 Lochner, Herbert Hoover and Germany, p. 38.  Loc cit,
584 Lochner, Herbert Hoover and Germany, p. 44-45.  The process of relief proposed by the British was slow
the delaying actions of the French.  Loc cit, p. 45. 
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sowed (the) dragon’s teeth for another war,” Hoover recalled years later, “It made it doubtful t
Germany could be saved from Communism.”  Although more than 1,215,216 tons of food 
valued at $282,421,665 were delivered during the armistice, the food outlook in Germany after 
Versailles was grim.
hat 
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nd immense: “Our 
hundre   The 
 relief 
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established the Supreme Council of Supply and Relief to deal with questions of food, finance and 
the shipping of resources in relation to the transportation of food supplies to struggling nations.  
                                                          
585 
The Brussels Agreement created in March of 1919 allowed Germany to purchase food 
supplies under specific restrictions before the final lifting of the Allied blockade.  Once in place, 
Hoover was charged with finding, buying, and shipping 1,800,000 tons of food to Germany
Upon receiving authorization, he released a vast stock of food stored at Brussels, Rotterdam, an
Antwerp without receiving initial payment.  In total the entire food reserve of the CRB was 
diverted to the Germans.  Hoover reported that the impact was immediate a
ds of thousands of tons stored in ports poured like manna over all (of) Germany.”
speed of reaction by the Americans astonished even the German press who interpreted the
of the nation without payment as a mark of confidence in the newly formed Ebert government.  
After the blockade was lifted the American Friends Service Committee, staffed by Quakers, 
handled the relief of Germany.  Hoover recognized that the “Friends” provided an invaluable 
service by organizing and operating canteens and dispensing $6,728,989 in assistance.  T
newly formed American Relief Administration (ARA) provided additional relief to the Germ
Under the leadership of Hoover the organization provided $34,271,649 in aid to Germany.586   
Shortly after the armistice it became evident that a major international food problem was
eminent in 1919.  In an attempt to combat hunger the Allies and the US in early January 1919 
 of 1922, believing that their services were need more in Russia. Loc cit, p. 3:335.  Loc cit, p. 3:340. 
585 Hoover, An American Epic, p. 3:85.  Loc cit, p. 3:333. 
586 Hoover, An American Epic, p. 3:86.  Loc cit, p. 3:87.  Loc cit, p. 3:334-335.  The Friends withdrew from 
Germany in July
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Headed by Hoover and staffed by representatives from France, Britain, and Italy, the council
estimated that $400,000,000 in relief was r
 
equired to ration starving peoples for the rest of the 
winter. e.  
 
 
 
uld then be 
aser to friends in Europe where the food could be obtained from ARA 
wareho  to 
l was 
  At the same time Hoover had a strategy in mind for an American based relief initiativ
On January 25, Hoover wrote to Wilson with the details of a proposed U.S. Relief 
Administration.  With a previously secured funding base of $105,000,000, the administration
would coordinate the distribution of foodstuffs required by any country.  To maintain autonomy, 
Hoover demanded that the program not be placed under the control of the Allied Supreme 
Council of Supply and Relief.  A day earlier on January 24, the Congress passed the European 
Famine Relief Bill with a budget of $100,000,000 earmarked for direct European assistance.  On
February 24, Wilson drafted the executive order establishing the ARA.587 
Working as a logical progression from previously organized initiatives of relief 
(including the CRB), the ARA inherited warehouses that its predecessors had established 
throughout Europe.  The process of supplying food to Europe through the ARA was unique from 
previous efforts managed by Hoover.  In the process of relief the administration sold food drafts
to individuals through American banks in denominations of ten to fifty dollars that co
sent by the purch
uses.  Under ARA administration a total of $24,302,916 in food drafts were sold
Europe.  Beyond the sale of provisions, the ARA held a series of public dinners under the title 
“The Invisible Guest.”  The most successful was a New York benefit that in addition to selling 
1000 tickets at $1000 each also raised over $1,000,000 in pledges.  When the pledge tota
                                                          
587 No author listed.  “V. The International Food Problem.”  Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 3, 
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announced for the dinner American oil magnate John D. Rockefeller, Jr. announced that he 
would bring the total up to $3,300,000.588 
Similar to his experiences with the CRB, securing stable funding for the ARA was a 
constant challenge for Herbert Hoover.  The signing of the Versailles Treaty marked a shift in
American foreign policy towards Europe that had an immediate impact on the ARA.  Un
Congressional directive on either July 1, 1919 or upon the signing of the Versailles Treaty the 
authority of the US Treasury to make loans to Europe under the Europea
 
der 
n Famine Relief Bill 
would tons 
for 
y 
re 
come to an end.  The sudden privatization of the administration threatened the 17,585 
of supplies en route to Europe.  For many the post-war work of providing food relief in Europe 
was just beginning.  On July 1, Hoover reported that although the ARA had received request 
aid to 2,500,000 children along with an additional 3,950,000 expectant mothers and orphans in 
relief canteens that demanded continued attention.  Advisors to President Wilson echoed 
concerns over the stability of Europe and its potential spillover into the United States.  If stabilit
initiatives failed, Wilson’s chief economic advisors feared in May 1919 that a serious business 
and industrial depression would result in America fomenting industrial and political 
revolutions.589   
Beyond the prospects of relief Hoover was deeply concerned with the financial 
capabilities of Germany and Austria to rebuild after the peace.  In a press statement released on 
June 7, Hoover questioned how they would be able to pay indemnity and at the same time secu
credit for raw materials and food imports under a commission whose duty it is to secure 
maximum reparations.  Food combined with credit to purchase goods overseas was the solution 
                                                          
588 Hoover, An American Epic, p. 3:250.  Loc cit, p. 3:256-257.  Hoover himself often spoke at such benefits raising 
money for the ARA.   
t, p. 3:242. Hogan, The U.S. and the problem of 589 Hoover, An American Epic, p. 3:236.  Loc cit, p. 3:249.  Loc ci
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to European restructuring.  According to Hoover if such finances could be provided, Europ
should be self-supporting within a year.  Without credit and food relief the guarantees of basic 
rights and freedoms in Europe were at risk.  In a memorandum sent to Wilson on July 3, Hoov
reported that the problem of social ferment and class-consciousness was the most difficult to 
solve.  Because of the suffering already faced throughout much of Europe the tumult of 
Socialism and Communism, “has embraced to itself the claim to speak for all the downtrodd
to alone bespeak human sympathy and to alone present remedies…”
e 
er 
en, 
rol 
 
f that amount, $57,782,118 was applied 
to Euro RA 
, 
en 
s.  
at famine conditions due to underproduction and a lack 
greatly ameliorated.  Beyond the ARA and the U.S. 
grain c f 
 7, Hoover declared that outside of a few dozen 
590 
Although Congressional funding ended with the peace, the grain corporation created 
under the wartime US Food Administration was extended to Europe and placed under the cont
of the ARA to discharge its surplus of American foodstuffs.  From the sale of provisions the
corporation generated $226,384,291 in excess profits.  O
pe while another $18,662,180 was dedicated to Russian relief.  Over four years the A
offered the populations of Europe foodstuffs in four different packages containing flour, beans
milk, and a fourth item (bacon, cottonseed oil, or corned beef) valued at either $10 or $50.  Wh
sales halted in June of 1923 to value of food supplied to Europe totaled $24,302,916.  From that 
amount $14,417,510 went to Russian relief.591 
Despite the efforts of the ARA, the international food problem continued into the 1920
Nevertheless, in 1920 it was reported th
of adequate transportation facilities were 
orporation, the American Red Cross announced in 1920 that it had set aside a fund o
$30,000,000 for European and Russian relief.  Funding and relief totals still fell below what was 
necessary to assist Europe however.  On January
                                                          
590 O’Brien, Two Peacemakers in Paris, p. 159.  Loc cit, p. 199. 
591 Hoover, An American Epic, p. 3:261.  Loc cit, p. 3:254.  Loc cit, p. 3:255. 
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cities in Central and Southern Europe the continent could not feed itself.  In a January 12 
appearance before the House Ways and Means Committee, Hoover reported that although the
United States was spending $7,000,000 per month to feed 3,00,000 children in impoverished 
Europe the relief was not enough.  In supporting Treasury Secretary Glass’ recommendation of
$150,000,000 appropriation for Europe, Hoover predicted that the granting of such aid
starving cities in Central Europe would “build up security for its $10,000,000,000 (loaned) 
abroad.”  Assistance provided by the ARA in 1920 increasingly spread to Eastern Europe and 
Russia.  In battling typhus, famine, and other problem
 
 a 
 to 
s in Russia the ARA committed a total of 
g 
thought to be the defining moment of the century, 33 countries mobilized 70 million men in the 
                                                          
over $1,000,000,000 between 1921 and 1923.  During this period Hoover even went as far as 
selling a percentage of the 1922 American wheat crop to the Bolsheviks, a group whom he 
would not deal with under any other circumstances.592 
From an original plan in the summer of 1919 to provide relief to children in twelve 
countries the ARA quickly expanded its efforts.  Under Hoover the administration distributed 
19,000,000 tons of food, clothing, and other supplies valued at $3,500,000,000 between 1919 
and 1923.  Public support for both the CRB and the ARA were critical to their successes.  Durin
its existence, 47 institutions contributed $29,556,071.90 to the ARA.  Combining charity with 
volunteer work of many varieties the administration estimated that approximately 7,000,000 
individuals contributed to the effort.593 
The Contributions of Herbert Hoover 
World War I had a devastating effect on the European continent.  In what was then 
592 No author listed.  “IV. The International Food Problem.”  Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 3, 
Supplement. (Sept. 1920): 19-20, p. 19.  Hoover, An American Epic, p. 3:250-252.  Hawley, Ellis W. (Ed.).  Herbert 
to), 1975), 46.  Hoover, An American Epic, p. 3:257-258. 
Hoover as Secretary of Commerce.  (Iowa City, IA: University of Iowa Press, 1974), p. 133.  
593 Wilson, Joan Hoff.  Herbert Hoover: Forgotten Progressive. (Little, Brown, and Company (Boston and 
Toron
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Great War.  In the 1,564 days of conflict, 20 million were wounded with another 15 million 
disabled.  Beyond combatant deaths an additional 20 million civilians died in World War I.  
f, 
e, and 
d adapt to circumstances.  To the Belgian, 
French duals 
llion 
 
l state 
ed 
B 
                                                          
Thanks in large part to CRB relief efforts the death rate as a percentage of the total population in 
Belgium totaled 0.5 percent.  Applying his personal beliefs in cooperation to the task of relie
Herbert Hoover set precedence for his future work in government as chairman of the 
commission.  In Belgian relief, Hoover demonstrated his partiality for volunteer professionals 
like himself and through his administrational efforts proved his ability to recruit, organiz
retain these experts in promoting a common goal.594 
 Efficient management of critical resources in a multitude of dangerous environments 
framed Hoover’s abilities to perform under pressure an
, British, and US governments whom directly funded relief and the millions of indivi
who made private contributions, the CRB was answerable for the honest and efficient use of the 
resources at its disposal.  In total the committee managed resources valued at nearly one bi
dollars, a sum equivalent to the net debt of the United States in the years prior to World War I.  
Bold actions and quick decision making directly contributed to the success of the CRB.  As the
director of the committee, Hoover made executive decisions that at times risked his own personal 
safety.  An official of the British Foreign Office once described the CRB as a “piratica
organization for benevolence.”  While operating as a private entity, the committee perform
functions and enjoyed prerogatives that were usually reserved for official state bodies.  The CR
itself was a neutral entity flying under its own colors and operated under its own fleet between 
594 Broadberry, Stephen and Harrison, Mark (Ed.).  The Economics of World War I.  (London: Cambridge University 
tarism and War Organization During the Great War, p. Press, 2005), 35.  Loc cit, p. 27.  Cuff, The Ideology of Volun
359. 
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the opposing lines, but in the pursuit of duties it created frequent controversy for both 
belligerents.595 
 
lic 
 
 Belgian death rate to nearly one half of that in New York City 
the com ched in 
gg 
 
Hoover understood the importance of his work and strove to make sure that the CRB did 
not fail.  To the people of Belgium and Northern France who had been left defenseless and 
starving by the war the CRB was a volunteer champion striving with all its power to save the 
population.  While the commission was an international organization its founders and principal 
directors were American.  Hoover and those associated with him in the direction of the 
committee were private citizens from the United States and in their work looked first to their 
fellow countrymen for moral and material support.  During World War I the American pub
itself viewed the CRB as an American enterprise.596   
Hoover’s efforts were equally appreciated within the commission itself.  In a letter
written on February 16, 1916, Horace Fletcher marveled at the CRB’s one-percent administrative 
costs compared to an average of 60 percent for similar philanthropic endeavors.  Fletcher 
commented that in reducing the
mission was “unparalleled” in the history of philanthropy and was only approa
regards to engineer-efficiency by the recently-completed Panama Canal project.  Vernon Kello
added that much of Hoover’s success as a philanthropist was due to his application of 
engineering methods to the work of relief by procedurally ascertaining facts, determining 
participants, formulating a strategy, and the mobilizing instant action.  According to Kellogg, 
“Many of us believe that Hoover has pioneered the path to a new form of philanthropic action
with something of a new end to be attained.  His way involves the application in large relief 
                                                          
595 Lochner, Herbert Hoover and Germany, p. 11.  Ibid, 10. 
596 Lochner, Herbert Hoover and Germany, p. 11. 
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measures of the new methods of engineering science (with) the methods of great busines
administration and executive committee.”
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hildren, and the helpless.”  Effective government, 
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tredge believed that Hoover “did 
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597 
Kellogg also observed that there was much more to the chairman’s work than an engineer 
attacking a problem.  He believed that the political results of Hoover’s work were ancillary to his 
life saving activities.  During the armistice period Hoover fought bitter prejudices in order to 
feed Germany and Austria.  While many considered him “pro-German,” in reality the chairm
was in Kellogg’s opinion, “pro-women, c
business organization, and knowledge of economics and sociology were the instrumentali
Hoover believed should be used to advance human service and expand the spiritual life of 
nations.  Kellogg observed that the kind of humanitarian work Hoover did not only saved live
and ameliorated suffering but also created domestic and international good will.  Hoover 
believed that in places where millions were engaged in a common effort to help the less fortuna
the result was undoubtedly the advancement of brotherhood and a development of responsib
from one person to another.598 
Between 1914 and 1919, Hoover assisted in the coordination of relief totaling 
$5,234,028,208.56.  Under his management the people of Europe received 33,841,307 tons 
supplies provided by America mostly.  CRB delegate T.B. Kit
save Belgium; he saved the population from famine by getting them food, he saved their 
souls from despair by brining to them the ever-present assurance that the world recognized
justice of their cause and that the world would right their wrongs.”  The echoes of Hoover’
humanitarian efforts during the war era reverberated throughout the rest of his public career.  In 
and agenda, November 1915-November 1918. Kellogg, Herbert Hoover As His Friends See Him, p. 7.  Loc cit, p. 
 
597 CRB NY Regular Meeting Minutes, Addendum Letter, pp. 1, Friday, February, 25, 1916.  Herbert Hoover 
Presidential Library Archives (microfilm): Commission for Relief in Belgium, New York office committee minutes 
15.  Kellogg added that Hoover’s relief program included components of sound economic and social restoration with
immediate needs of charity.   
598 Kellogg, Herbert Hoover As His Friends See Him, p. 12.  Loc cit, p. 15. 
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June 1928 the New York Times commented that Hoover was “one of the few successful 
businessmen who turned to politics and government in the prime of his life, introducing methods 
of business efficiency, standardization and economy into public office, and encountering success
in politics comparable with his success in business.”  A decade after the CRB retired King Albert
promised that “Belgium will never forget the help given by Mr. Hoover to (its) people
in the throes of the Great War.  He was the soul of (our) relief amidst the greatest political, 
maritime, and economic difficulties.”
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ndividualism.  What wartime administrators like 
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ice, 
ted the structure of 
military sed on 
                                                          
599 
 In its achievements the CRB simultaneously demonstrated the value of Hoove
commitments to voluntarism, cooperation, and i
 wanted most of all was to have the utmost freedom of flexibility in action.  Viewing 
themselves as representatives of the moral and technically superior expert in public serv
administrators believed that they should be trusted with wide-ranging delegated authority.  As 
the head of Belgian relief, the ARA, and the U.S. Food Administration, Hoover projected a 
romantic view of the professional man, a common cultural theme of the period and a central 
component of the promise of voluntarism.  In this manner it was possible for the character, 
integrity, social consciousness, and proud individualism of the gentleman to unite with the 
efficiency and technical virtuosity of the modern manager.600 
Working under the guise of voluntarism, Hoover sketched his own model of the efficient 
organization.  His personal views on the appropriate forms of administrational leadership 
reinforced his image as the embodiment of voluntarism.  Hoover rejec
 organizations and the modern industrial corporation in favor of an organization ba
his private experiences in mining/consulting.  In managing relief during World War I, Hoover 
s 
. 2. 
ar Organization During the Great War, p. 371.  Loc cit, p. 359. 
599 Surface and Bland, American Food in the World War and Reconstruction Period, p. ix.  Kittredge, Californian
with Hoover in Europe, p. 4:159.  New York Times, June 15, 1928, p. 10.  New York Times, January 20, 1929, p
600 Cuff, The Ideology of Voluntarism and W
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chose a professional over a bureaucratic form of organization.  Throughout his years in public 
service, Hoover employed this same strategy to other situations, including economic crises 
encountered as president.    Voluntarism was also critical to the placement of private citizens
public positions and for the countering of conflict of interest charges aimed at Hoover and other 
“dollar per year men” working for American wartime institutions.  The structure and 
management of emergency administration also required justification, and, in keeping with the 
ideal of voluntarism, Hoover and his staff argued for administrative informality and unified 
authority against congressmen who demanded detailed statutory prescriptions, stri
 in 
ct 
accoun
 
 
 ARA 
over called American individualism—the use of voluntary 
decentr
g 
                                                          
tability, and committee-based action.601 
The structure of voluntarism as a mode of thought reflected in fundamental ways the
structure of American mobilization as a unique system of war organization.  Hoover’s 
remarkable war career confirmed the impact of voluntarism in practice.  He saw the world, and 
America in particular as standing at the crossroads of history after World War I—one path 
leading to higher standards of living through decentralized techno-corporate organization and 
cooperative individualism; the other leading to socialism, fascism, syndicalism or communism 
through the dehumanized collective personality that destroyed individual initiative and retarded
progress.  Writing in 1922, Hoover commented that socialism necessitated a “bureaucracy of the 
entire population” and destroyed the economic initiative of the citizenry.  The CRB and the
proved the successes of what Ho
alization for carrying out nationally coordinated programs.602  
For his efforts, Hoover received resounding praise and thanks from a multitude of 
sources.  On such occasions he was reluctant to receive commendations for his efforts.  Durin
601 Cuff, The Ideology of Voluntarism and War Organization During the Great War, p. 359.  Loc cit, p. 362-363. 
 War Organization During the Great War, p. 359.  Wilson, Herbert 602 Cuff, The Ideology of Voluntarism and
Hoover: Forgotten Progressive, p. 56-57. 
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the war, Hoover respectfully refused King Albert of Belgium’s proposal to confer him Hoover
the highest order of decoration.  In Britain, appreciations for the successful coordination of relief 
were expressed as the conflict pressed on.  In April 1917, Lord Eustace Percy of the British 
Foreign Office wrote to Hoover that “what I have (learned) in these years I have (learned) from
my association with you…this is not a subject I can dilate upon—I have not the words.”  Percy
added, “I have watched a great work accomplished by a great American—with a concentration 
of purpose and a devotion to duty (that) I cannot forget.  I hope the years to come will give
some opportunity of showing the respect—and something more—that I feel.”
 
 
 
 me 
 Allied blockade preceding the signing of the peace.  German 
authori s in 
 
ing, 
e candidate for the presidency.  
Through his earlier work in engineering and more recent efforts in the direction of the CRB, 
                                                          
603  
Central power belligerents also expressed gratitude towards the humanitarian efforts of 
Hoover.  In Germany, Hoover was respected for his cunning during the conflict and for his 
commitment to lifting the
ties were impressed by his astute dealings with authorities and considerable shrewdnes
obtaining the maximum about of food and supplies for the available funds.  They also recognized
that Hoover knew the markets and the ways of speculators, and he did not hesitate to engage in 
manipulations to prevent an undue rise in food prices because of the heavy purchases made by 
the CRB.  Moreover, Hoover was praised by the Germans for his organization of food relief to 
the nation after the armistice.  In 1928, Baron von Hunefeld proposed a toast to Hoover, say
“You, sir, were the first after the war to give food to the German people.  It shall never be 
forgotten in the Fatherland.”604 
By 1920, Hoover enjoyed the reputation of an outstanding “engineer-economist-
organizer.”  The same year his name was mentioned as a viabl
ivilization, p. 4:25.  Lochner, Herbert Hoover and Germany, p. 67. 
603 Hoover, An American Epic, p. 1:443. 
604 Dorfman, The Economic Mind in American C
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’s career exemplified a combination of self-reliance and practical idealism, of the self 
made man and the efficient humanitarian.  Most of his presidential campaign support came from
journalists and public figures rather than party figures.  This factor played a significant rol
the Republican nomination of Warren G. Harding over of Hoover.  Nevertheless, there can be 
little doubt that there was widespread public sentiment in favor of the former chairman of the 
CRB for president in 1920.  Respect and admiration for Hoover crossed partisan boundaries in 
the early 1920s.  Among those to praise his e
n D. Roosevelt.  During the mid-1920s, Hoover employed ideals voluntarism, coo
capitalism, and individualism to his work as the US Secretary of Commerce.  While holding the 
position he continued to pay specific attention to Europe, especially in regards to economic 
recovery and stability.605 
Behind the organizational talent and business-leadership acumen was another side of
Hoover that few ever saw.  To those that knew him best there was generous and passionate m
behind the cool and sometimes implacable public persona.  Privately behind the scenes Hoover
dedicated his personal wealth and risked his own fortune to assure the success of the CRB.  In 
1914, Hoover signed a personal note of indebtedness for $600,000 to keep the commission goin
during the early phases of operation.  Two years later he was prepared to pledge his entire 
personal fortune—worth more than a million dollars—as security against any liability to his New
York advisory committee.  In addition, Hoover paid thousands of dollars out of his own pocket
for the living expenses of his CRB staff.  Throughout his chairmanship of the commission 
Hoover made no mention of these personal contributions.606   
ivilization, p. 4:26.  Loc cit, p. 4:25. 605 Dorfman, The Economic Mind in American C
606 Nash, The Life of Herbert Hoover, p. 2:374. 
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While outwardly appearing as a man of cold logic and unswerving purpose, Hoover was 
“more t orked 
 in 
 
ely 
 
n illustration of 
what su ans for 
                                                          
han a single-minded, hard-driving executive with a will of iron.”  No one who w
with him in those days, Lord Eustace Percy later recalled, could overlook his “emotional 
humanity” and “personal affectionateness.”  At times Hoover’s emotions came through—as in 
the case when he and Brand Whitlock made their first visit to a Brussels CRB relief station
late 1914.  Reportedly the episode was traumatic for Hoover.  Particularly among children his
unsentimental exterior dissolved quickly.607 
Hoover’s experience coordinating World War I relief edified his commitment to 
management through cooperation and voluntarism.  “Five years ago Hoover was comparativ
unknown,” journalist William C. Edgar wrote in the early 1920s, “today kings and rulers delight 
to honor him, and nations justly (praise) him as their preserver from hunger…he is the 
embodiment of the efficient American in achievements, but not only through his genius for 
organization, his inexhaustible capacity for work, his extraordinary grasp of perplexing and 
intricate problems and his magnetic leadership of men that he accomplishes wonders.”  While
serving as the Secretary of Commerce, a complimentary editorial appeared in the September 25, 
1925 edition of the New York Times, expressing that the story of the CRB “is a
ch a directing mind as that of Herbert Hoover can do when left to work out its pl
human betterment without political interference and when assisted by men and women of such 
competence and loyalty as surrounded him in this adventure on an earth-scale for relief of the 
neediest.”  In its final remarks the editorial concluded, “Whatever Mr. Hoover may do…he may 
have the consciousness that he has written the brightest chapter than any one man has written in 
the history of the war.”608     
607 Nash, The Life of Herbert Hoover, p. 2:372. 
608 Nash, The Life of Herbert Hoover, p. 3:503.  Loc cit, p. 3:444. 
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The CRB in Retrospect 
The accomplishments of the CRB after four and a half years of relief were also 
staggering.  “For four years it fed ten million people (and) brought them through withou
starvation,” Will Irwin concluded about the commission, “It maintained a stream of 350,000,000 
pounds of foodstuffs a month.  It carried the destitute—eventually about 55 percent of the 
Belgians and northern French—largely on profits from the affluent.”  After the armistice t
CRB continued its work for another six mon
t 
he 
ths at the request of the Belgian government.  
During
 
 
f the nation: “Let us express it once more, fully conscious of 
the serv
hat 
 
l 
 
with wartime philanthropy marveled at the fact that while in the past public relief on a large scale 
 this time Irwin observed that, “the price of all food stuffs (were) so much lower in 
Belgium (than) in other countries that the authorities feared international jealousy.”  In his 
memoirs, Hoover estimated that under his guidance relief organizations both during and after the
war shipped 33,841,307 tons of American food and supplies abroad valued at $5,234,000,000. 
On Christmas Eve 1919, French Foreign Minister Briand M. Edmond Labbe expressed his 
gratitude towards the commission o
ice that the CRB rendered to our populations during the interminable duration of this 
horrible war.  The CRB has given us the means of resisting physiological deterioration, and w
is of even greater value, of fighting against the weakening of our morale.”609  
Observers commented that if the term “benevolent neutrality” had any meaning 
whatsoever it was never more clearly manifested than in the work of the CRB.  Less than a year
into operations, Mable Hyde Kittredge recognized that the use of scientific organization as a too
of good will distinguished the commission from other charitable organizations.  Many associated
was commonly associated with extravagance and scandal the CRB was alone synonymous with 
                                                          
609 Lochner, Herbert Hoover and Germany, p. 26.  Wilson, Herbert Hoover: Forgotten Progressive, p. 46.  This 
estimation does not include the coordination of European supplies.  Hoover, An American Epic, p. 1:441. 
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economy and efficiency.  T.B. K
nothing less than “an absolute miracle of scientific organization.”  He added that this was the 
first time in history that an entire people were fed by a private organization.  Statistics 
notwithstanding, Hoover himself was especially pleased by the fact that 2,500,000 children came
out of the war in better health than normal.  The New York Times agreed that the CRB’s work 
was monumental.  Under the headline A Noble Achievement, the paper predicted that the 
commission was destined to be historic.
ittredge believed that the efforts of the commission were 
 
o 
t 
 
 
. Kittredge recalled in 
1920 that many people continued to wonder whether the enormous efforts made by America 
were necessary.  While critics grudgingly admitted that the work was praiseworthy and well 
done they persisted that it was none of America’s business and that those involved should have 
left Europe alone to deal with the problem.  Kittredge countered that the demographics and the 
population concentration of Belgium demanded action by outsiders.  As a nation that imported 
over three-fourths of its necessities in exchange for export products the Belgian population was 
                                                          
610 
After nearly four years of work the results of the commission’s program of imports was 
impressive.  Between 1914 and 1919 the CRB imported 3,896,180 tons of relief supplies t
Belgium valued at $641,056,693.69.  During the same period a total of 1,091,879 tons valued a
$220,283,550.52 were imported to Northern France.  Combined with an armistice program of
186,372 tons imported into Germany, the grand total of relief shipped by the CRB was 5,174,431
tons valued at $927,681,485.08.611 
Throughout its existence the CRB had its share of detractors.  T.B
610 Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 3.  Kittredge, Taking Care of Belgium, p. 2.  
Kittredge, The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 4.  Kellogg, Herbert Hoover As His Friends See 
Him, p. 9.  New York Times, July 24, 1921, p. 26. 
$759,159,607.19.  Loc cit, p. 142.  Of that total the various state 
,859.82.  Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, p. 
611 Surface and Bland, American Food in the World War and Reconstruction Period, p. 55.  To purchase relief 
supplies the CRB acquired a basic capital stock of 
organizations provided $6,051
2:309. 
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in serious need of assistance.612 
 The experience of the comm  the war convinced them that their 
s 
a 
ation acted as beggars receiving charity.  With heart-filled sincerity Belgians declared, “You 
e 
ifficult to tell.  While many were aware of the commission’s treaties with the Allies and 
5,000,000 tons of relief there was much more to the experience.  “The details have yet to be told 
r will be told.”  Through this project we now 
 understanding of the Commission for Relief in Belgium.  
ission’s volunteers during
work was of vital importance.  Throughout the Belgians struggle to survive they were 
perpetually grateful for the commission’s work.  Edward Eyre Hunt remembered that there wa
“something almost ritualistic in the reiteration of their gratitude.”  In his experience they never 
n
have saved our lives.  Without you, what would have become of us and our poor Belgium?”613   
For countless reasons Vernon Kellogg believed that complete story of the CRB would b
d
Germany and tremendous efforts made on behalf of its volunteers to collect the charity of the 
world and secure governmental funding in order to break the steel ring around Belgium with 
in full,” Kellogg concluded, “probably they neve
have a better 614
                                                          
612 Kittredge, Californians with Hoover in Europe, p. 1:7.  Belgium was the world’s most densely populated country 
e at nearly 700 people per square mile.   at the tim
613 Hunt, War Bread, p. 265. 
614 Kellogg, Herbert Hoover As His Friends See Him, p. 8.  Loc cit, p. 9. 
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